Why: The sandbox hides the host home directory and has no network, so pip install --user cannot supply python-docx, and the service PATH resolved python3 to a linuxbrew path that does not exist inside the sandbox.
Evidence: SELF go test of execenv, tools, store, app, server, runmgr, config, and cmd/agent-system on this worktree. CI has not run.
Impact: Sessions inherit a read-only base layer. Extra packages are requested through python_env, auto-approved only from the allowlist, and mounted per conversation. Schema 35 adds the request and binding tables.
Refs: .task/feature-layered-python-env.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: The sandbox tier wrote the session directory directly, so a buggy
or runaway script could leave the workspace half-mutated and nothing
bounded what a timeout had already written. The plan's first landing
shape (section 4.4) swaps the session bind for a frozen-base overlay:
each exec freezes the session dir (hardlink clone + sha256 baseline),
runs on a private upper, and only a clean exit promotes the change set
back via CAS (baseline hash match -> atomic replace/remove; externally
changed targets double-store as *.conflict-* instead of clobbering).
Timeouts and kills discard the upper entirely - half-written state
never lands.
Evidence: go test ./... green including bwrap integration roundtrips
(TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayRoundtrip: add/modify/delete through a real
overlayfs upper with whiteout handling and ws cleanup;
TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayTimeoutDiscards: partial writes discarded on
timeout) and unit anchors for freeze manifest (.agentx excluded), CAS
add/modify, conflict double-store, and the change summary.
Impact: Opt-in via --exec-workspace overlay / AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_WORKSPACE
(only with --exec-backend sandbox; fail-closed on unknown modes). The
model sees a one-line change summary appended to the tool output, so
discards and conflict files are visible. Default behavior is unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-10-agent-delegation-routing-sandbox.md section
4.4; Dev task feature/agent-s0-workspace-overlay.
Why: Real runs were fully serial: the direct path never set the kernel's
parallel tool mode, delegate_task handed the parent only the child's
160-char summary (the full text was dropped), MiniMax streamed its
reasoning inside content <think> blocks, and the EXT-16 sandbox hid
~/.local so python-docx/openpyxl/pptx could not even import. All four
were measured defects (F1/F2/F3/F5) in the delegation/routing proposal.
Why: Serial-only mutual exclusion is not enough for order-sensitive
tools - the card-stream test failed with out-of-order appends - so the
ordering moved into the kernel (SerialTools partition, Agent-Native
#44); process events pair by CallID (#42) and tool results write back
through the injected call context (#43).
Evidence: go test ./... green, including new regression anchors:
TestDelegateToolReturnsFullText, TestToolEventsPairByCallID,
TestToolExecModeAndSerialSet, TestOpenLLMClientReasoningSplitAuto,
TestSandboxArgvDepsLayer, TestExecEnvJoinsPythonPath.
Impact: Direct runs now execute independent same-turn calls
(searches, reads, delegate_task, review_findings) concurrently by
default (runtime.parallelTools=false restores sequential); card flow,
plans, workflows, exec primitives and file edits keep model-declared
order. delegate_task returns the capped full child text. MiniMax-*
models get reasoning_split=true so thinking streams via
reasoning_content. --exec-deps-dir/AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_DEPS_DIR mounts a
read-only dependency layer into the sandbox and merges PYTHONPATH.
Bumps deps/agent-native to c348441.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-10-agent-delegation-routing-sandbox.md (E1,
F1-F5); Agent-Native #42/#43/#44; Dev task feature/agent-e1-parallel-fixes.
Why: Q2 ruled exec tools stay disabled for now but code execution must
return later; the recovery path treats model-generated code as
untrusted. This abstracts the interpreter launch point in
exec_interpreter.go into an ExecBackend port (direct = byte-identical
status quo; sandbox = bwrap isolation) so downstream products can
re-enable execution behind isolation without further base surgery.
Evidence: go build/vet clean; go test ./... 32/32 packages green;
sandbox escape negatives all blocked locally (bwrap 0.11.1): home
secret unreadable (tmpfs /home), sibling session unreadable
(session-only bind), network blocked (--unshare-net), 400-process
spawn storm capped by ulimit -u 256 (fork: retry), 60s sleep killed at
3s timeout, orphans die with the namespace; session-dir write visible
on host; direct backend regression (exit=7 / exit=timeout texts)
unchanged.
Impact: run_shell/run_python route through the backend; workflow
ScriptCommand and the squad kernel ExecConfig stay direct (follow-up
scope); config key execBackend + env AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_BACKEND + CLI
--exec-backend; extension.Options.ExecBackend (SurfaceVersion
2.6.0-experimental); DisableExecTools remains the top-priority
fail-closed switch.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3-exec-backend.md section 4
(EXT-16, G2-8 prototype); Backend #110 (DisableExecTools).
weichenandCursor