Why: Administrator-issued password and login-key paths could take over target accounts, while old credentials and plugin handles ignored current account state.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-backend-all-replay.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-final-pg-core.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-build.json, and focused HTTP/concurrency receipts in /tmp/iam-u3-*.json.
Impact: Adds trusted pending-account initialization and reissue, preexisting owner-session proof, proposal/rotation/grant transactions, server-side admin search, current Host guards, and legacy HTTP/CLI closure. Production cutover and downstream pins remain pending.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Disabled accounts and mixed credentials could continue to authenticate, while web creation accepted passwords and administrator privileges.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-sqlite-green.json, /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-pg-regression.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-u2-server-sqlite-green.json.
Impact: Adds versioned enable/disable, revokes existing handles, protects the last operable manager, and exposes pending-account/profile APIs. Recovery proposal and legacy-entry closure remain in U3-4.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: passwordless activation/recovery must redeem only into a
set-password session; account ops must not create empty stores.
Evidence: SELF go test store/server login-key and OpenExisting cases.
Impact: auth middleware gates; CLI user create defaults to activate key.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/u4-one-time-login-key.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: a browser holding a revoked API key in localStorage sent the Bearer
header on every request; key precedence 401'd all APIs despite a valid
login session, locking admins out of user management. /api/me also
reported mustChangePassword for key principals, who cannot change
passwords (session-owned), dead-ending the forced-change gate.
Evidence: new TestStaleKeySessionFallback covers fallback and authVia;
TestAuthMiddleware/TestAdminAccountFlow unchanged and green; full
go test ./... green.
Impact: invalid key falls back to a valid session cookie before 401
(cookie-less programmatic clients unaffected); /api/me gains
authVia ("key"|"session"|""), letting the frontend keep key holders
out of the change-password gate.
Refs: Dev task feature/admin-auth-gate-fix.
Why: the user ruled out self-registration (2026-09-30): accounts are
created only by admins who set an initial password; first login (and
first login after any admin reset) must force a password change.
Evidence:
- migration v10 auth_accounts (users password/must_change/is_admin +
sessions table; upgrade test walks v1<->v10 both directions).
- argon2id hash/verify with PHC encoding; store tests cover hash
roundtrip, duplicate-owner conflict, must-change lifecycle, session
keep/except semantics.
- e2e TestAdminAccountFlow: static login page reachable without auth,
wrong password 401, login sets HttpOnly cookie + mustChangePassword,
admin creates user (409 on duplicate), non-admin create 403, forced
change clears flag and old password dies, admin reset revokes sessions
and re-arms forced change, API-key channel untouched, 5-fail backoff
429, logout kills session. Full go test ./... green.
Impact: middleware now accepts Bearer key OR session cookie and exempts
static + /api/auth/login (also fixes the latent case where the login
page itself could 401). Embedded no-auth mode unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-09-30-ui-redesign-and-auth.md section 5 (admin-issued
variant, user decision 2026-09-30)
weichen
