Why: System, role, and project entry permissions need explicit actions instead of a single administrator flag or unrestricted project creation.
Evidence: The full Backend test suite passed, including role APIs, action isolation, project.create denial/allow, storage migration coverage, and account write fences.
Impact: Adds versioned role and grant endpoints, maps account actions to explicit permissions, and requires project.create authority.
Refs: Focused role and permission system task 3
Why: Role assignment and permission changes must preserve one active position, version conflicts, idempotency, and the final policy manager.
Evidence: The full Store suite passed on SQLite and focused role/policy tests passed on isolated PostgreSQL.
Impact: Adds transactional role mutations and seeds explicit system grants for existing administrators.
Refs: Focused role and permission system task 2
Why: Backend needs a single trusted catalog and durable role authority before RDM can stop owning position data.
Evidence: Authz catalog tests and the full store suite passed on SQLite; migration rollback and one-active-role constraints are covered.
Impact: Adds schema v35 and stable role/binding types without changing existing authorization callers.
Refs: Focused role and permission system task 1
Why: The previous endpoint regression used an SQLite-only server fixture even when isolated PostgreSQL was configured.
Evidence: The revised HTTP test passed with dialect=sqlite and dialect=postgres; it creates data through one Store and reads through another before and after disabling the local account.
Impact: U3 effective-state checks for the new process replay route now have a direct two-store PostgreSQL regression without changing production behavior.
Refs: IAM U3 affected Stage 7 review; Backend PR #198
Why: Merging run-process visibility introduced a read endpoint that bypassed U3 effective-account checks when authentication was off.
Evidence: A new regression first returned HTTP 200 for disabled local; with entry and final response checks it passed, and the event pagination test passed ten repeated runs after anchoring to its appended event sequence.
Impact: Explicitly disabled local accounts cannot read stored process events; missing implicit local remains compatible.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 8 integration review; Backend PR #198; main PR #199
Why: The SSE test canceled after 200 ms while filtering more than a thousand private events; CI and race builds stopped before the shared frame.
Evidence: The failure reproduced under go test -race with HTTP 200, no private leak, and no shared frame; after a two-second deadline the race case passed three times and the Server package passed.
Impact: The privacy assertion is unchanged and now reports which condition failed, while slower replay still reaches the event under test.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; Backend PR #198; CI run 3170
Why: Spawned agent progress disappeared when the parent reply settled.
Evidence: go test ./...; run-event route test covers child status and raw-output exclusion.
Impact: Return child progress and result events in parent history without exposing child raw tool streams.
Refs: Agent-System-Dev feature/work-companion-visibility UI1
Why: The user asked to bring proven external skills for document
beautification and content enrichment into the system. Surveying GitHub,
skills.sh and ClawHub found the popular document-editing skills are
proprietary (Anthropic document skills forbid extraction and derivatives),
so the compliant picks are the permissively-licensed leaders: frontend-
design (Apache-2.0, 985.7K installs), canvas-design (Apache-2.0, official
example skill with bundled OFL fonts), copywriting and copy-editing (MIT,
54.7K stars).
Evidence: Seed-time open-spec validation passes for all four vendored
SKILL.md frontmatters (dogfooded by the existing seed tests); anthropic
skill bodies verified byte-identical to the pinned upstream snapshot
(dbd4588f); marketing skills trimmed only of unvendored sibling pointers
and eval artifacts, recorded in per-skill UPSTREAM.md with pinned SHAs;
new provenance test guards license files.
Impact: Built-in skills grow from four to eight and the binary embeds
about 6 MB of font assets; prompt library base.deliverables v9 exposes
the entry points. House-style stays authoritative for Office themes; the
new skills add visual direction, poster/infographic rendering and
copywriting craft. Seeds upgrade existing deployments on next start.
Refs: Dev task feature/vendor-popular-skills
Why: The U3 migration must replace the target schema seed with the source directory revision and cursor key.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL TestMigrateEndToEndAndIdempotent passed with field-by-field source and target comparison.
Impact: Migration regressions that lose directory cursor identity now fail the existing end-to-end test.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; docs/proposals/2026-10-14-iam-u3-account-contract-and-plan.md §10
Why: Completed replies currently drop access to streamed thinking and tool output.
Evidence: go test ./...; isolated run-event pagination and conversation binding test.
Impact: Add owner-scoped paginated event reading for a single conversation run.
Refs: Agent-System-Dev feature/work-companion-visibility UI1
Why: U3 seeds a directory revision in every new target database, which made an empty PostgreSQL target look occupied to the migration guard.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL cmd/storage-migrate integration tests passed after the previously failing cases reproduced the error.
Impact: A fresh target remains eligible for migration; existing business rows and foreign migration identities still block it.
Refs: IAM U3 Stage 7; docs/proposals/2026-10-14-iam-u3-account-contract-and-plan.md §10
Why: RDM delegated rename rebuilt the creator Host and could commit a Backend project rename after the delegated operator was disabled.
Evidence: SQLite and isolated PostgreSQL targeted checks cover operator/creator disable order, two processes, sorted locks, auth-off local compatibility, and HTTP/command Host wiring; exact committed-head replay remains pending.
Impact: Adds a request-bound single-project extension capability and checks operator plus creator in the final Backend transaction. Global ScopedHost cannot derive delegated authority; RDM cross-database atomicity remains outside the promise.
Refs: Approved Documents delegated-projection amendment 5783940, U3 A1-A4 candidate adcd8fe, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: The backfill contract test used a fake PK-magic docx as its fixture;
the new registration structural gate correctly refuses that shape, so the
contract was no longer exercised.
Evidence: The three affected runmgr tests pass locally with -count=1;
the full combined suite receipt follows on the task card.
Impact: Test fixture only; the gate behavior under test is unchanged.
Refs: Dev task feature/pptx-register-structural-gate
Why: An agent bypassing the housestyle kit hand-assembled OOXML with
zipfile; the resulting pptx lacked masters, theme and docProps. Text
extraction succeeded and every existing check passed, so a package that
Office refuses to open reached the user as a deliverable.
Evidence: Focused Go suite covers a valid minimal pptx, the incident-
shaped package, nine chain-break variants and register-level integration;
the housestyle python suite adds BrokenPptxTests for masterless, kit-made
and unopenable files. Full combined suite receipt follows on the task
card before review.
Impact: register_artifact now runs a pure-Go OPC structural check for
docx/xlsx/pptx and refuses broken packages with a kit rebuild hint;
lint_pptx gains structure-broken assertions (master/theme/layout chain,
open-failure fallback) that template mode cannot downgrade; prompts
forbid hand-assembled OOXML and specify the missing-library fallback.
Refs: Dev task feature/pptx-register-structural-gate
Why: Account disable could be followed by late Backend business writes, API key creation could implicitly create users, account bootstrap locks could invert, and directory cursors were process-local or leaked out-of-scope changes.
Evidence: Local go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL package suites passed on the staged candidate; exact committed-head SELF replay and stage 6 human review remain pending.
Impact: Adds final account transactions and external-effect checks across HTTP, Host, Bus and run manager; tightens API key issuance and persists versioned cursor signing. Delegated RDM rename still needs the separately proposed real-operator contract, so A1 and stage 6 are not complete.
Refs: Documents U3 r1, approved A1-A4 amendment fb3a821, pending delegated-projection amendment 5783940, Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery.
Why: U7 account audit and identity gates advanced on main while U3 account initialization and recovery were in progress.
Evidence: SELF merge-tree checks passed with go test ./... and isolated PostgreSQL store/server tests; exact-head replay follows.
Impact: Preserve pending-account grants, proof-linked recovery, protected CLI delivery, account serialization, and atomic audit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1; U7 PR #185
Why: Historical full sessions could reach self-profile actions, and a lost recovery response had no safe idempotent retry contract.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-full-password-profile.json, /tmp/iam-u3-recovery-idempotent-sqlite.json, /tmp/iam-u3-recovery-idempotent-pg.json, /tmp/iam-u3-account-sse-pass.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-idempotent-all.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-backend-idempotent-pg.json.
Impact: Profile actions require a password-authenticated full cookie; duplicate owner confirmation or rotation returns status without plaintext; an active SSE stream stops before its next business frame after disable.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: A disable could commit after the run manager checked account state but before its final business message was stored.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-final-settle-sqlite.json, /tmp/iam-u3-final-settle-pg.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-settle-all.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-settle-pg.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-http-two-instance-pg.json.
Impact: The final run transaction locks and rechecks the account, rejects post-disable business output, and permits only an account-denial failure record. Auth-off implicit local ownership remains explicit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Administrator-issued password and login-key paths could take over target accounts, while old credentials and plugin handles ignored current account state.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-backend-all-replay.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-final-pg-core.json, /tmp/iam-u3-backend-build.json, and focused HTTP/concurrency receipts in /tmp/iam-u3-*.json.
Impact: Adds trusted pending-account initialization and reissue, preexisting owner-session proof, proposal/rotation/grant transactions, server-side admin search, current Host guards, and legacy HTTP/CLI closure. Production cutover and downstream pins remain pending.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Concurrent password changes, recovery key reissue, and session admission could accept retired credentials or omit rejected audits.
Evidence: Local Go vet and full tests passed; real PostgreSQL store suite, deterministic interleavings, and two-process contention passed with SELF receipts.
Impact: Account writes and session admission serialize per owner; stale sessions fail closed; checked rejections carry an audit row.
Refs: Agent-System-Dev #486; Agent-System-Backend #185; merge queue Issue #518
Why: API-key issuance shares the account maintenance no-create and credential-output contract; the old CLI printed its key and lacked --out-file.
Evidence: The new subprocess test failed before the flag existed, then passed for private output and pre-mutation collision refusal; current go vet and all Go tests pass.
Impact: apikey create accepts protected --dsn-file and --out-file, preserves stdout default, and never overwrites an existing destination.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; U7 KTD14
Why: The safe open requirement covers user, apikey and identity verify, including default CLI paths.
Evidence: All three paths use private missing directories; previous full Go and PostgreSQL receipts cover the implementation, with a focused recheck before push.
Impact: Test coverage only; no runtime behavior or migration changes.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486
Why: Deliver U7 account transactions and audit without losing main auth_version, restricted-session, project or migration behavior.
Evidence: SELF go vet and all Go tests passed; isolated PostgreSQL store tests, 20 repeated two-process admission rounds, and real SIGTERM/SIGKILL persistence passed. Original failures remain in receipts; exact-head CI and independent Review follow.
Impact: Adds schema v31, noncreating account CLI opens, preflight credential output, same-transaction audit, and bootstrap admission guards. No live database touched.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; original U7 r2 account specification; 2026-10-14 Root takeover
Why: The old account lister exposed a global, always-valid directory without a domain locator or field authorization.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-sqlite.json and /tmp/iam-u3-u3-backend-pg.json.
Impact: Adds versioned optional query and exact lookup, trusted RDM scope registration, visible-field cursor binding, and restricts legacy EXT-19 to effective system administrators. RDM consumption remains a separate U3-5 unit.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Disabled accounts and mixed credentials could continue to authenticate, while web creation accepted passwords and administrator privileges.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-sqlite-green.json, /tmp/iam-u3-u2-store-pg-regression.json, and /tmp/iam-u3-u2-server-sqlite-green.json.
Impact: Adds versioned enable/disable, revokes existing handles, protects the last operable manager, and exposes pending-account/profile APIs. Recovery proposal and legacy-entry closure remain in U3-4.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: Disabling an account must stop in-flight work as well as new HTTP requests.
Evidence: SELF receipts /tmp/iam-u3-u2-runtime-regression.json and /tmp/iam-u3-u2-app-compile.json.
Impact: Run start, tools, HITL, streaming output, child runs and final settlement recheck the account independently of project authorization.
Refs: IAM U3 r1 stages 4-5; Dev feature/iam-u3-account-directory-recovery
Why: preserve identity while supporting optional profiles and controlled account lifecycle.
Evidence: SELF complete SQLite store tests and real PostgreSQL account-model regressions; red receipts retained.
Impact: additive account schema with a security compatibility floor; no production migration executed.
Refs: IAM U3-1; approved Documents c236d3099dd3e20f7bdd35caf162e0be9a7d52eb
Why:
Legacy project streams replayed upload filenames and parser metadata to newly
authorized members even though the underlying cards remained owner-only.
Evidence:
SELF real HTTP red regressions exposed legacy replay, spoofed sharing claims,
private-history pagination, and live delivery after membership removal. The
affected packages, uncached full Backend suite, isolated PostgreSQL Store suite,
and agent-system build pass after applying the event boundary.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle streams resolve trusted resource ownership and require an
internal publication proof for cross-owner delivery. Event and proof commit in
one transaction; v30 adds an additive SQLite/PostgreSQL sidecar without granting
access to historical events. Seen and visible cursors remain separate, revoked
members leave live streams, and unregistered base behavior remains compatible.
The storage migration tool preserves the new proof rows.
Refs:
project-member-access-implementation-plan.md Task 1 / R5; authorized legacy SSE
privacy follow-up; project-member-composed-legacy-project-history.json
Why:
Nested unchanged credential masks left empty parents that looked like managed
subtree overwrites. Shared members also hit an owner-only upload guard, while
upload ingestion cards could disclose private filenames and parser metadata.
Evidence:
SELF independent nested-mask probe, HTTP nested/mixed writeback, member upload,
project card privacy and authorization-change regressions failed before each fix
and passed after it. Affected settings/server suite passed; exact final-object
build and independent replay remain delivery gates owned by the task coordinator.
Impact:
Prune only parents emptied by ignored masks; explicit empty/real managed writes
stay rejected. Registered uploads check live work and trusted project existence,
keep originals owned by the actor, and recheck before persistence. Suppress only
upload project cards when no private stream exists; explicit structure cards and
unregistered upload behavior remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1/R5; independent nested mask P2;
2026-10-13 composed member-upload and private project-stream acceptance findings
Why:
Legacy project metadata can contain credentials outside the settings scope table.
Sharing raw projection settings exposed them, and generic project PATCH bypassed
the system-managed path guard already enforced by project settings endpoints.
Evidence:
SELF member Host regression failed before the fix. The fixed 4f72aaf server
baseline overlay reproduced HTTP metadata leakage and managed PATCH returning 200.
SELF shared Host-to-HTTP, immutable mask, dotted/schema/fallback, public mutation
and atomic managed-write regressions passed; uncached full suite, isolated PG
Store suite and static build passed. Independent delta replay remains a gate.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle metadata returns detached credential-masked views while
preserving service/configuration keys and persisted data. Generic project PATCH
shares the existing managed validator before rename or settings mutation; allowed
metadata key shapes and raw owner-only management lookups remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1 and R5; approved hard secret boundary;
2026-10-13 shared project metadata review follow-up
Why:
Membership could be revoked while a tool waited for confirmation or a queued
HITL reply waited for consumption. Publication replacement also crossed an
empty project scope or another plugin's source namespace for the same Ref.
Evidence:
SELF replay of all four independent review reproductions failed before the
fix and passed unchanged afterward. Committed regressions cover direct and
queued HITL, yes/session confirmation, direct artifact writes, protected vectors,
exact empty project scopes, literal wildcard IDs and unregistered compatibility.
SELF uncached go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL Store tests and static build passed.
Impact:
Recheck trusted live owner/project authorization when HITL resumes and at write
boundaries. Registered publishers replace only exact owner/project/ref/plugin
rows and vectors; ordinary unregistered publication semantics are preserved.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; independent Backend
review findings against b9bea5bee0
Why:
Higher-ranked private rows could exhaust SQL candidate limits and hide an
otherwise authorized published slice from a member's current-project search.
Evidence:
SELF TestAuthorizedKnowledgeFiltersBeforeTopK failed with no shared hits before
the change and passed after it. SELF go test ./... and the isolated PostgreSQL
Store suite passed; independent replay and current-HEAD CI remain owner gates.
Impact:
Scan the resource-authorized shared fulltext path until enough allowed results
are found. Preserve ordinary legacy retrieval candidate limits and semantics.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1; R5 published knowledge availability
Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why: The login recovery contract leftovers and KTD12/KTD14 require:
concurrent same-name account creation must not overwrite the winner,
first-admin bootstrap must serialize across processes, the redeem
endpoint backoff must be shared across instances, revoked API keys
must close established SSE streams, and CLI credentials need an
env-DSN path plus a non-interactive 0600 file delivery mode.
Evidence: go test ./... green; new tests cover 16-way concurrent
create (1 win/15 conflict, winner credentials intact), 8-way
concurrent bootstrap (single admin, refuse takeover after), redeem
guard shared across two store handles on one DB, SSE stream closed
after key revocation within the recheck window, and HTTP 429 after
the failure cap (SELF worktree run; CI is the GATE, PG via test-pg).
Impact: Migration v29 (redeem_attempts); CreateAccount becomes a
single-row INSERT with unique-violation conflict; BootstrapFirstAdmin
advisory-locks (PG) / rechecks (SQLite) and commits admin+key+audit in
one transaction; SSE revalidation covers API-key streams; redeem
backoff moves to the shared DB; CLI gains AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN fallback
and --out file delivery for create/reset-password/issue-login-key/
bootstrap-admin.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/2026-10-13-login-recovery-contract.md leftovers;
proposal r2 KTD12/KTD14/R5/R11.
weichen
weichen