Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: User rulings 4/5 plus the P2-P4 live evidence. Keyword scoring dimensions
(readability, actionability) kept failing valid documents - normal Chinese
section headings flagged as column titles, loops of 4 corrections - because
they grade writing preferences, not verifiable facts. Unverified numbers
(~10-13 per run) remained the largest quality leak through every phase.
And the verifier runs on the same model as the worker (lightweight falls back
to chat), so "independent" verification was self-review. Separately, svc
seeding after boot never registered the tavily tools until a restart because
keys were snapshotted at startup.
Changes: quality.HardFacts (lint actually ran + zero errors) replaces the
full ScoreBytes projection in CheckArtifacts - keyword dimensions remain in
ScoreBytes for eval visibility only. New fact-consistency check
(runtime.factCheck, default on): extract percentages/dates/large numbers from
deliverable text, trace each against the material corpus (attachment text +
tool evidence); misses get exactly one correction round (fix, drop, or mark
as target/estimate), never a loop. runVerifier skips same-source model
verification unless runtime.verifierSameModel is set (hard facts + fact check
still run). Search tools now register lazily, reading tavily keys per call
(settings/seeding take effect immediately).
Evidence: SELF - TestHardFactsIgnoresKeywordDimensions,
TestHardFactsKeepsLintUnavailableBlocking, TestUnverifiedFactsAndNotice,
TestFactCheckContinuationOnce (fact note fires, corrected run passes);
go vet + go test ./... pass; live before/after on the golden task set
recorded on the phase05 task card per the policy clause.
Impact: Gate stops rejecting valid documents on stylistic grounds; invented
figures get one forced correction round; same-model verification no longer
pretends to be independent; tavily config is hot. No contract or storage
changes.
Why: plugin skills were written to the skill root unvalidated and the
bundled recipes carried no name — both now go through the library's
spec validator (name required + kebab-case + equals dir, description
required, known-keys whitelist).
Evidence: go test -count=1 ./... green; TestV2InvalidSkillRejected pins
the fail-closed path with plugin context + field location; Seed
validates each SKILL.md before write (recipes dogfood-compliant);
nested pins carry agent-native#28 (the validator).
Impact: invalid plugin skills now abort the plugin load with a located
error instead of landing silently; the architecture baseline gains
backend/plugins→backend/skills.
Refs: Agent-Native#28, Agent-Squad#32, N2 plan WP4
Why: N1 increment three host side - plugin agent assets must reject
hooks/mcp/permissionMode declarations (WP1 acceptance), and squad
members need the kernel ask port wired to the HITL card (WP4).
Evidence: go vet clean; go test ./... 29 packages ok, including new
agent-asset tests (banned keys located to the field, unknown keys,
missing id) and the V2 asset suite. Nested pins at native c5b9dca
(PR #18) and squad fc9620e (PR #17).
Impact: plugins agents/ assets now parse via parseAgentAsset
(strict JSON with banned-key rejection); PermissionAskOf exported
and takes any host with the optional method; app.go wires
cfg.PermissionAsk for the squad path. Legacy behavior unchanged when
nothing registers the port.
Refs: Documents proposal 2026-10-07-agent-stack-n1q1i1-plans.md WP1/WP4
Why: Mock mode needs a path that drives the real step runner, and the example plugin should fail the host test if its workflow or slot question is wrong.
Evidence: go test ./internal/plugins/ -run TestRepoExamplePluginLoads passed. The brief intent asks 主题是什么？ and keeps the topic slot.
Impact: #workflow is only the mock runner. The example plugin itself is in the Dev repo.
Refs: feature/agent-harness-p4
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: Intent routing needs a registry of workflow definitions, and uninstall was leaving intents and workflows in place.
Evidence: go test ./internal/workflow/ ./internal/plugins/ ./internal/app/ passed. Validation rejects duplicate ids, unknown kinds, denied tools, and both step caps. Unregister clears the registry and the intent gate.
Impact: Script steps must stay inside the plugin directory. The server holds the registry for later routing.
Refs: feature/agent-harness-p4
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: Downstream products must extend the base through a public package and host API instead of editing internal code.
Evidence: go test ./... passed, including plugin v2 assets, sidecar startup, migration v13, pending confirms, HITL timeout, hash embedder, command pairs, and the extension surface snapshot.
Impact: apiVersion 2.0-experimental rejects empty network allowlists for declarative HTTP. Hash embeddings stay opt-in via models.embedding.provider=hash. Plugin secrets resolve per owner at execution time.
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-10-01-plugin-contract-v2.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: the user ruled out self-registration (2026-09-30): accounts are
created only by admins who set an initial password; first login (and
first login after any admin reset) must force a password change.
Evidence:
- migration v10 auth_accounts (users password/must_change/is_admin +
sessions table; upgrade test walks v1<->v10 both directions).
- argon2id hash/verify with PHC encoding; store tests cover hash
roundtrip, duplicate-owner conflict, must-change lifecycle, session
keep/except semantics.
- e2e TestAdminAccountFlow: static login page reachable without auth,
wrong password 401, login sets HttpOnly cookie + mustChangePassword,
admin creates user (409 on duplicate), non-admin create 403, forced
change clears flag and old password dies, admin reset revokes sessions
and re-arms forced change, API-key channel untouched, 5-fail backoff
429, logout kills session. Full go test ./... green.
Impact: middleware now accepts Bearer key OR session cookie and exempts
static + /api/auth/login (also fixes the latent case where the login
page itself could 401). Embedded no-auth mode unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-09-30-ui-redesign-and-auth.md section 5 (admin-issued
variant, user decision 2026-09-30)
Why: T4 workspaces are declared by plugins via provides.workspaces (Core PluginWorkspace is the authoritative type); the host must surface the merged overlay for the frontend to render in OverlayHost.
Evidence: go test green - plugins suite new TestWorkspacesOverlay (manifest + workspaces/main.json loads, ListWorkspaces returns the declaration with shortcut and body); full internal sweep unchanged.
Impact: plugins host loads workspaces/*.json assets and exposes ListWorkspaces; server adds GET /api/workspaces passthrough; no behavior change without the manifest key.
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-09-30-ui-inbox-command-workspace.md T4; task card feature/workspaces-r1
Why: T3 of the interaction foundation - unify button/card/slash/chat entries onto one command bus (D27) composing the Agent-Command library (D30), with danger=high commands gated behind inline confirm cards and every dispatch leaving the same audit envelope.
Evidence: go test green - cmdbus suite (four-entrance audit symmetry, high-danger confirm lifecycle incl. cancel/expiry/handler-reject, audit-unavailable yields unknown, plugin spec fail-closed, schema scalar validation) and server e2e (danger command via POST /api/commands -> confirm card -> card action confirm -> committed receipt -> audit query ordered accepted->committed); legacy /help,/new,/mock,/model,/profile contract preserved through the bus; store migration v7 command_audit (both dialects) with roundtrip test updated.
Impact: new internal/cmdbus (L1 package per D33), server routes POST /api/commands/{id} + GET /api/commands/audit + registry-driven GET /api/commands, postMessage chat-entrance dispatch when the intent gate matches a registered command, plugins host OnCommands overlay, module cards policy/modules/{cmdbus,cardsvc}.md; pending confirm state is process-local (documented limitation).
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-09-30-ui-inbox-command-workspace.md T3; task card feature/command-bus-r1
weichen
