Why: The previous endpoint regression used an SQLite-only server fixture even when isolated PostgreSQL was configured.
Evidence: The revised HTTP test passed with dialect=sqlite and dialect=postgres; it creates data through one Store and reads through another before and after disabling the local account.
Impact: U3 effective-state checks for the new process replay route now have a direct two-store PostgreSQL regression without changing production behavior.
Refs: IAM U3 affected Stage 7 review; Backend PR #198
Why: Merging run-process visibility introduced a read endpoint that bypassed U3 effective-account checks when authentication was off.
Evidence: A new regression first returned HTTP 200 for disabled local; with entry and final response checks it passed, and the event pagination test passed ten repeated runs after anchoring to its appended event sequence.
Impact: Explicitly disabled local accounts cannot read stored process events; missing implicit local remains compatible.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 8 integration review; Backend PR #198; main PR #199
Why: The SSE test canceled after 200 ms while filtering more than a thousand private events; CI and race builds stopped before the shared frame.
Evidence: The failure reproduced under go test -race with HTTP 200, no private leak, and no shared frame; after a two-second deadline the race case passed three times and the Server package passed.
Impact: The privacy assertion is unchanged and now reports which condition failed, while slower replay still reaches the event under test.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; Backend PR #198; CI run 3170
Why: The U3 migration must replace the target schema seed with the source directory revision and cursor key.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL TestMigrateEndToEndAndIdempotent passed with field-by-field source and target comparison.
Impact: Migration regressions that lose directory cursor identity now fail the existing end-to-end test.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; docs/proposals/2026-10-14-iam-u3-account-contract-and-plan.md §10
Why: U3 seeds a directory revision in every new target database, which made an empty PostgreSQL target look occupied to the migration guard.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL cmd/storage-migrate integration tests passed after the previously failing cases reproduced the error.
Impact: A fresh target remains eligible for migration; existing business rows and foreign migration identities still block it.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; docs/proposals/2026-10-14-iam-u3-account-contract-and-plan.md §10
Why: RDM delegated rename rebuilt the creator Host and could commit a Backend project rename after the delegated operator was disabled.
Evidence: SQLite and isolated PostgreSQL targeted checks cover operator/creator disable order, two processes, sorted locks, auth-off local compatibility, and HTTP/command Host wiring; exact committed-head replay remains pending.
Impact: Adds a request-bound single-project extension capability and checks operator plus creator in the final Backend transaction. Global ScopedHost cannot derive delegated authority; RDM cross-database atomicity remains outside the promise.
Refs: Approved Documents delegated-projection amendment 5783940, U3 A1-A4 candidate adcd8fe, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: U7 account audit and identity gates advanced on main while U3 account initialization and recovery were in progress.
Evidence: SELF merge-tree checks passed with go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL store/server tests; exact-head replay follows.
Impact: Preserve pending-account grants, proof-linked recovery, protected CLI delivery, account serialization, and atomic audit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1; U7 PR #185
Why: Historical full sessions could reach self-profile actions, and a lost recovery response had no safe idempotent retry contract.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-full-password-profile.json, /tmp/iam-u3-recovery-idempotent-sqlite.json, /tmp/iam-u3-recovery-idempotent-pg.json, /tmp/iam-u3-account-sse-pass.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-idempotent-all.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-backend-idempotent-pg.json.
Impact: Profile actions require a password-authenticated full cookie; duplicate owner confirmation or rotation returns status without plaintext; an active SSE stream stops before its next business frame after disable.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: A disable could commit after the run manager checked account state but before its final business message was stored.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-final-settle-sqlite.json, /tmp/iam-u3-final-settle-pg.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-settle-all.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-settle-pg.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-http-two-instance-pg.json.
Impact: The final run transaction locks and rechecks the account, rejects post-disable business output, and permits only an account-denial failure record. Auth-off implicit local ownership remains explicit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Administrator-issued password and login-key paths could take over target accounts, while old credentials and plugin handles ignored current account state.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-backend-all-replay.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-final-pg-core.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-build.json, and focused HTTP/concurrency receipts in /tmp/iam-u3-*.json.
Impact: Adds trusted pending-account initialization and reissue, preexisting owner-session proof, proposal/rotation/grant transactions, server-side admin search, current Host guards, and legacy HTTP/CLI closure. Production cutover and downstream pins remain pending.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: The old account lister exposed a global, always-valid directory without a domain locator or field authorization.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-sqlite.json and /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-pg.json.
Impact: Adds versioned optional query and exact lookup, trusted RDM scope registration, visible-field cursor binding, and restricts legacy EXT-19 to effective system administrators. RDM consumption remains a separate U3-5 unit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Disabled accounts and mixed credentials could continue to authenticate, while web creation accepted passwords and administrator privileges.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-sqlite-green.json, /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-pg-regression.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-u2-server-sqlite-green.json.
Impact: Adds versioned enable/disable, revokes existing handles, protects the last operable manager, and exposes pending-account/profile APIs. Recovery proposal and legacy-entry closure remain in U3-4.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Disabling an account must stop in-flight work as well as new HTTP requests.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u2-runtime-regression.json and /tmp/iam-u3-u2-app-compile.json.
Impact: Run start, tools, HITL, streaming output, child runs and final settlement recheck the account independently of project authorization.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: preserve identity while supporting optional profiles and controlled account lifecycle.
Evidence: SELF complete SQLite store tests and real PostgreSQL account-model regressions; red receipts retained.
Impact: additive account schema with a security compatibility floor; no production migration executed.
Refs: IAM U3-1; approved Documents c236d3099dd3e20f7bdd35caf162e0be9a7d52eb
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