{ "status": "complete", "verdict": "Ready with fixes", "verdict_reason": "Four P1 defects remain in managed integration, child lifetime and candidate-build behavior, plus a P2 completion-approval bypass. Resolve admission (#1), supervision (#2), build-source choice and nightly compatibility (#3-#4), then approval parsing (#5). No bounded requirement is wholly omitted; partial items map to these findings.", "scope": { "base": "a241e838150f218f3a09d3523f93291b847d45fd", "branch": "feature/agent-governance-implementation", "head_sha": "eb4dbdca5baae8dd5f3ddefc0f5510ac2978dcd3", "pr_url": null, "files_changed": 41, "includes_working_tree_diff": true }, "intent": "Implement approved R01-R10 governance and minimal L1 managed operations: isolated worktrees, canonical SQLite coordination, scoped leases, process identity and conservative recovery, docs CAS/receipts, exact candidate integration and safe service/build guards. Preserve history and existing product behavior; L2 OS isolation and cross-host operations are outside this unit.", "intent_confidence": "explicit", "reviewers": [ "correctness", "security", "testing", "maintainability", "reliability", "adversarial", "project-standards", "agent-native" ], "reviewer_selection": [ { "reviewer": "correctness", "tier": "session", "reason": "always-on" }, { "reviewer": "security", "tier": "session", "reason": "Managed-operation permissions and path/capability boundaries" }, { "reviewer": "testing", "tier": "mid", "reason": "Real temporary Git/SQLite subprocess test harnesses changed" }, { "reviewer": "maintainability", "tier": "mid", "reason": "Substantial new coordinator abstractions and 2343 executable changed lines" }, { "reviewer": "reliability", "tier": "mid", "reason": "Lease expiry, process identity, signal handling and recovery" }, { "reviewer": "adversarial", "tier": "session", "reason": "Concurrency, persistence and silent-pass guard risks; external transport prohibited" }, { "reviewer": "project-standards", "tier": "mid", "reason": "Root AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md govern all changed paths" }, { "reviewer": "agent-native", "tier": "mid", "reason": "New agent-facing governance commands and instructions" } ], "findings": [ { "#": 1, "autofix_class": "manual", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:802-805 checks ancestry and SELECT sha FROM validations WHERE sha=?; integrate:874-879 additionally checks task, two parents and frozen first parent.", "Real temporary Git reproduction with production hooks: integrate rejected the linear SHA; agentctl with --resource git:dev --cwd MAIN -- git merge --ff-only SHA succeeded and advanced dev. No hook disabling or unleased writes." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:802 -- if git(repo.main, 'merge-base', '--is-ancestor', old, new, check=False).returncode:", "independent_reviewers": [ "adversarial", "security" ], "line": 802, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "adversarial", "security" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Share candidate admission between integrate and hook_ref: require two parents, first parent equal to old dev, and validation bound to candidate/task. Alternatively require an integration receipt binding old dev, candidate and owning run. Test rejection through the alternate managed git merge path.", "title": "Managed fast-forward bypasses the validated merge-candidate invariant", "why_it_matters": "A registered git:dev operator can promote a validated linear commit through agentctl with and git merge, although integrate rejects that commit as INVALID_CANDIDATE. The reference hook checks ancestry and any SHA receipt but omits the required two-parent, frozen-baseline and task-bound checks.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "With a registered git:dev task and a validated linear descendant, the new execute path permits main-worktree git merge (scripts/agentctl.py:509-527) while hook_ref checks only ancestry and any SHA receipt (802-807), bypassing integrate's two-parent and frozen-first-parent checks (874-879); the supplied real-Git reproduction supports reachability, which was independently verified in source rather than rerun.", "protected_subject": "authorization-authentication" }, { "#": 2, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 and 890-894 start new-session children then wait; Lease.__exit__:468-477 finalizes failure and unlocks without child termination.", "execute:531-558 already forwards signals, escalates, reaps and marks recovery. Interruption finding confirmed from source; incidence was not measured." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 -- child = subprocess.Popen(command, cwd=repo.current, start_new_session=True) ... code = child.wait()", "independent_reviewers": [ "correctness", "reliability" ], "line": 848, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "correctness", "reliability" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Reuse execute child supervision in validate and integrate: forward SIGINT/SIGTERM, escalate with bounded SIGKILL, reap the process group and retain recovery_required until safe resolution. Test interruption of both commands.", "title": "Interrupted validation leaves its child running", "why_it_matters": "SIGINT during validate or integrate can leave a separately sessioned child running after the lease is marked failed and unlocked. A later operation can overlap validation writes, or detached git merge can advance dev after reported failure.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "If SIGINT interrupts validate or integrate after its new-session child starts, scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 and 890-894 have no signal forwarding or exception cleanup and Lease.__exit__:468-477 marks the non-document run failed and unlocks without terminating the child, allowing conflicting admission at 429-439; confirmation is source-based and interruption incidence was not measured.", "protected_subject": "concurrency" }, { "#": 3, "autofix_class": "manual", "confidence": 75, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:692-696 checks HEAD/cleanliness without retaining a lease; candidate-images-build.sh:48-53 builds from the mutable checkout and publishes COMMIT at 84.", "Real Git/SQLite controlled reproduction paused a fake Docker boundary: managed source edit succeeded, then build/manifest succeeded with the original SHA and dirty source. Actual image contents were not built or examined." ], "file": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh", "first_evidence": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh:30 -- python3 \"${ROOT}/scripts/agentctl.py\" guard build --commit \"${COMMIT}\"", "independent_reviewers": [ "adversarial" ], "line": 30, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "adversarial" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Choose an immutable checkout pinned to COMMIT, or retain source/index leases that conflict with every managed writer through both builds and manifest publication. Recheck provenance before publishing and add a synchronized concurrent-writer regression.", "title": "Concurrent managed edits invalidate successful candidate image provenance", "why_it_matters": "After the one-shot build guard exits, managed writers can change the checkout while Docker reads it. A successful manifest can therefore name the original commit despite build inputs changing.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "If a managed writer changes build-relevant source after the newly added guard returns, scripts/agentctl.py:692-696 retains no lease and candidate-images-build.sh:48-53 reads the mutable checkout before publishing the original COMMIT at 84, so the new managed-build admission does not preserve its exact-source guarantee; supplied fake-Docker boundary evidence establishes writer admission and receipt behavior, not actual image contents or production incidence.", "protected_subject": "concurrency" }, { "#": 4, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 75, "evidence": [ "run-nightly-real-pi.sh:33,115,174,193 writes evidence under the checkout before ensure_candidate_images at 198; agentctl.py:158-160 rejects untracked files.", "git check-ignore found no ignores for the default evidence paths. Complete nightly execution was not rerun." ], "file": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh", "first_evidence": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh:30 -- python3 \"${ROOT}/scripts/agentctl.py\" guard build --commit \"${COMMIT}\"", "independent_reviewers": [ "correctness" ], "line": 30, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "correctness" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Keep nightly evidence outside the build checkout until image creation finishes, then persist it at the documented path; alternatively build from a separate clean pinned checkout. Preserve dirty-source rejection and test the default fresh-manifest flow.", "title": "New build guard rejects nightly's own evidence files", "why_it_matters": "With default paths and no existing image manifest, nightly creates untracked health/test evidence before calling the builder. The new clean_source guard rejects those files, turning otherwise passing tests into infra_fail before image creation.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "With default nightly evidence paths, passing required tests and no existing image manifest, run-nightly-real-pi.sh:33,115,174,193 creates untracked evidence before invoking the builder at 198, whose new guard calls clean_source and rejects all untracked files at scripts/agentctl.py:158-160; independent git check-ignore found no matching ignores, while a complete nightly execution was not rerun.", "protected_subject": "public-contract" }, { "#": 5, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:645 matches only '| done |'; row checks at 651-660 trim cells and require docs:approve plus evidence.", "The exact predicates evaluated on '| core |done|' give whole_document_detects_done=False and row_detects_done=True. Receipts at 682-685 satisfy hook_check:781-787 without transition rechecking; live incidence was not measured." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:645 -- if any('| done |' in line and line not in old_done for line in replacement.splitlines()):", "independent_reviewers": [ "security" ], "line": 645, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "security" ], "severity": "P2", "suggested_fix": "Parse trimmed table cells with a shared helper and compare status transitions by record id. Reject newly done rows in @document regardless of spacing; retain approval/evidence transitions on the row path. Test docs:admin without docs:approve using | core |done|.", "title": "CWE-863: Whole-document edits bypass completion approval", "why_it_matters": "A docs:admin and docs:publish task without docs:approve can introduce a done row through @document using valid Markdown such as | core |done|. The exact-space predicate misses it, publishes a receipt and allows the commit hook to accept completion without approval or evidence.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "For a docs:admin and docs:publish task lacking docs:approve, a whole-document replacement containing a newly completed row such as '| core |done|' passes the exact '| done |' predicate at scripts/agentctl.py:643-648, receives a receipt at 682-683 and satisfies the receipt-only hook at 781-787 despite the row-path approval requirement at 654-660; confirmation is source-based and live incidence was not measured.", "protected_subject": "authorization-authentication" } ], "actionable_findings": [ { "#": 1, "autofix_class": "manual", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:802-805 checks ancestry and SELECT sha FROM validations WHERE sha=?; integrate:874-879 additionally checks task, two parents and frozen first parent.", "Real temporary Git reproduction with production hooks: integrate rejected the linear SHA; agentctl with --resource git:dev --cwd MAIN -- git merge --ff-only SHA succeeded and advanced dev. No hook disabling or unleased writes." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:802 -- if git(repo.main, 'merge-base', '--is-ancestor', old, new, check=False).returncode:", "independent_reviewers": [ "adversarial", "security" ], "line": 802, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "adversarial", "security" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Share candidate admission between integrate and hook_ref: require two parents, first parent equal to old dev, and validation bound to candidate/task. Alternatively require an integration receipt binding old dev, candidate and owning run. Test rejection through the alternate managed git merge path.", "title": "Managed fast-forward bypasses the validated merge-candidate invariant", "why_it_matters": "A registered git:dev operator can promote a validated linear commit through agentctl with and git merge, although integrate rejects that commit as INVALID_CANDIDATE. The reference hook checks ancestry and any SHA receipt but omits the required two-parent, frozen-baseline and task-bound checks.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "With a registered git:dev task and a validated linear descendant, the new execute path permits main-worktree git merge (scripts/agentctl.py:509-527) while hook_ref checks only ancestry and any SHA receipt (802-807), bypassing integrate's two-parent and frozen-first-parent checks (874-879); the supplied real-Git reproduction supports reachability, which was independently verified in source rather than rerun.", "protected_subject": "authorization-authentication" }, { "#": 2, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 and 890-894 start new-session children then wait; Lease.__exit__:468-477 finalizes failure and unlocks without child termination.", "execute:531-558 already forwards signals, escalates, reaps and marks recovery. Interruption finding confirmed from source; incidence was not measured." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 -- child = subprocess.Popen(command, cwd=repo.current, start_new_session=True) ... code = child.wait()", "independent_reviewers": [ "correctness", "reliability" ], "line": 848, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "correctness", "reliability" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Reuse execute child supervision in validate and integrate: forward SIGINT/SIGTERM, escalate with bounded SIGKILL, reap the process group and retain recovery_required until safe resolution. Test interruption of both commands.", "title": "Interrupted validation leaves its child running", "why_it_matters": "SIGINT during validate or integrate can leave a separately sessioned child running after the lease is marked failed and unlocked. A later operation can overlap validation writes, or detached git merge can advance dev after reported failure.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "If SIGINT interrupts validate or integrate after its new-session child starts, scripts/agentctl.py:848-853 and 890-894 have no signal forwarding or exception cleanup and Lease.__exit__:468-477 marks the non-document run failed and unlocks without terminating the child, allowing conflicting admission at 429-439; confirmation is source-based and interruption incidence was not measured.", "protected_subject": "concurrency" }, { "#": 3, "autofix_class": "manual", "confidence": 75, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:692-696 checks HEAD/cleanliness without retaining a lease; candidate-images-build.sh:48-53 builds from the mutable checkout and publishes COMMIT at 84.", "Real Git/SQLite controlled reproduction paused a fake Docker boundary: managed source edit succeeded, then build/manifest succeeded with the original SHA and dirty source. Actual image contents were not built or examined." ], "file": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh", "first_evidence": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh:30 -- python3 \"${ROOT}/scripts/agentctl.py\" guard build --commit \"${COMMIT}\"", "independent_reviewers": [ "adversarial" ], "line": 30, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "adversarial" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Choose an immutable checkout pinned to COMMIT, or retain source/index leases that conflict with every managed writer through both builds and manifest publication. Recheck provenance before publishing and add a synchronized concurrent-writer regression.", "title": "Concurrent managed edits invalidate successful candidate image provenance", "why_it_matters": "After the one-shot build guard exits, managed writers can change the checkout while Docker reads it. A successful manifest can therefore name the original commit despite build inputs changing.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "If a managed writer changes build-relevant source after the newly added guard returns, scripts/agentctl.py:692-696 retains no lease and candidate-images-build.sh:48-53 reads the mutable checkout before publishing the original COMMIT at 84, so the new managed-build admission does not preserve its exact-source guarantee; supplied fake-Docker boundary evidence establishes writer admission and receipt behavior, not actual image contents or production incidence.", "protected_subject": "concurrency" }, { "#": 4, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 75, "evidence": [ "run-nightly-real-pi.sh:33,115,174,193 writes evidence under the checkout before ensure_candidate_images at 198; agentctl.py:158-160 rejects untracked files.", "git check-ignore found no ignores for the default evidence paths. Complete nightly execution was not rerun." ], "file": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh", "first_evidence": "scripts/candidate-images-build.sh:30 -- python3 \"${ROOT}/scripts/agentctl.py\" guard build --commit \"${COMMIT}\"", "independent_reviewers": [ "correctness" ], "line": 30, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "correctness" ], "severity": "P1", "suggested_fix": "Keep nightly evidence outside the build checkout until image creation finishes, then persist it at the documented path; alternatively build from a separate clean pinned checkout. Preserve dirty-source rejection and test the default fresh-manifest flow.", "title": "New build guard rejects nightly's own evidence files", "why_it_matters": "With default paths and no existing image manifest, nightly creates untracked health/test evidence before calling the builder. The new clean_source guard rejects those files, turning otherwise passing tests into infra_fail before image creation.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "With default nightly evidence paths, passing required tests and no existing image manifest, run-nightly-real-pi.sh:33,115,174,193 creates untracked evidence before invoking the builder at 198, whose new guard calls clean_source and rejects all untracked files at scripts/agentctl.py:158-160; independent git check-ignore found no matching ignores, while a complete nightly execution was not rerun.", "protected_subject": "public-contract" }, { "#": 5, "autofix_class": "gated_auto", "confidence": 100, "evidence": [ "scripts/agentctl.py:645 matches only '| done |'; row checks at 651-660 trim cells and require docs:approve plus evidence.", "The exact predicates evaluated on '| core |done|' give whole_document_detects_done=False and row_detects_done=True. Receipts at 682-685 satisfy hook_check:781-787 without transition rechecking; live incidence was not measured." ], "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "first_evidence": "scripts/agentctl.py:645 -- if any('| done |' in line and line not in old_done for line in replacement.splitlines()):", "independent_reviewers": [ "security" ], "line": 645, "owner": "downstream-resolver", "pre_existing": false, "requires_verification": true, "reviewers": [ "security" ], "severity": "P2", "suggested_fix": "Parse trimmed table cells with a shared helper and compare status transitions by record id. Reject newly done rows in @document regardless of spacing; retain approval/evidence transitions on the row path. Test docs:admin without docs:approve using | core |done|.", "title": "CWE-863: Whole-document edits bypass completion approval", "why_it_matters": "A docs:admin and docs:publish task without docs:approve can introduce a done row through @document using valid Markdown such as | core |done|. The exact-space predicate misses it, publishes a receipt and allows the commit hook to accept completion without approval or evidence.", "validation_status": "confirmed", "validation_reason": "For a docs:admin and docs:publish task lacking docs:approve, a whole-document replacement containing a newly completed row such as '| core |done|' passes the exact '| done |' predicate at scripts/agentctl.py:643-648, receives a receipt at 682-683 and satisfies the receipt-only hook at 781-787 despite the row-path approval requirement at 654-660; confirmation is source-based and live incidence was not measured.", "protected_subject": "authorization-authentication" } ], "triage_groups": [ { "title": "Managed integration admission and child lifetime", "findings": [ 1, 2 ], "context": "Managed integration must enforce the same exact candidate and retain coordination while child processes can still act.", "preferred_resolution": "Decision gate: choose shared admission or an integration receipt for #1, then reuse child supervision for #2. Verify alternate-entrypoint and interruption cases.", "why": "The two independent defects can admit invalid or overlapping protected-ref operations; fixing either alone leaves the other reachable." }, { "title": "Candidate build source and nightly evidence", "findings": [ 3, 4 ], "context": "The builder reads a mutable checkout and the nightly caller creates evidence there before invoking its clean-source guard.", "preferred_resolution": "Decision gate: choose immutable build input or retained source leases for #3, then keep nightly evidence outside that input for #4. Verify concurrency and the default fresh-manifest flow.", "why": "A pinned clean checkout can address both concerns, but concurrency and self-generated dirty state remain separate acceptance cases." } ], "pre_existing_findings": [], "requirements_completeness": { "plan": "/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System/.worktrees/agent-governance-implementation/.doc/audit/2026-09-21-agent-policy-review.md", "source": "explicit", "requirements": [ { "id": "R01", "requirement": "Scope tests and model evidence to changes", "status": "met", "note": "Scoped validation contract and temporary Git/SQLite/subprocess tests are present; no shared product-runtime claim." }, { "id": "R02", "requirement": "Exact real-PI selection and no-skip evidence", "status": "partially addressed", "note": "Exact test selection and no-skip evidence checks are present; default nightly completion is blocked by #4." }, { "id": "R03", "requirement": "Task levels and single durable record for small work", "status": "met", "note": "Task-level and single-record conventions are present in AGENTS.md and task templates." }, { "id": "R04", "requirement": "CURRENT active coordination and preserved history", "status": "met", "note": "CURRENT coordination changes and archived history are present." }, { "id": "R05", "requirement": "Separate session, task, integration, deployment, cleanup statuses", "status": "met", "note": "Separate lifecycle status conventions are present in the task and close templates." }, { "id": "R06", "requirement": "Atomic logical commits without fixed layer order", "status": "met", "note": "Atomic logical commit guidance is present; this review does not attest future caller commits." }, { "id": "R07", "requirement": "Normative SSOT lifecycle and thin client entries", "status": "met", "note": "Policy registry, lifecycle guidance and thin client entrypoints are present." }, { "id": "R08", "requirement": "Task authorization and exception boundaries", "status": "partially addressed", "note": "Scoped capabilities and exception boundaries are implemented, with alternate-entrypoint gaps #1 and #5." }, { "id": "R09", "requirement": "Minimal L1 worktree, env, docs CAS, commit and integration gates", "status": "partially addressed", "note": "Minimal L1 gates are implemented, with integration, child-lifetime and build defects #1-#4." }, { "id": "R10", "requirement": "Cleanup owner, retention reason, revisit trigger", "status": "met", "note": "Cleanup ownership, retention and revisit guidance are present; inaccessible processes fail closed." } ], "implementation_units": [], "note": "Coverage describes the bounded two-document/dev L1 unit. L2, cross-host and full product-image delivery are deferred." }, "learnings": [], "agent_native_gaps": [], "deployment_notes": [], "residual_risks": [ "Interruption and completion-approval incidence were not measured; validator confirmation is source-based.", "The controlled build probe establishes managed-writer admission and receipt behavior, not actual Docker image contents.", "Default nightly and shared product runtime were not executed in this review." ], "testing_gaps": [ { "title": "Test admin capability denial", "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "line": 611, "autofix_class": "advisory", "owner": "human", "suggested_fix": "Add a docs:publish-only whole-document request to test_admin_document_cas_preserves_slot_and_needs_capability (or a separate test), assert CAPABILITY_REQUIRED, and compare the document bytes before and after." }, { "title": "Exercise failed validation outcomes", "file": "scripts/agentctl.py", "line": 855, "autofix_class": "advisory", "owner": "human", "suggested_fix": "Extend test_validated_merge_candidate_is_exactly_promoted_to_dev (or add focused tests) with a nonzero validation command and a command that creates an untracked file; for each, assert validate fails and a subsequent integrate for that candidate is rejected with VALIDATION_REQUIRED." } ], "coverage": { "notes": [ "Standalone current-tree review against explicit base; staged and unstaged intent-to-add files included.", "Standards fall back to root AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md; no CODING_STANDARDS.md exists.", "No Compound Packs or matching docs/solutions corpus.", "Tool-only change: shared product services, Go/React/database runtime and L2 OS isolation excluded; tests are temporary Git/SQLite/process scenarios.", "Run artifacts use skill-sanctioned temporary directory; no repository artifacts written by reviewers.", "All eight local reviewer returns collected. Testing and standards reviewers independently ran real temporary Git/SQLite/subprocess suite: 67 tests passed. Parent additionally reports 20-contender probe PASS, one writer/19 busy; raw parent evidence outside this review run.", "Cross-model transport is outside the caller-authorized boundary; no peer launched. Adversarial lens uses in-session reviewer; no different-model corroboration claimed.", "Two testing-only findings are report-only gaps: nonzero/dirty validation receipt denial and docs:admin denial. No defect is inferred from their absence. The line-count-only split proposal failed the concrete-consequence/applicable-standard admission check; the specific duplicate supervision bug remains primary.", "Three positive cleanup tests mock only /proc enumeration; inaccessible-process and live-cwd negatives remain real. Production cleanup fails closed." ], "first_evidence_backfilled": 10, "quote_gate_demoted": 0, "suppressed_by_confidence": { "50": 0, "25": 0 }, "malformed_findings": 0, "malformed_returns": 0, "semantic_duplicates_merged": 2, "mode_aware_demotions": 2, "admission_rejected": 1, "settlement_suppressed": 0, "validator_shortcut_skipped": 0, "validator_shortcut_evidence_basis": "No independently verified cross-model peer; in-session persona agreement never licenses shortcut or confidence promotion.", "failed_reviewers": [], "bound_exceeded": [], "compound_packs": { "roots": [], "errors": [], "warnings": [] }, "independence_note": "independent_reviewers retains helper-derived persona provenance; these identities do not represent different serving models.", "mode": "agent report-only", "lite": false, "cross_model_outcome": "in-process-fallback", "cross_model_coverage": "Cross-model transport is outside the caller-authorized boundary; no peer launched. Adversarial lens uses in-session reviewer; no different-model corroboration claimed.", "validator": { "outcome": "verdicts", "batches": 1, "confirmed": 5, "rejected": 0, "unresolved": 0, "malformed": 0, "failed": 0, "shortcut_skipped": 0, "bound_exceeded": false, "protected_subject_reclassifications": [], "degraded_blockers": [], "reason": "All five matched verdicts landed; severity, confidence and routes preserved. Reasons and evidence limits accompany each finding." } }, "artifact_path": "/tmp/compound-engineering-1000/ce-code-review/20260921-133611-5e4781e6", "run_id": "20260921-133611-5e4781e6" }