Evidence: 作者对 d26f3cf2e8 的完整 Backend、隔离 PostgreSQL Store 和构建输出已由 evidence 保存（SELF）。独立审阅者 /root/backend_review 已重放历史收养泄漏用例，最后事件增量复审及当前 HEAD CI 推进中；正式结果由 Dev 任务卡保存，不把本地结果当 GATE。
Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why:
Higher-ranked private rows could exhaust SQL candidate limits and hide an
otherwise authorized published slice from a member's current-project search.
Evidence:
SELF TestAuthorizedKnowledgeFiltersBeforeTopK failed with no shared hits before
the change and passed after it. SELF go test ./... and the isolated PostgreSQL
Store suite passed; independent replay and current-HEAD CI remain owner gates.
Impact:
Scan the resource-authorized shared fulltext path until enough allowed results
are found. Preserve ordinary legacy retrieval candidate limits and semantics.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1; R5 published knowledge availability
Why:
Membership could be revoked while a tool waited for confirmation or a queued
HITL reply waited for consumption. Publication replacement also crossed an
empty project scope or another plugin's source namespace for the same Ref.
Evidence:
SELF replay of all four independent review reproductions failed before the
fix and passed unchanged afterward. Committed regressions cover direct and
queued HITL, yes/session confirmation, direct artifact writes, protected vectors,
exact empty project scopes, literal wildcard IDs and unregistered compatibility.
SELF uncached go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL Store tests and static build passed.
Impact:
Recheck trusted live owner/project authorization when HITL resumes and at write
boundaries. Registered publishers replace only exact owner/project/ref/plugin
rows and vectors; ordinary unregistered publication semantics are preserved.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; independent Backend
review findings against b9bea5bee0
Why:
Legacy project metadata can contain credentials outside the settings scope table.
Sharing raw projection settings exposed them, and generic project PATCH bypassed
the system-managed path guard already enforced by project settings endpoints.
Evidence:
SELF member Host regression failed before the fix. The fixed 4f72aaf server
baseline overlay reproduced HTTP metadata leakage and managed PATCH returning 200.
SELF shared Host-to-HTTP, immutable mask, dotted/schema/fallback, public mutation
and atomic managed-write regressions passed; uncached full suite, isolated PG
Store suite and static build passed. Independent delta replay remains a gate.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle metadata returns detached credential-masked views while
preserving service/configuration keys and persisted data. Generic project PATCH
shares the existing managed validator before rename or settings mutation; allowed
metadata key shapes and raw owner-only management lookups remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1 and R5; approved hard secret boundary;
2026-10-13 shared project metadata review follow-up
Why:
Nested unchanged credential masks left empty parents that looked like managed
subtree overwrites. Shared members also hit an owner-only upload guard, while
upload ingestion cards could disclose private filenames and parser metadata.
Evidence:
SELF independent nested-mask probe, HTTP nested/mixed writeback, member upload,
project card privacy and authorization-change regressions failed before each fix
and passed after it. Affected settings/server suite passed; exact final-object
build and independent replay remain delivery gates owned by the task coordinator.
Impact:
Prune only parents emptied by ignored masks; explicit empty/real managed writes
stay rejected. Registered uploads check live work and trusted project existence,
keep originals owned by the actor, and recheck before persistence. Suppress only
upload project cards when no private stream exists; explicit structure cards and
unregistered upload behavior remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1/R5; independent nested mask P2;
2026-10-13 composed member-upload and private project-stream acceptance findings
Why:
Legacy project streams replayed upload filenames and parser metadata to newly
authorized members even though the underlying cards remained owner-only.
Evidence:
SELF real HTTP red regressions exposed legacy replay, spoofed sharing claims,
private-history pagination, and live delivery after membership removal. The
affected packages, uncached full Backend suite, isolated PostgreSQL Store suite,
and agent-system build pass after applying the event boundary.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle streams resolve trusted resource ownership and require an
internal publication proof for cross-owner delivery. Event and proof commit in
one transaction; v30 adds an additive SQLite/PostgreSQL sidecar without granting
access to historical events. Seen and visible cursors remain separate, revoked
members leave live streams, and unregistered base behavior remains compatible.
The storage migration tool preserves the new proof rows.
Refs:
project-member-access-implementation-plan.md Task 1 / R5; authorized legacy SSE
privacy follow-up; project-member-composed-legacy-project-history.json
weichen
merged commit 5d5fc9891c into main2026-10-13 11:52:27 +00:00
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Why: 注册项目服务的成员现在可以在同一个项目里创建私人会话并上传自己的原件，宿主项目生命周期由服务统一处理。原有 owner-only 列表/上传、孤立身份路径及私人历史事件暴露会阻断或越过成员边界。
Evidence: 作者对
d26f3cf2e8的完整 Backend、隔离 PostgreSQL Store 和构建输出已由 evidence 保存（SELF）。独立审阅者 /root/backend_review 已重放历史收养泄漏用例，最后事件增量复审及当前 HEAD CI 推进中；正式结果由 Dev 任务卡保存，不把本地结果当 GATE。Impact: 可选生命周期/ProjectHost 保留未注册兼容；成员会话、原件和卡事件默认按可信所有者授权。显式结构事件通过 v30 同事务共享证明开放，私人历史和实时事件按同一边界过滤；撤权后执行与事件流停止。检索解析可信领域根并在权限过滤后取 TopK，发布替换按 owner/project/ref/plugin 隔离，共享元数据脱敏且受管设置预写拒绝。
Refs: Dev feature/project-member-access；系统项目协作 r1.1；Frontend PR82；Documents PR97。无运行库修改或部署。