From a4e33f192fbf5aa7ac6196b8ea1fcabc8832bd1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: weichen Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 04:08:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Serialize account credential and session changes Why: Concurrent password changes, recovery key reissue, and session admission could accept retired credentials or omit rejected audits. Evidence: Local Go vet and full tests passed; real PostgreSQL store suite, deterministic interleavings, and two-process contention passed with SELF receipts. Impact: Account writes and session admission serialize per owner; stale sessions fail closed; checked rejections carry an audit row. Refs: Agent-System-Dev #486; Agent-System-Backend #185; merge queue Issue #518 --- internal/app/app.go | 2 +- internal/store/account_process_crash_test.go | 16 +- .../account_security_integration_test.go | 84 ++++++ .../store/account_serialization_pg_test.go | 167 +++++++++++ internal/store/account_two_process_pg_test.go | 59 +++- internal/store/account_tx.go | 50 ++-- internal/store/auth.go | 36 ++- internal/store/dialect.go | 8 + internal/store/login_keys.go | 261 ++++++++++-------- 9 files changed, 529 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/store/account_serialization_pg_test.go diff --git a/internal/app/app.go b/internal/app/app.go index 0effc9b..fe050c6 100644 --- a/internal/app/app.go +++ b/internal/app/app.go @@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ func VerifySystemIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir, instanceID, dbref string) (int, e } func cliActor() string { - return fmt.Sprintf("uid:%d", os.Getuid()) + return fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid()) } func accountInstanceID() string { diff --git a/internal/store/account_process_crash_test.go b/internal/store/account_process_crash_test.go index 4ec21c5..61fb4fe 100644 --- a/internal/store/account_process_crash_test.go +++ b/internal/store/account_process_crash_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package store import ( "bufio" + "errors" "fmt" "os" "os/exec" @@ -27,9 +28,8 @@ func TestAccountPasswordSurvivesProcessTermination(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - if err := st.Close(); err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } + // Keep the database connection and process alive at the signal point; + // a graceful close would only test reopen, not abrupt termination. fmt.Println("U7_COMMITTED") select {} } @@ -82,7 +82,15 @@ func TestAccountPasswordSurvivesProcessTermination(t *testing.T) { if err := child.Process.Signal(tc.signal); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - _ = child.Wait() + waitErr := child.Wait() + var exitErr *exec.ExitError + if !errors.As(waitErr, &exitErr) { + t.Fatalf("child was not terminated by %s: %v", tc.name, waitErr) + } + status, ok := exitErr.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus) + if !ok || !status.Signaled() || status.Signal() != tc.signal { + t.Fatalf("child ended without requested %s: %v", tc.name, waitErr) + } reopened, err := OpenExistingSQLite(path) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) diff --git a/internal/store/account_security_integration_test.go b/internal/store/account_security_integration_test.go index 1dd18e6..8359ad5 100644 --- a/internal/store/account_security_integration_test.go +++ b/internal/store/account_security_integration_test.go @@ -101,3 +101,87 @@ func TestRevokeAllRefusesMissingOwnerWithoutCredential(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("orphan credential rows=%d err=%v", n, err) } } + +func TestActivePasswordChangeRevokesUnusedRecoveryKey(t *testing.T) { + s := activeAccount(t) + key, _, err := s.IssueLoginKey("ada", LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "admin", 0) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + session, err := s.CreateSession("ada") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + hash, err := HashPassword("replacement-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := s.ChangeUserPasswordActive("ada", "old-password", hash, session); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, _, err := s.RedeemLoginKey(key); err == nil { + t.Fatal("unused recovery key issued before active password change still redeems") + } +} + +func TestRejectedActiveChangeIsAudited(t *testing.T) { + s := activeAccount(t) + h, err := HashPassword("next-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + err = s.ChangeUserPasswordActive("ada", "incorrect-current-password", h, "") + if !errors.Is(err, ErrBadCredentials) { + t.Fatalf("expected bad credentials, got %v", err) + } + count, err := s.CountAudit("ada", "rejected") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if count != 1 { + t.Fatalf("rejected checked account mutation has %d rejected audit rows, want1", count) + } +} + +func TestDelayedOldVersionSessionIsRejectedAtUse(t *testing.T) { + s := activeAccount(t) + _, ver, ok := s.VerifyLoginWithVersion("ada", "old-password") + if !ok { + t.Fatal("healthy verification missing") + } + h, err := HashPassword("new-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := s.ApplyPasswordChange(AccountWrite{Owner: "ada", PasswordHash: h}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + // Represents an insert racing after the replacement's earlier DELETE. + token := "sess_private_stale_fixture" + _, err = s.db.Exec(s.q(`INSERT INTO sessions(token_hash,owner,created_at,expires_at,last_seen_at,scope,auth_version) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`), + hashKey(token), "ada", nowISO(), time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), nowISO(), SessionScopeFull, ver) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, _, ok := s.SessionInfo(token); ok { + t.Fatal("session carrying the retired auth_version became authorized") + } +} + +func TestActivePasswordChangePreservesCurrentVersionedSession(t *testing.T) { + s := activeAccount(t) + token, err := s.CreateSession("ada") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + h, err := HashPassword("new-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := s.ChangeUserPasswordActive("ada", "old-password", h, token); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if owner, scope, ok := s.SessionInfo(token); !ok || owner != "ada" || scope != SessionScopeFull { + t.Fatal("active change did not retain its current full session") + } +} diff --git a/internal/store/account_serialization_pg_test.go b/internal/store/account_serialization_pg_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..436c086 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/store/account_serialization_pg_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +package store + +import ( + "context" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// The trigger holds a transaction after its authorization read. A second +// connection must wait for that owner's lock before replacing credentials. +func holdPGAccountWrite(t *testing.T, s *Store, table, event, suffix string) func() { + t.Helper() + lock := "u7_account_" + suffix + _, err := s.db.Exec(`CREATE FUNCTION u7_pause_account() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$ BEGIN PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(current_schema() || ':` + lock + `')); RETURN NEW; END $$`) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, err = s.db.Exec(`CREATE TRIGGER u7_pause_account BEFORE ` + event + ` ON ` + table + ` FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION u7_pause_account()`) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + conn, err := s.db.Conn(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := conn.ExecContext(context.Background(), `SELECT pg_advisory_lock(hashtext(current_schema() || ':`+lock+`'))`); err != nil { + conn.Close() + t.Fatal(err) + } + released := false + release := func() { + if !released { + released = true + _, _ = conn.ExecContext(context.Background(), `SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(hashtext(current_schema() || ':`+lock+`'))`) + _ = conn.Close() + } + } + t.Cleanup(release) + return release +} + +func waitForPGAccountWrite(t *testing.T, s *Store, suffix string) { + t.Helper() + lock := "u7_account_" + suffix + deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + var n int + err := s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM pg_locks WHERE locktype='advisory' AND NOT granted + AND objid=(hashtext(current_schema() || ':` + lock + `')::bigint & 4294967295)::oid`).Scan(&n) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if n > 0 { + return + } + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatal("account write did not reach the deterministic PostgreSQL pause") +} + +func awaitPGAccountResult[T any](t *testing.T, done <-chan T) T { + t.Helper() + select { + case result := <-done: + return result + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("serialized account transaction did not finish") + var zero T + return zero + } +} + +func TestPGVerifiedSessionAndPasswordChangeSerialize(t *testing.T) { + s := activeAccount(t) + if s.Dialect() != "postgres" { + t.Skip("real PostgreSQL required") + } + _, version, ok := s.VerifyLoginWithVersion("ada", "old-password") + if !ok { + t.Fatal("initial login failed") + } + release := holdPGAccountWrite(t, s, "sessions", "INSERT", "session") + type sessionResult struct { + token string + err error + } + sessionDone := make(chan sessionResult, 1) + go func() { + token, err := s.CreateSessionVerified("ada", SessionScopeFull, time.Hour, version) + sessionDone <- sessionResult{token, err} + }() + waitForPGAccountWrite(t, s, "session") + hash, err := HashPassword("replacement-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + changeDone := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.ApplyPasswordChange(AccountWrite{Owner: "ada", PasswordHash: hash, Actor: "admin"}) + changeDone <- err + }() + select { + case err := <-changeDone: + t.Fatalf("replacement committed ahead of the in-flight verified session: %v", err) + case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond): + } + release() + session := awaitPGAccountResult(t, sessionDone) + if session.err != nil { + t.Fatal(session.err) + } + if err := awaitPGAccountResult(t, changeDone); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, _, ok := s.SessionInfo(session.token); ok { + t.Fatal("old verified session survived later password replacement") + } +} + +func TestPGRestrictedPasswordSetAndKeyReissueSerialize(t *testing.T) { + s := openTestStore(t) + if s.Dialect() != "postgres" { + t.Skip("real PostgreSQL required") + } + if err := s.CreateAccount("ada", "Ada", "", false); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + key, _, err := s.IssueLoginKey("ada", LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "admin", 0) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + token, _, err := s.RedeemLoginKey(key) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + hash, err := HashPassword("replacement-password") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + release := holdPGAccountWrite(t, s, "users", "UPDATE", "password") + setDone := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.CompleteSetPasswordChecked(token, hash) + setDone <- err + }() + waitForPGAccountWrite(t, s, "password") + issueDone := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, _, err := s.IssueLoginKey("ada", LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "admin", 0) + issueDone <- err + }() + select { + case err := <-issueDone: + t.Fatalf("key replacement committed ahead of the in-flight password set: %v", err) + case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond): + } + release() + if err := awaitPGAccountResult(t, setDone); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := awaitPGAccountResult(t, issueDone); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, _, ok := s.SessionInfo(token); ok { + t.Fatal("old restricted session survived password set and key reissue") + } +} diff --git a/internal/store/account_two_process_pg_test.go b/internal/store/account_two_process_pg_test.go index b281e9e..fea8054 100644 --- a/internal/store/account_two_process_pg_test.go +++ b/internal/store/account_two_process_pg_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package store import ( "bytes" + "context" "database/sql" "errors" "fmt" @@ -24,6 +25,9 @@ func TestAccountTwoProcessPostgresAdmission(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } defer st.Close() + if err := os.WriteFile(os.Getenv("U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_READY"), []byte("ready"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } for i := 0; i < 500; i++ { if _, err := os.Stat(barrier); err == nil { break @@ -96,14 +100,38 @@ func TestAccountTwoProcessPostgresAdmission(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } st.Close() + // Hold the shared admission point so both independent processes + // are demonstrably contending before either may commit. + lockKey := "bootstrap:first-admin" + if tc.mode == "create" { + lockKey = "account:same" + } + lockConn, err := admin.Conn(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer lockConn.Close() + if _, err := lockConn.ExecContext(context.Background(), `SELECT pg_advisory_lock(hashtext($1))`, lockKey); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + released := false + release := func() { + if !released { + released = true + _, _ = lockConn.ExecContext(context.Background(), `SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(hashtext($1))`, lockKey) + } + } + defer release() barrier := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "go") + readyDir := t.TempDir() var children [2]*exec.Cmd var logs [2]bytes.Buffer for i := range children { + readyPath := filepath.Join(readyDir, fmt.Sprintf("ready-%d", i)) cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestAccountTwoProcessPostgresAdmission$", "-test.v") cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_MODE="+tc.mode, "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_DSN="+dsn, "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_OWNER="+tc.owners[i], "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_ARTIFACTS="+artifacts, - "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_BARRIER="+barrier) + "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_BARRIER="+barrier, "U7_ACCOUNT_CHILD_READY="+readyPath) cmd.Stdout = &logs[i] cmd.Stderr = &logs[i] if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil { @@ -111,9 +139,38 @@ func TestAccountTwoProcessPostgresAdmission(t *testing.T) { } children[i] = cmd } + deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second) + for i := range children { + readyPath := filepath.Join(readyDir, fmt.Sprintf("ready-%d", i)) + for { + if _, err := os.Stat(readyPath); err == nil { + break + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + t.Fatalf("child %d never opened the shared database: %s", i, logs[i].String()) + } + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + } + } if err := os.WriteFile(barrier, []byte("go"), 0o600); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } + for { + var waiters int + err := admin.QueryRow(`SELECT count(*) FROM pg_locks WHERE locktype='advisory' AND NOT granted + AND objid=(hashtext($1)::bigint & 4294967295)::oid`, lockKey).Scan(&waiters) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if waiters >= 2 { + break + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + t.Fatalf("only %d of 2 child processes reached the shared admission lock: %s | %s", waiters, logs[0].String(), logs[1].String()) + } + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + } + release() wins, losses := 0, 0 for i, cmd := range children { if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil { diff --git a/internal/store/account_tx.go b/internal/store/account_tx.go index 561625b..88f72b1 100644 --- a/internal/store/account_tx.go +++ b/internal/store/account_tx.go @@ -104,6 +104,12 @@ func (s *Store) ApplyPasswordChange(w AccountWrite) (AccountOutcome, error) { if err != nil { return err } + if w.ExceptToken != "" { + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE sessions SET auth_version=(SELECT auth_version FROM users WHERE owner=?) WHERE owner=? AND token_hash=?`), + w.Owner, w.Owner, hashKey(w.ExceptToken)); err != nil { + return err + } + } out.OperationID = opID return nil }) @@ -204,6 +210,16 @@ func (s *Store) accountTx(w AccountWrite, fn func(*sql.Tx, string) error) error _ = tx.Rollback() } }() + if w.Owner != "" { + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, w.Owner); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if w.InstanceID == "" { + if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT instance_id FROM agent_system_identity`).Scan(&w.InstanceID); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return err + } + } if err := fn(tx, opID); err != nil { _ = tx.Rollback() committed = true @@ -218,10 +234,14 @@ func (s *Store) accountTx(w AccountWrite, fn func(*sql.Tx, string) error) error return err } if err := insertAudit(s, tx, w, opID, "success"); err != nil { + _ = tx.Rollback() + committed = true + s.recordRejected(w, opID) return err } if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { - s.recordRejected(w, opID) + // Commit may have reached the database even if the client lost its + // response. Recording a rejection here would assert an unknown outcome. return err } committed = true @@ -350,31 +370,3 @@ func (s *Store) CountAudit(owner, outcome string) (int, error) { err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT COUNT(1) FROM audit_events WHERE owner=? AND entry=? AND outcome=?`), owner, "account", outcome).Scan(&n) return n, err } - -// commitAccountMutation extends existing checked transactions without moving -// their authorization checks outside the transaction or replacing account_events. -func (s *Store) commitAccountMutation(tx *sql.Tx, w AccountWrite) error { - opID := newID("op") - if w.InstanceID == "" { - err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT instance_id FROM agent_system_identity`).Scan(&w.InstanceID) - if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { - return err - } - } - if s.accountFault != nil { - err := s.accountFault - _ = tx.Rollback() - s.recordRejected(w, opID) - return err - } - if err := insertAudit(s, tx, w, opID, "success"); err != nil { - _ = tx.Rollback() - s.recordRejected(w, opID) - return err - } - if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { - s.recordRejected(w, opID) - return err - } - return nil -} diff --git a/internal/store/auth.go b/internal/store/auth.go index 379c354..bb87030 100644 --- a/internal/store/auth.go +++ b/internal/store/auth.go @@ -313,17 +313,32 @@ func (s *Store) CreateSessionScoped(owner, scope string, ttl time.Duration) (str if ttl <= 0 { ttl = sessionTTL } - ver := 0 - _ = s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT auth_version FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner).Scan(&ver) raw := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil { return "", err } token := "sess_" + hex.EncodeToString(raw) exp := time.Now().Add(ttl) - _, err := s.db.Exec(s.q(`INSERT INTO sessions(token_hash,owner,created_at,expires_at,last_seen_at,scope,auth_version) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`), + tx, err := s.db.Begin() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + defer tx.Rollback() + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, owner); err != nil { + return "", err + } + var ver int + if err := tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT auth_version FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner).Scan(&ver); errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return "", ErrNotFound + } else if err != nil { + return "", err + } + _, err = tx.Exec(s.q(`INSERT INTO sessions(token_hash,owner,created_at,expires_at,last_seen_at,scope,auth_version) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`), hashKey(token), owner, nowISO(), exp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), nowISO(), scope, ver) - return token, err + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return token, tx.Commit() } // CreateSessionVerified 建会话并绑定期望认证版本：事务内重读账户版本，与密码验证 @@ -346,6 +361,9 @@ func (s *Store) CreateSessionVerified(owner, scope string, ttl time.Duration, ex return "", err } defer tx.Rollback() + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, owner); err != nil { + return "", err + } var ver int err = tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT auth_version FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner).Scan(&ver) if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { @@ -376,11 +394,17 @@ func (s *Store) SessionInfo(token string) (owner, scope string, ok bool) { return "", "", false } var exp string - err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT owner,expires_at,COALESCE(scope,'full') FROM sessions WHERE token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)). - Scan(&owner, &exp, &scope) + var sessionVersion, accountVersion int + err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT s.owner,s.expires_at,COALESCE(s.scope,'full'),s.auth_version,u.auth_version + FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.owner=s.owner WHERE s.token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)). + Scan(&owner, &exp, &scope, &sessionVersion, &accountVersion) if err != nil { return "", "", false } + if sessionVersion != accountVersion { + _, _ = s.db.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash=? AND auth_version=?`), hashKey(token), sessionVersion) + return "", "", false + } if expT, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, exp); err != nil || time.Now().After(expT) { s.db.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)) return "", "", false diff --git a/internal/store/dialect.go b/internal/store/dialect.go index 9bf2c84..5c54cea 100644 --- a/internal/store/dialect.go +++ b/internal/store/dialect.go @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ type dialect interface { // lockBootstrap 锁定首次管理员引导的「核验无用户→建号→激活 Key」串行段 //（KTD12：防两个进程并发引导出双管理员）。 lockBootstrap(tx *sql.Tx) error + // lockAccount serializes credential and session admission for one owner. + lockAccount(tx *sql.Tx, owner string) error } // ---- SQLite（嵌入式档）---- @@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ func (sqliteDialect) lockConversation(*sql.Tx, string) error { return nil } func (sqliteDialect) lockScope(*sql.Tx, string, string) error { return nil } func (sqliteDialect) lockAdmission(*sql.Tx) error { return nil } func (sqliteDialect) lockBootstrap(*sql.Tx) error { return nil } +func (sqliteDialect) lockAccount(*sql.Tx, string) error { return nil } // ---- PostgreSQL（多用户/多实例档）---- @@ -72,3 +75,8 @@ func (postgresDialect) lockBootstrap(tx *sql.Tx) error { _, err := tx.Exec(`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1))`, "bootstrap:first-admin") return err } + +func (postgresDialect) lockAccount(tx *sql.Tx, owner string) error { + _, err := tx.Exec(`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1))`, "account:"+owner) + return err +} diff --git a/internal/store/login_keys.go b/internal/store/login_keys.go index 2413883..7ac1a73 100644 --- a/internal/store/login_keys.go +++ b/internal/store/login_keys.go @@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ func (s *Store) IssueLoginKey(owner, purpose, createdBy string, ttl time.Duratio return "", meta, err } defer tx.Rollback() + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, owner); err != nil { + return "", meta, err + } + var exists int + if err := tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner).Scan(&exists); errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return "", meta, ErrNotFound + } else if err != nil { + return "", meta, err + } meta, err = s.insertLoginKeyTx(tx, owner, purpose, createdBy, plain, id, now, exp) if err != nil { return "", meta, err @@ -204,11 +213,20 @@ func (s *Store) RevokeLoginKey(id string) error { // RevokeLoginKeyCascade 撤销 Key 并作废该用户全部 set_password_only 会话（管理员 // HTTP 入口）。Key 已消费/过期时仍返回属主并作废会话；编号不存在才报 NotFound。 func (s *Store) RevokeLoginKeyCascade(id, actor string) (owner string, err error) { + if err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT owner FROM login_keys WHERE id=?`), id).Scan(&owner); errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return "", ErrNotFound + } else if err != nil { + return "", err + } tx, err := s.db.Begin() if err != nil { return "", err } defer tx.Rollback() + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, owner); err != nil { + return "", err + } + lockedOwner := owner err = tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT owner FROM login_keys WHERE id=?`), id).Scan(&owner) if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { return "", ErrNotFound @@ -216,6 +234,9 @@ func (s *Store) RevokeLoginKeyCascade(id, actor string) (owner string, err error if err != nil { return "", err } + if owner != lockedOwner { + return "", ErrConflict + } if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE id=? AND status=?`), LoginKeyStatusRevoked, id, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { return "", err @@ -279,11 +300,20 @@ func (s *Store) RedeemLoginKey(plain string) (token string, owner string, err er if plain == "" || len(plain) < 5 || plain[:4] != "alk_" { return "", "", ErrNotFound } + var lockOwner string + if err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT owner FROM login_keys WHERE key_hash=?`), hashKey(plain)).Scan(&lockOwner); errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return "", "", ErrNotFound + } else if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } tx, err := s.db.Begin() if err != nil { return "", "", err } defer tx.Rollback() + if err := s.dialect.lockAccount(tx, lockOwner); err != nil { + return "", "", err + } var id, o, status, exp string err = tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT id,owner,status,expires_at FROM login_keys WHERE key_hash=?`), hashKey(plain)). Scan(&id, &o, &status, &exp) @@ -293,6 +323,9 @@ func (s *Store) RedeemLoginKey(plain string) (token string, owner string, err er if err != nil { return "", "", err } + if o != lockOwner { + return "", "", ErrConflict + } expT, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, exp) if err != nil || time.Now().After(expT) { _, _ = tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE id=? AND status=?`), LoginKeyStatusExpired, id, LoginKeyStatusUnused) @@ -339,137 +372,139 @@ func (s *Store) RedeemLoginKey(plain string) (token string, owner string, err er // 写 hash、清 must_change、bump auth_version、作废未用登录 Key、删除全部会话、 // 写成功审计。会话或版本失效时返回 ErrConflict，不做任何写入。 func (s *Store) CompleteSetPasswordChecked(token, passwordHash string) (owner string, err error) { - tx, err := s.db.Begin() + // Discover only the lock key here. Authorization is checked again after + // acquiring the owner's transaction lock, alongside key reissue/revocation. + if err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT owner FROM sessions WHERE token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)).Scan(&owner); errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return "", ErrNotFound + } else if err != nil { + return "", err + } + lockOwner := owner + err = s.accountTx(AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: owner, Action: "account.set_password"}, func(tx *sql.Tx, _ string) error { + var scope, sessExp, actualOwner string + var sessVer, userVer int + var mustChange bool + var hash sql.NullString + err := tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT s.owner,s.scope,s.expires_at,s.auth_version,u.auth_version,u.must_change_password,u.password_hash + FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.owner=s.owner WHERE s.token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)). + Scan(&actualOwner, &scope, &sessExp, &sessVer, &userVer, &mustChange, &hash) + if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return ErrNotFound + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + if actualOwner != lockOwner { + return ErrConflict + } + if expT, perr := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, sessExp); perr != nil || time.Now().After(expT) { + return ErrNotFound + } + if scope != SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly && !mustChange && hash.Valid && hash.String != "" { + return ErrConflict + } + if sessVer != userVer { + return ErrConflict + } + res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=?`), + passwordHash, nowISO(), false, lockOwner) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n != 1 { + return ErrNotFound + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE owner=? AND status=?`), + LoginKeyStatusRevoked, lockOwner, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), lockOwner); err != nil { + return err + } + entrance := "must-change" + if scope == SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly { + entrance = "recovery" + } + return s.insertAccountEvent(tx, lockOwner, entrance, lockOwner, "password_set", entrance) + }) if err != nil { return "", err } - defer tx.Rollback() - var scope, sessExp string - var sessVer, userVer int - var mustChange bool - var hash sql.NullString - err = tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT s.owner,s.scope,s.expires_at,s.auth_version,u.auth_version,u.must_change_password,u.password_hash - FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.owner=s.owner WHERE s.token_hash=?`), hashKey(token)). - Scan(&owner, &scope, &sessExp, &sessVer, &userVer, &mustChange, &hash) - if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { - return "", ErrNotFound - } - if err != nil { - return "", err - } - if expT, perr := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, sessExp); perr != nil || time.Now().After(expT) { - return "", ErrNotFound - } - // 受限会话、待改密、未设密三者之一才允许免旧密码设密；其余按主动改密路径走。 - if scope != SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly && !mustChange && (hash.Valid && hash.String != "") { - return "", ErrConflict - } - // 会话创建后账户凭据已变（并发改密/重置）：本次授权过期，拒绝继续。 - if sessVer != userVer { - return "", ErrConflict - } - res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=?`), - passwordHash, nowISO(), false, owner) - if err != nil { - return "", err - } - if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 { - return "", ErrNotFound - } - if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE owner=? AND status=?`), - LoginKeyStatusRevoked, owner, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { - return "", err - } - if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), owner); err != nil { - return "", err - } - entrance := "must-change" - if scope == SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly { - entrance = "recovery" - } - if err := s.insertAccountEvent(tx, owner, entrance, owner, "password_set", entrance); err != nil { - return "", err - } - return owner, s.commitAccountMutation(tx, AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: owner, Action: "account.set_password"}) + return lockOwner, nil } // ChangeUserPasswordActive 主动改密单事务：校验当前密码 → 更新（带认证版本乐观 // 检查）→ bump auth_version → 吊销其他会话（保留当前）→ 审计。中途失败无部分成功。 func (s *Store) ChangeUserPasswordActive(owner, current, passwordHash, keepToken string) error { - tx, err := s.db.Begin() - if err != nil { - return err - } - defer tx.Rollback() - var hash string - var ver int - var mustChange bool - err = tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT password_hash,auth_version,must_change_password FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner). - Scan(&hash, &ver, &mustChange) - if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { - return ErrNotFound - } - if err != nil { - return err - } - if mustChange || hash == "" { - // 强制态必须走受限设密路径，不在此处用旧密码换新密码。 - return ErrConflict - } - if !VerifyPassword(hash, current) { - return ErrBadCredentials - } - res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=? AND auth_version=?`), - passwordHash, nowISO(), false, owner, ver) - if err != nil { - return err - } - if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 { - return ErrConflict // 并发改密：版本已前进 - } - if keepToken != "" { - if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=? AND token_hash<>?`), owner, hashKey(keepToken)); err != nil { + return s.accountTx(AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: owner, Action: "account.change_password"}, func(tx *sql.Tx, _ string) error { + var hash string + var ver int + var mustChange bool + err := tx.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT password_hash,auth_version,must_change_password FROM users WHERE owner=?`), owner). + Scan(&hash, &ver, &mustChange) + if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return ErrNotFound + } + if err != nil { return err } - } else if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), owner); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := s.insertAccountEvent(tx, owner, "settings", owner, "password_change", ""); err != nil { - return err - } - return s.commitAccountMutation(tx, AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: owner, Action: "account.change_password"}) + if mustChange || hash == "" { + return ErrConflict + } + if !VerifyPassword(hash, current) { + return ErrBadCredentials + } + res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=? AND auth_version=?`), + passwordHash, nowISO(), false, owner, ver) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n != 1 { + return ErrConflict + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE owner=? AND status=?`), + LoginKeyStatusRevoked, owner, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { + return err + } + if keepToken != "" { + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=? AND token_hash<>?`), owner, hashKey(keepToken)); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE sessions SET auth_version=? WHERE owner=? AND token_hash=?`), + ver+1, owner, hashKey(keepToken)); err != nil { + return err + } + } else if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), owner); err != nil { + return err + } + return s.insertAccountEvent(tx, owner, "settings", owner, "password_change", "") + }) } // AdminResetUserPassword 管理员/CLI 重置密码单事务：写 hash、must_change=true、 // bump auth_version、作废未用登录 Key、吊销全部会话、审计（actor 为操作者）。 func (s *Store) AdminResetUserPassword(owner, passwordHash, actor, entrance string) error { - tx, err := s.db.Begin() - if err != nil { - return err - } - defer tx.Rollback() - res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=?`), - passwordHash, nowISO(), true, owner) - if err != nil { - return err - } - if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 { - return ErrNotFound - } - if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE owner=? AND status=?`), - LoginKeyStatusRevoked, owner, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), owner); err != nil { - return err - } if entrance == "" { entrance = entranceOf(actor) } - if err := s.insertAccountEvent(tx, actor, entrance, owner, "admin_password_reset", ""); err != nil { - return err - } - return s.commitAccountMutation(tx, AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: actor, Action: "account.reset_password"}) + return s.accountTx(AccountWrite{Owner: owner, Actor: actor, Action: "account.reset_password"}, func(tx *sql.Tx, _ string) error { + res, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, password_set_at=?, must_change_password=?, auth_version=auth_version+1 WHERE owner=?`), + passwordHash, nowISO(), true, owner) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n != 1 { + return ErrNotFound + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`UPDATE login_keys SET status=? WHERE owner=? AND status=?`), + LoginKeyStatusRevoked, owner, LoginKeyStatusUnused); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE owner=?`), owner); err != nil { + return err + } + return s.insertAccountEvent(tx, actor, entrance, owner, "admin_password_reset", "") + }) } // CountUnusedLoginKeys 未使用登录 Key 计数（list 展示）。