test(server): reject non-member comment and audit reads on postgres

The in-memory authorizer treats any positive user id as a member, so the HTTP negative has to run against a real project row. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-09-19 13:22:37 +00:00
parent c49637cbb5
commit 404defced2
1 changed files with 103 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/auth"
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/authz"
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/bizdev"
+)
+
+// 批注与审计的项目成员检查必须走 Postgres 授权器。
+// 内存授权器在无库时把任意正用户 id 视为成员，不能用它证明 HTTP 负例。
+func TestDocGovCommentsAndAudit_NonMemberIs403_PG(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, pool := pgConfigFromTestDSN(t)
+	defer pool.Close()
+	cfg.AuthRegistrationEnabled = true
+	cfg.AuthRequireApproval = false
+
+	svc := bizdev.MustNewService(t, cfg)
+	srv := NewServer(cfg, svc)
+	srv.authorizer = authz.NewAuthorizer(pool)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	var projectID int64
+	if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT id FROM projects ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 1`).Scan(&projectID); err != nil || projectID <= 0 {
+		t.Skip("no projects for comment/audit negative test")
+	}
+
+	docID := fmt.Sprintf("doc_h2_nonmember_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
+	if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO document_records (doc_id, project_id, task_key, title)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, 'intake', 'H2 非成员负例')
+	`, docID, projectID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert document: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_, _ = pool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM document_records WHERE doc_id = $1`, docID)
+	})
+
+	uname := fmt.Sprintf("outsider_h2_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
+	pass := "OutsiderPass123!"
+	regBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
+		"username": uname,
+		"password": pass,
+		"name":     "局外人",
+	})
+	regReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/register", bytes.NewReader(regBody))
+	regW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Routes().ServeHTTP(regW, regReq)
+	if regW.Code != http.StatusOK && regW.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("register outsider: %d %s", regW.Code, regW.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	loginBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": uname, "password": pass})
+	loginReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/login", bytes.NewReader(loginBody))
+	loginW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Routes().ServeHTTP(loginW, loginReq)
+	if loginW.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("outsider login: %d %s", loginW.Code, loginW.Body.String())
+	}
+	var session auth.SessionInfo
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(loginW.Body).Decode(&session); err != nil || session.Token == "" || session.User == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode outsider session: %v body=%s", err, loginW.Body.String())
+	}
+	if err := srv.authorizer.RequireProjectAccess(ctx, projectID, session.User.ID); err != authz.ErrForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("outsider must not be a member of project %d: %v", projectID, err)
+	}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		method string
+		target string
+		body   []byte
+	}{
+		{name: "list comments", method: http.MethodGet, target: "/api/v1/docgov/comments?doc_id=" + url.QueryEscape(docID)},
+		{name: "list audit", method: http.MethodGet, target: "/api/v1/docgov/audit-logs?doc_id=" + url.QueryEscape(docID)},
+		{
+			name:   "add comment",
+			method: http.MethodPost,
+			target: "/api/v1/docgov/comments",
+			body:   []byte(`{"doc_id":"` + docID + `","content":"should-fail"}`),
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.target, bytes.NewReader(tc.body))
+			withBearerAuth(req, session.Token)
+			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			srv.Routes().ServeHTTP(w, req)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Fatalf("%s want 403 got %d %s", tc.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}