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Author SHA1 Message Date
weichen 4d1ca60067 Expose role and system permission APIs 
Why: System, role, and project entry permissions need explicit actions instead of a single administrator flag or unrestricted project creation.

Evidence: The full Backend test suite passed, including role APIs, action isolation, project.create denial/allow, storage migration coverage, and account write fences.

Impact: Adds versioned role and grant endpoints, maps account actions to explicit permissions, and requires project.create authority.

Refs: Focused role and permission system task 3
 2026-10-14 17:02:11 +00:00
weichen adcd8fefd2 Fence U3 account writes and stabilize directory cursors 
Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.

Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.

Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.

Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
 2026-10-14 07:33:54 +00:00
weichen a4783d18e7 Consult the EXT-8 authorizer in project artifact read paths
ci / vet-and-test (pull_request) Successful in 41s
Details 
Why: With the surface and injection seam in place, the read endpoints must fall back to the adapter when owner-scoped lookup misses, keeping default-deny and fail-closed semantics.
Evidence: TestProjectResourceAuthorizerSharesReads green (default deny, shared list/meta/content via adapter, third-party denied, authorizer error fail-closed); go test ./... 32/32 packages ok.
Impact: listArtifacts/getArtifact/artifactContent consult authorizeSharedProject; store gains gated helpers (GetArtifactByID/ArtifactContentByID/ListProjectArtifactsAll) documented internal-only; writes untouched; SSE project stream and project card aggregate deliberately deferred to EXT-12 (conversation-card mirroring privacy).
Refs: EXT-8; red run at d89e748; task card.
 2026-10-08 15:34:18 +00:00
weichen d89e74880b Add the EXT-8 authorizer surface and a red sharing test 
Why: EXT-8 is accepted (Documents #49); the surface (Registry.RegisterResourceAuthorizer, ResourceAuthorizer, SurfaceVersion 2.1.0-experimental) plus the Server injection seam must land before the read-path consultation, and the behavioral red run proves the gap.
Evidence: go test ./internal/server -run TestProjectResourceAuthorizerSharesReads FAIL (shared read 404 with adapter set); default-deny section passes; row recorded on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt updated); projectAuthz slot in hostcaps; Server.ProjectAuthz + setter; app wiring after compiled load; declarative registry fails closed. Read behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-8 in Documents 2026-10-08-ext-c1-c7-rdm-shared-contracts; task card.
 2026-10-08 15:32:04 +00:00