Why: the sandbox hides /home and only remounts the resolved Python prefix, so executing python/current/bin/python3 failed before the base layer could be imported.
Evidence: go test ./internal/tools/ -run TestResolveInterpreterFollowsManagedSymlink passed, and env doctor against the built base layer printed doctor ok (SELF).
Impact: run_python and env doctor follow the symlink into the mounted prefix or /usr/bin/python3. The layer and the prefix mount stay the same.
Refs: Agent-System-Backend PR 207
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: The sandbox hides the host home directory and has no network, so pip install --user cannot supply python-docx, and the service PATH resolved python3 to a linuxbrew path that does not exist inside the sandbox.
Evidence: SELF go test of execenv, tools, store, app, server, runmgr, config, and cmd/agent-system on this worktree. CI has not run.
Impact: Sessions inherit a read-only base layer. Extra packages are requested through python_env, auto-approved only from the allowlist, and mounted per conversation. Schema 35 adds the request and binding tables.
Refs: .task/feature-layered-python-env.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: RDM's sandbox policy must run after HostOptions are merged and be able to refuse startup when bwrap is missing.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -count=1 passed on this tree (SELF).
Impact: InProc.Prepare and PrepareCompiled; serve applies plugin rewrites before app.Run.
Refs: feature/svc-plugin-host-options
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: a composed base binary must apply plugin startup defaults and plugin-owned flags without a downstream main.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -count=1 (SELF, this commit's parent tree plus these files).
Impact: blank-imported plugins can set HostOptions and a CLI hook; GET /api/registry gains a compiled id list; explicit serve flags still win.
Refs: plugins/registry compose deploy
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: U7 account audit and identity gates advanced on main while U3 account initialization and recovery were in progress.
Evidence: SELF merge-tree checks passed with go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL store/server tests; exact-head replay follows.
Impact: Preserve pending-account grants, proof-linked recovery, protected CLI delivery, account serialization, and atomic audit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1; U7 PR #185
Why: Administrator-issued password and login-key paths could take over target accounts, while old credentials and plugin handles ignored current account state.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-backend-all-replay.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-final-pg-core.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-build.json, and focused HTTP/concurrency receipts in /tmp/iam-u3-*.json.
Impact: Adds trusted pending-account initialization and reissue, preexisting owner-session proof, proposal/rotation/grant transactions, server-side admin search, current Host guards, and legacy HTTP/CLI closure. Production cutover and downstream pins remain pending.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: API-key issuance shares the account maintenance no-create and credential-output contract; the old CLI printed its key and lacked --out-file.
Evidence: The new subprocess test failed before the flag existed, then passed for private output and pre-mutation collision refusal; current go vet and all Go tests pass.
Impact: apikey create accepts protected --dsn-file and --out-file, preserves stdout default, and never overwrites an existing destination.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; U7 KTD14
Why: Deliver U7 account transactions and audit without losing main auth_version, restricted-session, project or migration behavior.
Evidence: SELF go vet and all Go tests passed; isolated PostgreSQL store tests, 20 repeated two-process admission rounds, and real SIGTERM/SIGKILL persistence passed. Original failures remain in receipts; exact-head CI and independent Review follow.
Impact: Adds schema v31, noncreating account CLI opens, preflight credential output, same-transaction audit, and bootstrap admission guards. No live database touched.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; original U7 r2 account specification; 2026-10-14 Root takeover
Why: The login recovery contract leftovers and KTD12/KTD14 require:
concurrent same-name account creation must not overwrite the winner,
first-admin bootstrap must serialize across processes, the redeem
endpoint backoff must be shared across instances, revoked API keys
must close established SSE streams, and CLI credentials need an
env-DSN path plus a non-interactive 0600 file delivery mode.
Evidence: go test ./... green; new tests cover 16-way concurrent
create (1 win/15 conflict, winner credentials intact), 8-way
concurrent bootstrap (single admin, refuse takeover after), redeem
guard shared across two store handles on one DB, SSE stream closed
after key revocation within the recheck window, and HTTP 429 after
the failure cap (SELF worktree run; CI is the GATE, PG via test-pg).
Impact: Migration v29 (redeem_attempts); CreateAccount becomes a
single-row INSERT with unique-violation conflict; BootstrapFirstAdmin
advisory-locks (PG) / rechecks (SQLite) and commits admin+key+audit in
one transaction; SSE revalidation covers API-key streams; redeem
backoff moves to the shared DB; CLI gains AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN fallback
and --out file delivery for create/reset-password/issue-login-key/
bootstrap-admin.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/2026-10-13-login-recovery-contract.md leftovers;
proposal r2 KTD12/KTD14/R5/R11.
Why: identity open and the unknown-subcommand check landed on main, and this branch still has to refuse account migration while advertising capabilities.
Evidence: go test ./internal/store ./internal/app ./cmd/agent-system ./pkg/identity passed after the merge.
Impact: identity verify uses the no-migrate opener and returns the schema version. Account open still does not migrate. v28 is registered as readable by older artifacts.
Refs: cmd/agent-system/main.go, internal/app/app.go, internal/store/store.go, internal/store/migrate_compat.go
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: creating an account and its activation key, and changing a password, were separate commits, so a crash could leave a user without a key or a new password with a still-valid login key.
Evidence: SELF go test ./internal/store including TestConcurrentCreateOneWinner, TestPasswordChangeIsAtomic, TestOpenExistingDoesNotMigrateOrCreate, and TestBootstrapRefusesExistingBusiness. PostgreSQL cases are NOT_RUN locally.
Impact: strict insert returns ErrConflict instead of overwriting. Account CLI opens an existing database without migrating. --dsn and --password still work and warn. capabilities --json does not touch the database.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/u7-account-tx-audit.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: identity ensure/verify went through the normal store open, which
creates a database and runs migrations. A deploy gate that calls the
candidate before stopping the old service could migrate production
ahead of the switch, and a missing database was turned into an empty one.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/ ./internal/store/ ./cmd/agent-system/ -run 'TestCapabilities|TestEnsure|TestVerify|TestDSN|TestUsage|TestSystemIdentity|TestOpenIdentity|TestUnknownSubcommand' passed in this worktree.
Impact: identity CLI refuses a missing file or a missing agent_system_identity table, does not migrate, reads DSN from the environment or a 0600 file, and version --json plus identity capabilities emit one capability document. Unknown top-level commands exit 2.
Refs: recovery plan r3.1 D1; Dev feature/svc-d1-identity-flow
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: runIdentity lived in cmd/agent-system package main, so downstream
combination binaries (Agent-System-RDM) cannot reuse it and their unknown
subcommands fall into the serve path; the 2026-10-12 rdm1/rdmcand batch
update failures traced back to that capability gap.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/identity/... ok; CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ok;
behavioral probes (usage rc=2, capabilities v1, ensure/verify roundtrip)
recorded in the PR.
Impact: identity semantics unchanged for the base binary; adds
identity capabilities (v1) and usage-on-unknown contract shared by all
products; no storage changes.
Refs: Dev PR #474 (svc.sh candidate gate); user root-cause report
2026-10-12 U1 (shared identity interface).
Why: U1 I3 needs a DB-side instance identity anchor matching
manifest.instance_id so wrong/missing DB blocks startup (I4).
Evidence: go test ./internal/store/ ./internal/app/; CLI smoke
ensure/verify on SQLite temp dir.
Impact: migration v26; store Ensure/Verify; identity subcommand;
serve checks AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID when set.
Refs: docs/recovery/u1-identity-manifest.md §5.2; Dev feature/recovery-u1-db-identity
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: passwordless activation/recovery must redeem only into a
set-password session; account ops must not create empty stores.
Evidence: SELF go test store/server login-key and OpenExisting cases.
Impact: auth middleware gates; CLI user create defaults to activate key.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/u4-one-time-login-key.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: the approved collaboration plan U2 (KTD1/KTD8/KTD12) requires an explicit fail-closed team deployment tier, DDL-and-ledger-atomic migrations serialized across migrators, and a configurable PG connection budget with sanitized effective values.
Evidence: real PostgreSQL 18.6 + pgvector + Redis 8.10.2 local gate - full backend suite green twice with AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN/AGENT_REDIS_TEST_ADDR (isolated svc.sh instance collabtest:8897, redis 6399); SQLite suite green without env.
Impact: config tier+pool keys and validation; store PoolOptions + statement_timeout DSN param + single-transaction migration with PG advisory lock and SQLite _txlock=immediate + unknown-schema-version refusal; app tier guard fail-closed (team requires DSN+auth, no SQLite fallback); CLI flags and explain rows; tests for tier/pool parsing, atomicity fault-injection, racing migrators, old-schema upgrade; fixed pre-existing real-PG test defects (blind &search_path= appends in runmgr/pgbus helpers, pg_trgm per-schema install race, exhausted seq-conflict retries).
Refs: proposals/2026-10-11-collaboration-storage-and-distribution.md U2, KTD1/KTD8/KTD12; R2/R3/R7.
Why: The sandbox tier wrote the session directory directly, so a buggy
or runaway script could leave the workspace half-mutated and nothing
bounded what a timeout had already written. The plan's first landing
shape (section 4.4) swaps the session bind for a frozen-base overlay:
each exec freezes the session dir (hardlink clone + sha256 baseline),
runs on a private upper, and only a clean exit promotes the change set
back via CAS (baseline hash match -> atomic replace/remove; externally
changed targets double-store as *.conflict-* instead of clobbering).
Timeouts and kills discard the upper entirely - half-written state
never lands.
Evidence: go test ./... green including bwrap integration roundtrips
(TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayRoundtrip: add/modify/delete through a real
overlayfs upper with whiteout handling and ws cleanup;
TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayTimeoutDiscards: partial writes discarded on
timeout) and unit anchors for freeze manifest (.agentx excluded), CAS
add/modify, conflict double-store, and the change summary.
Impact: Opt-in via --exec-workspace overlay / AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_WORKSPACE
(only with --exec-backend sandbox; fail-closed on unknown modes). The
model sees a one-line change summary appended to the tool output, so
discards and conflict files are visible. Default behavior is unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-10-agent-delegation-routing-sandbox.md section
4.4; Dev task feature/agent-s0-workspace-overlay.
Why: Real runs were fully serial: the direct path never set the kernel's
parallel tool mode, delegate_task handed the parent only the child's
160-char summary (the full text was dropped), MiniMax streamed its
reasoning inside content <think> blocks, and the EXT-16 sandbox hid
~/.local so python-docx/openpyxl/pptx could not even import. All four
were measured defects (F1/F2/F3/F5) in the delegation/routing proposal.
Why: Serial-only mutual exclusion is not enough for order-sensitive
tools - the card-stream test failed with out-of-order appends - so the
ordering moved into the kernel (SerialTools partition, Agent-Native
#44); process events pair by CallID (#42) and tool results write back
through the injected call context (#43).
Evidence: go test ./... green, including new regression anchors:
TestDelegateToolReturnsFullText, TestToolEventsPairByCallID,
TestToolExecModeAndSerialSet, TestOpenLLMClientReasoningSplitAuto,
TestSandboxArgvDepsLayer, TestExecEnvJoinsPythonPath.
Impact: Direct runs now execute independent same-turn calls
(searches, reads, delegate_task, review_findings) concurrently by
default (runtime.parallelTools=false restores sequential); card flow,
plans, workflows, exec primitives and file edits keep model-declared
order. delegate_task returns the capped full child text. MiniMax-*
models get reasoning_split=true so thinking streams via
reasoning_content. --exec-deps-dir/AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_DEPS_DIR mounts a
read-only dependency layer into the sandbox and merges PYTHONPATH.
Bumps deps/agent-native to c348441.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-10-agent-delegation-routing-sandbox.md (E1,
F1-F5); Agent-Native #42/#43/#44; Dev task feature/agent-e1-parallel-fixes.
Why: Q2 ruled exec tools stay disabled for now but code execution must
return later; the recovery path treats model-generated code as
untrusted. This abstracts the interpreter launch point in
exec_interpreter.go into an ExecBackend port (direct = byte-identical
status quo; sandbox = bwrap isolation) so downstream products can
re-enable execution behind isolation without further base surgery.
Evidence: go build/vet clean; go test ./... 32/32 packages green;
sandbox escape negatives all blocked locally (bwrap 0.11.1): home
secret unreadable (tmpfs /home), sibling session unreadable
(session-only bind), network blocked (--unshare-net), 400-process
spawn storm capped by ulimit -u 256 (fork: retry), 60s sleep killed at
3s timeout, orphans die with the namespace; session-dir write visible
on host; direct backend regression (exit=7 / exit=timeout texts)
unchanged.
Impact: run_shell/run_python route through the backend; workflow
ScriptCommand and the squad kernel ExecConfig stay direct (follow-up
scope); config key execBackend + env AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_BACKEND + CLI
--exec-backend; extension.Options.ExecBackend (SurfaceVersion
2.6.0-experimental); DisableExecTools remains the top-priority
fail-closed switch.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3-exec-backend.md section 4
(EXT-16, G2-8 prototype); Backend #110 (DisableExecTools).
Why: The DOCX parser only read w:r runs that were direct children of w:p, so
text inside w:ins, w:hyperlink and w:fldSimple was dropped with no warning,
violating the no-silent-degradation rule. Separately, runtime.exec is a
user-writable setting, so multi-user deployments could not reliably turn the
exec primitives off.
Evidence: SELF - red tests TestParseDocxTrackedChangesAndHyperlinks and
TestExecHardDisabledOverridesSettings failed before and pass after; backend
go test ./... (32 packages) passes; a mock-mode binary started with
--disable-exec-tools hides run_shell/run_python/register_artifact from
/api/tools even after the user sets runtime.exec=true.
Impact: DOCX paragraphs are decoded from the token stream at any depth;
deleted/moved-from text, field codes and mc:Fallback are excluded and
revised documents carry an explicit warning. New Options.DisableExecTools
(SurfaceVersion 2.5.0-experimental), CLI --disable-exec-tools, config key
disableExecTools and env AGENT_SYSTEM_DISABLE_EXEC_TOOLS; zero value keeps
current behavior.
Refs: Agent-System-RDM docs/proposals/2026-10-09-V22-review-and-implementation-plan.md (G0-7, B-5)
Why: The embedded tier starts without auth, and nothing checked Origin or Host, so a public bind or a foreign page could call write APIs.
Evidence: go test ./internal/config ./internal/server covering listen policy, origin rejection, and response headers.
Impact: Non-loopback without auth exits before opening the database. HTML artifacts get a sandbox CSP. Reverse proxies must list their public host in allowedHosts.
Refs: feature/sillytavern-review
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: A hard kill left runs in pending, running, or waiting_hitl, a busy send stored a message before the 409, finishRun could mark a run completed without an assistant message, and a full SSE buffer dropped events without closing the stream.
Evidence: GOWORK=off go vet ./... and GOWORK=off go test -count=1 ./... passed, including store, runmgr, bus, and server recovery tests.
Impact: Migration v14 adds runs.instance_id and messages.request_id. Startup reconciliation and shutdown share one seal. Turn and workflow sends claim a slot before writing. Duplicate request ids return the existing message. SettleRun updates the run and appends the assistant message in one transaction. A full subscriber buffer closes the channel so SSE can replay from the cursor.
Refs: Dev feature/pi-durable-borrow
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: the user ruled out self-registration (2026-09-30): accounts are
created only by admins who set an initial password; first login (and
first login after any admin reset) must force a password change.
Evidence:
- migration v10 auth_accounts (users password/must_change/is_admin +
sessions table; upgrade test walks v1<->v10 both directions).
- argon2id hash/verify with PHC encoding; store tests cover hash
roundtrip, duplicate-owner conflict, must-change lifecycle, session
keep/except semantics.
- e2e TestAdminAccountFlow: static login page reachable without auth,
wrong password 401, login sets HttpOnly cookie + mustChangePassword,
admin creates user (409 on duplicate), non-admin create 403, forced
change clears flag and old password dies, admin reset revokes sessions
and re-arms forced change, API-key channel untouched, 5-fail backoff
429, logout kills session. Full go test ./... green.
Impact: middleware now accepts Bearer key OR session cookie and exempts
static + /api/auth/login (also fixes the latent case where the login
page itself could 401). Embedded no-auth mode unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-09-30-ui-redesign-and-auth.md section 5 (admin-issued
variant, user decision 2026-09-30)
Why: startup had only defaults and CLI flags; dev/test/prod operation needs
the standard baseline (explicit file, environment, explicit-only CLI) and a
read-only diagnostic.
Evidence: internal/config unit tests cover precedence, unset-CLI no-override,
presence-based file semantics, unknown-key/missing-file errors, env bool
parsing, explain source labelling and DSN redaction; full suite 12 packages
pass; live run of config explain with envs/prod.json shows correct layer
attribution and redaction.
Impact: serve gains --config and AGENT_SYSTEM_* env overrides (behavior
unchanged when neither is used); new config explain subcommand; envs/
examples and PROJECT.md configuration section.
Refs: documents docs/proposals/2026-09-30-configuration-surface.md; standards/configuration.md
agent-exec-transport
weichenandCursor