Why: PR #209 is behind main by 14 commits (admin passwords, managed
interpreter path, U8 SQLite instance guard, EXT-20 regulations) and conflicted
in app wiring, host capabilities, migrations and the extension surface; the
user authorized merging the renderer line on 2026-10-18.
Evidence: content is the agent-exec transport 87a99ece (cursor worker, unit
backend-task10-sync-main-56a7f9f-r2, receipt
/tmp/cleanup-20261018/render/backend-sync-run2.json, SELF): gofmt, go build,
go vet and go test ./... (43 packages) passed. Host check: main migrations
1-36 unchanged, feature migrations moved from 36-47 to 37-48 in order with
identical SQL, surface.txt is the sorted union.
Impact: main's migration 36 instance_guard stays authoritative; databases that
ran unmerged feature builds with the old numbering must be recreated.
SurfaceVersion becomes 2.24.0-experimental.
Refs: PR #209, Backend main 56a7f9f
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: Integrate Backend origin/main 7aa6243 while retaining the product's mandatory trusted project-context startup contract.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/... ./internal/app -count=1; go vet ./...; go test ./... -count=1; go build ./...; CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system.
Impact: Keep the appOptions helper and exec-environment fallbacks while forwarding RequireProjectContext without loss.
Refs: 92f9286e6c4004074f014902f8b04554287ddfb2; 7aa624370a
Why: RDM starts the server through extension.Main, which dropped ExecDepsDir, ExecWorkspace, and ExecEnvRoot, so a deployed product ignored the layered Python environment.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/link/ passed on this worktree (SELF).
Impact: a product binary reads the same AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_* variables as the base CLI when its own flags are empty; explicit Options still win.
Refs: Agent-System-Dev PR 570
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: The W4b verifier branch must include the current compiled-plugin host option surface before review.
Evidence: Focused extension, app, server, and command-bus tests pass after preserving both public API additions.
Impact: The public surface advances to 2.23.0-experimental and exposes both human-decision and compiled-plugin capabilities.
Refs: W4b human decision verifier
Why: A model-visible flag cannot prove that a person confirmed one proposal revision and payload hash.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension ./internal/app ./internal/server -run 'HumanDecision|SurfaceSnapshot|ResolveHuman|NaturalLanguage' passed locally.
Impact: SurfaceVersion 2.22.0-experimental adds HumanDecisionVerifier. Existing Host methods stay unchanged, and the base does not consume the proof.
Refs: W4b human confirmation design r1
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: Project retrieval hits, tool results, and saved visible analysis must be individually traceable and fully analyzed before later project actions consume them.
Evidence: RED tests first showed missing run-source capture, tool-result capture, and run-wide preflight; go test -p 1 ./... and go build ./... passed; isolated PostgreSQL source, migration, audit, and context tests passed.
Impact: Persist actual run-bound sources with current-status checks and exact manifests behind the disabled X3 assembly gate; no live product path, migration, deployment, or release is enabled.
Refs: TT-N03, TT-R01; approved X3 stage-five plan r1
Why: A durable observation receipt must not be mistaken for completed risk analysis or permission to execute a project action.
Evidence: Exact-source preflight tests cover pending versus proceed, partial attachment, post-ACK source tampering, current authorization, and receipt idempotency; go test -p 1 ./... and go build ./... passed.
Impact: Add a fail-closed host preflight helper and per-message manifest read, still unwired to the public product path pending recovery and four-route coverage.
Refs: TT-N03, TT-R01; approved X3 design r1
Why: X3 must share one Backend surface with the X1 context and X2 audit candidates while current main now owns account migrations 32-34.
Evidence: go test -p 1 ./... and go build ./... passed on the merged tree; isolated PostgreSQL project audit, migration, and work-context tests passed against a temporary instance. Default parallel go test ./... had only the unrelated sandbox orphan timing test fail; its isolated ten-run replay passed.
Impact: Preserve account migrations 32-34, place X1/X2 migrations at 35-43, and retain account-effective write guards alongside project audit/context behavior. X3 observer remains a contract only.
Refs: TT-C01-TT-C04, TT-A01-TT-A04, TT-N03, TT-R01; combination probe d9b00c2
Why: Real project messages and retrieved material need a scoped observer and preflight decision contract before they can become governed project candidates.
Evidence: Registration denial test was RED before the implementation; go test ./... passed on Backend origin/main 2716b9e.
Impact: Add public X3 types and trusted single-provider registration; the production observer slot is deliberately not wired yet, so no project observation behavior is claimed.
Refs: TT-N03, TT-R01; approved work observation stage-five plan r1
Why: RDM's sandbox policy must run after HostOptions are merged and be able to refuse startup when bwrap is missing.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -count=1 passed on this tree (SELF).
Impact: InProc.Prepare and PrepareCompiled; serve applies plugin rewrites before app.Run.
Refs: feature/svc-plugin-host-options
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: a composed base binary must apply plugin startup defaults and plugin-owned flags without a downstream main.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -count=1 (SELF, this commit's parent tree plus these files).
Impact: blank-imported plugins can set HostOptions and a CLI hook; GET /api/registry gains a compiled id list; explicit serve flags still win.
Refs: plugins/registry compose deploy
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: RDM delegated rename rebuilt the creator Host and could commit a Backend project rename after the delegated operator was disabled.
Evidence: SQLite and isolated PostgreSQL targeted checks cover operator/creator disable order, two processes, sorted locks, auth-off local compatibility, and HTTP/command Host wiring; exact committed-head replay remains pending.
Impact: Adds a request-bound single-project extension capability and checks operator plus creator in the final Backend transaction. Global ScopedHost cannot derive delegated authority; RDM cross-database atomicity remains outside the promise.
Refs: Approved Documents delegated-projection amendment 5783940, U3 A1-A4 candidate adcd8fe, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: Both approved Backend slices share extension surfaces and migration numbers, and current main added account audit v31.
Evidence: The isolated probe resolves additive interfaces and v31-v40 ordering; focused and full Go tests passed without PostgreSQL.
Impact: Produces a local integration candidate for isolated PostgreSQL and race verification only; shipping branches remain unchanged.
Refs: feature/rdm-two-trees-latest-templates W6 W9
Why: Explicit low IDs bypassed the implicit sequence allocator and could commit after a higher audit page cutoff.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL RED receipt for cross-page omission; local GREEN for explicit and default writes, trigger drift, isolation, mutation denial, offline copy rollback, retry, and sequence non-rewind. Fixed-HEAD receipts follow.
Impact: Add v34 all-writer and append-only guards; reject unsafe strong reads; make command audit storage migration exclusive and atomic with guard restoration and a forward-only sequence.
Refs: Approved W9 all-writers cutoff adjustment r1; W9 Backend task card.
Why: PostgreSQL sequence IDs could commit out of order and make fixed project audit cursors permanently skip a late row.
Evidence: SELF PG cross-page RED, CACHE 10 counterexample, configuration drift RED/GREEN, and pre-commit Go, PG migration, and race receipts are recorded in the W9 task card. Fixed-HEAD checks follow this commit.
Impact: Guard implicit command audit ID allocation with a transaction advisory lock; reject unsafe sequence/default drift; preserve explicit-ID storage migration; report committed-prefix only for verified project pages.
Refs: Approved W9 PostgreSQL cutoff adjustment r1; W9 Backend task card.
Why: Goal-sensitive workflow verification persisted model prompts and prior output text in trusted receipt rows, while cross-step model inputs could reuse stale machine output.
Evidence: RED receipt privacy test; full Go suite, targeted race, isolated PostgreSQL store/runmgr/storage-migrate tests, vet, and static build passed locally before commit. A known unrelated TempDir cleanup flake failed once and passed on targeted and serial full replay.
Impact: Add optional same-provider source recheck, verify every included item and evidence body before reuse, gate cross-step outputs, reject unsettled attempts, remove raw scope columns, scrub isolated candidate v34 SQLite/PG schemas, and reject unsafe backups.
Refs: Approved RDM stage6 W6 source-recheck design adjustment r1; W6 independent review.
Why: Compiled workflow critics could resend a prior prompt output after document duty or publication changed across separate model guards.
Evidence: RED cross-guard revocation and retry tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted go test -race passed locally before commit.
Impact: Bind materialized prompt bytes to the engine step attempt and responded model receipt; recheck current project sources and epochs before judging, failing closed for unproven or ambiguous output.
Refs: RDM two-trees stage5 W6; stage6 X1 public extension request; W6 independent review P1.
Why: Clock-derived IDs could collide and string-scoped hosts could impersonate a registered audit publisher.
Evidence: Fixed-clock concurrent, ambiguous private offset, forged scoped-host, and registered publisher RED-to-GREEN tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted race test passed locally as SELF.
Impact: Generate 192-bit host IDs, reject ambiguous explicit offsets, and issue a publication-only capability at verifier registration.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1; review of a8fa2fe
Why: Administrator-issued password and login-key paths could take over target accounts, while old credentials and plugin handles ignored current account state.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-backend-all-replay.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-final-pg-core.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-build.json, and focused HTTP/concurrency receipts in /tmp/iam-u3-*.json.
Impact: Adds trusted pending-account initialization and reissue, preexisting owner-session proof, proposal/rotation/grant transactions, server-side admin search, current Host guards, and legacy HTTP/CLI closure. Production cutover and downstream pins remain pending.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: A domain outbox could not correlate its committed event with the host receipt because the bus generated the operation ID after the handler returned.
Evidence: RED-to-GREEN bus and compiled-handler tests; local go test ./... -count=1 and isolated PostgreSQL operation/link checks passed as SELF.
Impact: Expose a host-generated operation ID to handlers and resolve a unique committed audit offset after dispatch; missing receipts remain retryable and ambiguous rows fail closed.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1
Why: Project work currently reaches model calls without current authorized project facts or a persisted input receipt.
Evidence: SELF go test ./... -count=1, targeted go test -race for W6 paths, go vet ./..., and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed on this change set.
Impact: Add optional X1 interfaces, trusted persisted work-task binding, request-scoped context injection, evidence reauthorization, and attempted/responded/unknown manifests. Existing non-project behavior stays available.
Refs: TT-C01 TT-C02 TT-C03 TT-C04; stage5 W6; Dev stage6 X1 public extension request r1
Why: Owner-only command audit cannot prove shared business commits, and button dispatch omitted its authenticated actor.
Evidence: Local go test ./... passed; isolated PostgreSQL cutoff, link, and SQLite-to-PostgreSQL migration receipts are recorded as SELF in the task card.
Impact: Add an optional domain-verified metadata link, exact authorized cross-member read, idempotent storage, actor propagation, and honest PostgreSQL cutoff coverage. Broad audit pagination and other sources remain pending.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1
Why: Project audit cannot use owner-wide logs or current conversation project state to establish trusted attribution.
Evidence: RED cases were observed locally; go test ./pkg/extension ./internal/store ./internal/app -count=1 passed on this tree (SELF).
Impact: Add optional X2 read and audit.read callback, immutable project/name snapshots, safe owner-only projection, and explicit unsupported coverage. Cross-member publication remains pending.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; Stage 6 X2 public extension request
Why: The old account lister exposed a global, always-valid directory without a domain locator or field authorization.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-sqlite.json and /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-pg.json.
Impact: Adds versioned optional query and exact lookup, trusted RDM scope registration, visible-field cursor binding, and restricts legacy EXT-19 to effective system administrators. RDM consumption remains a separate U3-5 unit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why:
Legacy project metadata can contain credentials outside the settings scope table.
Sharing raw projection settings exposed them, and generic project PATCH bypassed
the system-managed path guard already enforced by project settings endpoints.
Evidence:
SELF member Host regression failed before the fix. The fixed 4f72aaf server
baseline overlay reproduced HTTP metadata leakage and managed PATCH returning 200.
SELF shared Host-to-HTTP, immutable mask, dotted/schema/fallback, public mutation
and atomic managed-write regressions passed; uncached full suite, isolated PG
Store suite and static build passed. Independent delta replay remains a gate.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle metadata returns detached credential-masked views while
preserving service/configuration keys and persisted data. Generic project PATCH
shares the existing managed validator before rename or settings mutation; allowed
metadata key shapes and raw owner-only management lookups remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1 and R5; approved hard secret boundary;
2026-10-13 shared project metadata review follow-up
Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why: main gained AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN fallback in #182 after this branch
was cut. Both changes touch identity DSN parsing.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/ ./internal/store/ ./cmd/agent-system/ for the identity, schema, and unknown-subcommand cases passed after the resolution.
Impact: keeps open-existing identity mode and the 0600 dsn file. Environment
DSN still wins when --dsn is absent, via ResolveDSN.
Refs: Backend #182; recovery plan r3.1 D1
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: a rollback can only be safe when the candidate says which schema it
will migrate to and whether older binaries can still read that schema.
A new migration that forgets to register that fact must fail the test.
Evidence: go test ./internal/store/ ./pkg/identity/ -run 'TestMigrationCompat|TestCapabilities' passed.
Impact: version --json and identity capabilities include schema.target and
schema.compatFloor. Every migration version is listed in
migrationBreaksOldReaders. Current versions do not break old readers, so
the floor stays 0.
Refs: recovery plan r3.1 D2
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: identity ensure/verify went through the normal store open, which
creates a database and runs migrations. A deploy gate that calls the
candidate before stopping the old service could migrate production
ahead of the switch, and a missing database was turned into an empty one.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/ ./internal/store/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -run 'TestCapabilities|TestEnsure|TestVerify|TestDSN|TestUsage|TestSystemIdentity|TestOpenIdentity|TestUnknownSubcommand' passed in this worktree.
Impact: identity CLI refuses a missing file or a missing agent_system_identity table, does not migrate, reads DSN from the environment or a 0600 file, and version --json plus identity capabilities emit one capability document. Unknown top-level commands exit 2.
Refs: recovery plan r3.1 D1; Dev feature/svc-d1-identity-flow
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: svc.sh delivers database credentials via environment per G1-7
(command lines are visible to every process on the host), but identity
ensure/verify only accepted --dsn on the command line for pg-bound
instances.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/... ok; build ok.
Impact: --dsn remains highest priority, then AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN, then
embedded SQLite; no storage changes.
Refs: Dev U3 (real-combination CI gates); G1-7 credential discipline.
Why: runIdentity lived in cmd/agent-system package main, so downstream
combination binaries (Agent-System-RDM) cannot reuse it and their unknown
subcommands fall into the serve path; the 2026-10-12 rdm1/rdmcand batch
update failures traced back to that capability gap.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/... ok; CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ok;
behavioral probes (usage rc=2, capabilities v1, ensure/verify roundtrip)
recorded in the PR.
Impact: identity semantics unchanged for the base binary; adds
identity capabilities (v1) and usage-on-unknown contract shared by all
products; no storage changes.
Refs: Dev PR #474 (svc.sh candidate gate); user root-cause report
2026-10-12 U1 (shared identity interface).
Why: the admin zone could not host plugin-declared partitions - KTD4
requires the RDM audit partition to be reachable by RDM domain admins and
base superadmins without hardcoding RDM into the base AdminZone.
Evidence: go test ./internal/app ./internal/server ./pkg/extension green
incl. new admin-zone recording/endpoint tests; surface snapshot test
green after surface.txt update; CI (Dev composite) is authoritative.
Impact: extension surface 2.8.0 -> 2.9.0 (Registry.AddAdminZone +
AdminZoneSpec, fail-closed on invalid specs); applyCompiled records
declarations into the plugin summary; new authenticated GET
/api/admin-zone/sections returns the flattened, ordered declaration list.
Entry visibility stays metadata-only - data capability remains enforced
by each section's own command surface (fail-closed).
Refs: WP3-I3/KTD4; task card feature-adminzone-plugin-sections.
Why: Generative UI proposal U2 needs the host side of the contract:
owner-isolated surface storage with revision CAS, an execution-level
enable/disable ledger (default-off, epoch bumped on every transition so
in-flight submits after a disable are rejected), a single-choke-point
service that validates specs (strict decode + catalog rules) before
saving, event publish with pending recovery, the optional SurfaceHost
extension capability, and direct API endpoints that share the same
guard (no bypass by entrance).
Evidence: go build/vet clean; full go test ./... passes (SQLite);
surface store tests also pass under AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN (PostgreSQL);
surface.txt regenerated via the AST snapshot test.
Impact: Additive migration v22 (new tables only); existing endpoints and
plugin_grants semantics untouched; old consumers unaffected. U3+ (data
binding, actions, frontend) deliberately out of scope.
Refs: Documents proposal 2026-10-10-generative-ui-plugin.md (r2 U2);
Core PR #25; Dev task feature/generative-ui-u2
Why: TestSurfaceSnapshot compares the exported-symbol list verbatim;
Registry.AddIntent and IntentSpec (SurfaceVersion 2.7.0-experimental)
are intentional additions.
Evidence: pkg/extension suite green; full go test ./... 32/32 packages
green.
Impact: surface.txt only.
Why: plan G2-2 requires plugin commands reachable via slash aliases
through the same bus and audit envelope (EXT-10②), and a natural-
language routing entry so '帮我写项目建议书' can reach the compile
flow. The agent-command lib now carries a validated Slash field
(lib PR #6, pin bumped to 4f583ca); the bus binds plugin-spec aliases
into the same slash table; intents are declared via the extension
registry and routed deterministically (normalized containment, longest
phrase first) to commands through the bus — the system.intent builtin
(/intent) is the chat-entrance dispatch point with a candidate list on
miss.
Evidence: TestPluginSlashAliasBindsAndDispatches — alias binds, case/
whitespace-normalized resolution, slash and button entrances hit the
same command handler with committed receipts; TestIntentDeclareMatch
Route — declare/validate, miss on unrelated text, normalized hit,
bus-dispatch through the chat entrance, longest-phrase priority;
server suite green with the dual-entry pair registered; full go test
./... 31/31 packages green.
Impact: cmdbus plugin-spec slash binding + IntentStore; extension
Registry.AddIntent + IntentSpec (SurfaceVersion 2.7.0-experimental);
pluginRegistry.AddIntent wires plugin-declared intents; server
builtin system.intent; command-pairs fixture extended.
Refs: plan G2-2 (line 366); EXT-10②; lib PR #6 (4f583ca).
Why: Q2 ruled exec tools stay disabled for now but code execution must
return later; the recovery path treats model-generated code as
untrusted. This abstracts the interpreter launch point in
exec_interpreter.go into an ExecBackend port (direct = byte-identical
status quo; sandbox = bwrap isolation) so downstream products can
re-enable execution behind isolation without further base surgery.
Evidence: go build/vet clean; go test ./... 32/32 packages green;
sandbox escape negatives all blocked locally (bwrap 0.11.1): home
secret unreadable (tmpfs /home), sibling session unreadable
(session-only bind), network blocked (--unshare-net), 400-process
spawn storm capped by ulimit -u 256 (fork: retry), 60s sleep killed at
3s timeout, orphans die with the namespace; session-dir write visible
on host; direct backend regression (exit=7 / exit=timeout texts)
unchanged.
Impact: run_shell/run_python route through the backend; workflow
ScriptCommand and the squad kernel ExecConfig stay direct (follow-up
scope); config key execBackend + env AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_BACKEND + CLI
--exec-backend; extension.Options.ExecBackend (SurfaceVersion
2.6.0-experimental); DisableExecTools remains the top-priority
fail-closed switch.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3-exec-backend.md section 4
(EXT-16, G2-8 prototype); Backend #110 (DisableExecTools).
Why: The DOCX parser only read w:r runs that were direct children of w:p, so
text inside w:ins, w:hyperlink and w:fldSimple was dropped with no warning,
violating the no-silent-degradation rule. Separately, runtime.exec is a
user-writable setting, so multi-user deployments could not reliably turn the
exec primitives off.
Evidence: SELF - red tests TestParseDocxTrackedChangesAndHyperlinks and
TestExecHardDisabledOverridesSettings failed before and pass after; backend
go test ./... (32 packages) passes; a mock-mode binary started with
--disable-exec-tools hides run_shell/run_python/register_artifact from
/api/tools even after the user sets runtime.exec=true.
Impact: DOCX paragraphs are decoded from the token stream at any depth;
deleted/moved-from text, field codes and mc:Fallback are excluded and
revised documents carry an explicit warning. New Options.DisableExecTools
(SurfaceVersion 2.5.0-experimental), CLI --disable-exec-tools, config key
disableExecTools and env AGENT_SYSTEM_DISABLE_EXEC_TOOLS; zero value keeps
current behavior.
Refs: Agent-System-RDM docs/proposals/2026-10-09-V22-review-and-implementation-plan.md (G0-7, B-5)
Why: EXT-11 is accepted; the surface (SetScopedHostFactory/NewScopedHost, SurfaceVersion 2.4.0-experimental) must land with the behavioral red pinned - wiring absent, NewScopedHost fails closed with ErrNotLinked.
Evidence: TestScopedHostFactory red at the wired-factory assertion; row follows on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt +2 symbols); internal wireScopedHostFactory stub. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-11 proposal; task card.
Why: Knowledge retrieval cross-owner and conversation-card mirroring are the registered EXT-8 slice-2 items; the fields/wiring land with the acceptance reds pinned first.
Evidence: mirror red (project channel still emitted with switch off); shared-retrieval red (grant yields 0 hits); SSE-scope red (grant yields non-200); rows follow on the task card.
Impact: Options.DisableConvCardMirror passthrough (extension/link/app); cardsvc.MirrorConvCards (default true = current behavior); SurfaceVersion 2.3.0-experimental. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-8/EXT-12 proposals; task card.
Why: EXT-9 is the other step-4 hard prerequisite; the surface (Options.DisableUploadIndexing passthrough, Host.KnowledgePublish idempotent replace, Host.KnowledgeDelete prefix-enforced revoke, SurfaceVersion 2.2.0-experimental) must land with the acceptance reds pinned before implementation.
Evidence: app red = publish not implemented; server red = switch-on still indexes (hits=1); rows recorded on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt updated); internal Options passthrough; Server.DisableUploadIndexing field; host method stubs. Behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-9 proposal; task card.
Why: EXT-8 is accepted (Documents #49); the surface (Registry.RegisterResourceAuthorizer, ResourceAuthorizer, SurfaceVersion 2.1.0-experimental) plus the Server injection seam must land before the read-path consultation, and the behavioral red run proves the gap.
Evidence: go test ./internal/server -run TestProjectResourceAuthorizerSharesReads FAIL (shared read 404 with adapter set); default-deny section passes; row recorded on the task card.
Impact: pkg/extension additive surface (surface.txt updated); projectAuthz slot in hostcaps; Server.ProjectAuthz + setter; app wiring after compiled load; declarative registry fails closed. Read behavior unchanged.
Refs: EXT-8 in Documents 2026-10-08-ext-c1-c7-rdm-shared-contracts; task card.
Why: downstream parsers are unreachable via extension.Host and the base lacked xlsx/pptx parsers; MS1 needs Excel and PPT ingest (EXT-5 request, documents proposal 2026-10-06-ext-5-host-parse-document).
Evidence: local GOWORK=off go test ./... all 29 packages pass incl. new ooxml_test (hand-built parts), ooxml_python_test (openpyxl/python-pptx round-trip), inproc owner-scope and limit tests, xlsx upload e2e; go vet clean; recorded as SELF on the Dev task card, PR CI to confirm.
Impact: Host gains ParseDocument (pure compute; errors only on ctx cancel or >100MiB input); builtin:xlsx (sheet order via workbook.xml rels, rich-text shared strings, formula cache, 1900/1904 dates, sparse cells) and builtin:pptx (sldIdLst order, titles, group shapes, AlternateContent Choice, tables, notes) added with 200k-cell/64MiB-part caps; legacy doc/xls/ppt get an actionable hint; ParsersDescription gains xlsx/pptx and the missing text ext; surface snapshot now records exported interface methods; docx part reads share the 64MiB cap.
Refs: documents 2026-10-06-ext-5-host-parse-document.md; EXT-1 host.go precedent.
weichenandCursor