Why: Combined W6 and W9 storage validation must cover actual work task and step-source rows, not only empty tables.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL migration test copies and reads both rows with their trusted scope intact.
Impact: Adds integration coverage for the combined v31-v40 migration; no production behavior change.
Refs: feature/rdm-two-trees-latest-templates Backend combination probe
Why: Parallel unpublished candidates reused numeric versions, so version-only checks could reinterpret a different schema after combination.
Evidence: SQLite ledger and source-copy mismatch tests failed before the guard and pass now; PostgreSQL store/migrator and full Go suites pass.
Impact: Fail closed on version-name mismatch before opening a migration target or serving a database.
Refs: feature/rdm-two-trees-latest-templates Backend combination probe
Why: Both approved Backend slices share extension surfaces and migration numbers, and current main added account audit v31.
Evidence: The isolated probe resolves additive interfaces and v31-v40 ordering; focused and full Go tests passed without PostgreSQL.
Impact: Produces a local integration candidate for isolated PostgreSQL and race verification only; shipping branches remain unchanged.
Refs: feature/rdm-two-trees-latest-templates W6 W9
Why: Validate W6 against account-audit migration v31 on the current authoritative base.
Evidence: Focused store/runmgr/migrator and full Go tests passed in the isolated probe after resolving migration collisions.
Impact: Renumbers unpublished W6 migrations to v32-v36; this probe commit is not a shipping branch or live migration.
Refs: feature/rdm-two-trees-latest-templates W6 integration probe
Why: Explicit low IDs bypassed the implicit sequence allocator and could commit after a higher audit page cutoff.
Evidence: Isolated PostgreSQL RED receipt for cross-page omission; local GREEN for explicit and default writes, trigger drift, isolation, mutation denial, offline copy rollback, retry, and sequence non-rewind. Fixed-HEAD receipts follow.
Impact: Add v34 all-writer and append-only guards; reject unsafe strong reads; make command audit storage migration exclusive and atomic with guard restoration and a forward-only sequence.
Refs: Approved W9 all-writers cutoff adjustment r1; W9 Backend task card.
Why: A crash after dropping candidate raw prompt columns but before SQLite compaction left physical prompt bytes without a visible reason to retry, and storage backup could accept that file.
Evidence: RED post-commit interruption and pending-backup tests; full Go suite, targeted race, isolated PostgreSQL package tests, vet, and build passed locally before commit.
Impact: Commit a durable pending marker with v35, retry compaction and WAL truncation until completion, conservatively re-scrub earlier v35 candidates, and reject backup or migration while cleanup is pending or unverified.
Refs: Approved RDM stage6 W6 source-recheck design adjustment r1; W6 independent review crash-window finding.
Why: PostgreSQL sequence IDs could commit out of order and make fixed project audit cursors permanently skip a late row.
Evidence: SELF PG cross-page RED, CACHE 10 counterexample, configuration drift RED/GREEN, and pre-commit Go, PG migration, and race receipts are recorded in the W9 task card. Fixed-HEAD checks follow this commit.
Impact: Guard implicit command audit ID allocation with a transaction advisory lock; reject unsafe sequence/default drift; preserve explicit-ID storage migration; report committed-prefix only for verified project pages.
Refs: Approved W9 PostgreSQL cutoff adjustment r1; W9 Backend task card.
Why: Goal-sensitive workflow verification persisted model prompts and prior output text in trusted receipt rows, while cross-step model inputs could reuse stale machine output.
Evidence: RED receipt privacy test; full Go suite, targeted race, isolated PostgreSQL store/runmgr/storage-migrate tests, vet, and static build passed locally before commit. A known unrelated TempDir cleanup flake failed once and passed on targeted and serial full replay.
Impact: Add optional same-provider source recheck, verify every included item and evidence body before reuse, gate cross-step outputs, reject unsettled attempts, remove raw scope columns, scrub isolated candidate v34 SQLite/PG schemas, and reject unsafe backups.
Refs: Approved RDM stage6 W6 source-recheck design adjustment r1; W6 independent review.
Why: A goal-sensitive project provider can return different authorized sources for a prompt step and its judge, causing a valid workflow to fail when the judge re-resolves with an empty goal.
Evidence: RED goal-sensitive step test; full compiled workflow positive and withdrawal negative tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted race passed locally before commit.
Impact: Persist each trusted model attempt selector outside the public manifest, enforce receipt state continuity, and reauthorize every contributing model turn with its original selector before judging.
Refs: RDM two-trees stage5 W6; W6 independent review P2.
Why: Compiled workflow critics could resend a prior prompt output after document duty or publication changed across separate model guards.
Evidence: RED cross-guard revocation and retry tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted go test -race passed locally before commit.
Impact: Bind materialized prompt bytes to the engine step attempt and responded model receipt; recheck current project sources and epochs before judging, failing closed for unproven or ambiguous output.
Refs: RDM two-trees stage5 W6; stage6 X1 public extension request; W6 independent review P1.
Why: Revoked project material could remain in later model turns, and plugin Audit could impersonate a model-input manifest.
Evidence: SELF red tests reproduced both paths; updated project revocation, trusted receipt, migration, and entrypoint tests pass locally with go test ./... -count=1 and targeted race checks.
Impact: Rebuild direct model requests after scope changes, sanitize or block unproven generic history, omit legacy project injections, and persist manifests in a dedicated state-checked table.
Refs: TT-C02 TT-C03 TT-C04; stage5 W6; review P1 stale context and manifest provenance
Why: Clock-derived IDs could collide and string-scoped hosts could impersonate a registered audit publisher.
Evidence: Fixed-clock concurrent, ambiguous private offset, forged scoped-host, and registered publisher RED-to-GREEN tests; go test ./... -count=1 and targeted race test passed locally as SELF.
Impact: Generate 192-bit host IDs, reject ambiguous explicit offsets, and issue a publication-only capability at verifier registration.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1; review of a8fa2fe
Why: A domain outbox could not correlate its committed event with the host receipt because the bus generated the operation ID after the handler returned.
Evidence: RED-to-GREEN bus and compiled-handler tests; local go test ./... -count=1 and isolated PostgreSQL operation/link checks passed as SELF.
Impact: Expose a host-generated operation ID to handlers and resolve a unique committed audit offset after dispatch; missing receipts remain retryable and ambiguous rows fail closed.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1
Why: Project work currently reaches model calls without current authorized project facts or a persisted input receipt.
Evidence: SELF go test ./... -count=1, targeted go test -race for W6 paths, go vet ./..., and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed on this change set.
Impact: Add optional X1 interfaces, trusted persisted work-task binding, request-scoped context injection, evidence reauthorization, and attempted/responded/unknown manifests. Existing non-project behavior stays available.
Refs: TT-C01 TT-C02 TT-C03 TT-C04; stage5 W6; Dev stage6 X1 public extension request r1
Why: Concurrent password changes, recovery key reissue, and session admission could accept retired credentials or omit rejected audits.
Evidence: Local Go vet and full tests passed; real PostgreSQL store suite, deterministic interleavings, and two-process contention passed with SELF receipts.
Impact: Account writes and session admission serialize per owner; stale sessions fail closed; checked rejections carry an audit row.
Refs: Agent-System-Dev #486; Agent-System-Backend #185; merge queue Issue #518
Why: Owner-only command audit cannot prove shared business commits, and button dispatch omitted its authenticated actor.
Evidence: Local go test ./... passed; isolated PostgreSQL cutoff, link, and SQLite-to-PostgreSQL migration receipts are recorded as SELF in the task card.
Impact: Add an optional domain-verified metadata link, exact authorized cross-member read, idempotent storage, actor propagation, and honest PostgreSQL cutoff coverage. Broad audit pagination and other sources remain pending.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; approved Stage 6 audit-link design adjustment r1
Why: API-key issuance shares the account maintenance no-create and credential-output contract; the old CLI printed its key and lacked --out-file.
Evidence: The new subprocess test failed before the flag existed, then passed for private output and pre-mutation collision refusal; current go vet and all Go tests pass.
Impact: apikey create accepts protected --dsn-file and --out-file, preserves stdout default, and never overwrites an existing destination.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; U7 KTD14
Why: The safe open requirement covers user, apikey and identity verify, including default CLI paths.
Evidence: All three paths use private missing directories; previous full Go and PostgreSQL receipts cover the implementation, with a focused recheck before push.
Impact: Test coverage only; no runtime behavior or migration changes.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486
Why: Project audit cannot use owner-wide logs or current conversation project state to establish trusted attribution.
Evidence: RED cases were observed locally; go test ./pkg/extension ./internal/store ./internal/app -count=1 passed on this tree (SELF).
Impact: Add optional X2 read and audit.read callback, immutable project/name snapshots, safe owner-only projection, and explicit unsupported coverage. Cross-member publication remains pending.
Refs: Stage 5 W9; Stage 6 X2 public extension request
Why: Deliver U7 account transactions and audit without losing main auth_version, restricted-session, project or migration behavior.
Evidence: SELF go vet and all Go tests passed; isolated PostgreSQL store tests, 20 repeated two-process admission rounds, and real SIGTERM/SIGKILL persistence passed. Original failures remain in receipts; exact-head CI and independent Review follow.
Impact: Adds schema v31, noncreating account CLI opens, preflight credential output, same-transaction audit, and bootstrap admission guards. No live database touched.
Refs: Backend PR #185; Dev PR #486; original U7 r2 account specification; 2026-10-14 Root takeover
Why:
Legacy project streams replayed upload filenames and parser metadata to newly
authorized members even though the underlying cards remained owner-only.
Evidence:
SELF real HTTP red regressions exposed legacy replay, spoofed sharing claims,
private-history pagination, and live delivery after membership removal. The
affected packages, uncached full Backend suite, isolated PostgreSQL Store suite,
and agent-system build pass after applying the event boundary.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle streams resolve trusted resource ownership and require an
internal publication proof for cross-owner delivery. Event and proof commit in
one transaction; v30 adds an additive SQLite/PostgreSQL sidecar without granting
access to historical events. Seen and visible cursors remain separate, revoked
members leave live streams, and unregistered base behavior remains compatible.
The storage migration tool preserves the new proof rows.
Refs:
project-member-access-implementation-plan.md Task 1 / R5; authorized legacy SSE
privacy follow-up; project-member-composed-legacy-project-history.json
Why:
Nested unchanged credential masks left empty parents that looked like managed
subtree overwrites. Shared members also hit an owner-only upload guard, while
upload ingestion cards could disclose private filenames and parser metadata.
Evidence:
SELF independent nested-mask probe, HTTP nested/mixed writeback, member upload,
project card privacy and authorization-change regressions failed before each fix
and passed after it. Affected settings/server suite passed; exact final-object
build and independent replay remain delivery gates owned by the task coordinator.
Impact:
Prune only parents emptied by ignored masks; explicit empty/real managed writes
stay rejected. Registered uploads check live work and trusted project existence,
keep originals owned by the actor, and recheck before persistence. Suppress only
upload project cards when no private stream exists; explicit structure cards and
unregistered upload behavior remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1/R5; independent nested mask P2;
2026-10-13 composed member-upload and private project-stream acceptance findings
Why:
Legacy project metadata can contain credentials outside the settings scope table.
Sharing raw projection settings exposed them, and generic project PATCH bypassed
the system-managed path guard already enforced by project settings endpoints.
Evidence:
SELF member Host regression failed before the fix. The fixed 4f72aaf server
baseline overlay reproduced HTTP metadata leakage and managed PATCH returning 200.
SELF shared Host-to-HTTP, immutable mask, dotted/schema/fallback, public mutation
and atomic managed-write regressions passed; uncached full suite, isolated PG
Store suite and static build passed. Independent delta replay remains a gate.
Impact:
Registered lifecycle metadata returns detached credential-masked views while
preserving service/configuration keys and persisted data. Generic project PATCH
shares the existing managed validator before rename or settings mutation; allowed
metadata key shapes and raw owner-only management lookups remain available.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1 and R5; approved hard secret boundary;
2026-10-13 shared project metadata review follow-up
Why:
Membership could be revoked while a tool waited for confirmation or a queued
HITL reply waited for consumption. Publication replacement also crossed an
empty project scope or another plugin's source namespace for the same Ref.
Evidence:
SELF replay of all four independent review reproductions failed before the
fix and passed unchanged afterward. Committed regressions cover direct and
queued HITL, yes/session confirmation, direct artifact writes, protected vectors,
exact empty project scopes, literal wildcard IDs and unregistered compatibility.
SELF uncached go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL Store tests and static build passed.
Impact:
Recheck trusted live owner/project authorization when HITL resumes and at write
boundaries. Registered publishers replace only exact owner/project/ref/plugin
rows and vectors; ordinary unregistered publication semantics are preserved.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; independent Backend
review findings against b9bea5bee0
Why:
Higher-ranked private rows could exhaust SQL candidate limits and hide an
otherwise authorized published slice from a member's current-project search.
Evidence:
SELF TestAuthorizedKnowledgeFiltersBeforeTopK failed with no shared hits before
the change and passed after it. SELF go test ./... and the isolated PostgreSQL
Store suite passed; independent replay and current-HEAD CI remain owner gates.
Impact:
Scan the resource-authorized shared fulltext path until enough allowed results
are found. Preserve ordinary legacy retrieval candidate limits and semantics.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access plan r1 Task 1; R5 published knowledge availability
Why:
Shared project reads previously doubled as write permission, project mutations
bypassed the domain lifecycle, and coarse retrieval shared private resources.
Evidence:
SELF red-before-implementation logs cover projection, lifecycle, private work,
resource filtering, canonical retrieval scope, publication source and namespace.
SELF go test ./..., isolated PostgreSQL go test ./internal/store -count=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system passed; task owner owns replay/CI.
Impact:
Add optional actor-scoped projection/lifecycle capabilities; registered providers
control public lifecycle and live work. Preserve owned conversation history and
ordinary unregistered behavior. Authorize knowledge by stored ID/source, map
current host scopes through trusted service metadata, and filter artifact lists.
Refs:
Dev project-member-access implementation plan r1 Task 1; approved design r0.1;
2026-10-13 trusted publication Source hardening ruling
Why: The login recovery contract leftovers and KTD12/KTD14 require:
concurrent same-name account creation must not overwrite the winner,
first-admin bootstrap must serialize across processes, the redeem
endpoint backoff must be shared across instances, revoked API keys
must close established SSE streams, and CLI credentials need an
env-DSN path plus a non-interactive 0600 file delivery mode.
Evidence: go test ./... green; new tests cover 16-way concurrent
create (1 win/15 conflict, winner credentials intact), 8-way
concurrent bootstrap (single admin, refuse takeover after), redeem
guard shared across two store handles on one DB, SSE stream closed
after key revocation within the recheck window, and HTTP 429 after
the failure cap (SELF worktree run; CI is the GATE, PG via test-pg).
Impact: Migration v29 (redeem_attempts); CreateAccount becomes a
single-row INSERT with unique-violation conflict; BootstrapFirstAdmin
advisory-locks (PG) / rechecks (SQLite) and commits admin+key+audit in
one transaction; SSE revalidation covers API-key streams; redeem
backoff moves to the shared DB; CLI gains AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN fallback
and --out file delivery for create/reset-password/issue-login-key/
bootstrap-admin.
Refs: docs/svc-deploy/2026-10-13-login-recovery-contract.md leftovers;
proposal r2 KTD12/KTD14/R5/R11.
Why: Since the system-managed settings change (#188), runtime.* writes
at the user scope are rejected, so the mock startup flag failed with
"system-managed settings require admin" and the serve process never
became healthy - the Dev multi-instance integration regression.
Evidence: go build ok; internal/app and internal/settings suites green
(SELF); the Dev composite CI on the follow-up PR re-runs
make test-multi-instance against this fix (GATE).
Impact: The mock startup flag now seeds runtime.mock via MergeSystem
(trusted operator input, effective for every tenant through the
Effective merge chain); no HTTP surface changes.
Refs: Dev PR #508; backend #188.
Why: The 2026-10-13 login recovery contract (Dev docs/svc-deploy/
2026-10-13-login-recovery-contract.md, plan item 6.7) requires that
established SSE connections stop receiving private events once a
password write destroys their session.
Evidence: go test ./... green; TestSSESessionInvalidationClosesStream
streams over a real HTTP server, invalidates the session via
AdminResetUserPassword, and asserts the stream terminates with the
session-expired marker within the recheck window (SELF, worktree run).
Impact: Session-authenticated event streams revalidate at a 15s
heartbeat cadence (package var, shortened in tests) and terminate on
invalidation; API-key streams are unchanged (key revocation is separate).
EventSource reconnects are rejected by the auth middleware.
Refs: Dev PR #504; login recovery contract section 6.7.
Why: The login recovery contract (2026-10-13) requires admin-issued
one-time keys, in-transaction revalidation of restricted sessions, a
login race guard, and audited password writes; the previous
implementation validated sessions outside the change-password
transaction and let stale password verifications create sessions.
Evidence: go test ./... green (SQLite); store tests switch to
openTestStore so the CI test-pg job covers real PostgreSQL, including
100-way concurrent redeem single-winner and auth-version race cases
(SELF, local run).
Impact: New migration v28 (users/sessions.auth_version,
account_events). New admin endpoints POST/GET
/api/admin/users/{owner}/login-keys and DELETE
.../login-keys/{id}. Login binds session creation to the verified
auth version and creates restricted sessions for must-change accounts;
redeem gains per-IP backoff; cookies gain Secure under TLS; active
change-password and admin/CLI resets become single transactions that
bump auth_version, revoke keys and sessions, and write audit events.
Refs: modules/documents/docs/proposals/2026-10-12-svc-unified-deploy-and-login-key.md r2; Dev task feature/svc-login-recovery-flow
Why: an unset object-storage endpoint passed a typed nil into the store and artifact upload panicked.
Evidence: GATE vet-and-test run 2783 job 4031 success on 46073d30a5. Independent review approved with no blockers.
Impact: unconfigured stores fall back to the local artifacts directory. Configured S3 is unchanged.
Refs: #186
Why: an unset S3 client passed through the Store interface is not a nil interface, so uploads panic instead of using the local artifact directory.
Evidence: TestIsNil and TestFinishOpenTypedNilS3UsesLocalArtifacts failed before this change and pass after it. The PostgreSQL case skips unless AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN is set.
Impact: only an unset blob store falls back; a constructed S3 or local store is unchanged.
Refs: internal/blobstore/blobstore.go internal/store/store.go
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: identity open and the unknown-subcommand check landed on main, and this branch still has to refuse account migration while advertising capabilities.
Evidence: go test ./internal/store ./internal/app ./cmd/agent-system ./pkg/identity passed after the merge.
Impact: identity verify uses the no-migrate opener and returns the schema version. Account open still does not migrate. v28 is registered as readable by older artifacts.
Refs: cmd/agent-system/main.go, internal/app/app.go, internal/store/store.go, internal/store/migrate_compat.go
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Why: identity probes must open an existing database without creating or migrating it, and DSN must stay out of argv.
Evidence: GATE ci / vet-and-test success on 0f192a4813, run 2625 job 3782.
Impact: version --json carries schema target and compat floor; unknown top-level commands exit 2.
Refs: #184
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