Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why: main gained AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN fallback in #182 after this branch
was cut. Both changes touch identity DSN parsing.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/ ./internal/store/ ./cmd/agent-system/ for the identity, schema, and unknown-subcommand cases passed after the resolution.
Impact: keeps open-existing identity mode and the 0600 dsn file. Environment
DSN still wins when --dsn is absent, via ResolveDSN.
Refs: Backend #182; recovery plan r3.1 D1
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: a rollback can only be safe when the candidate says which schema it
will migrate to and whether older binaries can still read that schema.
A new migration that forgets to register that fact must fail the test.
Evidence: go test ./internal/store/ ./pkg/identity/ -run 'TestMigrationCompat|TestCapabilities' passed.
Impact: version --json and identity capabilities include schema.target and
schema.compatFloor. Every migration version is listed in
migrationBreaksOldReaders. Current versions do not break old readers, so
the floor stays 0.
Refs: recovery plan r3.1 D2
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: identity ensure/verify went through the normal store open, which
creates a database and runs migrations. A deploy gate that calls the
candidate before stopping the old service could migrate production
ahead of the switch, and a missing database was turned into an empty one.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/ ./internal/store/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -run 'TestCapabilities|TestEnsure|TestVerify|TestDSN|TestUsage|TestSystemIdentity|TestOpenIdentity|TestUnknownSubcommand' passed in this worktree.
Impact: identity CLI refuses a missing file or a missing agent_system_identity table, does not migrate, reads DSN from the environment or a 0600 file, and version --json plus identity capabilities emit one capability document. Unknown top-level commands exit 2.
Refs: recovery plan r3.1 D1; Dev feature/svc-d1-identity-flow
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: svc.sh delivers database credentials via environment per G1-7
(command lines are visible to every process on the host), but identity
ensure/verify only accepted --dsn on the command line for pg-bound
instances.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/... ok; build ok.
Impact: --dsn remains highest priority, then AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN, then
embedded SQLite; no storage changes.
Refs: Dev U3 (real-combination CI gates); G1-7 credential discipline.
Why: runIdentity lived in cmd/agent-system package main, so downstream
combination binaries (Agent-System-RDM) cannot reuse it and their unknown
subcommands fall into the serve path; the 2026-10-12 rdm1/rdmcand batch
update failures traced back to that capability gap.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/... ok; CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ok;
behavioral probes (usage rc=2, capabilities v1, ensure/verify roundtrip)
recorded in the PR.
Impact: identity semantics unchanged for the base binary; adds
identity capabilities (v1) and usage-on-unknown contract shared by all
products; no storage changes.
Refs: Dev PR #474 (svc.sh candidate gate); user root-cause report
2026-10-12 U1 (shared identity interface).
Why: the admin zone could not host plugin-declared partitions - KTD4
requires the RDM audit partition to be reachable by RDM domain admins and
base superadmins without hardcoding RDM into the base AdminZone.
Evidence: go test ./internal/app ./internal/server ./pkg/extension green
incl. new admin-zone recording/endpoint tests; surface snapshot test
green after surface.txt update; CI (Dev composite) is authoritative.
Impact: extension surface 2.8.0 -> 2.9.0 (Registry.AddAdminZone +
AdminZoneSpec, fail-closed on invalid specs); applyCompiled records
declarations into the plugin summary; new authenticated GET
/api/admin-zone/sections returns the flattened, ordered declaration list.
Entry visibility stays metadata-only - data capability remains enforced
by each section's own command surface (fail-closed).
Refs: WP3-I3/KTD4; task card feature-adminzone-plugin-sections.
Why: Generative UI proposal U2 needs the host side of the contract:
owner-isolated surface storage with revision CAS, an execution-level
enable/disable ledger (default-off, epoch bumped on every transition so
in-flight submits after a disable are rejected), a single-choke-point
service that validates specs (strict decode + catalog rules) before
saving, event publish with pending recovery, the optional SurfaceHost
extension capability, and direct API endpoints that share the same
guard (no bypass by entrance).
Evidence: go build/vet clean; full go test ./... passes (SQLite);
surface store tests also pass under AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN (PostgreSQL);
surface.txt regenerated via the AST snapshot test.
Impact: Additive migration v22 (new tables only); existing endpoints and
plugin_grants semantics untouched; old consumers unaffected. U3+ (data
binding, actions, frontend) deliberately out of scope.
Refs: Documents proposal 2026-10-10-generative-ui-plugin.md (r2 U2);
Core PR #25; Dev task feature/generative-ui-u2
Why: TestSurfaceSnapshot compares the exported-symbol list verbatim;
Registry.AddIntent and IntentSpec (SurfaceVersion 2.7.0-experimental)
are intentional additions.
Evidence: pkg/extension suite green; full go test ./... 32/32 packages
green.
Impact: surface.txt only.
Why: plan G2-2 requires plugin commands reachable via slash aliases
through the same bus and audit envelope (EXT-10②), and a natural-
language routing entry so '帮我写项目建议书' can reach the compile
flow. The agent-command lib now carries a validated Slash field
(lib PR #6, pin bumped to 4f583ca); the bus binds plugin-spec aliases
into the same slash table; intents are declared via the extension
registry and routed deterministically (normalized containment, longest
phrase first) to commands through the bus — the system.intent builtin
(/intent) is the chat-entrance dispatch point with a candidate list on
miss.
Evidence: TestPluginSlashAliasBindsAndDispatches — alias binds, case/
whitespace-normalized resolution, slash and button entrances hit the
same command handler with committed receipts; TestIntentDeclareMatch
Route — declare/validate, miss on unrelated text, normalized hit,
bus-dispatch through the chat entrance, longest-phrase priority;
server suite green with the dual-entry pair registered; full go test
./... 31/31 packages green.
Impact: cmdbus plugin-spec slash binding + IntentStore; extension
Registry.AddIntent + IntentSpec (SurfaceVersion 2.7.0-experimental);
pluginRegistry.AddIntent wires plugin-declared intents; server
builtin system.intent; command-pairs fixture extended.
Refs: plan G2-2 (line 366); EXT-10②; lib PR #6 (4f583ca).
Why: Q2 ruled exec tools stay disabled for now but code execution must
return later; the recovery path treats model-generated code as
untrusted. This abstracts the interpreter launch point in
exec_interpreter.go into an ExecBackend port (direct = byte-identical
status quo; sandbox = bwrap isolation) so downstream products can
re-enable execution behind isolation without further base surgery.
Evidence: go build/vet clean; go test ./... 32/32 packages green;
sandbox escape negatives all blocked locally (bwrap 0.11.1): home
secret unreadable (tmpfs /home), sibling session unreadable
(session-only bind), network blocked (--unshare-net), 400-process
spawn storm capped by ulimit -u 256 (fork: retry), 60s sleep killed at
3s timeout, orphans die with the namespace; session-dir write visible
on host; direct backend regression (exit=7 / exit=timeout texts)
unchanged.
Impact: run_shell/run_python route through the backend; workflow
ScriptCommand and the squad kernel ExecConfig stay direct (follow-up
scope); config key execBackend + env AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_BACKEND + CLI
--exec-backend; extension.Options.ExecBackend (SurfaceVersion
2.6.0-experimental); DisableExecTools remains the top-priority
fail-closed switch.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3-exec-backend.md section 4
(EXT-16, G2-8 prototype); Backend #110 (DisableExecTools).
Why: The DOCX parser only read w:r runs that were direct children of w:p, so
text inside w:ins, w:hyperlink and w:fldSimple was dropped with no warning,
violating the no-silent-degradation rule. Separately, runtime.exec is a
user-writable setting, so multi-user deployments could not reliably turn the
exec primitives off.
Evidence: SELF - red tests TestParseDocxTrackedChangesAndHyperlinks and
TestExecHardDisabledOverridesSettings failed before and pass after; backend
go test ./... (32 packages) passes; a mock-mode binary started with
--disable-exec-tools hides run_shell/run_python/register_artifact from
/api/tools even after the user sets runtime.exec=true.
Impact: DOCX paragraphs are decoded from the token stream at any depth;
deleted/moved-from text, field codes and mc:Fallback are excluded and
revised documents carry an explicit warning. New Options.DisableExecTools
(SurfaceVersion 2.5.0-experimental), CLI --disable-exec-tools, config key
disableExecTools and env AGENT_SYSTEM_DISABLE_EXEC_TOOLS; zero value keeps
current behavior.
Refs: Agent-System-RDM docs/proposals/2026-10-09-V22-review-and-implementation-plan.md (G0-7, B-5)
Why: EXT-11 is accepted; the surface (SetScopedHostFactory/NewScopedHost, SurfaceVersion 2.4.0-experimental) must land with the behavioral red pinned - wiring absent, NewScopedHost fails closed with ErrNotLinked.
Evidence: TestScopedHostFactory red at the wired-factory assertion; row follows on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt +2 symbols); internal wireScopedHostFactory stub. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-11 proposal; task card.
Why: Knowledge retrieval cross-owner and conversation-card mirroring are the registered EXT-8 slice-2 items; the fields/wiring land with the acceptance reds pinned first.
Evidence: mirror red (project channel still emitted with switch off); shared-retrieval red (grant yields 0 hits); SSE-scope red (grant yields non-200); rows follow on the task card.
Impact: Options.DisableConvCardMirror passthrough (extension/link/app); cardsvc.MirrorConvCards (default true = current behavior); SurfaceVersion 2.3.0-experimental. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-8/EXT-12 proposals; task card.
Why: EXT-9 is the other step-4 hard prerequisite; the surface (Options.DisableUploadIndexing passthrough, Host.KnowledgePublish idempotent replace, Host.KnowledgeDelete prefix-enforced revoke, SurfaceVersion 2.2.0-experimental) must land with the acceptance reds pinned before implementation.
Evidence: app red = publish not implemented; server red = switch-on still indexes (hits=1); rows recorded on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt updated); internal Options passthrough; Server.DisableUploadIndexing field; host method stubs. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-9 proposal; task card.
Why: EXT-8 is accepted (Documents #49); the surface (Registry.RegisterResourceAuthorizer, ResourceAuthorizer, SurfaceVersion 2.1.0-experimental) plus the Server injection seam must land before the read-path consultation, and the behavioral red run proves the gap.
Evidence: go test ./internal/server -run TestProjectResourceAuthorizerSharesReads FAIL (shared read 404 with adapter set); default-deny section passes; row recorded on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt updated); projectAuthz slot in hostcaps; Server.ProjectAuthz + setter; app wiring after compiled load; declarative registry fails closed. Read behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-8 in Documents 2026-10-08-ext-c1-c7-rdm-shared-contracts; task card.
Why: downstream parsers are unreachable via extension.Host and the base lacked xlsx/pptx parsers; MS1 needs Excel and PPT ingest (EXT-5 request, documents proposal 2026-10-06-ext-5-host-parse-document).
Evidence: local GOWORK=off go test ./... all 29 packages pass incl. new ooxml_test (hand-built parts), ooxml_python_test (openpyxl/python-pptx round-trip), inproc owner-scope and limit tests, xlsx upload e2e; go vet clean; recorded as SELF on the Dev task card, PR CI to confirm.
Impact: Host gains ParseDocument (pure compute; errors only on ctx cancel or >100MiB input); builtin:xlsx (sheet order via workbook.xml rels, rich-text shared strings, formula cache, 1900/1904 dates, sparse cells) and builtin:pptx (sldIdLst order, titles, group shapes, AlternateContent Choice, tables, notes) added with 200k-cell/64MiB-part caps; legacy doc/xls/ppt get an actionable hint; ParsersDescription gains xlsx/pptx and the missing text ext; surface snapshot now records exported interface methods; docx part reads share the 64MiB cap.
Refs: documents 2026-10-06-ext-5-host-parse-document.md; EXT-1 host.go precedent.
Why: Downstream products must extend the base through a public package and host API instead of editing internal code.
Evidence: go test ./... passed, including plugin v2 assets, sidecar startup, migration v13, pending confirms, HITL timeout, hash embedder, command pairs, and the extension surface snapshot.
Impact: apiVersion 2.0-experimental rejects empty network allowlists for declarative HTTP. Hash embeddings stay opt-in via models.embedding.provider=hash. Plugin secrets resolve per owner at execution time.
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-10-01-plugin-contract-v2.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
weichen
