Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why: U6 extends pages from conversations into the task/project
workspace - surfaces aggregate across conversations under the owner's
project scope (project resolved authoritatively from the conversation
row, never self-reported by the model), and the catalog guidance now
organizes pages by task phase (requirements/execution/acceptance)
while stating that task facts come only from real task records.
Evidence: build/vet clean; surfacesvc suite green incl. the new
project-aggregation test (owner isolation, cross-owner zero, history
retained post-disable); genui/store suites green.
Impact: New endpoint GET /api/projects/{id}/surfaces; Submit resolves
project from conversation; catalog text guidance. Existing endpoints
unchanged.
Refs: proposal r2 U6; Dev task feature/generative-ui-u6
Why: The approved U5 scope needs the action half of the loop: an
idempotent ledger (migration v24), a single-choke SubmitAction (plugin
activation, current-revision, action whitelist, params-hash
idempotency), dispatch through the command bus so DangerHigh lands on
the existing inline confirm card with no Confirmed passthrough (the
endpoint does not even bind the field), the button-only
generative-ui.submit storing form data in the plugin KV ledger, and
catalog discipline rejecting unknown action ids at present time.
Evidence: go build/vet clean; full go test ./... green; surfacesvc/
genui/store suites also green under AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN; red matrix
covers disabled/stale-revision/cross-owner/unknown-action/idempotent
same-and-different-params/danger-high-await-confirm and the endpoint
forged-confirmed case.
Impact: Additive migration v24 + new endpoint/command; existing
endpoints and command semantics untouched (B-class whitelist starts
empty per the approved scope).
Refs: U5 action-scope r2 (approved, Documents #71); UI #46/#47;
Frontend #56; Dev task feature/generative-ui-u5
Why: Generative UI proposal U2 needs the host side of the contract:
owner-isolated surface storage with revision CAS, an execution-level
enable/disable ledger (default-off, epoch bumped on every transition so
in-flight submits after a disable are rejected), a single-choke-point
service that validates specs (strict decode + catalog rules) before
saving, event publish with pending recovery, the optional SurfaceHost
extension capability, and direct API endpoints that share the same
guard (no bypass by entrance).
Evidence: go build/vet clean; full go test ./... passes (SQLite);
surface store tests also pass under AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN (PostgreSQL);
surface.txt regenerated via the AST snapshot test.
Impact: Additive migration v22 (new tables only); existing endpoints and
plugin_grants semantics untouched; old consumers unaffected. U3+ (data
binding, actions, frontend) deliberately out of scope.
Refs: Documents proposal 2026-10-10-generative-ui-plugin.md (r2 U2);
Core PR #25; Dev task feature/generative-ui-u2
Why: Downstream products must extend the base through a public package and host API instead of editing internal code.
Evidence: go test ./... passed, including plugin v2 assets, sidecar startup, migration v13, pending confirms, HITL timeout, hash embedder, command pairs, and the extension surface snapshot.
Impact: apiVersion 2.0-experimental rejects empty network allowlists for declarative HTTP. Hash embeddings stay opt-in via models.embedding.provider=hash. Plugin secrets resolve per owner at execution time.
Refs: docs/proposals/2026-10-01-plugin-contract-v2.md
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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