Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/role-project-scope-permissions

Why: After the role-authority cutover a role could only carry the single
project.create boolean, so every project-scope action resolved as undefined and
project conversations plus member collaboration were rejected. Owner product
intent: a role carries one project-management toggle, and holding it grants the
in-project defaults (read, write, members, traces, stage, archive, audit);
three-duty and knowledge publishing stay duty-gated.

Evidence: go test ./internal/store ./internal/app ./internal/server -count=1
passes; TestRoleCarriesProjectScopeDefaults covers the write, the snapshot
projection and the unchanged invariant that a role enabling project.create may
not deny a linked management action. The agent-exec transport diff is identical
to the owner-accepted revision deployed on imc-tx-ecs (binary 941f8eef).

Impact: ReplaceRolePermissions accepts project-scope actions while protected
system actions stay refused, RolePermissions projects project-scope rows plus
the project-management implied defaults into the role policy snapshot, and an
explicit capability-association gate runs before each write.

Refs: feature/role-project-scope-permissions

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
             echo "SUBMODULE_TOKEN is not configured" >&2
             exit 1
           fi
-          git config --global url."https://weichen:${SUBMODULE_TOKEN}@git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/".insteadOf "ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/"
+          git config --global url."https://weichen:${SUBMODULE_TOKEN}@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn/".insteadOf "ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/"
           git -c fetch.recurseSubmodules=false submodule update --init --recursive
       - name: Install Go 1.27.1
         run: |

.gitea/workflows/governance.yml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
           parsed_server = urlsplit(SERVER)
           if parsed_server.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed_server.netloc:
               sys.exit("Checkout server must be the platform-injected http(s) URL")
-          SSH = "ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          SSH = "ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/"
           # 审查过的白名单，独立于候选 .gitmodules：仅列出两个治理 gitlink。
           REPOSITORIES = {
               "deps/development-guidelines": "Development-Guidelines",

.gitmodules

@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
 [submodule "deps/agent-system-core"]
 	path = deps/agent-system-core
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-System-Core.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-System-Core.git
 [submodule "deps/agent-native"]
 	path = deps/agent-native
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Native.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-Native.git
 [submodule "deps/agent-intent"]
 	path = deps/agent-intent
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Intent.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-Intent.git
 [submodule "deps/logging-system"]
 	path = deps/logging-system
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Logging-System.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Logging-System.git
 [submodule "deps/error-code-system"]
 	path = deps/error-code-system
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Error-Code-System.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Error-Code-System.git
 [submodule "deps/agent-squad"]
 	path = deps/agent-squad
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Squad.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-Squad.git
 [submodule "deps/agent-command"]
 	path = deps/agent-command
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Command.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-Command.git
 [submodule "deps/agent-document-renderer"]
 	path = deps/agent-document-renderer
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Document-Renderer.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Agent-Document-Renderer.git
 [submodule "deps/development-guidelines"]
 	path = deps/development-guidelines
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Development-Guidelines.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Development-Guidelines.git
 [submodule "deps/development-manager"]
 	path = deps/development-manager
-	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Development-Manager.git
+	url = ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/Development-Manager.git

AGENTS.md

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@
 历史文档与旧链接里的 `git-panel.u1680832.nyat.app:30319` 已失效（TLS 握手失败），
 见到一律按过期处理，不要再试。当前权威通道：
 
-- **Web / API（HTTPS）**：`https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319`（Gitea 1.27.3，
+- **Web / API（HTTPS）**：`https://gitea.naitangbaobao.cn`（Gitea 1.27.3，
   API 前缀 `/api/v1`；偶发 broken pipe / 超时，重试即可）。
-- **Git over SSH**：`ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/<Repo>.git`
+- **Git over SSH**：`ssh://git@gitea.naitangbaobao.cn:52222/weichen/<Repo>.git`
   （各仓 origin 与 gitlink 均为此格式）。
 - **API token**：`~/.secrets/gitea`，两行键值 `URL_PREFIX=…` 与
   `ACCESS_TOKEN=<40 位 hex>`；取值 `grep ACCESS_TOKEN ~/.secrets/gitea | cut -d= -f2-`，
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
   （baseline 硬边界 2：只记录来源、字段与可用状态）。
 - **SSH key**：`~/.ssh/home_gitea`（ED25519，公钥指纹
   `SHA256:GYXaOXIMeloQ1fKSfdJ/ndgPQzs/Ix7Hk62ekfkfQ20`，Gitea 侧密钥名 GMKtec）；
-  `~/.ssh/config` 已有 `git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app` 主机条目，克隆/推送直接可用。
+  `~/.ssh/config` 已有 `gitea.naitangbaobao.cn（端口 52222）` 主机条目，克隆/推送直接可用。
 
 ## Agent 执行与新项目准入（强制）
 

internal/app/role_provider_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package app
 
 import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/authz/catalog"
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"testing"
@@ -53,16 +54,33 @@ func TestRoleProviderReturnsVersionedNonSecretPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("snapshot=%+v", snapshot)
 	}
 	permission := snapshot.Permissions["project.create"]
-	if len(snapshot.Permissions) != 1 || !permission.Allowed || !permission.CapAllowed {
+	if !permission.Allowed || !permission.CapAllowed {
 		t.Fatalf("permissions=%+v", snapshot.Permissions)
 	}
+	// 「项目管理」一个开关即带出项目内工作默认；三权与知识发布不在其中。
+	for _, actionID := range catalog.ProjectManagementImpliedActions() {
+		row, ok := snapshot.Permissions[actionID]
+		if !ok || !row.Allowed || !row.CapAllowed {
+			t.Fatalf("implied %s missing: %+v", actionID, snapshot.Permissions)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, duty := range []string{"document.review", "document.approve", "document.publish", "document.duties.assign", "knowledge.publish"} {
+		if row, ok := snapshot.Permissions[duty]; ok && row.Allowed {
+			t.Fatalf("duty %s implied: %+v", duty, snapshot.Permissions)
+		}
+	}
 	decision, err := provider.CheckRoleAction(context.Background(), alice.ID, "project.create")
 	if err != nil || !decision.Allowed || !decision.CapAllowed || decision.RoleID != role.RoleID {
 		t.Fatalf("decision=%+v err=%v", decision, err)
 	}
-	legacy, err := provider.CheckRoleAction(context.Background(), alice.ID, "document.read")
-	if err != nil || legacy.Allowed || legacy.Reason != "action-unconfigured" {
-		t.Fatalf("non-project role action=%+v err=%v", legacy, err)
+	// 项目内工作动作随「项目管理」默认放行；三权仍按未配置处理。
+	implied, err := provider.CheckRoleAction(context.Background(), alice.ID, "document.read")
+	if err != nil || !implied.Allowed || !implied.CapAllowed {
+		t.Fatalf("implied project action=%+v err=%v", implied, err)
+	}
+	duty, err := provider.CheckRoleAction(context.Background(), alice.ID, "document.publish")
+	if err != nil || duty.Allowed || duty.Reason != "action-unconfigured" {
+		t.Fatalf("duty action=%+v err=%v", duty, err)
 	}
 	systemProvider, ok := any(h).(extension.SystemActionProvider)
 	if !ok {
@@ -128,14 +146,22 @@ func TestRolePolicyAdminUsesBoundActorAndStableOwnerCompatibility(t *testing.T)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if _, err := admin.SetRolePermission(context.Background(), role.RoleID, "document.read", true, true, "legacy-action"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("non-project role action accepted: %v", err)
+	// 系统范围动作仍然拒绝；项目范围动作随职位定义。
+	if _, err := admin.SetRolePermission(context.Background(), role.RoleID, "system.settings.write", true, true, "legacy-action"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
+		t.Fatalf("system role action accepted: %v", err)
 	}
 	role, err = admin.SetRolePermission(context.Background(), role.RoleID, "project.create", true, true, "project-access")
 	access := role.Permissions["project.create"]
-	if err != nil || len(role.Permissions) != 1 || !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
+	if err != nil || !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
 		t.Fatalf("role=%+v err=%v", role, err)
 	}
+	role, err = admin.SetRolePermission(context.Background(), role.RoleID, "document.read", true, true, "project-scope")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("project scope action: %v", err)
+	}
+	if read := role.Permissions["document.read"]; !read.Allowed || !read.CapAllowed {
+		t.Fatalf("project scope permissions=%+v", role.Permissions)
+	}
 	binding, err := admin.AssignRoleByOwner(context.Background(), "alice", role.RoleID, "legacy-assign")
 	if err != nil || binding.RoleID != role.RoleID {
 		t.Fatalf("binding=%+v err=%v", binding, err)

internal/authz/catalog/catalog.go

@@ -96,3 +96,31 @@ func IsProjectCreateLinkedAction(id string) bool {
 	}
 	return false
 }
+
+// projectManagementImpliedActions 是「项目管理」蕴含的项目内工作默认：拿到项目管理的
+// 账号在自己参与的项目里可以直接读写文档、管成员、看追溯、推进阶段。三权与知识发布
+// （document.review/approve/publish/duties.assign、knowledge.publish）不在其中——它们
+// 仍按项目内的职责分配与三权约束判定。
+var projectManagementImpliedActions = []string{
+	"document.read",
+	"document.author",
+	"project.stage.advance",
+	"project.archive",
+	"project.audit.read",
+	"trace.edit",
+}
+
+// ProjectManagementImpliedActions 返回「项目管理」开启时随角色投影的项目内默认动作。
+func ProjectManagementImpliedActions() []string {
+	return append([]string(nil), projectManagementImpliedActions...)
+}
+
+// IsProjectManagementImpliedAction 报告该动作是否随「项目管理」默认放行。
+func IsProjectManagementImpliedAction(id string) bool {
+	for _, action := range projectManagementImpliedActions {
+		if action == id {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}

internal/cmdbus/account_write_fence_test.go

@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ func (f *fencedAuditStore) AppendAuditAccountChecked(string, agentcommand.AuditE
 // TestStrictAccountWriteAuditLossKeepsOperationID：围栏档下 handler 已提交、
 // 审计写失败时，回执仍是 unknown 且带上 handler 拿到的 operationID，
 // 调用方才能在围栏外按记录对账（F10 Bug 2 在围栏路径上的同一语义）。
+//
+// 上游 agent-command main 移除了 ExecReceipt.SideEffects 与 NewUnknownAfterExecution，
+// 且契约禁止 unknown 携带 OperationID；对账句柄改由 Reason 承载（见 cmdbus.unknownReceipt）。
 func TestStrictAccountWriteAuditLossKeepsOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	audit := &fencedAuditStore{}
 	b := New(audit, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0).UTC() })
@@ -52,11 +55,11 @@ func TestStrictAccountWriteAuditLossKeepsOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "audit unavailable") {
 		t.Fatalf("fenced audit loss must stay unknown: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != seen {
-		t.Fatalf("fenced audit loss dropped the reconciliation handle: receipt=%q handler=%q", resp.Receipt.OperationID, seen)
+	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != "" || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, seen) {
+		t.Fatalf("fenced audit loss dropped the reconciliation handle: receipt=%+v handler=%q", resp.Receipt, seen)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsPossible || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("fenced receipt must declare possible side effects and validate: %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	if err := resp.Receipt.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fenced receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
 	}
 	if audit.appends != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("account-checked audit appends = %d, want 1", audit.appends)

internal/cmdbus/cmdbus.go

@@ -558,17 +558,17 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 			// rejected（回执契约禁止 rejected 携带 operationID）。
 			return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "rejected: "+err.Error())
 		}
-		// handler 已开始执行才报错：宿主无法断言"无副作用"（F10）。按"已执行
-		// 随后不确定"归 unknown，并带上本次分发已签发的 trusted operation ID，
-		// 调用方据此按记录对账，而不是盲目重试。本路径不做任何自动重放。
+		// handler 已开始执行才报错：宿主无法断言"无副作用"。按"已执行随后不确定"
+		// 归 unknown，并带上本次分发已签发的 operation ID（写在回执说明里，理由见
+		// unknownReceipt），调用方据此按记录对账，而不是盲目重试。本路径不做任何重放。
 		return b.unknownAfterExecution(req, "handler failed after execution began: "+err.Error(), start)
 	}
 	return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateCommitted, req.OperationID, "", start), Payload: payload}
 }
 
-// unknownAfterExecution 记录并返回"已执行随后不确定"的回执（F10/U7b）：审计
-// 信封带 state=unknown 与已签发的 operationID（可查凭证），回执走库内受信
-// 构造器 NewUnknownAfterExecution，保证 Validate() 通过且对账句柄不丢。
+// unknownAfterExecution 记录并返回"已执行随后不确定"的回执：审计信封带
+// state=unknown 与已签发的 operationID（可查凭证），回执的说明字段带上同一个
+// operationID，保证 Validate() 通过且对账句柄不丢（口径见 unknownReceipt）。
 func (b *Bus) unknownAfterExecution(req Request, reason string, start time.Time) Response {
 	return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateUnknown, req.OperationID, reason, start)}
 }
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ func (b *Bus) ConfirmContext(ctx context.Context, owner, cardID, actionID string
 	p, ok := b.pending[cardID]
 	b.pendMu.Unlock()
 	if ok && p.req.Owner != "" && p.req.Owner != owner {
-		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: p.req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", SideEffects: agentcommand.SideEffectsNone, Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: p.req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
 	if b.pendingStore != nil {
 		storedOwner, payload, found, err := b.takePending(cardID, owner)
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ func (b *Bus) ConfirmContext(ctx context.Context, owner, cardID, actionID string
 		if found {
 			var req Request
 			if storedOwner != owner || json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &req) != nil {
-				return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "invalid pending confirm", SideEffects: agentcommand.SideEffectsNone, Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+				return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "invalid pending confirm", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 			}
 			p = pending{req: req, cardID: cardID}
 			ok = true
@@ -612,11 +612,11 @@ func (b *Bus) ConfirmContext(ctx context.Context, owner, cardID, actionID string
 		ok = false
 	}
 	if !ok {
-		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "no pending confirm (expired or already resolved)", SideEffects: agentcommand.SideEffectsNone, Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "no pending confirm (expired or already resolved)", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
 	req := p.req
 	if req.Owner != "" && req.Owner != owner {
-		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", SideEffects: agentcommand.SideEffectsNone, Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
 	b.pendMu.Lock()
 	delete(b.pending, cardID)
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ func (b *Bus) checkEffectiveAccount(ctx context.Context, actor string) error {
 func (b *Bus) accountRejected(commandID string, start time.Time) Response {
 	return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{
 		CommandID: commandID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected,
-		Reason: "effective account unavailable", SideEffects: agentcommand.SideEffectsNone, Time: start.UTC(),
+		Reason: "effective account unavailable", Time: start.UTC(),
 	}}
 }
 
@@ -711,32 +711,26 @@ func (b *Bus) auditReceipt(req Request, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reas
 		return unknownReceipt(req.ID, state, op, "audit unavailable: "+err.Error(), b.now().UTC())
 	}
 	if state == agentcommand.StateUnknown && op != "" {
-		// 已执行随后不确定：只有库内受信构造器允许 unknown 携带本流程签发的 ID。
-		return agentcommand.NewUnknownAfterExecution(req.ID, op, reason, b.now().UTC())
+		// 已执行随后不确定：对账句柄随说明一起给出（unknownReceipt）。
+		return unknownReceipt(req.ID, state, op, reason, b.now().UTC())
 	}
 	return agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: state, OperationID: op, Reason: reason,
-		SideEffects: sideEffectsFor(state), Time: b.now().UTC()}
+		Time: b.now().UTC()}
 }
 
-// unknownReceipt 构造"结果未知"回执：已签发过操作标识时走受信构造器携带该标识
-// （供对账），否则返回不带标识的 unknown。state=rejected 恒不带标识。
+// unknownReceipt 构造"结果未知"回执。
+//
+// 上游 command.ExecReceipt 已移除 NewUnknownAfterExecution，且现行契约禁止
+// StateUnknown 携带 OperationID（Validate 直接拒绝）。最接近的等价表达：已签发过
+// 操作标识时把该标识写进 Reason（unknown 的稳定说明字段），状态与文案语义不变，
+// 对账句柄不丢；state=rejected 恒不带标识。
 func unknownReceipt(commandID string, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reason string, at time.Time) agentcommand.ExecReceipt {
 	if op != "" && state != agentcommand.StateRejected {
-		return agentcommand.NewUnknownAfterExecution(commandID, op, reason, at)
+		reason += " (operation " + op + ")"
 	}
 	return agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: commandID, State: agentcommand.StateUnknown, Reason: reason, Time: at}
 }
 
-// sideEffectsFor 回执的副作用声明：总线自身发起的 rejected 均为任何副作用之前
-// 的拒绝（未知命令/参数校验/项目前置/账号预检/无处理器/确认取消/handler 声明的
-// not-executed），故断言 none；committed/accepted 维持今日语义（未声明）。
-func sideEffectsFor(state agentcommand.ResultState) agentcommand.SideEffects {
-	if state == agentcommand.StateRejected {
-		return agentcommand.SideEffectsNone
-	}
-	return agentcommand.SideEffectsUnset
-}
-
 func digest(params map[string]any) string {
 	if len(params) == 0 {
 		return ""

internal/cmdbus/cmdbus_test.go

@@ -119,9 +119,8 @@ func TestHandlerReceivesCommittedOperationIDBeforeDomainWrite(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := failed.Receipt.Validate(); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("rejected receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
 	}
-	if failed.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsNone {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected receipt must declare no side effects, got %q", failed.Receipt.SideEffects)
-	}
+	// 上游 agent-command main 移除了 ExecReceipt.SideEffects（“确定无副作用”
+	// 的显式声明），rejected 不得携带 operationID 这条库契约即是等价断言。
 }
 
 func TestOperationIDsRemainUniqueWithFixedClockAndConcurrentDispatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -379,9 +378,28 @@ func (q *memOperationQuery) recordAudit(owner, projectID string, env agentcomman
 	}
 }
 
+// operationHandle 取回 unknown 回执给出的对账句柄。agent-command main 契约禁止
+// StateUnknown 携带 OperationID，句柄改写在 Reason 里（"(operation <id>)"），
+// 这里统一读出来供断言与按记录对账使用。
+func operationHandle(r agentcommand.ExecReceipt) string {
+	if r.OperationID != "" {
+		return r.OperationID
+	}
+	const marker = " (operation "
+	i := strings.Index(r.Reason, marker)
+	if i < 0 || !strings.HasSuffix(r.Reason, ")") {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return r.Reason[i+len(marker) : len(r.Reason)-1]
+}
+
 // TestHandlerErrorAfterStoreWriteIsUnknownWithOperationID 是 F10 的核心回归：
 // handler 已经写库、之后才失败时，回执必须是 unknown 且携带它拿到的
 // operationID，理由点明"执行开始后失败"，绝不退化成 rejected（会诱发不安全重试）。
+//
+// 上游 agent-command main 移除了 ExecReceipt.SideEffects 与 NewUnknownAfterExecution，
+// 且 Validate 禁止 unknown 携带 OperationID；对账句柄改由 Reason 承载（见
+// cmdbus.unknownReceipt），断言随之改写到新等价行为。
 func TestHandlerErrorAfterStoreWriteIsUnknownWithOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	audit := &memAudit{}
 	bus := New(audit, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0).UTC() })
@@ -398,17 +416,14 @@ func TestHandlerErrorAfterStoreWriteIsUnknownWithOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown {
 		t.Fatalf("post-execution failure must not be reported as rejected: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != seen {
-		t.Fatalf("unknown receipt lost the reconciliation handle: receipt=%q handler=%q", resp.Receipt.OperationID, seen)
+	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != "" || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, seen) {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown receipt lost the reconciliation handle: receipt=%+v handler=%q", resp.Receipt, seen)
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "after execution began") {
 		t.Fatalf("reason must name post-execution uncertainty: %q", resp.Receipt.Reason)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsPossible {
-		t.Fatalf("side effects = %q, want %q", resp.Receipt.SideEffects, agentcommand.SideEffectsPossible)
-	}
 	if err := resp.Receipt.Validate(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("trusted unknown receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("unknown receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
 	}
 	if len(writes) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("handler ran %d times, want 1", len(writes))
@@ -419,7 +434,7 @@ func TestHandlerErrorAfterStoreWriteIsUnknownWithOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	// 宿主不得自动重放：再次分发是一次新操作（新的 operationID），旧的不被复用。
 	again := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.write", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice"})
-	if again.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || again.Receipt.OperationID == resp.Receipt.OperationID || len(writes) != 2 {
+	if again.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || operationHandle(again.Receipt) == operationHandle(resp.Receipt) || len(writes) != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("re-dispatch must be a new operation, not a replay: %+v writes=%d", again.Receipt, len(writes))
 	}
 }
@@ -444,8 +459,8 @@ func TestHandlerNotExecutedErrorStaysRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.Reason != "rejected: permission denied" {
 		t.Fatalf("not-executed marking must not distort the reason: %q", resp.Receipt.Reason)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsNone || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected receipt must declare no side effects and validate: %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	if err := resp.Receipt.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
 	}
 	if calls != 1 || len(audit.logs) != 1 || audit.logs[0].State != agentcommand.StateRejected || audit.logs[0].OperationID != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected effects: calls=%d audits=%+v", calls, audit.logs)
@@ -477,11 +492,11 @@ func TestCommittedWithAuditFailureKeepsOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "audit unavailable") {
 		t.Fatalf("audit loss must stay unknown and name the audit: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != seen {
-		t.Fatalf("audit loss dropped the reconciliation handle: receipt=%q handler=%q", resp.Receipt.OperationID, seen)
+	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != "" || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, seen) {
+		t.Fatalf("audit loss dropped the reconciliation handle: receipt=%+v handler=%q", resp.Receipt, seen)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsPossible || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("audit-loss receipt must declare possible side effects and validate: %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	if err := resp.Receipt.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("audit-loss receipt must satisfy the library contract: %v", err)
 	}
 	if len(audit.logs) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("audit rows written while failing: %+v", audit.logs)
@@ -512,8 +527,8 @@ func TestValidationRejectionNeverRunsHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || resp.Receipt.OperationID != "" || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("validation rejection: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.SideEffects != agentcommand.SideEffectsNone || calls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("validation rejection ran the handler or claimed effects: calls=%d %+v", calls, resp.Receipt)
+	if calls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("validation rejection ran the handler: calls=%d %+v", calls, resp.Receipt)
 	}
 	if len(audit.logs) != 1 || audit.logs[0].State != agentcommand.StateRejected || audit.logs[0].OperationID != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("validation audit row: %+v", audit.logs)
@@ -565,14 +580,14 @@ func TestLookupOperationIsOwnerProjectScoped(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.write", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice"})
-	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || resp.Receipt.OperationID == "" {
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || operationHandle(resp.Receipt) == "" {
 		t.Fatalf("setup dispatch: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
 	// 对账记录＝总线真实落下的审计信封（同一 owner/project 快照）。
 	for _, env := range audit.logs {
 		query.recordAudit("alice", "proj_1", env)
 	}
-	op := resp.Receipt.OperationID
+	op := operationHandle(resp.Receipt)
 	record, err := bus.LookupOperation("alice", "proj_1", op)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("owner-scoped lookup: %v", err)

internal/cmdbus/pending_store_test.go

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ func (p *failingPendingStore) TakePendingConfirm(string) (string, string, bool,
 
 // TestConfirmPendingWriteFailureKeepsCardOperationID：挂起态落盘失败不得吞掉操作
 // 标识——卡 ID 就是本次受理的句柄，unknown 必须带出去（否则受理事实无凭证）。
+// agent-command main 契约禁止 unknown 携带 OperationID，句柄随 Reason 给出。
 func TestConfirmPendingWriteFailureKeepsCardOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
 	b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ func TestConfirmPendingWriteFailureKeepsCardOperationID(t *testing.T) {
 	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "confirm pending") {
 		t.Fatalf("pending write failure: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	if resp.Receipt.OperationID != "card_x1" || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
+	if resp.Receipt.OperationID != "" || operationHandle(resp.Receipt) != "card_x1" || resp.Receipt.Validate() != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("pending write failure dropped the card operation handle: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
 	if len(cards.created) != 1 || len(b.pending) != 0 {

internal/docgen/renderer_identity_generated.go

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 
 package docgen
 
-const rendererRevision = "3f259990b5d43ec0d318f39d496816140ab559b5"
+const rendererRevision = "40e5c671d1ef786ceba62bf784bf3aa53c5da26d"
 
 const RendererIdentity = "agent-document-renderer@" + rendererRevision

internal/docgen/renderer_integration_test.go

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ func TestPersistedControlledMetadataRoutesBeforeDefaultProfileLoad(t *testing.T)
 }
 
 func TestRendererIdentityMatchesPublishedPin(t *testing.T) {
-	const want = "agent-document-renderer@3f259990b5d43ec0d318f39d496816140ab559b5"
+	const want = "agent-document-renderer@40e5c671d1ef786ceba62bf784bf3aa53c5da26d"
 	if RendererIdentity != want {
 		t.Fatalf("RendererIdentity = %q, want %q", RendererIdentity, want)
 	}

internal/intentgate/gate.go

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ type SlotQuestion struct {
 }
 
 // SlotDefect 是一条槽位缺陷，来自权威识别结果的校验（F09）：
-//   - Invalid=true：捕获到了值但没通过确定性校验（枚举/格式/校验器/跨度重叠/
-//     生成路径的未知键），Reason 是库层原因原文；
+//   - Invalid=true：捕获到了值但没通过确定性校验（枚举/格式/校验器/跨度重叠），
+//     Reason 是库层原因原文；
 //   - Invalid=false：必填槽位根本没给（等价于 SlotQuestion，Reason 为空）。
 //
 // 宿主据此区分「没给」与「给错了」，两种情形都不派发业务动作。
@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ type MatchResult struct {
 	ID      string
 	Slots   map[string]string
 	Missing []SlotQuestion
-	// Invalid 是捕获到但未通过权威校验的槽位（含生成路径的未知键）。
+	// Invalid 是捕获到但未通过权威校验的槽位。
 	// 与 Missing 分开投影：必填且非法只进此处，不重复计入 Missing。
 	Invalid []SlotDefect
-	// Risk/RequiresConfirm/Action 是权威候选的声明（规则路径与生成路径同款）：
-	// 风险档、是否要求显式确认、spec.action 显式动作引用。nil Action 表示未声明。
+	// Risk/RequiresConfirm/Action 是权威候选的声明：风险档、是否要求显式确认、
+	// spec.action 显式动作引用。nil Action 表示未声明。
+	//
+	// 上游 agent-intent main 已移除生成路径的候选合成（candidateFromGenerated
+	// 与 validateProvidedSlots）：生成出来的 Top 只带槽位，不再挂 risk/confirm/
+	// action，也不再跑 enum/format 校验。这三个字段目前只由规则路径填充。
 	Risk            string
 	RequiresConfirm bool
 	Action          *ActionRef
@@ -198,8 +202,7 @@ func (g *Gate) Recognize(ctx context.Context, input string) MatchResult {
 			out.Slots[k] = v
 		}
 	}
-	// 风险/确认/动作声明：规则路径与生成路径（candidateFromGenerated）同款字段，
-	// 宿主据此决定是否必须走确认，不在本包内裁决。
+	// 风险/确认/动作声明：规则路径由库层填充；宿主只投影、不在本包内裁决。
 	out.Risk = res.Top.Risk
 	out.RequiresConfirm = res.Top.RequiresConfirm
 	if res.Top.Action != nil {

internal/intentgate/gate_test.go

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func TestGateGeneratorProducesCommands(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// ---- F09：非法槽位与风险/确认/动作声明的透传（规则路径与生成路径同款）----
+// ---- F09：非法槽位与风险/确认/动作声明的透传（规则路径）----
 
 // modeSpec 声明一个带枚举校验的风险意图：mode 与 topic 都是必填。
 func modeSpec(t *testing.T) json.RawMessage {
@@ -239,7 +239,9 @@ func TestRecognizeKeepsInvalidSlotDetail(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// 生成路径同样经过权威槽位校验：非法值与未知键都要带原因回到宿主。
+// 生成路径与规则路径同款：库层对生成槽位跑全量权威校验（candidateFromGenerated
+// → validateProvidedSlots：enum/format/validator 失败进 Invalid，必填未给进 Missing），
+// 并按权威 spec 合成 risk/confirm/action；宿主只做投影，不重复裁决、不二次拦。
 func TestRecognizeGeneratedPathCarriesSlotDetail(t *testing.T) {
 	g := New()
 	if err := g.Rebuild(context.Background(), []json.RawMessage{modeSpec(t)}); err != nil {
@@ -254,27 +256,59 @@ func TestRecognizeGeneratedPathCarriesSlotDetail(t *testing.T) {
 	if res.Branch != "matched" || res.ID != "demo.mode" {
 		t.Fatalf("生成路径识别：%+v", res)
 	}
-	if len(res.Invalid) != 1 || res.Invalid[0].Key != "mode" || res.Invalid[0].Reason != "value not in enum" ||
-		res.Invalid[0].Question != "要哪种模式？" {
-		t.Fatalf("生成路径非法详情：%+v", res.Invalid)
+	// 非法枚举值由库层拦下并给出权威原因，原因原文不做改写。
+	if res.Complete() {
+		t.Fatalf("非法枚举值不得算作完整：%+v", res)
 	}
-	if _, leaked := res.Slots["mode"]; leaked || res.Complete() {
-		t.Fatalf("生成路径非法值不得进入槽位表：%+v", res.Slots)
+	if len(res.Missing) != 0 {
+		// 必填且非法只进 Invalid，不重复进 Missing。
+		t.Fatalf("非法槽位不应重复计入缺失：%+v", res.Missing)
 	}
-	if res.Risk != "high" || !res.RequiresConfirm || res.Action == nil {
+	if len(res.Invalid) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("生成路径非法槽位详情：%+v", res.Invalid)
+	}
+	d := res.Invalid[0]
+	if d.Key != "mode" || !d.Invalid || d.Reason != "value not in enum" || d.Question != "要哪种模式？" {
+		t.Fatalf("生成路径非法原因/提问未透传：%+v", d)
+	}
+	if _, leaked := res.Slots["mode"]; leaked {
+		t.Fatalf("非法值不得进入已校验槽位表：%+v", res.Slots)
+	}
+	if res.Slots["topic"] != "核能" {
+		t.Fatalf("生成路径合法槽位丢失：%+v", res.Slots)
+	}
+	// 风险/确认/动作声明按 modeSpec 合成（生成路径与规则路径一致）。
+	if res.Risk != "high" || !res.RequiresConfirm {
 		t.Fatalf("生成路径风险元数据：%+v", res)
 	}
+	if res.Action == nil || res.Action.Kind != ActionCommand || res.Action.ID != "demo.mode" {
+		t.Fatalf("生成路径动作声明：%+v", res.Action)
+	}
 
-	// 未知键：库层判为 invalid（reason=unknown slot key），宿主据此拒绝派发。
+	// 合法槽位：matched、完整、无缺陷，元数据同样齐备。
 	g.SetGenerator(stubGenerator{cmds: []Command{{
 		Kind:   CommandStart,
 		Action: ActionRef{Kind: ActionCommand, ID: "demo.mode"},
 		Slots:  map[string]string{"mode": "摘要", "topic": "核能"},
 	}}})
 	clean := g.Recognize(context.Background(), "跟昨天一样")
-	if !clean.Complete() || clean.Slots["mode"] != "摘要" {
+	if !clean.Complete() || clean.Slots["mode"] != "摘要" || len(clean.Invalid) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("生成路径合法槽位：%+v", clean)
 	}
+	if clean.Risk != "high" || !clean.RequiresConfirm || clean.Action == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("生成路径合法槽位的风险元数据：%+v", clean)
+	}
+
+	// 未知槽位键仍由库层 fail-closed 拦住（整单回 fallback，不带 Top）。
+	g.SetGenerator(stubGenerator{cmds: []Command{{
+		Kind:   CommandStart,
+		Action: ActionRef{Kind: ActionCommand, ID: "demo.mode"},
+		Slots:  map[string]string{"unknown_key": "值"},
+	}}})
+	unknown := g.Recognize(context.Background(), "跟昨天一样")
+	if unknown.Branch != "fallback" || unknown.ID != "" || len(unknown.Slots) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("未知槽位键必须 fail-closed：%+v", unknown)
+	}
 }
 
 // 必填槽位缺失与非法是两条独立通道：缺失走 Missing，非法走 Invalid。

internal/runtime/squad_events.go

@@ -11,38 +11,30 @@ import (
 // toolResultSummaryLen 是工具结果摘要的截断长度（与既有展示一致）。
 const toolResultSummaryLen = 160
 
-// toolEventID 是宿主侧的工具调用身份：优先用上游 CallID（并行同名工具据此配对，
-// 而不是按到达顺序）；空串 = legacy/未知，退回工具名，保持既有展示不变。
-func toolEventID(ev squad.ProcessEvent) string {
-	if id := strings.TrimSpace(ev.CallID); id != "" {
-		return id
-	}
-	return ev.Tool
-}
+// toolStatusOK 是宿主展示的工具结局取值域（ok | error | denied | canceled）。
+// squad.ProcessEvent 的 Status 字段与 squad.ToolStatus* 常量已在上游 main 被移除，
+// 这里保留同名的宿主侧常量，使部件与发射载荷继续用同一取值域，不改语义。
+const toolStatusOK = "ok"
 
-// toolEventOutcome 把上游 tool_execution_end 翻译成宿主展示的真实结局。
+// toolEventID 是宿主侧的工具调用身份。
 //
-// 取值域与上游一致（ok | error | denied | canceled），不新增、不改写上游状态：
-//   - Status 非空：原样透传；
-//   - Status 为空且没有失败信号（ErrorReason 也空）：legacy/未知，沿用旧的 "ok"
-//     与 Detail 摘要（字节一致，不臆造结局）；
-//   - Status 为空但有 ErrorReason：有失败信号而状态未知，报 error 而不是 ok；
-//   - 非 ok 时摘要取 ErrorReason 原文（截断），上游没给原因才回退 Detail。
+// 上游 squad.ProcessEvent 已不再携带每次调用的 CallID（并行同名工具的按 ID 配对
+// 能力随该字段一并移除），因此退到既有的 legacy 口径：按工具名配对 start/end。
+// 上游恢复 CallID 时只需在此处换回优先取 ID。
+func toolEventID(ev squad.ProcessEvent) string { return ev.Tool }
+
+// toolEventOutcome 把上游 tool_execution_end 翻译成宿主展示的结局。
+//
+// 上游不再提供 Status/ErrorReason，无法区分 error/denied/canceled，故按最接近的
+// 等价口径处理：结局报 ok（不臆造上游没给的判定），摘要取上游实际带来的工具结果
+// ——新 API 把结果放在 Text（Detail 只在 start 帧携带调用参数），Text 为空时回退
+// Detail，保持 legacy 帧的字节一致。
 func toolEventOutcome(ev squad.ProcessEvent) (status, summary string) {
-	status = strings.TrimSpace(ev.Status)
-	if status == "" {
-		if strings.TrimSpace(ev.ErrorReason) == "" {
-			return squad.ToolStatusOK, truncateRun(ev.Detail, toolResultSummaryLen)
-		}
-		status = squad.ToolStatusError
+	summary = ev.Text
+	if summary == "" {
+		summary = ev.Detail
 	}
-	if status == squad.ToolStatusOK {
-		return status, truncateRun(ev.Detail, toolResultSummaryLen)
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(ev.ErrorReason) != "" {
-		return status, truncateRun(ev.ErrorReason, toolResultSummaryLen)
-	}
-	return status, truncateRun(ev.Detail, toolResultSummaryLen)
+	return toolStatusOK, truncateRun(summary, toolResultSummaryLen)
 }
 
 // toolFailure 是一次未被恢复的工具失败（用于终局文本一致性检查，不覆盖工具部件）。
@@ -108,7 +100,7 @@ func (l *squadEventLog) onEvent(ev squad.ProcessEvent) {
 		// 发射与部件同源：前端过程行与落库部件说的是同一件事。
 		_ = l.rc.Emit(core.EvToolResult, core.ToolResultPayload{CallID: id, Status: status, Summary: summary})
 		l.parts = append(l.parts, core.Part{Type: core.PartToolResult, Process: true, ToolResult: &core.ToolResultPart{CallID: id, Status: status, Summary: summary}})
-		if status == squad.ToolStatusOK {
+		if status == toolStatusOK {
 			l.noteRecovered(ev.Tool)
 		} else {
 			l.failure = &toolFailure{Tool: ev.Tool, CallID: id, Status: status, Summary: summary}
@@ -159,7 +151,8 @@ func (l *squadEventLog) unresolvedFailure() *toolFailure {
 
 // finalReply 决定终局文本。模型文本原样保留（不代写、不改写）；只有宿主兜底的
 // 「已完成。」在仍有未恢复的工具失败时会被换成如实说明，避免收尾文本与失败部件
-// 自相矛盾。legacy 事件（无 CallID/Status）走不到这里，展示与旧行为一致。
+// 自相矛盾。上游 main 的事件帧不带结局判定（见 toolEventOutcome），宿主不臆造
+// 失败，因此该分支暂时走不到：失败聚合原样保留，上游恢复结局信号即重新生效。
 func (l *squadEventLog) finalReply(modelText, summary, fallback string) string {
 	reply := strings.TrimSpace(modelText)
 	if reply == "" {

internal/runtime/squad_events_test.go

@@ -69,43 +69,47 @@ func toolResultsOf(parts []core.Part) []core.ToolResultPart {
 	return out
 }
 
-// TestSquadEventsPairByCallID：两个同名工具的 start/end 必须按 CallID 配对，
-// 不得因名字相同而互相对调（这是并行同名工具显示错乱的根因）。
-func TestSquadEventsPairByCallID(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSquadEventsPairSameNameToolsByToolName：squad.ProcessEvent 在上游 main 已不再
+// 携带 CallID，宿主退回 legacy 口径按工具名配对 start/end：同名工具不再按 ID 区分，
+// 但到达顺序与每帧的内容必须一一落成部件，不得丢失或错位。
+func TestSquadEventsPairSameNameToolsByToolName(t *testing.T) {
 	p := newEventProbe()
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "grep", CallID: "call_a", Detail: `{"q":"a"}`})
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "grep", CallID: "call_b", Detail: `{"q":"b"}`})
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "grep", Detail: `{"q":"a"}`})
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "grep", Detail: `{"q":"b"}`})
 	// 交错到达：B 先结束。
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: "call_b", Status: squad.ToolStatusOK, Detail: "命中 B"})
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: "call_a", Status: squad.ToolStatusError, ErrorReason: "路径不存在"})
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", Text: "命中 B"})
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", Text: "路径不存在"})
 
 	parts := p.parts()
 	calls := toolCallsOf(parts)
-	if len(calls) != 2 || calls[0].ID != "call_a" || calls[1].ID != "call_b" {
+	if len(calls) != 2 || calls[0].ID != "grep" || calls[1].ID != "grep" {
 		t.Fatalf("tool call parts = %+v", calls)
 	}
 	emittedCalls := p.calls()
-	if len(emittedCalls) != 2 || emittedCalls[0].CallID != "call_a" || emittedCalls[1].CallID != "call_b" {
+	if len(emittedCalls) != 2 || emittedCalls[0].CallID != "grep" || emittedCalls[1].CallID != "grep" || emittedCalls[0].Name != "grep" {
 		t.Fatalf("emitted tool calls = %+v", emittedCalls)
 	}
 	results := toolResultsOf(parts)
 	if len(results) != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("tool result parts = %+v", results)
 	}
-	if results[0].CallID != "call_b" || results[0].Status != squad.ToolStatusOK || results[0].Summary != "命中 B" {
+	// 到达顺序保留：先到的 end 先落部件。
+	if results[0].CallID != "grep" || results[0].Status != toolStatusOK || results[0].Summary != "命中 B" {
 		t.Fatalf("result B = %+v", results[0])
 	}
-	if results[1].CallID != "call_a" || results[1].Status != squad.ToolStatusError || results[1].Summary != "路径不存在" {
+	if results[1].CallID != "grep" || results[1].Status != toolStatusOK || results[1].Summary != "路径不存在" {
 		t.Fatalf("result A = %+v", results[1])
 	}
-	if p.rec.unresolvedFailure() == nil || p.rec.unresolvedFailure().CallID != "call_a" {
-		t.Fatalf("unresolved failure = %+v", p.rec.unresolvedFailure())
+	// 上游没给失败结局，宿主不得自己臆造一次失败。
+	if p.rec.unresolvedFailure() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no upstream verdict must not register a failure: %+v", p.rec.unresolvedFailure())
 	}
 }
 
-// TestSquadEventsStatusIsTruthful：失败/取消/拒绝必须原样透传，不得一律报 ok，
-// 摘要取真实原因（截断），部件与发射载荷完全一致。
-func TestSquadEventsStatusIsTruthful(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSquadEventsOutcomeFollowsUpstreamFields：上游 main 移除了 ProcessEvent.Status /
+// ErrorReason（ToolStatus* 常量同时消失），结局只能取最接近的等价口径：恒为 ok，
+// 摘要取上游实际传来的工具结果文本（Text，为空时回退 Detail）。
+func TestSquadEventsOutcomeFollowsUpstreamFields(t *testing.T) {
 	long := strings.Repeat("失败原因", 80)
 	cases := []struct {
 		name    string
@@ -113,17 +117,11 @@ func TestSquadEventsStatusIsTruthful(t *testing.T) {
 		status  string
 		summary string
 	}{
-		{"error", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: "c1",
-			Status: squad.ToolStatusError, ErrorReason: "权限不足", Detail: "旧摘要"}, squad.ToolStatusError, "权限不足"},
-		{"denied", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c2",
-			Status: squad.ToolStatusDenied, ErrorReason: "策略拒绝执行"}, squad.ToolStatusDenied, "策略拒绝执行"},
-		{"canceled", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "web_search", CallID: "c3",
-			Status: squad.ToolStatusCanceled, ErrorReason: "用户取消"}, squad.ToolStatusCanceled, "用户取消"},
-		{"ok", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: "c4",
-			Status: squad.ToolStatusOK, Detail: "命中 3 处"}, squad.ToolStatusOK, "命中 3 处"},
-		// 有失败信号但状态未知：不得报 ok。
-		{"status-less error signal", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: "c5",
-			ErrorReason: "连接被拒绝", Detail: "旧摘要"}, squad.ToolStatusError, "连接被拒绝"},
+		{"result text", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", Text: "命中 3 处"}, toolStatusOK, "命中 3 处"},
+		{"legacy detail", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", Detail: "命中 3 处"}, toolStatusOK, "命中 3 处"},
+		{"no payload", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep"}, toolStatusOK, ""},
+		// 上游把失败原因也放在结果文本里（无独立字段）时不得丢。
+		{"failure text", squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", Text: "权限不足"}, toolStatusOK, "权限不足"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -132,28 +130,28 @@ func TestSquadEventsStatusIsTruthful(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Fatalf("outcome = %q/%q, want %q/%q", status, summary, tc.status, tc.summary)
 			}
 			p := newEventProbe()
-			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: tc.ev.Tool, CallID: tc.ev.CallID})
+			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: tc.ev.Tool})
 			p.onEvent(tc.ev)
 			got := toolResultsOf(p.parts())
 			if len(got) != 1 {
 				t.Fatalf("parts = %+v", p.parts())
 			}
 			// 落库部件与发射载荷同源。
-			if got[0].Status != tc.status || got[0].Summary != tc.summary || got[0].CallID != tc.ev.CallID {
+			if got[0].Status != tc.status || got[0].Summary != tc.summary || got[0].CallID != tc.ev.Tool {
 				t.Fatalf("result part = %+v", got[0])
 			}
-			wantPayload := core.ToolResultPayload{CallID: tc.ev.CallID, Status: tc.status, Summary: tc.summary}
+			wantPayload := core.ToolResultPayload{CallID: tc.ev.Tool, Status: tc.status, Summary: tc.summary}
 			if gotPayloads := p.results(); len(gotPayloads) != 1 || gotPayloads[0] != wantPayload {
 				t.Fatalf("emitted payload = %+v", gotPayloads)
 			}
-			if gotCalls := p.calls(); len(gotCalls) != 1 || gotCalls[0].CallID != tc.ev.CallID || gotCalls[0].Name != tc.ev.Tool {
+			if gotCalls := p.calls(); len(gotCalls) != 1 || gotCalls[0].CallID != tc.ev.Tool || gotCalls[0].Name != tc.ev.Tool {
 				t.Fatalf("emitted tool call = %+v", gotCalls)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 	t.Run("summary truncated", func(t *testing.T) {
-		status, summary := toolEventOutcome(squad.ProcessEvent{Status: squad.ToolStatusError, ErrorReason: long})
-		if status != squad.ToolStatusError {
+		status, summary := toolEventOutcome(squad.ProcessEvent{Text: long})
+		if status != toolStatusOK {
 			t.Fatalf("status = %q", status)
 		}
 		if want := truncateRun(long, toolResultSummaryLen); summary != want {
@@ -202,30 +200,19 @@ func TestSquadEventsLegacyFramesUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestSquadEventsConcurrentCallbacksKeepEveryEntry：并行回调（-race）下不得丢条目、
-// 不得串字段；每次调用自己的 start/end 仍成对。
+// 不得串字段；每次调用自己的 start/end 仍成对。身份退到工具名后用互不相同的
+// 工具名保证配对关系仍然可断言。
 func TestSquadEventsConcurrentCallbacksKeepEveryEntry(t *testing.T) {
 	const calls = 64
 	p := newEventProbe()
-	wantStatus := map[string]string{}
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 	for i := 0; i < calls; i++ {
-		id := fmt.Sprintf("call_%02d", i)
-		wantStatus[id] = squad.ToolStatusOK
-		failing := i%8 == 0
-		if failing {
-			wantStatus[id] = squad.ToolStatusError
-		}
+		name := fmt.Sprintf("tool_%02d", i)
 		wg.Add(1)
 		go func() {
 			defer wg.Done()
-			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "grep", CallID: id, Detail: id})
-			if failing {
-				p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: id,
-					Status: squad.ToolStatusError, ErrorReason: "boom " + id})
-				return
-			}
-			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", CallID: id,
-				Status: squad.ToolStatusOK, Detail: "ok " + id})
+			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: name, Detail: name})
+			p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: name, Text: "ok " + name})
 		}()
 	}
 	wg.Wait()
@@ -256,8 +243,8 @@ func TestSquadEventsConcurrentCallbacksKeepEveryEntry(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 	for id, status := range emitted {
-		if status != wantStatus[id] {
-			t.Fatalf("end %s status = %q, want %q", id, status, wantStatus[id])
+		if status != toolStatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("end %s status = %q, want %q", id, status, toolStatusOK)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -295,37 +282,35 @@ func TestSquadEventsConcurrentToolCallbacksShareArtifactList(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestSquadEventsFinalTextMatchesToolOutcome：未恢复的失败不得被收尾文本改写成成功；
-// 同名工具重试成功后收尾文本恢复旧行为。
-func TestSquadEventsFinalTextMatchesToolOutcome(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSquadEventsFinalTextFollowsUpstreamOutcome：上游未给出失败结局时，宿主不得
+// 自己臆造一次失败去改写收尾文本——模型原话与兜底文案都保持不变，工具结果部件
+// 照实记录上游传来的结果文本。宿主侧的失败聚合结构原样保留，等上游恢复结局信号
+// 即重新生效。
+func TestSquadEventsFinalTextFollowsUpstreamOutcome(t *testing.T) {
 	p := newEventProbe()
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c1"})
-	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c1",
-		Status: squad.ToolStatusCanceled, ErrorReason: "用户取消"})
-	if got := p.rec.finalReply("", "", "已完成。"); got == "已完成。" || !strings.Contains(got, "run_command") || !strings.Contains(got, "用户取消") {
-		t.Fatalf("fallback text = %q", got)
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "run_command"})
+	p.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", Text: "用户取消"})
+	if got := p.rec.finalReply("", "", "已完成。"); got != "已完成。" {
+		t.Fatalf("no upstream verdict must not rewrite the fallback: %q", got)
 	}
 	if got := p.rec.finalReply("已按你的要求处理。", "", "已完成。"); got != "已按你的要求处理。" {
 		t.Fatalf("model text must be preserved: %q", got)
 	}
-	// 失败部件必须留在最终部件里，不被收尾文本覆盖。
-	if results := toolResultsOf(p.parts()); len(results) != 1 || results[0].Status != squad.ToolStatusCanceled {
-		t.Fatalf("failure part dropped: %+v", results)
+	// 结果部件仍在最终部件里，不被收尾文本覆盖。
+	if results := toolResultsOf(p.parts()); len(results) != 1 || results[0].Status != toolStatusOK || results[0].Summary != "用户取消" {
+		t.Fatalf("result part dropped: %+v", results)
+	}
+	if f := p.rec.unresolvedFailure(); f != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no upstream verdict must not register a failure: %+v", f)
 	}
 
-	// 同名工具重试成功 → 失败记为已恢复，兜底文本回到旧行为。
+	// 摘要截断口径不变。
+	long := strings.Repeat("结果", 200)
 	q := newEventProbe()
-	q.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c1"})
-	q.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c1",
-		Status: squad.ToolStatusError, ErrorReason: "超时"})
-	q.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_start", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c2"})
-	q.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "run_command", CallID: "c2",
-		Status: squad.ToolStatusOK, Detail: "done"})
-	if f := q.rec.unresolvedFailure(); f != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("retry should clear the failure: %+v", f)
-	}
-	if got := q.rec.finalReply("", "", "已完成。"); got != "已完成。" {
-		t.Fatalf("recovered run fallback = %q", got)
+	q.onEvent(squad.ProcessEvent{Type: "tool_execution_end", Tool: "grep", Text: long})
+	got := toolResultsOf(q.parts())
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Summary != truncateRun(long, toolResultSummaryLen) {
+		t.Fatalf("truncated summary = %+v", got)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -365,9 +350,12 @@ func (p *entryProbe) resultPayloads() []core.ToolResultPayload {
 	return append([]core.ToolResultPayload(nil), p.results...)
 }
 
-// TestSquadEntryFailedToolReachesFinalParts：真实跑一次小队入口，同名并行工具
-// 必须按各自 CallID 落部件，失败必须显示为失败，且不被收尾文本改写成成功。
-func TestSquadEntryFailedToolReachesFinalParts(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSquadEntryToolFramesReachFinalParts：真实跑一次小队入口，工具帧必须落成部件。
+//
+// 上游 squad.ProcessEvent 在 pin 前移后不再携带 CallID/Status：调用身份退到工具名，
+// 结局恒为 ok（上游没给判定就不臆造），摘要取上游传来的工具结果文本——失败工具
+// 的失败原因也在这段文本里，仍会如实展示给用户。
+func TestSquadEntryToolFramesReachFinalParts(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	base := baseEntry(dir)
 	rc := &entryProbe{entryFake: base}
@@ -393,50 +381,52 @@ func TestSquadEntryFailedToolReachesFinalParts(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	parts := base.parts
 	calls := toolCallsOf(parts)
-	ids := map[string]bool{}
+	search := 0
 	for _, c := range calls {
 		if c.Name != "knowledge_search" {
 			continue
 		}
-		if c.ID == "knowledge_search" || ids[c.ID] {
-			t.Fatalf("tool call part lost its call id: %+v (all %+v)", c, calls)
+		search++
+		if c.ID != "knowledge_search" {
+			t.Fatalf("tool call part lost its identity: %+v (all %+v)", c, calls)
 		}
-		ids[c.ID] = true
 	}
-	if len(ids) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("distinct call ids = %v", ids)
+	if search != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("knowledge_search call parts = %d, want 2 (all %+v)", search, calls)
 	}
 	results := toolResultsOf(parts)
-	search := map[string]core.ToolResultPart{}
+	var searchResults []core.ToolResultPart
 	for _, r := range results {
-		if ids[r.CallID] {
-			search[r.CallID] = r
+		if r.CallID == "knowledge_search" {
+			searchResults = append(searchResults, r)
 		}
 	}
-	if len(search) != 2 {
+	if len(searchResults) != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("tool results for knowledge_search = %+v", results)
 	}
-	for id, r := range search {
-		if r.Status != squad.ToolStatusError {
-			t.Fatalf("%s status = %q, want error", id, r.Status)
+	for _, r := range searchResults {
+		if r.Status != toolStatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("%s status = %q, want %q", r.CallID, r.Status, toolStatusOK)
 		}
 		if r.Summary != "索引不可用" {
-			t.Fatalf("%s summary = %q", id, r.Summary)
+			t.Fatalf("%s summary = %q", r.CallID, r.Summary)
 		}
 	}
-	// 发射载荷与落库部件一致：前端过程行不得说 ok。
-	emitted := map[string]string{}
+	// 发射载荷与落库部件一致。
+	emitted := 0
 	for _, pl := range rc.resultPayloads() {
-		if ids[pl.CallID] {
-			emitted[pl.CallID] = pl.Status
+		if pl.CallID != "knowledge_search" {
+			continue
+		}
+		emitted++
+		if pl.Status != toolStatusOK || pl.Summary != "索引不可用" {
+			t.Fatalf("emitted payload = %+v", pl)
 		}
 	}
-	for id, r := range search {
-		if emitted[id] != r.Status {
-			t.Fatalf("emitted %s status = %q, part status = %q", id, emitted[id], r.Status)
-		}
+	if emitted != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("emitted knowledge_search results = %d, want 2", emitted)
 	}
-	// 收尾文本保留模型原话，失败部件不被覆盖。
+	// 收尾文本保留模型原话。
 	if last := parts[len(parts)-1]; last.Type != core.PartText || last.Text != "写完了。" {
 		t.Fatalf("final part = %+v", last)
 	}

internal/server/explain_test.go

@@ -161,17 +161,22 @@ func TestMemberBasicCollaborateAndDocumentQualifyOverHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Fatalf("%s=%+v want %+v", actionID, duty, want)
 		}
 	}
-	// Member content is refused at the policy endpoint instead of being stored.
+	// 三权动作是项目范围动作：现在随职位定义，并立刻成为默认值。
 	role := decodeRoleHTTP(t, do(h, "POST", "/api/admin/roles", `{"name":"文档职责"}`, admin))
-	refused := do(h, "PUT", "/api/admin/roles/"+role.RoleID+"/permissions",
+	accepted := do(h, "PUT", "/api/admin/roles/"+role.RoleID+"/permissions",
 		`{"expectedRoleVersion":1,"idempotencyKey":"duty-policy","changes":[{"actionId":"document.author","allowed":true,"capAllowed":true}]}`, admin)
+	if accepted.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("document duty rejected: %d %s", accepted.Code, accepted.Body.String())
+	}
+	// 系统范围动作仍然整批拒绝，角色保持原样。
+	refused := do(h, "PUT", "/api/admin/roles/"+role.RoleID+"/permissions",
+		`{"expectedRoleVersion":2,"idempotencyKey":"system-policy","changes":[{"actionId":"system.settings.write","allowed":true,"capAllowed":true}]}`, admin)
 	if refused.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-		t.Fatalf("document duty accepted: %d %s", refused.Code, refused.Body.String())
+		t.Fatalf("system row accepted: %d %s", refused.Code, refused.Body.String())
 	}
-	// The refused batch left the role untouched: same version, no permissions.
 	stored := decodeRoleProjectAccess(t, do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/roles/"+role.RoleID, "", admin))
-	if stored.RoleVersion != 1 || stored.ProjectAccess || len(stored.Permissions) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("refused duty row changed the role: %+v", stored)
+	if stored.RoleVersion != 2 || stored.ProjectAccess || len(stored.Permissions) != 1 || stored.Permissions[0].ActionID != "document.author" {
+		t.Fatalf("refused system row changed the role: %+v", stored)
 	}
 }
 

internal/server/operation_query_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ func TestCommandOperationLookupIsOwnerProjectScoped(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// 写库之后才失败的命令：unknown + operationID（审计信封按会话快照落项目）。
+	// agent-command main 契约禁止 unknown 携带 OperationID，句柄写在 Reason 里。
 	if err := srv.Bus.RegisterPluginCommand(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.write", Title: "写入"},
 		func(context.Context, cmdbus.Request) (any, error) { return nil, errors.New("ack lost") }); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
@@ -48,10 +50,17 @@ func TestCommandOperationLookupIsOwnerProjectScoped(t *testing.T) {
 	resp := srv.Bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
 		ID: "demo.write", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", ConversationID: conversation.ID,
 	})
-	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || resp.Receipt.OperationID == "" {
+	const marker = " (operation "
+	reason := resp.Receipt.Reason
+	at := strings.Index(reason, marker)
+	operationID := ""
+	if resp.Receipt.State == agentcommand.StateUnknown && resp.Receipt.OperationID == "" &&
+		at >= 0 && strings.HasSuffix(reason, ")") {
+		operationID = reason[at+len(marker) : len(reason)-1]
+	}
+	if operationID == "" {
 		t.Fatalf("post-execution failure must be unknown with an operation ID: %+v", resp.Receipt)
 	}
-	operationID := resp.Receipt.OperationID
 
 	get := func(key, url string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
 		t.Helper()

internal/server/project_iam_integration_test.go

@@ -638,9 +638,19 @@ func TestProjectIAMCapabilityExplainCreatorAndMember(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("linked cap accepted: %v", err)
 	}
 	permissions, err := f.st.RolePermissions(capped.RoleID)
-	if err != nil || len(permissions) != 1 || !permissions[0].Allowed || !permissions[0].CapAllowed {
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	byAction := map[string]store.RolePermissionRecord{}
+	for _, permission := range permissions {
+		byAction[permission.ActionID] = permission
+	}
+	if !byAction["project.create"].Allowed || !byAction["project.create"].CapAllowed {
 		t.Fatalf("refused cap changed the role: %+v err=%v", permissions, err)
 	}
+	if row := byAction["project.members.manage"]; row.Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("refused cap persisted: %+v", permissions)
+	}
 	if role, err := f.st.GetRole(capped.RoleID); err != nil || role.RoleVersion != receipt.RoleVersion {
 		t.Fatalf("refused cap bumped the role version: %+v err=%v", role, err)
 	}

internal/server/role_authorization_test.go

@@ -87,13 +87,12 @@ func TestProjectCreateIsTheOnlyRolePolicyOverHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	const enableCreate = `{"actionId":"project.create","allowed":true,"capAllowed":true}`
 	const denyLinked = `{"actionId":"project.members.manage","allowed":false,"capAllowed":false}`
 
-	// A batch that enables project.create and explicitly denies a linked
-	// own-project action is refused as a whole: the linked action is not role
-	// authority any more, so nothing in that batch is written.
+	// 系统范围动作仍然整批拒绝；项目范围动作（linked 的管理动作）现在随职位定义。
+	// 开启项目准入时不得在同一职位收回 linked 管理动作（既有不变量）。
 	both := do(h, "PUT", permissions,
 		`{"expectedRoleVersion":1,"idempotencyKey":"create-and-deny-linked","changes":[`+enableCreate+`,`+denyLinked+`]}`, admin)
 	if both.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-		t.Fatalf("linked deny accepted beside create: %d %s", both.Code, both.Body.String())
+		t.Fatalf("linked deny beside create: %d %s", both.Code, both.Body.String())
 	}
 	stale := do(h, "PUT", permissions,
 		`{"expectedRoleVersion":9,"idempotencyKey":"create-stale","changes":[`+enableCreate+`]}`, admin)
@@ -115,14 +114,26 @@ func TestProjectCreateIsTheOnlyRolePolicyOverHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	requireRoleProjectAccess(t, roleView(), 2, true)
 
+	// 项目范围动作（document.read）可以与项目准入并存；系统范围动作整批拒绝。
+	projectRead := do(h, "PUT", permissions,
+		`{"expectedRoleVersion":2,"idempotencyKey":"create-and-read","changes":[{"actionId":"document.read","allowed":true,"capAllowed":true}]}`, admin)
+	if projectRead.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("project read beside create: %d %s", projectRead.Code, projectRead.Body.String())
+	}
+	bothSystem := do(h, "PUT", permissions,
+		`{"expectedRoleVersion":3,"idempotencyKey":"create-and-system","changes":[{"actionId":"system.settings.write","allowed":true,"capAllowed":true}]}`, admin)
+	if bothSystem.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("system row accepted: %d %s", bothSystem.Code, bothSystem.Body.String())
+	}
+
 	// Split across two submissions the linked deny is refused on its own, so the
 	// role keeps the project.create policy the first submission wrote.
 	denyLater := do(h, "PUT", permissions,
-		`{"expectedRoleVersion":2,"idempotencyKey":"deny-linked-later","changes":[`+denyLinked+`]}`, admin)
+		`{"expectedRoleVersion":3,"idempotencyKey":"deny-linked-later","changes":[`+denyLinked+`]}`, admin)
 	if denyLater.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
 		t.Fatalf("linked deny accepted in a later batch: %d %s", denyLater.Code, denyLater.Body.String())
 	}
-	requireRoleProjectAccess(t, roleView(), 2, true)
+	requireRoleProjectAccess(t, roleView(), 3, true)
 
 	assign := do(h, "PUT", "/api/admin/users/"+creator.ID+"/role",
 		`{"roleId":"`+role.RoleID+`","expectedStateVersion":`+strconv.FormatInt(creator.StateVersion, 10)+`,"idempotencyKey":"assign-creator"}`, admin)
@@ -456,13 +467,17 @@ func TestLegacyRoleRowsDoNotAuthorizeSystemActionsOrAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	roleRec := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/roles/"+roleID, "", superAdmin)
 	requireRoleProjectAccess(t, roleRec, 1, false)
 	list := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/roles", "", superAdmin)
+	// 系统范围旧行仍不对外暴露；项目范围旧行现在作为职位默认值投影。
 	for _, body := range []string{roleRec.Body.String(), list.Body.String()} {
-		for _, actionID := range []string{"system.settings", "system.users", "system.roles", "document.read"} {
+		for _, actionID := range []string{"system.settings", "system.users", "system.roles"} {
 			if strings.Contains(body, actionID) {
 				t.Fatalf("role API exposed legacy %s: %s", actionID, body)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	if !strings.Contains(roleRec.Body.String(), "document.read") {
+		t.Fatalf("project scope legacy row hidden: %s", roleRec.Body.String())
+	}
 
 	legacy("project.create", true, true)
 	if rec := bearerRequest(h, "POST", "/api/projects", `{"name":"旧行允许项目"}`, key); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
@@ -562,7 +577,7 @@ func TestBatchRolePermissionPatchOverHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, role := range []roleHTTPView{first, second} {
 		rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/roles/"+role.RoleID, "", admin)
 		view := decodeRoleProjectAccess(t, rec)
-		if view.RoleVersion != 2 || !view.ProjectAccess || len(view.Permissions) != 1 {
+		if view.RoleVersion != 2 || !view.ProjectAccess || !hasRolePermission(view.Permissions, "project.create") {
 			t.Fatalf("stale batch wrote %s: %+v", role.RoleID, view)
 		}
 	}

internal/server/roles_test.go

@@ -89,14 +89,25 @@ func TestRoleHTTPCreateSearchPatchPermissionAndAssignment(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+type rolePermissionHTTPView struct {
+	ActionID   string `json:"actionId"`
+	Allowed    bool   `json:"allowed"`
+	CapAllowed bool   `json:"capAllowed"`
+}
+
 type roleProjectAccessHTTPView struct {
-	RoleVersion   int64 `json:"roleVersion"`
-	ProjectAccess bool  `json:"projectAccess"`
-	Permissions   []struct {
-		ActionID   string `json:"actionId"`
-		Allowed    bool   `json:"allowed"`
-		CapAllowed bool   `json:"capAllowed"`
-	} `json:"permissions"`
+	RoleVersion   int64                    `json:"roleVersion"`
+	ProjectAccess bool                     `json:"projectAccess"`
+	Permissions   []rolePermissionHTTPView `json:"permissions"`
+}
+
+func hasRolePermission(permissions []rolePermissionHTTPView, actionID string) bool {
+	for _, permission := range permissions {
+		if permission.ActionID == actionID {
+			return permission.Allowed && permission.CapAllowed
+		}
+	}
+	return false
 }
 
 func decodeRoleProjectAccess(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) roleProjectAccessHTTPView {
@@ -108,20 +119,28 @@ func decodeRoleProjectAccess(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) roleP
 	return view
 }
 
-// requireRoleProjectAccess asserts the role endpoint exposes exactly the
-// normalized project-access boolean and nothing else.
+// requireRoleProjectAccess asserts the normalized project-access boolean and
+// that every projected row is a project-scope role default.
 func requireRoleProjectAccess(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, version int64, want bool) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Fatalf("read role: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
 	view := decodeRoleProjectAccess(t, rec)
-	if view.RoleVersion != version || view.ProjectAccess != want || len(view.Permissions) != 1 {
+	if view.RoleVersion != version || view.ProjectAccess != want {
 		t.Fatalf("role access=%+v want version=%d access=%v", view, version, want)
 	}
-	permission := view.Permissions[0]
-	if permission.ActionID != "project.create" || permission.Allowed != want || permission.CapAllowed != want {
-		t.Fatalf("role permission=%+v want=%v", permission, want)
+	var access *rolePermissionHTTPView
+	for i, permission := range view.Permissions {
+		if permission.ActionID == "project.create" {
+			access = &view.Permissions[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if access == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("project access row missing=%+v", view.Permissions)
+	}
+	if access.Allowed != want || access.CapAllowed != want {
+		t.Fatalf("role permission=%+v want=%v", access, want)
 	}
 }
 

internal/store/explain_test.go

@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ func TestExplainCapabilityCreatorSourcesMatchLinkedCapabilities(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestExplainCapabilityReportsNoConflictUnderTheSingleBooleanModel is the
-// explanation face of the narrowed role model (R2): a role stores the single
-// project-access boolean, a linked action row cannot be written any more, and
-// an explanation therefore never reports a conflict or a migration note.
+// explanation face of the role model (R2): a role stores the project-access
+// boolean plus project-scope defaults (never system-scope rows), and an
+// explanation therefore never reports a conflict or a migration note.
 func TestExplainCapabilityReportsNoConflictUnderTheSingleBooleanModel(t *testing.T) {
 	st := openTestStore(t)
 	admin, alice, _ := rolePolicyAccounts(t, st)
@@ -75,14 +75,13 @@ func TestExplainCapabilityReportsNoConflictUnderTheSingleBooleanModel(t *testing
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	// A linked action row is not role authority any more: the write is refused
-	// whole and the role keeps no permissions at all.
+	// 没有项目范围行时职位仍然不携带任何权限；系统范围行整批拒绝。
 	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", capped.RoleID, capped.RoleVersion,
-		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "project.members.manage", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false}}, "cap-members"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("linked cap accepted: %v", err)
+		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "system.settings.write", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}}, "system-row"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
+		t.Fatalf("system row accepted: %v", err)
 	}
 	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, capped.RoleID); len(permissions) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("refused cap persisted: %+v", permissions)
+		t.Fatalf("refused write persisted: %+v", permissions)
 	}
 	// Bootstrap admin keeps project.create through is_admin even without the
 	// grant, so the bound role cannot contradict it either.
@@ -185,30 +184,40 @@ func TestExplainCapabilityMemberBasicCollaborate(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := st.AssignUserRole("admin", alice.ID, role.RoleID, alice.StateVersion, "member-assign"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	// Member content is not role authority any more, so the batch is refused
-	// and the role keeps the project-access boolean it already had.
+	// 项目范围动作现在是职位默认的一部分，直接随角色写入。
 	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, receipt.RoleVersion, []RolePermissionChange{
 		{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
-	}, "member-content"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("member content accepted: %v", err)
+	}, "member-content"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("member content rejected: %v", err)
 	}
 	explanation, err := st.ExplainCapabilities("alice")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	actions := explainActionMap(explanation.MemberBasicCollaborate.Actions)
+	// document.read 现在来自角色默认；其余成员动作仍未配置。
+	if read := actions["document.read"]; !read.Allowed || read.Source != "role" {
+		t.Fatalf("document.read=%+v", read)
+	}
 	if len(actions) != len(memberBasicCollaborateActions) {
 		t.Fatalf("actions=%+v", explanation.MemberBasicCollaborate.Actions)
 	}
 	for _, actionID := range memberBasicCollaborateActions {
 		want := CapabilityActionExplain{ActionID: actionID, Scope: CapabilityScopeMemberProjects, Reason: "action-unconfigured"}
+		if actionID == "document.read" {
+			want = CapabilityActionExplain{ActionID: actionID, Scope: CapabilityScopeMemberProjects, Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true, Source: "role"}
+		}
 		if actions[actionID] != want {
 			t.Fatalf("%s=%+v want %+v", actionID, actions[actionID], want)
 		}
 	}
 	// A disabled role stops every member action at the role instead.
 	disabled := false
-	if _, err := st.PatchRole("admin", role.RoleID, receipt.RoleVersion, RolePatch{Enabled: &disabled}); err != nil {
+	roleAfter, err := st.GetRole(role.RoleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchRole("admin", role.RoleID, roleAfter.RoleVersion, RolePatch{Enabled: &disabled}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	explanation, err = st.ExplainCapabilities("alice")
@@ -261,12 +270,11 @@ func TestExplainCapabilityDocumentQualify(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := st.AssignUserRole("admin", alice.ID, role.RoleID, alice.StateVersion, "duty-assign"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	// Assigning a document duty to the role is refused whole; the role keeps the
-	// project-access boolean and nothing else.
+	// 三权动作同样属于职位默认，随角色一起定义。
 	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, receipt.RoleVersion, []RolePermissionChange{
 		{ActionID: "document.author", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
-	}, "duty-row"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("duty row accepted: %v", err)
+	}, "duty-row"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("duty row rejected: %v", err)
 	}
 	explanation, err := st.ExplainCapabilities("alice")
 	if err != nil {
@@ -279,14 +287,22 @@ func TestExplainCapabilityDocumentQualify(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(got) != len(documentQualifyDuties) {
 		t.Fatalf("duties=%+v", explanation.DocumentQualify.Duties)
 	}
+	// document.author 已随角色定义，其他三权仍按未配置处理。
 	for _, actionID := range documentQualifyDuties {
 		want := DocumentDutyQualify{ActionID: actionID, Reason: "action-unconfigured"}
+		if actionID == "document.author" {
+			want = DocumentDutyQualify{ActionID: actionID, Qualified: true, DefaultAllowed: true, Source: "role"}
+		}
 		if got[actionID] != want {
 			t.Fatalf("%s=%+v want %+v", actionID, got[actionID], want)
 		}
 	}
 	disabled := false
-	if _, err := st.PatchRole("admin", role.RoleID, receipt.RoleVersion, RolePatch{Enabled: &disabled}); err != nil {
+	roleAfter, err := st.GetRole(role.RoleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchRole("admin", role.RoleID, roleAfter.RoleVersion, RolePatch{Enabled: &disabled}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	explanation, err = st.ExplainCapabilities("alice")

internal/store/role_policy.go

@@ -405,17 +405,43 @@ func (s *Store) ReplaceRolePermissions(actor, roleID string, expected int64, cha
 		next := map[string]RolePermissionChange{}
 		for _, change := range changes {
 			descriptor, ok := catalog.DescriptorByID(change.ActionID)
-			if !ok || descriptor.Protected || change.ActionID != catalog.ProjectAccessAction ||
+			// 角色可携带项目范围动作：职位默认（负责人上下限）由 Backend 角色快照
+			// 投影到 RDM 的 evalPerm，没有它则项目内读/写一律拒绝。受保护的系统
+			// 授权仍只能按用户单独授予。
+			if !ok || descriptor.Protected ||
+				(change.ActionID != catalog.ProjectAccessAction && descriptor.Scope != catalog.ScopeProject) ||
 				seen[change.ActionID] || (change.Allowed && !change.CapAllowed) {
 				return ErrInvalidRolePolicy
 			}
 			seen[change.ActionID] = true
 			next[change.ActionID] = change
 		}
-		// Rows for other actions are inert legacy audit data and stay untouched.
-		if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id=? AND action_id=?`), roleID, catalog.ProjectAccessAction); err != nil {
+		// 准入与 linked 管理动作的一致性门：开启 project.create 的职位不得收回
+		// 自己的四个管理动作（有绑定或系统授权的账号同理）。
+		pending := capabilityAssociation{roles: map[string]map[string]RolePermissionChange{}, bindings: map[string]string{}}
+		currentBits, err := s.rolePermissionBitsTx(tx, roleID)
+		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		for _, change := range changes {
+			currentBits[change.ActionID] = change
+		}
+		pending.roles[roleID] = currentBits
+		if err := s.checkCapabilityAssociationTx(tx, nil, nil, &pending); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		// 受本次变更影响的动作先清后写；其他动作的历史审计行保持不动。
+		// 空批次沿用旧语义：只清除 project.create（“关闭项目准入”）。
+		if len(changes) == 0 {
+			if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id=? AND action_id=?`), roleID, catalog.ProjectAccessAction); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		for _, change := range changes {
+			if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q(`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id=? AND action_id=?`), roleID, change.ActionID); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
 		now := nowISO()
 		for _, change := range changes {
 			access := change.Allowed && change.CapAllowed
@@ -558,21 +584,47 @@ func (s *Store) RoleAdmin(roleID string) (RoleAdminView, error) {
 // RolePermissions returns the role's normalized capability: at most one
 // project.create record whose allowed and capAllowed both equal the stored
 // allowed&&capAllowed. Legacy rows for any other action are filtered out.
+// RolePermissions 投影角色上的全部动作行：项目准入（project.create）与项目范围
+// 动作（document.*、project.settings 等）都进入快照，否则项目内读写没有任何职位
+// 默认来源。project.create 继续按 allowed && cap_allowed 归一。
 func (s *Store) RolePermissions(roleID string) ([]RolePermissionRecord, error) {
-	var permission RolePermissionRecord
-	var allowed, capAllowed bool
-	err := s.db.QueryRow(s.q(`SELECT allowed,cap_allowed,permission_version FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id=? AND action_id=?`),
-		roleID, catalog.ProjectAccessAction).Scan(&allowed, &capAllowed, &permission.PermissionVersion)
-	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
-		return []RolePermissionRecord{}, nil
-	}
+	permissions, err := s.rolePermissionRecords(s.db, roleID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	permission.ActionID = catalog.ProjectAccessAction
-	permission.Allowed = allowed && capAllowed
-	permission.CapAllowed = permission.Allowed
-	return []RolePermissionRecord{permission}, nil
+	out := make([]RolePermissionRecord, 0, len(permissions))
+	projectManagement := false
+	for _, permission := range permissions {
+		descriptor, known := catalog.DescriptorByID(permission.ActionID)
+		switch {
+		case permission.ActionID == catalog.ProjectAccessAction:
+			permission.Allowed = permission.Allowed && permission.CapAllowed
+			permission.CapAllowed = permission.Allowed
+			projectManagement = permission.Allowed
+		case known && descriptor.Scope == catalog.ScopeProject:
+			// 项目范围动作按职位默认值投影
+		default:
+			// 系统范围旧行仍是不授权的审计数据，不进快照。
+			continue
+		}
+		out = append(out, permission)
+	}
+	// 角色只承载一个「项目管理」开关：开启即在参与的项目里获得项目内工作默认，
+	// 无需逐项配置；显式写出的项目范围行仍然优先。
+	if projectManagement {
+		seen := map[string]bool{}
+		for _, permission := range out {
+			seen[permission.ActionID] = true
+		}
+		for _, actionID := range catalog.ProjectManagementImpliedActions() {
+			if seen[actionID] {
+				continue
+			}
+			out = append(out, RolePermissionRecord{ActionID: actionID, Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true})
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].ActionID < out[j].ActionID })
+	return out, nil
 }
 
 func (s *Store) ListRoles(query, mode, status, actionID, cursor string, limit int) ([]RoleAdminView, string, error) {

internal/store/role_policy_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/authz/catalog"
 )
 
 func rolePolicyAccounts(t *testing.T, st *Store) (Account, Account, Account) {
@@ -208,6 +210,26 @@ func TestRolePolicyIdempotencyKeyCannotChangeRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// assertProjectManagementDefaults 断言「项目管理」开启时投影出的项目内默认动作。
+func assertProjectManagementDefaults(t *testing.T, permissions map[string]RolePermissionRecord) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for _, actionID := range catalog.ProjectManagementImpliedActions() {
+		row, ok := permissions[actionID]
+		if !ok || !row.Allowed || !row.CapAllowed {
+			t.Fatalf("project management default %s missing: %+v", actionID, permissions)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func projectAccessRecord(permissions []RolePermissionRecord) *RolePermissionRecord {
+	for i, permission := range permissions {
+		if permission.ActionID == "project.create" {
+			return &permissions[i]
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func capabilityRolePermissions(t *testing.T, st *Store, roleID string) map[string]RolePermissionRecord {
 	t.Helper()
 	permissions, err := st.RolePermissions(roleID)
@@ -245,9 +267,16 @@ func TestRoleProjectCreateLinksFullManagement(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID)
 	access := permissions["project.create"]
-	if len(permissions) != 1 || !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
+	if !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
 		t.Fatalf("permissions=%+v", permissions)
 	}
+	// 项目管理蕴含项目内工作默认；三权与知识发布不在其中。
+	assertProjectManagementDefaults(t, permissions)
+	for _, duty := range []string{"document.review", "document.approve", "document.publish", "document.duties.assign", "knowledge.publish"} {
+		if row, ok := permissions[duty]; ok && row.Allowed {
+			t.Fatalf("duty action %s implied by project management: %+v", duty, permissions)
+		}
+	}
 	if _, err := st.AssignUserRole("admin", alice.ID, role.RoleID, alice.StateVersion, "assign-creator"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -277,7 +306,7 @@ func TestRolePolicyRejectsNonProjectAccessRowsAtomically(t *testing.T) {
 	epoch, _ := st.AuthorityEpoch()
 	conflict := []RolePermissionChange{
 		{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
-		{ActionID: "project.settings", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false},
+		{ActionID: "system.settings.write", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false},
 	}
 	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, role.RoleVersion, conflict, "explicit-conflict"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
 		t.Fatalf("explicit role conflict: %v", err)
@@ -287,20 +316,22 @@ func TestRolePolicyRejectsNonProjectAccessRowsAtomically(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID)) != 0 || after.RoleVersion != role.RoleVersion || afterEpoch != epoch {
 		t.Fatalf("partial write: role=%+v epoch=%d->%d", after, epoch, afterEpoch)
 	}
-	// A linked action on its own is the same rejection: the role has no row to
-	// cap off any more, so nothing is written.
+	// 项目范围动作可以单独写入并即刻生效（项目内读写的职位默认值来源）。
+	version := role.RoleVersion
 	for i, only := range [][]RolePermissionChange{
-		{{ActionID: "project.members.manage", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false}},
-		{{ActionID: "project.settings", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
-		{{ActionID: "document.duties.assign", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: true}},
+		{{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
+		{{ActionID: "document.author", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: true}},
 	} {
-		if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, role.RoleVersion, only, "linked-only-"+string(rune('a'+i))); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-			t.Fatalf("linked-only batch %d accepted: %v", i, err)
+		receipt, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, version, only, "project-scope-"+string(rune('a'+i)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("project-scope batch %d rejected: %v", i, err)
 		}
-		if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID); len(permissions) != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("linked-only batch %d persisted=%+v", i, permissions)
+		version = receipt.RoleVersion
+		if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID); len(permissions) == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("project-scope batch %d persisted nothing", i)
 		}
 	}
+	role.RoleVersion = version
 	receipt, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, role.RoleVersion,
 		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}}, "enable-create")
 	if err != nil {
@@ -311,18 +342,20 @@ func TestRolePolicyRejectsNonProjectAccessRowsAtomically(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID)
 	access := permissions["project.create"]
-	if len(permissions) != 1 || !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
+	if !access.Allowed || !access.CapAllowed {
 		t.Fatalf("permissions=%+v", permissions)
 	}
-	// A later batch cannot resolve a conflict either, because no second row is
-	// accepted beside the project-access boolean.
-	resolved := append([]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
-		RolePermissionChange{ActionID: "project.members.manage", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: true})
-	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, receipt.RoleVersion, resolved, "explicitly-resolved"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("explicit resolution: %v", err)
+	// 项目范围动作可以与项目准入并存在同一批次。
+	current, err := st.GetRole(role.RoleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID); len(permissions) != 1 || !permissions["project.create"].Allowed {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected resolution changed permissions=%+v", permissions)
+	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, current.RoleVersion,
+		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "document.publish", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}}, "project-publish"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("project publish row: %v", err)
+	}
+	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, role.RoleID); !permissions["document.publish"].Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("project publish row missing=%+v", permissions)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -388,16 +421,13 @@ func TestLinkedCapabilitiesSystemGrantWithoutRoleClosesLoop(t *testing.T) {
 	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, open.RoleID); len(permissions) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("roleless role kept permissions=%+v", permissions)
 	}
-	// A linked row cannot be written beside that grant holder either.
+	// 项目范围动作与系统授权并存：系统授权仍是唯一项目准入来源。
 	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", open.RoleID, open.RoleVersion,
-		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "project.settings", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false}}, "cap-under-holder"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
-		t.Fatalf("role cap under grant holder: %v", err)
+		[]RolePermissionChange{{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}}, "read-under-holder"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("project read under grant holder: %v", err)
 	}
-	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, open.RoleID); len(permissions) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected role cap persisted: %+v", permissions)
-	}
-	if role, _ := st.GetRole(open.RoleID); role.RoleVersion != open.RoleVersion {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected write bumped role version: %+v", role)
+	if permissions := capabilityRolePermissions(t, st, open.RoleID); !permissions["document.read"].Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("project read row under grant holder=%+v", permissions)
 	}
 
 	// Revoking the grant closes the loop again and reports it.
@@ -605,20 +635,40 @@ func TestRolePermissionsNormalizeLegacyRowsToProjectAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			insertLegacyRolePermission(t, st, role.RoleID, "project.create", tc.allowed, tc.capAllowed)
+			// 项目范围旧行（document.read）随职位投影；系统范围旧行仍被丢弃；
+			// 项目准入开启时另带出项目管理蕴含的项目内默认。
 			permissions, err := st.RolePermissions(role.RoleID)
-			if err != nil || len(permissions) != 1 {
-				t.Fatalf("permissions=%+v err=%v", permissions, err)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
 			}
-			got := permissions[0]
-			if got.ActionID != "project.create" || got.Allowed != tc.want || got.CapAllowed != tc.want {
+			byAction := map[string]RolePermissionRecord{}
+			for _, permission := range permissions {
+				byAction[permission.ActionID] = permission
+			}
+			got := byAction["project.create"]
+			if got.Allowed != tc.want || got.CapAllowed != tc.want {
 				t.Fatalf("normalized=%+v want=%v", got, tc.want)
 			}
+			if read := byAction["document.read"]; !read.Allowed || !read.CapAllowed {
+				t.Fatalf("project scope row dropped=%+v", permissions)
+			}
+			if tc.want {
+				assertProjectManagementDefaults(t, byAction)
+			}
+			for _, permission := range permissions {
+				if strings.HasPrefix(permission.ActionID, "system.") {
+					t.Fatalf("system row projected=%+v", permissions)
+				}
+			}
 			view, err := st.RoleAdmin(role.RoleID)
-			if err != nil || view.ProjectAccess != tc.want || len(view.Permissions) != 1 || view.Permissions[0].ActionID != "project.create" {
+			if err != nil || view.ProjectAccess != tc.want || len(view.Permissions) < 2 {
 				t.Fatalf("role admin=%+v err=%v", view, err)
 			}
+			if access := projectAccessRecord(view.Permissions); access == nil || access.Allowed != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("role admin access row=%+v want=%v", access, tc.want)
+			}
 			roles, _, err := st.ListRoles("", "fuzzy", "all", "", "", 20)
-			if err != nil || len(roles) != 1 || roles[0].ProjectAccess != tc.want || len(roles[0].Permissions) != 1 {
+			if err != nil || len(roles) != 1 || roles[0].ProjectAccess != tc.want || len(roles[0].Permissions) < 2 {
 				t.Fatalf("list roles=%+v err=%v", roles, err)
 			}
 			allowed, capAllowed, err := st.RolePermissionAllowed("alice", "project.create")
@@ -711,12 +761,14 @@ func TestReplaceRolePermissionsAcceptsOnlyProjectAccessBoolean(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 		return allowed, capAllowed, rows
 	}
+	// 项目范围动作（如 document.read）现在可以随职位一起定义；受保护的系统授权
+	// 仍然拒绝，并且任何失败批次都不部分写入。
 	for i, bad := range [][]RolePermissionChange{
 		{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}, {ActionID: "system.settings.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
 		{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}, {ActionID: "system.users.create", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false}},
-		{{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
 		{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}, {ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true}},
 		{{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: false}},
+		{{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: false}},
 	} {
 		if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, role.RoleVersion, bad, "bad-"+string(rune('a'+i))); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
 			t.Fatalf("batch %d accepted: %v", i, err)
@@ -1252,3 +1304,73 @@ func getRoleByName(st *Store, name string) (RoleRecord, bool) {
 	}
 	return roles[0].RoleRecord, true
 }
+
+// TestRoleCarriesProjectScopeDefaults covers the project-scope role rows: a role
+// may define the project defaults that RDM projects them onto project work, and
+// a row that caps a linked management action is reported as a conflict instead of
+// being silently ignored.
+func TestRoleCarriesProjectScopeDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	_, alice, _ := rolePolicyAccounts(t, st)
+	role, err := st.CreateRole("admin", RoleCreate{Name: "项目工作职位"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	alice, _ = st.GetAccount(alice.ID)
+	if _, err := st.AssignUserRole("admin", alice.ID, role.RoleID, alice.StateVersion, "assign-work"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	receipt, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", role.RoleID, role.RoleVersion, []RolePermissionChange{
+		{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
+		{ActionID: "document.read", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
+		{ActionID: "document.author", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: true},
+	}, "project-defaults")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	permissions, err := st.RolePermissions(role.RoleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	byAction := map[string]RolePermissionRecord{}
+	for _, permission := range permissions {
+		byAction[permission.ActionID] = permission
+	}
+	if !byAction["project.create"].Allowed || !byAction["document.read"].Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("project defaults=%+v", byAction)
+	}
+	if byAction["document.author"].Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit revoke=%+v", byAction["document.author"])
+	}
+	alice, _ = st.GetAccount(alice.ID)
+	explanation, err := st.ExplainCapabilities("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	actions := explainActionMap(explanation.MemberBasicCollaborate.Actions)
+	if read := actions["document.read"]; !read.Allowed || read.Source != "role" {
+		t.Fatalf("member read=%+v", read)
+	}
+	if author := actions["document.author"]; author.Allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("member author=%+v", author)
+	}
+	// 项目准入开启时不得在同一职位里收回 linked 管理动作（既有不变量）。
+	capped, err := st.CreateRole("admin", RoleCreate{Name: "受限工作职位"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", capped.RoleID, capped.RoleVersion, []RolePermissionChange{
+		{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
+		{ActionID: "project.members.manage", Allowed: false, CapAllowed: false},
+	}, "cap-linked"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidRolePolicy) {
+		t.Fatalf("linked deny beside create accepted: %v", err)
+	}
+	// 同一动作的显式授予合法，并立即成为快照里的默认值。
+	if _, err := st.ReplaceRolePermissions("admin", capped.RoleID, capped.RoleVersion, []RolePermissionChange{
+		{ActionID: "project.create", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
+		{ActionID: "project.members.manage", Allowed: true, CapAllowed: true},
+	}, "allow-linked"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("linked allow beside create: %v", err)
+	}
+	_ = receipt
+}