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Agent-System-Backend/internal/tools/exec_backend.go
weichen 01fd3b6fd4
ci / vet-and-test (pull_request) Successful in 43s
Add the S0 task workspace overlay: frozen base, private upper, CAS apply
Why: The sandbox tier wrote the session directory directly, so a buggy
or runaway script could leave the workspace half-mutated and nothing
bounded what a timeout had already written. The plan's first landing
shape (section 4.4) swaps the session bind for a frozen-base overlay:
each exec freezes the session dir (hardlink clone + sha256 baseline),
runs on a private upper, and only a clean exit promotes the change set
back via CAS (baseline hash match -> atomic replace/remove; externally
changed targets double-store as *.conflict-* instead of clobbering).
Timeouts and kills discard the upper entirely - half-written state
never lands.

Evidence: go test ./... green including bwrap integration roundtrips
(TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayRoundtrip: add/modify/delete through a real
overlayfs upper with whiteout handling and ws cleanup;
TestSandboxWorkspaceOverlayTimeoutDiscards: partial writes discarded on
timeout) and unit anchors for freeze manifest (.agentx excluded), CAS
add/modify, conflict double-store, and the change summary.

Impact: Opt-in via --exec-workspace overlay / AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_WORKSPACE
(only with --exec-backend sandbox; fail-closed on unknown modes). The
model sees a one-line change summary appended to the tool output, so
discards and conflict files are visible. Default behavior is unchanged.

Refs: proposal 2026-10-10-agent-delegation-routing-sandbox.md section
4.4; Dev task feature/agent-s0-workspace-overlay.
2026-10-11 02:04:05 +00:00

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// EXT-16 执行后端:把「启动白名单解释器进程」抽象为 ExecBackend 接口。
//
// direct = 现状(exec.CommandContext 直启,逐字节等价);sandbox = bwrap 隔离档
// (模型生成代码按不可信对待):只读系统根、tmpfs 遮蔽 /home 与 /tmp、仅会话
// 工作目录与技能目录挂载可写、--unshare-net 断网、ulimit -u 限进程数防 fork
// 炸弹、超时杀 bwrap 宿主侧进程组(pid 命名空间随之销毁,不可逃逸存活)。
// 启动级 DisableExecTools 是最终兜底,优先级高于后端选择(execGate 拒绝在前)。
package tools
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
)
// execSandboxMaxProcs sandbox 档内 ulimit -u(fork 炸弹防线;bash 自身进程也计入)。
const execSandboxMaxProcs = 256
// ExecSpec 一次解释器执行的启动规格(后端无关)。
type ExecSpec struct {
Bin string // 白名单解释器绝对路径
Args []string // 落盘脚本路径为唯一参数
Dir string // 会话沙箱工作目录(sandbox 档唯一可写挂载)
Env []string // 最小环境(execEnv 口径)
SkillsDir string // 技能根(sandbox 档只读挂载;空 = 不挂)
// DepsDir 依赖层(sandbox 档只读挂载;空 = 不挂):python-docx 等装在
// ~/.local 下会被 --tmpfs /home 遮蔽,只读挂回其原路径并并入 PYTHONPATH,
// 交付物生成链路(F3)在隔离档下才可用。
DepsDir string
// S0 工作区 overlay(sandbox 档;三者须同批非空):冻结基底(--overlay-src)、
// 私有 upper(--overlay RWSRC)、overlayfs work 目录。空 = EXT-16 现状直写。
WorkspaceFrozen string
WorkspaceUpper string
WorkspaceWork string
Timeout time.Duration // 硬超时(调用方 ctx.WithTimeout 之前传入,仅记录用)
}
// ExecProcess 后端启动的执行体句柄:Wait 等待退出;Kill 杀整个执行体
// (direct = 进程组 SIGKILL;sandbox = bwrap 宿主侧进程组,pid 命名空间销毁)。
type ExecProcess interface {
Wait() error
Kill() error
}
// ExecBackend 执行后端接口(EXT-16):启动 spec 描述的解释器,
// stdout+stderr 合并写入 out。
type ExecBackend interface {
Start(ctx context.Context, spec ExecSpec, out io.Writer) (ExecProcess, error)
}
// ---- 后端选择(组合根装配期设置)----
var execBackend = atomic.Value{} // string:"" / "direct" = 现状;"sandbox" = 隔离档
// SetExecBackend 按名选择执行后端;空串与 "direct" 等价(现状直启)。
// 未知名字报错(fail-closed,不静默回落)。硬关闭 DisableExecTools 优先于此。
func SetExecBackend(name string) error {
switch name {
case "", "direct", "sandbox":
execBackend.Store(name)
return nil
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unknown exec backend %q (direct|sandbox)", name)
}
}
// ExecBackendName 报告当前后端名(空 = direct)。
func ExecBackendName() string {
v, _ := execBackend.Load().(string)
return v
}
func currentExecBackend() ExecBackend {
if ExecBackendName() == "sandbox" {
return sandboxBackend{}
}
return directBackend{}
}
// ---- direct 后端:现状行为 ----
type directBackend struct{}
func (directBackend) Start(ctx context.Context, spec ExecSpec, out io.Writer) (ExecProcess, error) {
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, spec.Bin, spec.Args...)
cmd.Dir = spec.Dir
cmd.Env = spec.Env
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
cmd.WaitDelay = 2 * time.Second
cmd.Cancel = func() error {
if cmd.Process == nil {
return os.ErrProcessDone
}
err := syscall.Kill(-cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
return nil
}
return err
}
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Stderr = out
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cmdProcess{cmd: cmd}, nil
}
type cmdProcess struct {
cmd *exec.Cmd
}
func (p cmdProcess) Wait() error { return p.cmd.Wait() }
func (p cmdProcess) Kill() error {
if p.cmd.Process == nil {
return os.ErrProcessDone
}
err := syscall.Kill(-p.cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
return nil
}
return err
}
// ---- sandbox 后端:bwrap 隔离档 ----
type sandboxBackend struct{}
func (sandboxBackend) Start(ctx context.Context, spec ExecSpec, out io.Writer) (ExecProcess, error) {
bin, err := exec.LookPath("bwrap")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sandbox exec backend requires bwrap: %w", err)
}
if workspaceOverlay {
return startOverlaySandbox(ctx, spec, bin, out)
}
argv := sandboxArgv(spec)
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, bin, argv...)
cmd.Env = []string{"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH")}
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
cmd.WaitDelay = 2 * time.Second
cmd.Cancel = func() error {
if cmd.Process == nil {
return os.ErrProcessDone
}
err := syscall.Kill(-cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
return nil
}
return err
}
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Stderr = out
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cmdProcess{cmd: cmd}, nil
}
// sandboxArgv 组装 bwrap 参数(单测锚点;挂载顺序敏感——/home 与 /tmp 的
// tmpfs 遮蔽必须后于 --ro-bind /,会话目录 bind 必须后于其遮蔽)。
func sandboxArgv(spec ExecSpec) []string {
argv := []string{
"--unshare-all", // pid/net/ipc/uts/user 命名空间全隔离(断网在此)
"--die-with-parent",
"--ro-bind", "/", "/", // 只读系统根(解释器与依赖库可用)
"--tmpfs", "/home", // 遮蔽真实家目录(~/.secrets 等不可见不可读)
"--tmpfs", "/tmp", // 可写临时区(pip/tempfile),不含宿主内容
"--proc", "/proc",
"--dev", "/dev",
}
if spec.WorkspaceUpper != "" {
// S0:会话目录不再直写——冻结基底 overlay,写入只落私有 upper
// (正常退出后 CAS 回收;超时/中止整体丢弃,半写状态不落地)。
argv = append(argv,
"--overlay-src", spec.WorkspaceFrozen,
"--overlay", spec.WorkspaceUpper, spec.WorkspaceWork, spec.Dir)
} else {
argv = append(argv, "--bind", spec.Dir, spec.Dir) // 会话沙箱:唯一可写挂载
}
if spec.SkillsDir != "" {
argv = append(argv, "--ro-bind", spec.SkillsDir, spec.SkillsDir)
}
if spec.DepsDir != "" {
// 必须后于 --tmpfs /home:先遮蔽再只读挂回依赖层(挂载顺序敏感)。
argv = append(argv, "--ro-bind", spec.DepsDir, spec.DepsDir)
}
argv = append(argv, "--chdir", spec.Dir, "--clearenv")
for _, kv := range spec.Env {
if i := strings.IndexByte(kv, '='); i > 0 {
argv = append(argv, "--setenv", kv[:i], kv[i+1:])
}
}
// ulimit 包一层 bash(dash 不支持 -u):进程数限额防 fork 炸弹
// (命名空间内 RLIMIT_NPROC 生效)。
wrapped := append([]string{spec.Bin}, spec.Args...)
argv = append(argv, "/bin/bash", "-c",
fmt.Sprintf("ulimit -u %d; exec %s", execSandboxMaxProcs, shellQuote(wrapped)))
return argv
}
// shellQuote 逐元素单引号包裹(sh 安全拼接,无引号内插值)。
func shellQuote(parts []string) string {
out := make([]string, len(parts))
for i, p := range parts {
out[i] = "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(p, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
}
return strings.Join(out, " ")
}