agent-exec transport 3cbfba3aed64b516704b0d68a7a9f2fa/82da3fb3f31d

policy/facts.md

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 - 凭据类验证命令不得把凭据展开进命令行、输出或证据：经 `scripts/facts-verify.sh` 探针子命令在进程内读取并发送。
 - 旧端点 git-panel.u1680832.nyat.app:30319 已退役，一律不得使用——这是政策禁令，不随 F4 核验结果变化；
   F4 只登记可观测的 TLS 握手失败现象，DNS 失败、超时、连接失败或握手成功都判 FAIL，不刷新 last_verified。
+- F4 现有 last_verified（2026-10-14）是历史日期，来自旧的宽泛检查，不证明当前 TLS 层握手失败判据；
+  经该判据独立重验前不得当作已核实。
 
 | ID | 事实 | 验证命令 | last_verified | TTL(天) |
 |---|---|---|---|---|

scripts/facts-verify.sh

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
 # 用法：make facts-verify [ARGS=--update]   （--update：把 PASS 项 last_verified 刷为当天并写回）
 # 表内验证命令约定不含竖线；含 "\|" 转义时按字面还原后执行。
 # 登记表引用的探针子命令（单独运行时在 stderr 说明判定，不输出凭据）：
-#   api-token URL                 进程内读 ~/.secrets/gitea HOME 段 ACCESS_TOKEN 并 GET URL；
+#   api-token URL                 URL 须逐字等于登记端点 https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user，
-#                                 0=接受 3=缺失 4=格式不符 5=请求失败/被拒
+#                                 校验通过后才进程内读 ~/.secrets/gitea HOME 段 ACCESS_TOKEN 并 GET（不跟随重定向）；
+#                                 0=接受 3=缺失 4=格式不符 5=请求失败/被拒/重定向 6=非登记端点
 #   tls-handshake-fails HOST PORT 仅当 TCP 已连通且 TLS 层握手报错时 0；
 #                                 3=DNS 失败 4=超时 5=连接失败 6=握手成功（端点仍可用）
 set -uo pipefail
@@ -15,11 +16,23 @@ case "${1:-}" in
   api-token)
     [ $# -eq 2 ] || { echo "usage: facts-verify.sh api-token URL" >&2; exit 2; }
     exec python3 - "$SCRIPT_DIR" "$2" <<'PY'
-import sys
+import sys, urllib.request
 sys.path.insert(0, sys.argv[1])
 import task_triage
 
-url = sys.argv[2]
+ENDPOINT = "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user"
+if sys.argv[2] != ENDPOINT:
+    print("api-token: URL 不是 policy/facts.md F2 登记端点，拒绝发送凭据", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(6)
+
+
+class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return None
+
+
+urllib.request.install_opener(urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect))
+url = ENDPOINT
 token = task_triage.secrets_file_token()
 if not token:
     print("api-token: ~/.secrets/gitea HOME 段 ACCESS_TOKEN 缺失", file=sys.stderr)

tests/test_facts_verify.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 """外部事实重验契约（scripts/facts-verify.sh + policy/facts.md 的 F2/F4 验证命令）。
 
-全部离线：合成 HOME/IMC 凭据、sitecustomize 桩替换 urllib/socket/ssl（真实连接一律拒绝）、
+全部离线：合成 HOME/IMC 凭据、sitecustomize 桩拦截 urllib 处理器网络边界（保留真实重定向判定）
+与 socket/ssl（真实连接一律拒绝）、
 PATH 桩记录 curl/wget argv、临时 Git 仓库与临时登记表；不读取真实 ~/.secrets，不连接 Gitea 或旧端点。
 """
 import datetime
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ OLD_DATE = "2026-01-01"
 SECRETS = [HOME_TOKEN, IMC_TOKEN]
 
 STUB = r'''
-import json, os, socket, ssl, subprocess, urllib.error, urllib.request
+import http.client, io, json, os, socket, ssl, subprocess, urllib.request, urllib.response
 
 
 def _log(kind, **data):
@@ -49,33 +50,38 @@ def _popen(self, args, *rest, **kwargs):
 subprocess.Popen.__init__ = _popen
 
 
-class _Response:
+def _response(url, code, body=b"", location=None):
-    def __init__(self, body):
+    headers = http.client.HTTPMessage()
-        self._body = body
+    if location:
-
+        headers["Location"] = location
-    def read(self):
+    resp = urllib.response.addinfourl(io.BytesIO(body), headers, url, code)
-        return self._body
+    resp.msg = "stub"
-
+    return resp
-    def __enter__(self):
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, *exc):
-        return False
 
 
-def _urlopen(request, *args, **kwargs):
+REDIRECT_TARGET = "redirect-target.invalid"
-    url = getattr(request, "full_url", request)
+
-    auth = request.get_header("Authorization") if hasattr(request, "get_header") else None
+
+# Intercept only the handlers' network boundary so the opener's real redirect and
+# error processing still decides whether a follow-up request is made.
+def _open(self, request):
+    url = request.full_url
+    auth = request.get_header("Authorization")
     _log("http", url=url, authorization=auth)
+    if REDIRECT_TARGET in url:
+        return _response(url, 200, b'{"login": "redirect-target"}')
     mode = os.environ.get("FAKE_HTTP", "200")
     if mode == "200":
-        return _Response(b'{"login": "fixture"}')
+        return _response(url, 200, b'{"login": "fixture"}')
     if mode == "leak":
         raise ValueError("Invalid header value " + repr(auth))
-    raise urllib.error.HTTPError(url, int(mode), "stub", {}, None)
+    code = int(mode)
+    location = "https://" + REDIRECT_TARGET + "/collect" if 300 <= code < 400 else None
+    return _response(url, code, location=location)
 
 
-urllib.request.urlopen = _urlopen
+urllib.request.HTTPSHandler.https_open = _open
+urllib.request.HTTPHandler.http_open = _open
 
 
 class _Conn:
@@ -299,6 +305,55 @@ class FactsVerifyTests(unittest.TestCase):
                 self.assertNotIn("Authorization", direct.stderr)
                 self.assert_no_secrets(result.stdout, result.stderr, direct.stdout, direct.stderr)
 
+    def test_f2_rejects_unregistered_destination_before_reading_credentials(self):
+        bad_urls = [
+            "http://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user",
+            "https://evil.invalid/api/v1/user",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30320/api/v1/user",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app/api/v1/user",
+            "https://user:pw@git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319@evil.invalid/api/v1/user",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user#frag",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user?next=https://evil.invalid",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/users",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user/../admin",
+            "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user ",
+        ]
+        for secrets_present in (True, False):
+            if not secrets_present:
+                (self.home / ".secrets" / "gitea").unlink()
+            for url in bad_urls:
+                with self.subTest(url=url, secrets_present=secrets_present):
+                    self.stub_log.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+                    direct = self.run_script("api-token", url)
+                    self.assertEqual(direct.returncode, 6, direct.stderr)
+                    self.assertEqual(self.stub_events("http"), [], "no request to an unregistered destination")
+                    self.assertNotIn(url.strip(), direct.stdout + direct.stderr)
+                    self.assertNotIn("evil.invalid", direct.stdout + direct.stderr)
+                    self.assertNotIn("ACCESS_TOKEN", direct.stderr, "destination is checked before credentials")
+                    self.assert_no_secrets(direct.stdout, direct.stderr)
+
+    def test_f2_refuses_redirect_without_forwarding_authorization(self):
+        for code in ("301", "302", "303", "307", "308"):
+            with self.subTest(code):
+                self.stub_log.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+                direct = self.run_script("api-token", "https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user",
+                                         http=code)
+                self.assertEqual(direct.returncode, 5, direct.stderr)
+                requests = self.stub_events("http")
+                self.assertEqual([r["url"] for r in requests],
+                                 ["https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/api/v1/user"], "no follow-up request")
+                self.assertNotIn("redirect-target", direct.stdout + direct.stderr)
+                self.assert_no_secrets(direct.stdout, direct.stderr)
+
+                self.stub_log.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+                self.write_registry("F2")
+                result = self.run_script("--update", http=code)
+                self.assert_status(result.stdout, "F2", "FAIL")
+                self.assertEqual(self.dates()["F2"], OLD_DATE)
+                self.assertEqual(len(self.stub_events("http")), 1)
+                self.assert_no_secrets(result.stdout, result.stderr)
+
     # --- F4：只有 TLS 层握手失败才支持该事实 -----------------------------------
 
     def test_f4_only_tls_handshake_failure_passes_and_refreshes(self):