chore(tooling): reconcile PI executor branch with current dev

2026-09-24 05:54:49 +00:00
parent 930447a78c c1a70e67e5
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+# 管理员重置密码 / 登录凭据缺陷 — 问题主记录
+
+更新：2026-09-24。任务：`admin-password-reset-2026-09-24`。
+
+## ISSUE-20260924-admin-reset-dead
+
+### 问题
+
+管理台「重置密码」按钮调用 `authClient.adminResetPassword`，客户端硬 `throw`，后端无 `reset-password` 路由；UI 仍硬编码 `ResetPass123` 暗示成功。验收脚本曾重置 `chenwei` 哈希且不披露口令后，管理员无法通过 UI 恢复访问。
+
+### 根因
+
+T20-F4 已设计未实施（选项 B 卡产品）。`password_changed_at` 停在 2026-09-20 证明重置从未入库。
+
+### 修复
+
+`POST /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/reset-password`：服务端随机临时口令、`must_change_password=true`、撤销会话、审计表 `user_password_reset_audits`（goose 00067）；前端接线并去掉硬编码。
+
+### 状态
+
+resolved（本任务合入后）。
+
+---
+
+## ISSUE-20260924-login-error-envelope
+
+### 问题
+
+登录失败响应 `code=AUTHZ` / `message=无权访问`，前端再把整段 JSON 原文塞进 `Error.message`，用户误判为权限问题。
+
+### 根因
+
+`httpx.CodeFromStatus(401)=AUTHZ` + `SafeMessage`；`auth.ts` login 未用信封解析、未优先 `error` 领域字段。
+
+### 修复
+
+`authErrorMessage` 优先取信封 `error`；不改全局 AUTHZ 映射（事件复用与安全取舍另立专项）。
+
+### 状态
+
+resolved。
+
+---
+
+## ISSUE-20260924-zombie-credentials
+
+### 问题
+
+`CreateUser` 在 `PasswordHash==""` 时静默跳过 `user_credentials` 插入；`LEFT JOIN` + `COALESCE` 使登录哈希为空串，任意密码均失败且报错与真凭据错误相同。
+
+### 盘点（只读，2026-09-24）
+
+| 环境 | total | missing_cred | empty_username |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| dev | 416 | 263 | 255 |
+| test | 9 | 0 | 0 |
+| main | 4 | 3 | 0 |
+
+main 三行为 goose 00011 seed（`seed-admin` 等），非业务用户。本任务**不清理**存量；仅 fail-closed 防新增。
+
+### 修复
+
+PgStore/MemoryStore `CreateUser` 拒绝空哈希；`Login` 对空哈希记 `slog.Warn(user_id)` 仍统一 401。
+
+### 状态
+
+resolved（机制）；存量清理 = open / 另授权。
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# admin-password-reset-2026-09-24
+
+| 字段 | 值 |
+|---|---|
+| status | in_progress |
+| write_scope | internal, web, deploy/postgres/goose, .doc |
+| mutex | auth+env:test |
+| base_dev_sha | 3de5bc5c396fc21887f0f19e6e3baa8784347f99 |
+| review_state | pending |
+| integration_state | pending |
+| deployment | not_required（合入 local_dev；晋升 test 另授权） |
+| cleanup | pending |
+| remote_sync | not_requested |
+| policy_revision | AGENTS.md + worktree workflow 2026-09-21 |
+
+## 用户目标
+
+恢复 test 环境 `chenwei` 登录；实现 T20-F4-B 管理员重置密码 API；修无凭据僵尸账号防护；修正登录错误文案误导。
+
+## 范围
+
+- Phase 0：test 库一次性恢复（已完成；临时口令仅 agent store）
+- Phase 1–3：后端 API + goose 00067 + 前端接线 + CreateUser fail-closed
+- Phase 4：单测/回归 + 报告 + ISSUES + 合入 local_dev
+
+## 禁止
+
+- 未授权 `git push` / 晋升 test/main
+- 临时口令写入 git / 聊天 / 报告正文
+- 写入 main/dev 生产僵尸账号数据清理
+
+## 验证计划
+
+- `./scripts/arch-check.sh --mode block`；`go vet ./...`；`go test -short ./...`
+- `web npm test` / `npm run build`
+- 新增 AdminResetPassword 正负例与 authErrorMessage 单测
+- Phase 0 实测 login 200（证据不披露口令）
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# agentctl coordinator daemon 装载记录（Linux/systemd）
+
+- task_id: agentctl-daemon-load-2026-09-24
+- owner: Cursor
+- 授权来源：用户会话确认（2026-09-24 09:37，"装载 systemd 单元"选项明示批准）
+- base_dev_sha: 5423b261f97f371bdf7fa5066e9305f9eddaef42
+- status: done（验证完成；文档合入待集成）
+- write_scope: .doc/ops/short-term/（本文档）、.doc/ops/CURRENT.md（docs apply 认领行）
+- mutex: agentctl-daemon-load
+- review_state: reviewed（自查，见下）
+- integration_state: pending
+- deployment: n/a（daemon 已在本机装载运行，即本文档记录的对象）
+- cleanup: pending
+- remote_sync: no（未 push）
+
+## 一、背景
+
+用户报告"本机的 agentctl 似乎没有在运作"。检查结论：
+
+- CLI 管理面（`daemon status` / `doctor` / `queue list`）与 Git 门禁（pre-commit 钩子、`PROTECTED_BRANCH` 拒绝）均正常。
+- **coordinator daemon 从未装载**：`.locks/os/daemon.heartbeat` 与 `manager.lock` 不存在；`scripts/daemon/README.md` 标注 "Templates only. Not loaded on this machine"。本机为 Linux/systemd（规范模板中 launchd 适用于 macOS），systemd 模板从未实例化。
+- 附带发现两条死进程残留 run 卡住 `env:dev`（详见下节）。
+
+## 二、操作记录
+
+### 1. 残留 run 恢复（前置清理）
+
+两条 run 属任务 `dev-full-gate-test-promo-2026-09-24`，进程经 `ps` 确认死亡、无运行副作用：
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/agentctl.py recover --run e072b136-c538-4d66-9100-f4966e02e8ec \
+  --reason 'verified: pid 1993666/1993739 dead (ps confirmed, exit 143 SIGTERM); /proc absent; env:dev idle, no side effects; release stale lease from night supervisor kill'
+# → {"run_id": "e072b136-...", "status": "recovered"}
+
+python3 scripts/agentctl.py recover --run d542d9d9-513e-4301-b303-8bf3c62bc681 \
+  --reason 'verified: pid 1992327 dead (ps confirmed); busy placeholder from lock-wait timeout, no command executed; release stale env:dev slot'
+# → {"run_id": "d542d9d9-...", "status": "recovered"}
+```
+
+恢复后 `doctor` 显示该任务新 run 正常 `running`（supervisor_alive=alive），租约链路恢复。
+
+### 2. daemon 装载（本次主操作）
+
+依据 `scripts/daemon/README.md` 的 fail-closed 装载门禁（显式授权 + 验证记录 + 回滚命令），按用户明示授权执行：
+
+```bash
+# 实例化模板（替换 /path/to/Agent-System 占位符）
+sed -e "s|/path/to/Agent-System|/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System|g" \
+  scripts/daemon/agentctl-coordinator.service \
+  > ~/.config/systemd/user/agentctl-coordinator.service
+
+systemctl --user daemon-reload
+systemctl --user enable --now agentctl-coordinator.service
+```
+
+## 三、装载验证（fail-closed 证据）
+
+| 项 | 值 |
+|---|---|
+| host | weichen（Linux 7.0.0-31-generic，systemd user session） |
+| unit | `~/.config/systemd/user/agentctl-coordinator.service`（enabled, preset: enabled） |
+| unit sha256 | `3ec73b4830a4f18c1b755ca750e146720362737fba445b39a8313be0131856a7` |
+| ActiveState/SubState | `active (running)` since 2026-09-24 01:34:59 UTC |
+| MainPID | 2120143 |
+| manager.lock | held=true, holder_pid=2120143 |
+| heartbeat | cycle 226（启动约 4.5 分钟），heartbeat_age_seconds≈0.5，持续 <2s |
+| queue | pending=0, claimed=0（无积压；daemon 轮转正常，每秒 1 周期 processed:0） |
+| 主目录分支 | dev（满足单元 WorkingDirectory 约束） |
+
+journal 摘录（截选）：
+
+```text
+Sep 24 01:34:59 systemd[3852]: Started agentctl-coordinator.service - agentctl foreground coordinator (queue schedule under manager.lock).
+Sep 24 01:34:59 python3[2120143]: {"audit_every": 30, "interval": 1.0, "max_cycles": null, "pid": 2120143, "status": "daemon_started"}
+Sep 24 01:34:59 python3[2120143]: {"processed": 0, "results": [], "status": "ok"}
+Sep 24 01:39:07 python3[2120143]: {"processed": 0, "results": [], "status": "ok"}
+```
+
+## 四、回滚（经确认后执行）
+
+```bash
+systemctl --user disable --now agentctl-coordinator.service
+rm ~/.config/systemd/user/agentctl-coordinator.service
+systemctl --user daemon-reload
+```
+
+## 五、影响评估
+
+- daemon 职责仅为驱动 `queue schedule`（已验证候选的 ff-only 集成调度）；不触碰 `env:*`、不授予新能力（README 明示）。
+- 队列当前为空，装载不改变现有 `validate`+`integrate` 流程行为。
+- 未修改仓库内文件（单元文件在 `~/.config/systemd/user/`，仓库 tracked 文件零变更）。
+
+## 六、后续
+
+- daemon 已 `Restart=on-failure`，崩溃后 5s 自动拉起；无需人工干预。
+- 如需停用，见回滚一节（需重新确认）。
+- 本任务剩余收口：集成（integrate）到 local dev、CURRENT 行置 done、worktree 清理。
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+title: "dev 全面门禁与 test 晋升（rc-v1.1.0-beta.3）"
+task_id: docs-gate-promo-report-2026-09-24
+status: done
+created: 2026-09-24
+updated: 2026-09-24
+owner: Cursor
+task_type: ops
+task_tier: multi_stage
+policy_revision: "AGENTS+worktree-ops @ 3de5bc5c"
+branch: feature/docs-gate-promo-report-2026-09-24
+worktree: .worktrees/docs-gate-promo-report-2026-09-24
+base_dev_sha: "8ca448ddca7682f851835978921473594eec0ad9"
+head_sha: ""
+write_scope: [".doc/"]
+allowed_environments: ["dev", "test"]
+mutex: git:dev+env:test+docs
+review_state: accepted
+integration_state: pending_merge
+deployment: test_ok_schema_66
+cleanup: pending
+cleanup_owner: 独立维护者
+cleanup_trigger: tip 为 local_dev/origin 祖先且无进程占用后 remove
+remote_sync: pending_push
+---
+
+# dev 全面门禁与 test 晋升
+
+## 用户目标与授权
+
+- 用户目标：dev 全面深测后晋升 test（merge + `rc-v1.1.0-beta.3` + 部署验收 + 恢复基线 + push）
+- 授权来源：用户确认计划（推送远端 + test 验收后恢复基线）；RERANKER 笔误已自改
+- 交付终点：见 [测试报告](../../test-reports/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion-test-report.md)
+
+## 结果摘要
+
+- nightly PASS @ `3de5bc5c`；promote M=`0e4b111d` + `rc-v1.1.0-beta.3`；test schema 66
+- 小队 intake completed / 6802 字 / 幂等；S1 restore MATCH
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# 管理员重置密码与登录凭据修复 测试报告
+
+## 一、 测试背景 (Background)
+
+test 环境账号 `chenwei` 登录失败，表现为 `code=AUTHZ` / `message=无权访问` / `error=用户名或密码错误`。管理员 UI「重置密码」无法生效。根因调查确认：验收期曾重置哈希且不披露口令；重置按钮为 T20-F4 死功能；前端把信封 JSON 原文展示给用户。
+
+## 二、 测试目标 (Test Objectives)
+
+- Phase 0：恢复 `chenwei` 可登录且 `must_change_password=true`
+- Admin 重置 API：成功路径 + 非管理员 403 + 目标不存在 4xx + 旧会话失效
+- 登录错误文案优先领域 `error`，不再展示裸 JSON / 「无权访问」误导
+- CreateUser 拒绝空哈希；空哈希登录统一 401
+- Go short 全量与前端测试通过
+
+## 三、 测试方案与环境 (Test Plan & Environment)
+
+- OS: Linux；Go short；web npm test/build
+- test 环境：`http://127.0.0.1:8081`，schema 65（运行时）；代码侧新增 goose 00067（合入后待迁移）
+- **NOT REQUIRED**：nightly 真实 PI 全链路（依据：本变更为 IAM/管理台，非产品 PI / 工作流模板 / 提示词；见 PROJECT.md §8 与测试报告规范「纯工程」例外说明）
+- **NOT REQUIRED（本报告）**：test 环境 live `reset-password` API 冒烟 — 代码尚未晋升/重建到 test 容器；以 httptest 集成测 + Phase 0 SQL 恢复为验收。晋升后应补跑 live API。
+
+证据目录：[assets/2026-09-24-admin-password-reset/](./assets/2026-09-24-admin-password-reset/)
+
+## 四、 预期结果 (Expected Results)
+
+| 用例 | 预期 |
+|---|---|
+| chenwei 临时口令登录 | 200，token，must_change_password=true |
+| AdminResetPassword | 200，返回 temp_password；旧密 401；旧会话 401 |
+| 非管理员重置 | 403 |
+| authErrorMessage | 「用户名或密码错误」，无 `{`，非「无权访问」 |
+| CreateUser 空哈希 | 错误 `password hash required` |
+
+## 五、 实际测试结果与判定 (Actual Results & Evaluation)
+
+### 用例 1：Phase 0 chenwei 恢复登录
+
+- **输入**：test 库 UPDATE credentials + must_change；`POST /api/v1/auth/login`
+- **实际输出**：见 `assets/.../phase0-login-verify.txt`：`HTTP 200` / `LOGIN_OK` / `must_change_password True`；`password_changed_at` 日期 2026-09-24
+- **判定**：PASS（口令不入报告，路径仅 agent store）
+
+### 用例 2：AdminResetPassword 集成测
+
+- **输入**：`go test -short -run AdminReset|... ./internal/auth/ ./internal/server/`
+- **实际输出**：见 `assets/.../go-focused.txt`：`ok auth` / `ok server`
+- **判定**：PASS
+
+### 用例 3：前端信封解析
+
+- **输入**：`authErrorMessage` 单测 + `npm test`
+- **实际输出**：497 + 34 vitest PASS；`authErrorMessage` 断言通过
+- **判定**：PASS
+
+### 用例 4：三环境凭据盘点（只读）
+
+- **输入**：SQL 聚合
+- **实际输出**：见 `cred-inventory.txt` — dev 263 missing / main 3 seed missing / test 0
+- **判定**：PASS（盘点）；存量清理不在本任务
+
+## 六、 自动化测试套件汇总 (Test Suite Execution)
+
+```text
+./scripts/arch-check.sh --mode block   # PASS
+go vet ./...                           # PASS
+go test -short ./...                   # PASS（server ~18s）
+cd web && npm test                     # 497 + 34 PASS
+cd web && npm run build                # PASS
+```
+
+## 七、 测试结论与后续优化建议 (Conclusion & Next Steps)
+
+- 达到合入 local_dev 标准。
+- 合入后：授权晋升 test → 迁移 00067 → rebuild → 用管理台真实重置 API 验收。
+- 存量僵尸账号清理需独立授权；main seed 三行非业务账号。
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# 2026-09-24 dev 全面门禁与 test 晋升 — 测试报告
+
+## 一、 测试背景 (Background)
+
+本地 `dev` 领先 `origin/test@9984c68d`（schema 65）多轮合入（含 go-agentx、FAV、jevdecide assist、intentflow U9–U12、squad/coordinator/workspace）。本轮按验证契约做 dev 全面深测（**重点保障真实智能体小队链路**），全绿后晋升 test 并打 `rc-v1.1.0-beta.3`，部署验收后恢复 S1 基线。
+
+过程中发现并修复：`cleanHeadingTitle` 多位中文序数未剥离、nightly 相对 `DATA_DIR` 导致 workspace 与 pi-agent 挂载分叉、FullChain 固定项目名 409；另修正宿主机 `.env` 中 `RERANKER_MODEL` 笔误（`qwen3-reranky`→`qwen3-rerank`，reranker 503 fail-open 不挡门禁）。
+
+## 二、 测试目标 (Test Objectives)
+
+- 静态/单元门禁全绿；真实 PI nightly（U8 + FullChain×3 + FullNoneMixed）**全部 PASS** 并写 promotion receipt
+- 合入修复后冻结 tip，晋升 test：`--no-ff` 第一父=`origin/test@9984c68d`，tag `rc-v1.1.0-beta.3`，schema **66**
+- test 验收：冒烟、真实小队 intake、助手多轮/stream、演示数据负例；`pg_restore` 回 S1
+- push `origin/dev` + `origin/test` + rc tag；文档收口
+
+## 三、 测试方案与环境 (Test Plan & Environment)
+
+| 项 | 值 |
+|----|-----|
+| OS | Linux |
+| Go | 仓库 go.mod 基线 |
+| 冻结 nightly tip | `3de5bc5c`（abs DATA_DIR + unique FullChain + heading 祖先） |
+| promote tip M | `0e4b111d`（P1=`9984c68d`，含 `3de5bc5c`） |
+| rc tag | `rc-v1.1.0-beta.3` → `0e4b111d` |
+| dev Runner | `127.0.0.1:18865` / MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed |
+| test Runner | `127.0.0.1:18866` / MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed |
+| 隔离治理 PG | gate-pg `:5436` / `agent_gate` |
+| S0 | `/tmp/agent-test-snap-s0-pre-beta3-20260924T043533Z` |
+| S1 | `/tmp/agent-test-snap-s1-post-beta3-20260924T044504Z`（goose 66 / projects 9 / task_runs 9） |
+
+分层：arch-check / `go vet` / `go test -short` / npm test+build / agentctl unittest → nightly 真实 PI → test 冒烟+小队+助手 → restore。
+
+## 四、 预期结果 (Expected Results)
+
+- nightly 五例均 `PASS`，receipt `verdict=pass`，candidate images digests 齐备
+- test health `schema_version=66`，pinned image digest 与 receipt 一致
+- 小队 intake：`completed`、正文 ≥1500 字、`client_turn_id` 幂等
+- stream 含 `turn_ack`→`delta`→`done`；演示项目 id 6001–6010 交集为空
+- restore 后 goose/projects/task_runs 与 S1 manifest 一致
+
+## 五、 实际测试结果与判定 (Actual Results & Evaluation)
+
+### 5.1 静态与单元（dev）
+
+- arch-check / go vet / go test -short / npm test+build / scripts unittest：前序门禁轮次 PASS（证据目录 `/tmp/dev-full-gate-20260924/`）
+- 定向：`go test ./internal/squad ./internal/coordinator ./internal/workspace` PASS
+
+### 5.2 真实 PI nightly（重点）
+
+- **Input**：`run-nightly-real-pi.sh` @ `3de5bc5c`，`TEST_DATABASE_URL=…:5436/agent_gate`，绝对 `DATA_DIR=…/data/dev`，导出 `KB_DB_PASSWORD`
+- **Actual**（`/tmp/dev-full-gate-20260924/nightly-r9-033243`）：
+
+| 用例 | 结果 | 耗时 |
+|------|------|------|
+| TestMultiIntentU8_RealPI_ConfirmGenerate_PG | PASS | 214.76s |
+| TestWorkflowGovernance_PiAgent_PG_FullNoneMixedChain | PASS | 932.89s |
+| TestWorkflowGovernance_PiAgent_PG_FullChain | PASS | 307.07s |
+| …_ProductManager_FullChain | PASS | 894.51s |
+| …_TestManager_FullChain | PASS | 1316.52s |
+
+- receipt：[`3de5bc5c….json`](./assets/promotion-receipts/3de5bc5c396fc21887f0f19e6e3baa8784347f99.json) `verdict=pass`；images：同前缀 `.images.json`
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**
+
+### 5.3 test 晋升与部署
+
+- **Input**：候选 `0e4b111d`（共享 CURRENT/MATRIX 保留 test 侧以避免 DOCUMENT_RECEIPT）；`candidate-images-apply.sh test`；`env-service.sh test rebuild`（`SEED_DEMO_USERS=false`，pinned）
+- **Actual**：health schema **66**；app image `sha256:3bbf11c6…`（与 receipt 一致）；端口 8081/5434/18866
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**
+
+### 5.4 test 冒烟 / 负例
+
+- smoke ready/health/SPA/runner：PASS（[`smoke.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/smoke.txt)、[`health.json`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/health.json)）
+- 演示 id 负例：`overlap=[]`（[`demo-negative.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/demo-negative.txt)）
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**
+
+### 5.5 真实小队 intake（test）
+
+- **Input**：项目 11 激活 main（SoD 26/27/28）；`mtx_owner` `POST /api/v1/tasks/runs` `task_key=intake` `backend=pi-agent`
+- **Actual**：
+  - create 202，`run_id=run_1790225874439969653`，≈300s 后 `completed`（[`34b-summary.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/34b-summary.txt)）
+  - `output.md` chars=6802 ≥1500（[`36b-intake-output-summary.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/36b-intake-output-summary.txt)）
+  - 同 `client_turn_id` 幂等 `same_run=True`（[`37b-idempotent-summary.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/37b-idempotent-summary.txt)）
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**
+
+### 5.6 助手多轮 / stream
+
+- sync chat：turn1 `CASUAL_CHAT` `reply_len=1322`（`reply_source=template`）；turn2 `SUPPLEMENT_INFO`（见 summaries）
+- stream：`kinds=['turn_ack','delta','done',…]`（[`chat-stream-summary.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/chat-stream-summary.txt)、[`chat-stream.sse`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/chat-stream.sse)）
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**（stream 契约满足；sync 路径存在 template 回落，记为观察项，不挡本轮晋升——小队真实 PI 与 nightly 已覆盖核心链路）
+
+### 5.7 恢复 S1
+
+- **Actual**：[`50-restore-s1.txt`](./assets/2026-09-24-dev-full-gate-test-promotion/50-restore-s1.txt) — goose=66、projects=9、task_runs=9、users=9；与 S1 manifest 一致；验证 workspace 已清
+- S0 保留于 `/tmp/agent-test-snap-s0-pre-beta3-20260924T043533Z`
+- **Verdict**: **PASS**
+
+## 六、 自动化测试套件汇总 (Test Suite Execution)
+
+- `go test -short ./...`：门禁轮次 PASS（`/tmp/dev-full-gate-20260924/03-go-test-short*.txt`）
+- nightly 真实 PI：见 §5.2（非 stub）
+- 工程规范变更不适用产品 PI 全量冒充：本报告产品链路均为真实 Runner
+
+## 七、 测试结论与后续优化建议 (Conclusion & Next Steps)
+
+- **结论**：达到合并/晋升标准。`rc-v1.1.0-beta.3` @ `0e4b111d` 已在 test 落地 schema **66**；小队真实 intake + nightly 五链 PASS；库已回 S1。
+- **非阻塞**：embedding 401 运维债；sync chat `reply_source=template` 观察；FAV live 不放量、U9–U12 tier 停 confirm、D7 不物理删除——约束不变。
+- **收口**：`review_state=accepted`；`integration_state=merged_local_dev` + test 已晋升；`deployment=test_ok`；`remote_sync` 见 push 结果；`cleanup=pending`。
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+=== INV inventory 2026-09-24T04:15:07Z ===
+--- dev ---
+ total_users | missing_cred | empty_username 
+-------------+--------------+----------------
+         416 |          263 |            255
+(1 row)
+
+--- test ---
+ total_users | missing_cred | empty_username 
+-------------+--------------+----------------
+           9 |            0 |              0
+(1 row)
+
+--- main ---
+ total_users | missing_cred | empty_username 
+-------------+--------------+----------------
+           4 |            3 |              0
+(1 row)
+
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ok  	chat-agent-system/internal/auth	0.500s
+ok  	chat-agent-system/internal/server	0.852s
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+HTTP 200
+username chenwei
+user_id 35
+must_change_password True
+has_token True
+LOGIN_OK
+password_redacted=true
+store_path=/run/user/1000/cursor_agent_stores/2a07f859-5ca4-479f-b61d-b5c62ea42dee/files/chenwei-test-temp-password.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+admin_id=4 mtx_id=26 must_change_admin=False
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+11
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+  "project_id": 11,
+  "lifecycle_status": "active",
+  "active_workflow_key": "main",
+  "instance": {
+    "id": 8,
+    "project_id": 11,
+    "workflow_version_id": 13,
+    "instance_no": 1,
+    "status": "active",
+    "config_revision": 1,
+    "plan_hash": "eb9bde6660dbf70d1dcbe6e4a323db1d79b88ed2edac8003741ff8d7d8b0e3ce",
+    "config_snapshot": {
+      "workflow_definition_key": "main",
+      "workflow_version": 2,
+      "workflow_version_id": 13,
+      "stages": [
+        {
+          "stage_key": "V0.1_triage",
+          "stage_name": "V0.1 需求摸底",
+          "enabled": true,
+          "doc_tasks": [
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_intake",
+              "task_title": "用户初始需求收集表",
+              "enabled": true,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {
+                "author_user_id": 26,
+                "reviewer_user_id": 27,
+                "approver_user_id": 28
+              }
+            }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "stage_key": "V0.5_feasibility",
+          "stage_name": "V0.5 方案与可行性",
+          "enabled": true,
+          "doc_tasks": [
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_feasibility_dev",
+              "task_title": "设计开发可行性评估报告",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            },
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_feasibility_reg",
+              "task_title": "注册路径可行性评估报告",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            },
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_prelim_design",
+              "task_title": "系统初步设计方案",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            },
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_research",
+              "task_title": "调研报告",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            },
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_user_requirements",
+              "task_title": "用户需求表",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "stage_key": "V1.0_quoting",
+          "stage_name": "V1.0 商务报价",
+          "enabled": true,
+          "doc_tasks": [
+            {
+              "task_key": "bd_cdo_quote",
+              "task_title": "CDO 报价单",
+              "enabled": false,
+              "approval_configurable": true,
+              "duties": {}
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "activated_by": 4,
+    "activated_at": "2026-09-24T04:57:54.434372Z",
+    "created_by": 4,
+    "created_at": "2026-09-24T04:57:54.426343Z",
+    "updated_at": "2026-09-24T04:57:54.434372Z"
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "run_id": "run_1790225874439969653",
+  "status": "running"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+run_id=run_1790225874439969653 status=completed elapsed=300.3s
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+path=/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System/data/test/workspaces/bizdev/intake_1790225875990871262/output.md chars=6802 status=completed
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+http=202 same_run=True run_id=run_1790225874439969653
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+health={"status":"ok","env":"test","agent_backend":"pi-agent","version":"v1.0","shared_kb_port":5432,"kb_ready":true,"database_ready":true,"schema_version":66,"schema_ready":true,"task_store_ready":true,"vault_identity_ok":false,"vault_connected":false,"vault_lag_ok":true}
+goose=66
+projects=9
+task_runs=9
+users=9
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+kinds=['delta', 'done', 'phase', 'status', 'turn_ack']
+lines=24
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+event: phase
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227040420430_1","type":"phase","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.04042131Z","phase":{"phase_id":"intent_recognizing","message":"正在研判您的意图与项目上下文...","role":"coordinator"}}
+
+event: turn_ack
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227042183457_2","type":"turn_ack","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.042184847Z","turn":{"client_turn_id":"beta3-stream-1790225213","user_message_id":64,"status":"processing"}}
+
+event: status
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227043422481_3","type":"status","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.043423081Z","status":{"intent":"CASUAL_CHAT","branch":"AMBIGUOUS_FALLBACK","current_stage":"V0.1_triage","message":"识别分支: AMBIGUOUS_FALLBACK (置信度: 20%)"}}
+
+event: phase
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227709969798_4","type":"phase","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.709971408Z","phase":{"phase_id":"dialogue_generating","message":"正在整理回复...","role":"assistant","progress":40}}
+
+event: status
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227710044446_5","type":"status","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.710044766Z","status":{"intent":"CASUAL_CHAT","branch":"AMBIGUOUS_FALLBACK","current_stage":"V0.1_triage","message":"意图判定: CASUAL_CHAT (置信度: 20%)"}}
+
+event: phase
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225227710270889_6","type":"phase","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:07.710271199Z","phase":{"phase_id":"dialogue_generating","message":"正在生成项目助手回复...","role":"assistant","progress":60}}
+
+event: delta
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225232805789277_7","type":"delta","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:12.805790577Z","delta":"您好，我在的。有什么需要我协助的吗？"}
+
+event: done
+data: {"id":"evt_1790225232805836466_8","type":"done","timestamp":"2026-09-24T04:47:12.805836846Z","done":{"session_id":"sess_beta3_chat_1790225213-stream","client_turn_id":"beta3-stream-1790225213","duration_ms":5765,"total_events":7,"user_message_id":64,"message_id":65,"status":"completed","content_revision":1,"content_sha256":"fecdb9d7f552f5666e69077b7fe9b2ffc995c41aa562e53e77331b7e1ba5e382","export_capability":{"policy":"full","formats":["rich_clipboard","markdown","docx","pdf","private_document"],"body_selector":"content_only","content_revision":1,"content_sha256":"fecdb9d7f552f5666e69077b7fe9b2ffc995c41aa562e53e77331b7e1ba5e382"}}}
+
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+turn=1 http=200 intent=CASUAL_CHAT reply_source=template reply_len=1322 duration=13.5s
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+turn=2 http=200 intent=SUPPLEMENT_INFO reply_source=None reply_len=45 duration=0.0s
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ids=[10, 9, 8, 7, 5, 3, 2]
+overlap=[]
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"status":"ok","env":"test","agent_backend":"pi-agent","version":"v1.0","shared_kb_port":5432,"kb_ready":true,"database_ready":true,"schema_version":66,"schema_ready":true,"task_store_ready":true,"vault_identity_ok":false,"vault_connected":false,"vault_lag_ok":true}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"ok":true,"service":"shuimu-pi-agent-runner","endpoint_url":"https://api.minimaxi.com/v1","model_id":"MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed","api":"openai-compatible","has_token":true,"tavily":{"active":true,"keys_count":2},"data_dir":"/app/data/workspaces","uptime":55.936716389}
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[PASS] test app SPA /
+[PASS] test app deep link /projects
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "commit": "3de5bc5c396fc21887f0f19e6e3baa8784347f99",
+  "source_tree": "5d407ffa231db42fbffdfb21cd0b9a65b9792f9f",
+  "source_context": "git-archive",
+  "recorded_at": "2026-09-24T04:34:11Z",
+  "tags": {
+    "app": "shuimu-agent-app:candidate-3de5bc5c396f",
+    "events": "shuimu-agent-events:candidate-3de5bc5c396f",
+    "pi-agent": "shuimu-pi-agent:candidate-3de5bc5c396f"
+  },
+  "image_ids": {
+    "app": "sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "events": "sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "pi-agent": "sha256:b0a173a7b17ec7997237b51a23486982bd1e9b9ba91cd4c184e6f2045bbfaf7b"
+  },
+  "image_digests": {
+    "app": "shuimu-agent-app@sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "events": "shuimu-agent-app@sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "pi-agent": "shuimu-pi-agent@sha256:b0a173a7b17ec7997237b51a23486982bd1e9b9ba91cd4c184e6f2045bbfaf7b"
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "verdict": "pass",
+  "commit": "3de5bc5c396fc21887f0f19e6e3baa8784347f99",
+  "recorded_at": "2026-09-24T04:34:11Z",
+  "runner_url": "http://127.0.0.1:18865",
+  "model_id": "MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed",
+  "protocol": "typed-result-v1",
+  "image_digests": {
+    "app": "shuimu-agent-app@sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "events": "shuimu-agent-app@sha256:3bbf11c62a7e62cf5853b26b94bb9c0b88004fbb76c9b04d4729b9b42397ee90",
+    "pi-agent": "shuimu-pi-agent@sha256:b0a173a7b17ec7997237b51a23486982bd1e9b9ba91cd4c184e6f2045bbfaf7b"
+  },
+  "suite": "nightly-real-pi-u8-four-workflows",
+  "failure_class": "none",
+  "evidence_refs": [
+    "/tmp/dev-full-gate-20260924/nightly-r9-033243/evidence/go-test.txt",
+    "/tmp/dev-full-gate-20260924/nightly-r9-033243/evidence/runner-health.json"
+  ]
+}
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ Thumbs.db

 # Runtime Data, Logs, and Databases
 /data/
+# go test cwd=internal/server + relative DATA_DIR writes here by mistake
+internal/server/data/
 logs/
 *.log
 *.sqlite
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Admin password reset audit trail (no password or hash stored).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_password_reset_audits (
+    id              BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    target_user_id  BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    actor_user_id   BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT,
+    request_id      TEXT,
+    created_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_password_reset_audits_target_created
+    ON user_password_reset_audits (target_user_id, created_at DESC);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_password_reset_audits_actor_created
+    ON user_password_reset_audits (actor_user_id, created_at DESC);
+
+-- +goose Down
+DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_user_password_reset_audits_actor_created;
+DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_user_password_reset_audits_target_created;
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_password_reset_audits;
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package auth_test
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/auth"
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/config"
+)
+
+func TestGenerateTempPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	pw, err := auth.GenerateTempPassword(16)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(pw) != 16 {
+		t.Fatalf("len=%d", len(pw))
+	}
+	for _, r := range pw {
+		if !strings.ContainsRune("ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz23456789", r) {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected rune %q", r)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCreateUserRejectsEmptyPasswordHash(t *testing.T) {
+	store := auth.NewMemoryStore(&config.Config{Env: "dev", AllowInMemory: true})
+	_, err := store.CreateUser(t.Context(), &auth.UserAccount{
+		Username: "nohash",
+		Name:     "无哈希",
+		Status:   auth.StatusActive,
+		RoleID:   "role-guest",
+	})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "password hash required") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected password hash required, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAdminResetPassword_Service(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &config.Config{Env: "dev", AllowInMemory: true, AdminUsername: "admin", AdminPassword: "admin123"}
+	store := auth.NewMemoryStore(cfg)
+	svc := auth.NewService(store, nil, cfg)
+
+	created, err := svc.CreateUserByAdmin(t.Context(), auth.CreateUserRequest{
+		Username:        "svc_reset",
+		Name:            "服务重置",
+		InitialPassword: "InitPass123",
+		RoleID:          "role-engineer",
+		Position:        "方案工程师",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	result, err := svc.AdminResetPassword(t.Context(), created.ID, 1, "req_test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if result.TempPassword == "" || !result.MustChangePassword {
+		t.Fatalf("bad result %+v", result)
+	}
+
+	_, err = svc.Login(t.Context(), "svc_reset", "InitPass123")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("old password should fail")
+	}
+	session, err := svc.Login(t.Context(), "svc_reset", result.TempPassword)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !session.MustChangePassword {
+		t.Fatal("expected must_change_password")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginMissingPasswordHash(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &config.Config{Env: "dev", AllowInMemory: true, AdminUsername: "admin", AdminPassword: "admin123"}
+	store := auth.NewMemoryStore(cfg)
+	// Bypass CreateUser guard by mutating seeded user hash after create via UpdateUserPassword empty is not allowed;
+	// plant via direct store map is not exported — use CreateUser with hash then clear via UpdateUserPassword with invalid.
+	// Instead: create with hash then overwrite stored hash through UpdateUserPassword with a sentinel that CheckPassword rejects,
+	// and separately verify empty-hash path by creating through internal seed is hard.
+	// Use Login against unknown user for 401 uniformity, and empty-hash via GetUserByID mutation on MemoryStore UpdateUserPassword
+	// with hash "" is allowed by UpdateUserPassword — plant empty hash that way.
+	created, err := store.CreateUser(t.Context(), &auth.UserAccount{
+		Username:     "emptyhash",
+		Name:         "空哈希",
+		PasswordHash: "placeholder",
+		Status:       auth.StatusActive,
+		RoleID:       "role-guest",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := store.UpdateUserPassword(t.Context(), created.ID, "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	svc := auth.NewService(store, nil, cfg)
+	_, err = svc.Login(t.Context(), "emptyhash", "anything")
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != "用户名或密码错误" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected unified credential error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
@@ -1,9 +1,16 @@
 package auth

 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )

+// tempPasswordAlphabet excludes ambiguous characters (0/O, 1/l/I).
+const tempPasswordAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz23456789"
+
 // HashPassword 使用 bcrypt 对明文密码进行安全加盐哈希
 func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
 	bytes, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
@@ -18,3 +25,20 @@ func CheckPassword(hashed, password string) bool {
 	err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hashed), []byte(password))
 	return err == nil
 }
+
+// GenerateTempPassword returns a cryptographically random temporary password.
+func GenerateTempPassword(length int) (string, error) {
+	if length <= 0 {
+		length = 16
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, length)
+	max := big.NewInt(int64(len(tempPasswordAlphabet)))
+	for i := range out {
+		n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, max)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("generate temp password: %w", err)
+		}
+		out[i] = tempPasswordAlphabet[n.Int64()]
+	}
+	return string(out), nil
+}
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ func (s *PgStore) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, user *UserAccount) (*UserAccou
 	if user == nil || strings.TrimSpace(user.Username) == "" {
 		return nil, errors.New("username required")
 	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(user.PasswordHash) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("password hash required")
+	}
 	tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -161,14 +164,12 @@ func (s *PgStore) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, user *UserAccount) (*UserAccou
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("insert user: %w", err)
 	}

-	if user.PasswordHash != "" {
-		_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `
-			INSERT INTO user_credentials (user_id, password_hash)
-			VALUES ($1, $2)
-		`, id, user.PasswordHash)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("insert credentials: %w", err)
-		}
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO user_credentials (user_id, password_hash)
+		VALUES ($1, $2)
+	`, id, user.PasswordHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("insert credentials: %w", err)
 	}

 	if user.RoleID != "" {
@@ -315,6 +316,14 @@ func (s *PgStore) UpdateUserPassword(ctx context.Context, id int64, passwordHash
 	return s.GetUserByID(ctx, id)
 }

+func (s *PgStore) RecordPasswordResetAudit(ctx context.Context, targetUserID, actorUserID int64, requestID string) error {
+	_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO user_password_reset_audits (target_user_id, actor_user_id, request_id)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''))
+	`, targetUserID, actorUserID, strings.TrimSpace(requestID))
+	return err
+}
+
 func (s *PgStore) ListUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]*UserAccount, error) {
 	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, userSelectSQL+` ORDER BY u.id ASC`)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"

@@ -83,6 +84,11 @@ func (s *Service) Login(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*Sessio
 		return nil, errors.New("用户名或密码错误")
 	}

+	if strings.TrimSpace(user.PasswordHash) == "" {
+		slog.Warn("auth_login_missing_password_hash", "user_id", user.ID)
+		return nil, errors.New("用户名或密码错误")
+	}
+
 	if !CheckPassword(user.PasswordHash, password) {
 		return nil, errors.New("用户名或密码错误")
 	}
@@ -193,6 +199,48 @@ func (s *Service) ChangePassword(ctx context.Context, userID int64, oldPass, new
 	return err
 }

+// AdminResetPasswordResult is returned once to the calling admin; plaintext must not be logged.
+type AdminResetPasswordResult struct {
+	TempPassword       string `json:"temp_password"`
+	MustChangePassword bool   `json:"must_change_password"`
+	UserID             int64  `json:"user_id"`
+}
+
+// AdminResetPassword generates a temporary password, persists its hash with
+// must_change_password=true, revokes existing sessions, and records an audit row.
+func (s *Service) AdminResetPassword(ctx context.Context, targetID, actorID int64, requestID string) (*AdminResetPasswordResult, error) {
+	if targetID <= 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("无效的用户ID")
+	}
+	if actorID <= 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("无效的操作者")
+	}
+	if _, err := s.store.GetUserByID(ctx, targetID); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("用户不存在")
+	}
+
+	temp, err := GenerateTempPassword(16)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("生成临时口令失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	hash, err := HashPassword(temp)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("临时口令加密失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.store.UpdateUserPassword(ctx, targetID, hash, true); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	_ = s.sessions.RevokeAllForUser(ctx, targetID)
+	if err := s.store.RecordPasswordResetAudit(ctx, targetID, actorID, requestID); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("记录重置审计失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &AdminResetPasswordResult{
+		TempPassword:       temp,
+		MustChangePassword: true,
+		UserID:             targetID,
+	}, nil
+}
+
 // GetUserByToken 根据会话 Token 查找登录用户
 func (s *Service) GetUserByToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*UserAccount, error) {
 	userID, err := s.sessions.ResolveUserID(ctx, HashToken(token))
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ type AuthStore interface {
 	UpdateUserRole(ctx context.Context, id int64, roleID, position string) (*UserAccount, error)
 	UpdateUserStatus(ctx context.Context, id int64, status AccountStatus) (*UserAccount, error)
 	UpdateUserPassword(ctx context.Context, id int64, passwordHash string, mustChangePassword bool) (*UserAccount, error)
+	RecordPasswordResetAudit(ctx context.Context, targetUserID, actorUserID int64, requestID string) error
 	ListUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]*UserAccount, error)
 	ListActiveUserDirectory(ctx context.Context) ([]UserDirectoryEntry, error)
 	GetConfig(ctx context.Context) (SystemAuthConfig, error)
@@ -155,6 +156,10 @@ func (s *MemoryStore) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, user *UserAccount) (*UserA
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()

+	if user == nil || strings.TrimSpace(user.PasswordHash) == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("password hash required")
+	}
+
 	for _, existing := range s.users {
 		if strings.EqualFold(existing.Username, user.Username) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("username already exists: %s", user.Username)
@@ -176,6 +181,11 @@ func (s *MemoryStore) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, user *UserAccount) (*UserA
 	return &result, nil
 }

+// RecordPasswordResetAudit records an admin password reset in memory (no persistence).
+func (s *MemoryStore) RecordPasswordResetAudit(ctx context.Context, targetUserID, actorUserID int64, requestID string) error {
+	return nil
+}
+
 // UpdateUser 更新用户基础资料；actorID==user.ID 时清除管理员代改标记。
 func (s *MemoryStore) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, user *UserAccount, actorID int64) (*UserAccount, error) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (

 	"chat-agent-system/internal/auth"
 	"chat-agent-system/internal/authz"
+	"chat-agent-system/internal/httpx"
 )

 // authIsInfrastructureError classifies DB/driver/tx failures that must not be
@@ -383,6 +384,41 @@ func (s *Server) handleAdminUpdateStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(updated)
 }

+// handleAdminResetPassword POST /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/reset-password
+// Returns a one-time temporary password; must not be logged.
+func (s *Server) handleAdminResetPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireSystemAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+		writeSafeError(w, r, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "不支持的请求方法")
+		return
+	}
+
+	targetID, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || targetID <= 0 {
+		writeSafeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "无效的用户ID")
+		return
+	}
+
+	result, err := s.authSvc.AdminResetPassword(r.Context(), targetID, actor.ID, httpx.RequestID(r))
+	if err != nil {
+		msg := err.Error()
+		status := http.StatusBadRequest
+		if strings.Contains(msg, "不存在") {
+			status = http.StatusNotFound
+		} else if authIsInfrastructureError(err) {
+			status = http.StatusInternalServerError
+		}
+		writeSafeError(w, r, status, msg)
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result)
+}
+
 // handleAuthPublicConfig 返回登录/注册页所需的公开准入配置（无需鉴权）
 func (s *Server) handleAuthPublicConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
 	"testing"

 	"chat-agent-system/internal/auth"
@@ -285,3 +286,114 @@ func TestAuthHandlers_AdminCreateUser_MustChangePassword(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Expected MustChangePassword to be false after changing password")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAuthHandlers_AdminResetPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	ts, authSvc := setupTestServer(t)
+	client := &http.Client{}
+
+	adminLoginBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": "admin", "password": "admin123"})
+	adminResp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(adminLoginBody))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("admin login: %v", err)
+	}
+	var adminSession auth.SessionInfo
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(adminResp.Body).Decode(&adminSession)
+	adminResp.Body.Close()
+	if adminSession.Token == "" {
+		t.Fatal("admin token empty")
+	}
+
+	created, err := authSvc.CreateUserByAdmin(t.Context(), auth.CreateUserRequest{
+		Username:        "reset_target",
+		Name:            "重置目标",
+		InitialPassword: "OldPassword111",
+		RoleID:          "role-engineer",
+		Position:        "方案工程师",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create target: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	oldLoginBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": "reset_target", "password": "OldPassword111"})
+	oldLoginResp, _ := http.Post(ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(oldLoginBody))
+	var oldSession auth.SessionInfo
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(oldLoginResp.Body).Decode(&oldSession)
+	oldLoginResp.Body.Close()
+	if oldSession.Token == "" {
+		t.Fatal("target old session empty")
+	}
+
+	resetReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/api/v1/admin/users/"+itoa64(created.ID)+"/reset-password", bytes.NewReader([]byte("{}")))
+	resetReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminSession.Token)
+	resetReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	resetResp, err := client.Do(resetReq)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reset request: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer resetResp.Body.Close()
+	if resetResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("reset status=%d", resetResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var resetBody auth.AdminResetPasswordResult
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resetResp.Body).Decode(&resetBody); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode reset: %v", err)
+	}
+	if resetBody.TempPassword == "" || !resetBody.MustChangePassword || resetBody.UserID != created.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected reset body: %+v", resetBody)
+	}
+
+	// Old password no longer works.
+	badResp, _ := http.Post(ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(oldLoginBody))
+	if badResp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("old password expected 401, got %d", badResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	badResp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Old session revoked.
+	meReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/me", nil)
+	meReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+oldSession.Token)
+	meResp, _ := client.Do(meReq)
+	if meResp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("old session expected 401, got %d", meResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	meResp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Temp password works and forces change.
+	tempLoginBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": "reset_target", "password": resetBody.TempPassword})
+	tempResp, _ := http.Post(ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(tempLoginBody))
+	var tempSession auth.SessionInfo
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(tempResp.Body).Decode(&tempSession)
+	tempResp.Body.Close()
+	if tempResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK || !tempSession.MustChangePassword {
+		t.Fatalf("temp login status=%d must_change=%v", tempResp.StatusCode, tempSession.MustChangePassword)
+	}
+
+	// Non-admin forbidden.
+	memberLoginBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": "zhanggong", "password": "123456"})
+	memberResp, _ := http.Post(ts.URL+"/api/v1/auth/login", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(memberLoginBody))
+	var memberSession auth.SessionInfo
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(memberResp.Body).Decode(&memberSession)
+	memberResp.Body.Close()
+	denyReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/api/v1/admin/users/"+itoa64(created.ID)+"/reset-password", bytes.NewReader([]byte("{}")))
+	denyReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+memberSession.Token)
+	denyReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	denyResp, _ := client.Do(denyReq)
+	if denyResp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("non-admin expected 403, got %d", denyResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	denyResp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Missing user.
+	missingReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/api/v1/admin/users/999999/reset-password", bytes.NewReader([]byte("{}")))
+	missingReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminSession.Token)
+	missingReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	missingResp, _ := client.Do(missingReq)
+	if missingResp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound && missingResp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("missing user expected 404/400, got %d", missingResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	missingResp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+func itoa64(v int64) string {
+	return strconv.FormatInt(v, 10)
+}
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ func (s *Server) Routes() http.Handler {
 	mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/role", s.handleAdminUpdateRole)
 	mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/status", s.handleAdminUpdateStatus)
 	mux.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/profile", s.handleAdminUpdateProfile)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/reset-password", s.handleAdminResetPassword)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/admin/config", s.handleAdminConfig)
 	mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/v1/admin/config", s.handleAdminConfig)

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ func TestWorkflowGovernance_PiAgent_PG_FullChain(t *testing.T) {
 		WfKey:       workflowdef.OfficialKeyMain,
 		TaskKey:     "intake",
 		StageKey:    "V0.1_triage",
-		ProjectName: "PG PiAgent 治理链中文项目",
+		ProjectName: fmt.Sprintf("PG PiAgent 治理链 %d", time.Now().UnixNano()%1_000_000),
 		Materials: []bizdev.MaterialInput{{
 			Filename: "project_brief.md",
 			Content:  []byte("# 项目简报\n\n- 产品：超声软组织手术系统\n- 目标：NMPA III 类注册路径摸底\n- 关键需求：双频刀头、灌注与负压吸引\n"),
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func TestWorkflowGovernance_PiAgent_PG_ProductManager_FullChain(t *testing.T) {
 		WfKey:              workflowdef.OfficialKeyProductManager,
 		TaskKey:            "system_reqs",
 		StageKey:           "requirements_baseline",
-		ProjectName:        "PG PiAgent 产品经理治理链",
+		ProjectName:        fmt.Sprintf("PG PiAgent 产品经理 %d", time.Now().UnixNano()%1_000_000),
 		ExpectPlanningDone: true,
 		Materials: []bizdev.MaterialInput{{
 			Filename: "intake_summary.md",
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func TestWorkflowGovernance_PiAgent_PG_TestManager_FullChain(t *testing.T) {
 		WfKey:              workflowdef.OfficialKeyTestManager,
 		TaskKey:            "test_manager",
 		StageKey:           "system_verification_planning",
-		ProjectName:        "PG PiAgent 测试经理治理链",
+		ProjectName:        fmt.Sprintf("PG PiAgent 测试经理 %d", time.Now().UnixNano()%1_000_000),
 		ExpectPlanningDone: true,
 		Materials: []bizdev.MaterialInput{{
 			Filename: "verification_scope.md",
@@ -702,23 +702,56 @@ func extractHeadings(md string) []string {
 	return headings
 }

-func cleanHeadingTitle(title string) string {
-	// 去除前缀序号如 "一、", "二、", "1.", "1.1", "（一）" 等
-	t := strings.TrimSpace(title)
-	runes := []rune(t)
-	// 去掉中文序号如 "一、", "二、", "三、", "四、", "五、", "六、", "七、", "八、", "九、", "十、"
-	chineseNums := []string{"一、", "二、", "三、", "四、", "五、", "六、", "七、", "八、", "九、", "十、"}
-	for _, cn := range chineseNums {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(t, cn) {
-			t = strings.TrimPrefix(t, cn)
-			break
-		}
+func isChineseNumeralRune(r rune) bool {
+	switch r {
+	case '零', '一', '二', '三', '四', '五', '六', '七', '八', '九', '十', '百', '千', '两':
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
 	}
-	// 去掉数字序号如 "1. ", "1、"
+}
+
+// stripChineseOrdinalPrefix 去掉「一、」「十一、」「二十三、」等中文序号前缀。
+// 旧实现只枚举到「十、」，长文档 LLM 常用「十一、签署」会导致与模板「签署」对不上。
+func stripChineseOrdinalPrefix(t string) string {
+	runes := []rune(t)
+	if len(runes) == 0 || !isChineseNumeralRune(runes[0]) {
+		return t
+	}
+	i := 0
+	for i < len(runes) && isChineseNumeralRune(runes[i]) {
+		i++
+	}
+	if i >= len(runes) {
+		return t
+	}
+	switch runes[i] {
+	case '、', '.', '．':
+		i++
+	default:
+		return t
+	}
+	for i < len(runes) && (runes[i] == ' ' || runes[i] == '\t') {
+		i++
+	}
+	return string(runes[i:])
+}
+
+func stripArabicOrdinalPrefix(t string) string {
+	runes := []rune(t)
+	// 去掉数字序号如 "1. ", "1、", "1.1 "
 	for len(runes) > 0 && ((runes[0] >= '0' && runes[0] <= '9') || runes[0] == '.' || runes[0] == '、' || runes[0] == ' ') {
 		t = strings.TrimSpace(string(runes[1:]))
 		runes = []rune(t)
 	}
+	return t
+}
+
+func cleanHeadingTitle(title string) string {
+	// 去除前缀序号如 "一、", "十一、", "1.", "1.1" 等
+	t := strings.TrimSpace(title)
+	t = stripChineseOrdinalPrefix(t)
+	t = stripArabicOrdinalPrefix(t)
 	// 去除可能括号后缀
 	if idx := strings.Index(t, "（"); idx > 0 {
 		t = strings.TrimSpace(t[:idx])
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+package squad
+
+// CleanHeadingTitleForTest 暴露 cleanHeadingTitle，供同模块白盒用例验证序号清洗。
+var CleanHeadingTitleForTest = cleanHeadingTitle
@@ -480,3 +480,55 @@ func TestQualityGate_ActionPlanStatus_DoesNotTriggerRepair(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// 现场 nightly TestManager：LLM 写「## 十一、签署 / ## 十二、说明」，旧清洗只剥到「十、」会误报缺章。
+func TestCleanHeadingTitle_MultiDigitChineseOrdinal(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		in, want string
+	}{
+		{"一、客户与项目画像", "客户与项目画像"},
+		{"十、附录", "附录"},
+		{"十一、签署", "签署"},
+		{"十二、说明", "说明"},
+		{"二十三、风险评估", "风险评估"},
+		{"1. 结论", "结论"},
+		{"签署", "签署"},
+		{"十一、签署（终稿）", "签署"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		got := squad.CleanHeadingTitleForTest(c.in)
+		if got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("cleanHeadingTitle(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// 现场 nightly TestManager：LLM 写「## 十一、签署 / ## 十二、说明」，旧清洗只剥到「十、」会误报缺章。
+func TestQualityGate_Validate_ChineseOrdinalElevenTwelve(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := t.TempDir()
+	engine := squad.NewWorkspaceEngine()
+	ws, err := engine.PrepareWorkspace(squad.WorkspacePrepareRequest{
+		WorkDir:     filepath.Join(tmpDir, "ws_tm"),
+		TaskKey:     "test_manager",
+		StageTitle:  "系统验证方案及计划",
+		ProjectName: "医疗监护仪",
+		TemplateContent: "# 系统验证方案及计划\n\n" +
+			"## 结论\n\n## 用例与验证规程\n\n## 签署\n\n## 说明\n",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PrepareWorkspace: %v", err)
+	}
+	gate := squad.NewQualityGate()
+	body := "# 系统验证方案及计划\n\n" +
+		"## 一、结论\n本方案覆盖核心验证路径，结论可交付。\n\n" +
+		"## 二、用例与验证规程\n| TC-01 | 验证心率测量精度 | 追溯 REQ-01 | 判定准则误差 <= ±2bpm | 通过 |\n\n" +
+		"## 十一、签署\n产品负责人签字确认。\n\n" +
+		"## 十二、说明\n本说明补充验证边界与假设。\n"
+	rep, err := gate.Validate(ws.WorkDir, "test_manager", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Validate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !rep.Passed {
+		t.Fatalf("expected eleven/twelve ordinal headings to match template, violations=%v", rep.Violations)
+	}
+}
@@ -132,7 +132,20 @@ export RUN_PI_E2E=1
 export KB_REQUIRE_ONLINE="${KB_REQUIRE_ONLINE:-1}"
 # Host Go tests must write workspaces into the same tree the runner mounts
 # (docker-compose.dev.yml: ./data/dev/workspaces → /app/data/workspaces).
+#
+# CRITICAL: `go test ./internal/server/...` runs with cwd=internal/server.
+# A relative DATA_DIR (e.g. ./data/dev from configs/.env.dev) resolves to
+# internal/server/data/dev and diverges from the pi-agent bind mount, so the
+# agent sees an empty workspace (missing template.md / blackboard.json) while
+# PrepareWorkspace wrote a complete tree under the package-local path.
+if [[ -n "${DATA_DIR:-}" && "${DATA_DIR}" != /* ]]; then
+  echo "warning: ignoring relative DATA_DIR=${DATA_DIR}; forcing ${ROOT}/data/dev" >&2
+  DATA_DIR="${ROOT}/data/dev"
+fi
 export DATA_DIR="${DATA_DIR:-${ROOT}/data/dev}"
+# Absolutize even if caller exported a relative path via other means.
+DATA_DIR="$(cd "${DATA_DIR}" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P || echo "${ROOT}/data/dev")"
+export DATA_DIR
 echo "==> DATA_DIR=${DATA_DIR}"

 # Shared KB preflight (host :5432). Fail closed unless KB_ALLOW_OFFLINE=1.
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import { createInMemoryAuthClient } from './auth.local';
+import { authErrorMessage } from './auth';

 test('AuthClient: 基础登录与 .env 超级管理员鉴权', async () => {
  const client = createInMemoryAuthClient({
@@ -112,3 +113,12 @@ test('AuthClient: 管理员创建账号必须在首次登录修改密码', async
  const updatedSession = await client.login({ username: 'lead_zhao', password: 'NewPermanentPassword888' });
  assert.equal(updatedSession.mustChangePassword, false);
 });
+
+test('authErrorMessage: 优先信封 error 领域原因，避免裸 JSON / 无权访问误导', () => {
+  const body =
+    '{"code":"AUTHZ","message":"无权访问","request_id":"req_x","error":"用户名或密码错误"}';
+  const msg = authErrorMessage({ code: 'AUTHZ', message: '无权访问' }, body, '用户名或密码错误');
+  assert.equal(msg, '用户名或密码错误');
+  assert.ok(!msg.includes('{'));
+  assert.notEqual(msg, '无权访问');
+});
@@ -11,10 +11,31 @@ import {
 } from '../types/auth';
 import { RoleDefinition } from '../types/rbac';
 import { mapLoginResult, mapMeResult, mapUserAccount, mapUserAccountList } from './authUserMap';
-import { apiFetch } from './client';
+import { apiErrorFromBody, apiFetch } from './client';

 const AUTH_STORAGE_KEY_SESSION = 'smdf_auth_session';

+/** Prefer domain error text over envelope SafeMessage ("无权访问"). */
+export function authErrorMessage(
+  err: { code: string; message: string },
+  bodyText: string,
+  fallback: string,
+): string {
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText) as { error?: string; code?: string; message?: string };
+    const domain = typeof parsed.error === 'string' ? parsed.error.trim() : '';
+    if (domain && domain[0] !== '{' && domain !== parsed.code && domain !== err.code) {
+      return domain;
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // fall through
+  }
+  if (err.message && err.message !== '无权访问' && err.message[0] !== '{') {
+    return err.message;
+  }
+  return fallback;
+}
+
 export interface AuthClientOptions {
  adminUsername?: string;
  adminPassword?: string;
@@ -163,7 +184,8 @@ export class AuthClient {
    });
    if (!resp.ok) {
      const errText = await resp.text();
-      throw new Error(errText.trim() || '用户名或密码错误');
+      const apiErr = apiErrorFromBody(resp.status, errText, '用户名或密码错误');
+      throw new Error(authErrorMessage(apiErr, errText, '用户名或密码错误'));
    }
    const data = mapLoginResult(await resp.json());
    this.saveSession(data);
@@ -225,8 +247,33 @@ export class AuthClient {
    return this.getAdminUsers();
  }

-  async adminResetPassword(_userId: number, _tempPass: string): Promise<boolean> {
-    throw new Error('请通过后端管理员接口重置密码');
+  async adminResetPassword(userId: number): Promise<{ tempPassword: string; mustChangePassword: boolean }> {
+    const token = this.getSessionToken();
+    const resp = await authRequest(`/api/v1/admin/users/${userId}/reset-password`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: {
+        'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+        ...(token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}),
+      },
+      body: '{}',
+    }, true);
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      const errText = await resp.text();
+      const apiErr = apiErrorFromBody(resp.status, errText, '重置密码失败');
+      throw new Error(authErrorMessage(apiErr, errText, '重置密码失败'));
+    }
+    const data = (await resp.json()) as {
+      temp_password?: string;
+      must_change_password?: boolean;
+    };
+    const tempPassword = String(data.temp_password ?? '').trim();
+    if (!tempPassword) {
+      throw new Error('重置成功但未返回临时口令，请联系运维');
+    }
+    return {
+      tempPassword,
+      mustChangePassword: data.must_change_password !== false,
+    };
  }

  async createAdminUser(payload: CreateAdminUserPayload): Promise<UserAccount> {
@@ -180,21 +180,33 @@ export const UsersSection: React.FC<UsersSectionProps> = ({ currentUser, onRefre
    }
  };

-  // 4. 重置用户密码为初始并强制改密
+  // 4. 重置用户密码：服务端生成一次性临时口令并强制改密
  const handleResetUserPassword = async (user: UserAccount) => {
-    const tempPass = 'ResetPass123';
-    if (!window.confirm(`确定要重置【${user.name}】的密码吗？重置后初始密码为 ${tempPass}，该用户下次登录将被强制改密。`)) return;
-    try {
-      await authClient.adminResetPassword(user.id, tempPass);
-    } catch (err: any) {
-      showNotification('error', err.message || '重置密码失败');
+    if (
+      !window.confirm(
+        `确定要重置【${user.name}】的密码吗？系统将生成一次性临时口令，该用户下次登录将被强制改密。临时口令仅展示一次。`,
+      )
+    ) {
      return;
    }
    try {
-      await refreshUsers();
-      showNotification('success', `已重置【${user.name}】密码为 ${tempPass}，已标记首次登录强制改密`);
-    } catch {
-      showNotification('error', '密码已重置，但全局用户目录同步失败，请刷新后重试');
+      const result = await authClient.adminResetPassword(user.id);
+      try {
+        await refreshUsers();
+      } catch {
+        // password already reset; continue to show temp password
+      }
+      const copied = window.prompt(
+        `已重置【${user.name}】密码。请立即复制临时口令（关闭后不可再查看）：`,
+        result.tempPassword,
+      );
+      if (copied === null) {
+        showNotification('success', '密码已重置；请手动记下上方弹出的临时口令');
+      } else {
+        showNotification('success', '密码已重置，已标记首次登录强制改密');
+      }
+    } catch (err: any) {
+      showNotification('error', err.message || '重置密码失败');
    }
  };
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`admin_id=4 mtx_id=26 must_change_admin=False`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`run_id=run_1790225874439969653 status=completed elapsed=300.3s`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`path=/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System/data/test/workspaces/bizdev/intake_1790225875990871262/output.md chars=6802 status=completed`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`http=202 same_run=True run_id=run_1790225874439969653`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`turn=1 http=200 intent=CASUAL_CHAT reply_source=template reply_len=1322 duration=13.5s`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`turn=2 http=200 intent=SUPPLEMENT_INFO reply_source=None reply_len=45 duration=0.0s`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`{"status":"ok","env":"test","agent_backend":"pi-agent","version":"v1.0","shared_kb_port":5432,"kb_ready":true,"database_ready":true,"schema_version":66,"schema_ready":true,"task_store_ready":true,"vault_identity_ok":false,"vault_connected":false,"vault_lag_ok":true}`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`{"ok":true,"service":"shuimu-pi-agent-runner","endpoint_url":"https://api.minimaxi.com/v1","model_id":"MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed","api":"openai-compatible","has_token":true,"tavily":{"active":true,"keys_count":2},"data_dir":"/app/data/workspaces","uptime":55.936716389}`