package swboot

import (
	"context"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"path/filepath"
	"strings"
	"testing"
)

type fakeAllowlist struct {
	paths    map[string]bool
	commands map[string][]string
}

func (f *fakeAllowlist) IsAllowlisted(p string) bool { return f.paths[filepath.Clean(p)] }
func (f *fakeAllowlist) AllowedCommands(p string) []string {
	return f.commands[filepath.Clean(p)]
}

func initTestRepo(t *testing.T) string {
	t.Helper()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	run := func(args ...string) {
		c := exec.Command("git", args...)
		c.Dir = dir
		c.Env = []string{"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"), "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0",
			"GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=t", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=t@t", "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=t", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=t@t",
			"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null", "GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null"}
		if out, err := c.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("git %v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
		}
	}
	run("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "hello.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	run("add", ".")
	run("commit", "-q", "-m", "init")
	return dir
}

const samplePatch = `--- a/hello.txt
+++ b/hello.txt
@@ -1 +1 @@
-hello
+hello swboot
`

func newExecutor(allow RepoAllowlistReader) *ControlledPatchExecutor {
	return &ControlledPatchExecutor{Allowlist: allow}
}

func TestExecutor_RejectsNonAllowlistedPath(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{paths: map[string]bool{"/definitely/not/allowed": true}})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 1, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD", Patches: []string{samplePatch},
	})
	if err == nil || res.Status != "failed" || !strings.Contains(res.Error, "ERR_REPO_PATH_NOT_ALLOWLISTED") {
		t.Fatalf("expected allowlist rejection, got res=%+v err=%v", res, err)
	}
	if res.WorktreePath != "" {
		t.Fatalf("no worktree must be created on rejection")
	}
}

func TestExecutor_AppliesPatchOnIsolatedWorktree(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	// Baseline untouched.
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{paths: map[string]bool{repo: true}})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 7, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD", Patches: []string{samplePatch},
	})
	if err != nil || res.Status != "succeeded" {
		t.Fatalf("expected success, got res=%+v err=%v", res, err)
	}
	if res.PatchesApplied != 1 || len(res.Files) != 1 || res.Files[0].Path != "hello.txt" || res.Files[0].Sha == "" {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected files evidence: %+v", res.Files)
	}
	if !strings.HasPrefix(res.Branch, "feature/swboot-") || res.WorktreePath == "" {
		t.Fatalf("expected isolated branch/worktree: %+v", res)
	}
	// Patch landed only in the isolated worktree.
	patched, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(res.WorktreePath, "hello.txt"))
	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(patched), "hello swboot") {
		t.Fatalf("worktree not patched: %v %q", err, patched)
	}
	base, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repo, "hello.txt"))
	if strings.Contains(string(base), "swboot") {
		t.Fatalf("repository working tree must stay untouched")
	}
}

func TestExecutor_RunsOnlyAllowlistedCommands(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{
		paths:    map[string]bool{repo: true},
		commands: map[string][]string{repo: {"echo"}},
	})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 8, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD",
		Patches:  []string{samplePatch},
		Commands: []string{"echo ci-ok"},
	})
	if err != nil || res.Status != "succeeded" {
		t.Fatalf("expected success: %+v %v", res, err)
	}
	if len(res.Commands) != 1 || res.Commands[0].ExitCode != 0 || !strings.Contains(res.Commands[0].Output, "ci-ok") {
		t.Fatalf("command evidence wrong: %+v", res.Commands)
	}

	res2, err2 := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 8, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD",
		Patches:  []string{samplePatch},
		Commands: []string{"curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"},
	})
	if err2 == nil || res2.Status != "failed" || !strings.Contains(res2.Error, "not in admin allowlist") {
		t.Fatalf("non-allowlisted command must fail closed: %+v %v", res2, err2)
	}
}

func TestExecutor_RejectsBrokenPatchAndKeepsEvidence(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{paths: map[string]bool{repo: true}})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 9, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD",
		Patches: []string{"not a unified diff"},
	})
	if err == nil || res.Status != "failed" {
		t.Fatalf("broken patch must fail: %+v %v", res, err)
	}
	if res.PatchesApplied != 0 {
		t.Fatalf("no patch applied on failure: %+v", res)
	}
}

func TestExecutor_CommandFailureStopsPipeline(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{
		paths:    map[string]bool{repo: true},
		commands: map[string][]string{repo: {"false", "echo"}},
	})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 10, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD",
		Patches:  []string{samplePatch},
		Commands: []string{"false", "echo unreachable"},
	})
	if err == nil || res.Status != "failed" {
		t.Fatalf("failing command must stop: %+v %v", res, err)
	}
	if len(res.Commands) != 1 || res.Commands[0].ExitCode == 0 {
		t.Fatalf("first command must record failure and stop: %+v", res.Commands)
	}
}

func TestApproveMerge_NeverExecutes(t *testing.T) {
	if err := ApproveMerge("anything"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ERR_MERGE_REQUIRES_SEPARATE_AUTHORIZATION") {
		t.Fatalf("merge must stay behind separate authorization: %v", err)
	}
}

// TestExecutor_CommandAllowlistIsExactNotPrefix FIND-SEC-03 回归：
// 白名单是精确命令名匹配，前缀伪装（echo 放行 echo-evil）必须被拒。
func TestExecutor_CommandAllowlistIsExactNotPrefix(t *testing.T) {
	if commandAllowed("echo-evil pwn", []string{"echo"}) {
		t.Fatal("prefix spoof 'echo-evil' must not match allowlist entry 'echo'")
	}
	if !commandAllowed("echo ci-ok", []string{"echo"}) {
		t.Fatal("exact command 'echo' must match")
	}
	if !commandAllowed("/usr/bin/echo hi", []string{"echo"}) {
		t.Fatal("absolute-path basename must match entry 'echo'")
	}
	if commandAllowed("", []string{"echo"}) || commandAllowed("   ", []string{"echo"}) {
		t.Fatal("empty command must be rejected")
	}
}

// TestExecutor_NoShellEvaluation FIND-SEC-03 回归：argv 化执行后，命令行中\n// 的 shell 元字符只作为字面参数传给命令，不会被 shell 求值。
func TestExecutor_NoShellEvaluation(t *testing.T) {
	repo := initTestRepo(t)
	marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sh-pwn-marker")
	e := newExecutor(&fakeAllowlist{
		paths:    map[string]bool{repo: true},
		commands: map[string][]string{repo: {"echo"}},
	})
	res, err := e.Execute(context.Background(), ControlledPatchRequest{
		ProjectID: 11, RepoPath: repo, BaseRef: "HEAD",
		Patches: []string{samplePatch},
		Commands: []string{"echo x && touch " + marker},
	})
	if err != nil || res.Status != "succeeded" {
		t.Fatalf("echo with literal metachar args should succeed: %+v %v", res, err)
	}
	if len(res.Commands) != 1 || !strings.Contains(res.Commands[0].Output, "x && touch") {
		t.Fatalf("output should be literal echo args: %+v", res.Commands)
	}
	if _, statErr := os.Stat(marker); statErr == nil {
		t.Fatal("shell metacharacters must not be evaluated; marker file was created")
	}
}