Why: Direct HTTP and surface command dispatch could mutate RDM project facts without an analyzed committed-message manifest.
Evidence: Command-bus, server, and app suites pass with a classification regression for formal writes and read/proof exceptions.
Impact: Formal HTTP writes require a conversation anchor and committed proceed decision; surface writes fail closed until they can carry the same proof.
Refs: TT-N03 TT-R01
Why: An interrupted import cleanup removed the cmdbus core import while two human-decision files used an explicit alias.
Evidence: go test ./internal/cmdbus ./internal/server passes.
Impact: The backend worktree is buildable and consistently names the core package without behavior changes.
Refs: W4b human decision verifier
Why: A model-visible flag cannot prove that a person confirmed one proposal revision and payload hash.
Evidence: go test ./pkg/extension ./internal/app ./internal/server -run 'HumanDecision|SurfaceSnapshot|ResolveHuman|NaturalLanguage' passed locally.
Impact: SurfaceVersion 2.22.0-experimental adds HumanDecisionVerifier. Existing Host methods stay unchanged, and the base does not consume the proof.
Refs: W4b human confirmation design r1
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: X3 must share one Backend surface with the X1 context and X2 audit candidates while current main now owns account migrations 32-34.
Evidence: go test -p 1 ./... and go build ./... passed on the merged tree; isolated PostgreSQL project audit, migration, and work-context tests passed against a temporary instance. Default parallel go test ./... had only the unrelated sandbox orphan timing test fail; its isolated ten-run replay passed.
Impact: Preserve account migrations 32-34, place X1/X2 migrations at 35-43, and retain account-effective write guards alongside project audit/context behavior. X3 observer remains a contract only.
Refs: TT-C01-TT-C04, TT-A01-TT-A04, TT-N03, TT-R01; combination probe d9b00c2
Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: Clock-derived IDs could collide and string-scoped hosts could impersonate a registered audit publisher.
Evidence: Fixed-clock concurrent, ambiguous private offset, forged scoped-host, and registered publisher RED-to-GREEN tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted race test passed locally as SELF.
Impact: Generate 192-bit host IDs, reject ambiguous explicit offsets, and issue a publication-only capability at verifier registration.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1; review of a8fa2fe
Why: A domain outbox could not correlate its committed event with the host receipt because the bus generated the operation ID after the handler returned.
Evidence: RED-to-GREEN bus and compiled-handler tests; local go test ./... -count=1 and isolated PostgreSQL operation/link checks passed as SELF.
Impact: Expose a host-generated operation ID to handlers and resolve a unique committed audit offset after dispatch; missing receipts remain retryable and ambiguous rows fail closed.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1
Why: Generative UI U3 - the agent needs a real submission path and the
next turn needs to see prior pages: a built-in in-process plugin
registers generative-ui.present (exposeAsTool) carrying the catalog
(prompt=validation single source) with a schema-repair strategy
measured against real MiniMax-M3 deviations; the command bus gains an
owner-scoped tool gate so a disabled plugin stops injecting its tool
(execution guard remains in surfacesvc); ctxasm projects saved surfaces
back into context so the model can revise existing structure; doc-refs
are authorized against the owner's real artifacts.
Evidence: unit suites green (genui guards/epoch/doc-ref, gate fail-closed,
projection content); full go test ./... green; cmdbus/ctxasm also green
under AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN; real-model closed loop (env-gated
TestRealModelSurfaceLoop) passes: task->spec->save->projection->revise
with revision 1->2 and structure change, CNY 0.08 total.
Impact: New internal/genui package; additive cmdbus/ctxasm/runmgr/
runtime hooks; no storage or contract changes (U2 layer untouched).
Refs: Documents proposal r2 U3; Core PR #25/#26; Backend #143; Dev task
feature/generative-ui-u3
Why: plan G2-2 requires plugin commands reachable via slash aliases
through the same bus and audit envelope (EXT-10②), and a natural-
language routing entry so '帮我写项目建议书' can reach the compile
flow. The agent-command lib now carries a validated Slash field
(lib PR #6, pin bumped to 4f583ca); the bus binds plugin-spec aliases
into the same slash table; intents are declared via the extension
registry and routed deterministically (normalized containment, longest
phrase first) to commands through the bus — the system.intent builtin
(/intent) is the chat-entrance dispatch point with a candidate list on
miss.
Evidence: TestPluginSlashAliasBindsAndDispatches — alias binds, case/
whitespace-normalized resolution, slash and button entrances hit the
same command handler with committed receipts; TestIntentDeclareMatch
Route — declare/validate, miss on unrelated text, normalized hit,
bus-dispatch through the chat entrance, longest-phrase priority;
server suite green with the dual-entry pair registered; full go test
./... 31/31 packages green.
Impact: cmdbus plugin-spec slash binding + IntentStore; extension
Registry.AddIntent + IntentSpec (SurfaceVersion 2.7.0-experimental);
pluginRegistry.AddIntent wires plugin-declared intents; server
builtin system.intent; command-pairs fixture extended.
Refs: plan G2-2 (line 366); EXT-10②; lib PR #6 (4f583ca).
Why: RDM's capabilities are rdm.* commands; the agent run has no bridge
to them, so the V0.1 end-to-end goal (full-conversation operation) and
the agent-driven two-trees-one-net access are unreachable (Q4 option A).
Evidence: SELF - red tests first: TestCommandToolsProjected and
TestCommandToolDispatchesThroughBus failed on undefined symbols, then
green; TestCommandToolsFiltering and TestCommandToolDispatchEnvelope
cover projection filtering (risk default low, description falls back to
title, unexposed commands absent) and the full dispatch receipt with
Entrance=agent preserved through CanonicalEntrance; go test ./... 32/32
packages ok.
Impact: agent-command pin cc1ad77 -> 5c6dd0c (library PRs #4/#5: optional
ExposeAsTool field + "agent" entrance). cmdbus gains CommandTool view and
Bus.CommandTools; runmgr gains SetCommandSource with projection into
runCtx.Tools (dedup: registry tools win) and routing in ExecuteTool -
model calls dispatch through the bus with Entrance=agent, Actor/Owner =
conversation owner, ConversationID set; high-danger commands keep the
inline-confirm-card flow via the bus; unregistered source = current
registry behavior. Composition root wires a busAdapter. No
pkg/extension change.
Refs: proposal 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3 section 2; Agent-Command #4/#5
Why: GET /api/commands/audit leaked every tenant's audit rows (command ids, entrances, conversation ids, param digests) to any authenticated user; owner was never recorded nor filtered.
Evidence: Red run at a7cc69b FAIL (alice sees bob's row); after fix go test ./... 32/32 packages ok, including TestCommandAuditOwnerScoping and the v18 backfill test (rows recorded on the task card).
Impact: v18 migration adds command_audit.owner with actor-based backfill (empty-actor rows stay invisible via API, kept in-table); AppendAudit/ListAudits gain owner params; cmdbus port and fakes updated; handler passes authenticated owner. No public extension surface change.
Refs: Task card R1; U0 proposal section 5 C7 finding.
Why: Masks must not be the only copy of a key, and personal instructions, lore hits, and candidate replies have to reach the model without rewriting the system prefix or deleting history.
Evidence: go test ./internal/store ./internal/ctxasm ./internal/settings ./internal/runtime ./internal/server. Migration v16 upgrades and rolls back. Startup snapshots settings before moving raw keys.
Impact: One labeled key is active per service. Excluding a message hides its whole run from the model. Regenerating appends another candidate and rewinds files to the user turn. User slash commands expand to prompt text and do not fire on their own.
Refs: docs/records/2026-10-04-sillytavern-review.md
Why: Downstream products must extend the base through a public package and host API instead of editing internal code.
Evidence: go test ./... passed, including plugin v2 assets, sidecar startup, migration v13, pending confirms, HITL timeout, hash embedder, command pairs, and the extension surface snapshot.
Impact: apiVersion 2.0-experimental rejects empty network allowlists for declarative HTTP. Hash embeddings stay opt-in via models.embedding.provider=hash. Plugin secrets resolve per owner at execution time.
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-10-01-plugin-contract-v2.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: the user ruled out self-registration (2026-09-30): accounts are
created only by admins who set an initial password; first login (and
first login after any admin reset) must force a password change.
Evidence:
- migration v10 auth_accounts (users password/must_change/is_admin +
sessions table; upgrade test walks v1<->v10 both directions).
- argon2id hash/verify with PHC encoding; store tests cover hash
roundtrip, duplicate-owner conflict, must-change lifecycle, session
keep/except semantics.
- e2e TestAdminAccountFlow: static login page reachable without auth,
wrong password 401, login sets HttpOnly cookie + mustChangePassword,
admin creates user (409 on duplicate), non-admin create 403, forced
change clears flag and old password dies, admin reset revokes sessions
and re-arms forced change, API-key channel untouched, 5-fail backoff
429, logout kills session. Full go test ./... green.
Impact: middleware now accepts Bearer key OR session cookie and exempts
static + /api/auth/login (also fixes the latent case where the login
page itself could 401). Embedded no-auth mode unchanged.
Refs: proposal 2026-09-30-ui-redesign-and-auth.md section 5 (admin-issued
variant, user decision 2026-09-30)
Why: T3 of the interaction foundation - unify button/card/slash/chat entries onto one command bus (D27) composing the Agent-Command library (D30), with danger=high commands gated behind inline confirm cards and every dispatch leaving the same audit envelope.
Evidence: go test green - cmdbus suite (four-entrance audit symmetry, high-danger confirm lifecycle incl. cancel/expiry/handler-reject, audit-unavailable yields unknown, plugin spec fail-closed, schema scalar validation) and server e2e (danger command via POST /api/commands -> confirm card -> card action confirm -> committed receipt -> audit query ordered accepted->committed); legacy /help,/new,/mock,/model,/profile contract preserved through the bus; store migration v7 command_audit (both dialects) with roundtrip test updated.
Impact: new internal/cmdbus (L1 package per D33), server routes POST /api/commands/{id} + GET /api/commands/audit + registry-driven GET /api/commands, postMessage chat-entrance dispatch when the intent gate matches a registered command, plugins host OnCommands overlay, module cards policy/modules/{cmdbus,cardsvc}.md; pending confirm state is process-local (documented limitation).
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-09-30-ui-inbox-command-workspace.md T3; task card feature/command-bus-r1
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