Merge pull request 'Add U3 account directory, lifecycle and self-recovery' (#198) from feature/iam-u3-account-foundation into main

Why: The previous endpoint regression used an SQLite-only server fixture even when isolated PostgreSQL was configured.

Evidence: The revised HTTP test passed with dialect=sqlite and dialect=postgres; it creates data through one Store and reads through another before and after disabling the local account.

Impact: U3 effective-state checks for the new process replay route now have a direct two-store PostgreSQL regression without changing production behavior.

Refs: IAM U3 affected Stage 7 review; Backend PR #198

cmd/agent-system/account_io.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+func runCapabilities(args []string) int {
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("capabilities", flag.ExitOnError)
+	asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "以 JSON 打印能力，不打开数据库")
+	_ = fs.Parse(args)
+	caps := map[string]any{
+		"accountTransaction": true,
+		"accountAudit":       true,
+		"accountOpsOpen":     true,
+		"passwordStdin":      true,
+		"dsnFile":            true,
+		"outFile":            true,
+	}
+	if !*asJSON {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system capabilities --json")
+		return 2
+	}
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout)
+	enc.SetIndent("", "  ")
+	if err := enc.Encode(caps); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "capabilities:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func resolveAccountDSN(flagDSN, dsnFile string) (string, error) {
+	if flagDSN != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "warning: --dsn is deprecated; use AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN or --dsn-file")
+	}
+	if dsnFile != "" {
+		info, err := os.Stat(dsnFile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("dsn file %s must be mode 0600", dsnFile)
+		}
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(dsnFile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		return string(trimNewline(raw)), nil
+	}
+	if env := os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN"); env != "" {
+		return env, nil
+	}
+	return flagDSN, nil
+}
+
+func resolveAccountPassword(flagPassword string, fromStdin bool) (string, error) {
+	if flagPassword != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "warning: --password is deprecated; use --password-stdin")
+	}
+	if !fromStdin {
+		return flagPassword, nil
+	}
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return string(trimNewline(raw)), nil
+}
+
+func writeExclusiveSecret(path, body string) error {
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	_, err = io.WriteString(f, body+"\n")
+	return err
+}
+
+func trimNewline(raw []byte) []byte {
+	for len(raw) > 0 && (raw[len(raw)-1] == '\n' || raw[len(raw)-1] == '\r') {
+		raw = raw[:len(raw)-1]
+	}
+	return raw
+}

cmd/agent-system/account_io_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func accountCLI(t *testing.T, args ...string) (int, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	out, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "capture-")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer out.Close()
+	oldOut, oldErr := os.Stdout, os.Stderr
+	os.Stdout = out
+	os.Stderr = out
+	defer func() { os.Stdout = oldOut; os.Stderr = oldErr }()
+	rc := runUser(args)
+	out.Seek(0, 0)
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return rc, string(raw)
+}
+func cliStore(t *testing.T) (string, *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	s, e := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if e != nil {
+		t.Fatal(e)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { s.Close() })
+	if e := s.EnsureSystemIdentity("fixture", "sqlite"); e != nil {
+		t.Fatal(e)
+	}
+	return dir, s
+}
+func TestOutputFileAppliesToEveryCredentialCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, sub := range []string{"create", "initialize-account", "bootstrap-admin"} {
+		t.Run(sub, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, s := cliStore(t)
+			if sub != "bootstrap-admin" {
+				if _, e := s.BootstrapFirstAdminWrite(store.AccountWrite{Owner: "root", Name: "Root", Actor: "test"}); e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+			}
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret")
+			args := []string{sub, "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--out-file", out}
+			if sub == "initialize-account" {
+				a, e := s.CreatePendingAccount("root", "ada", store.AccountProfile{Name: "Ada"})
+				if e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+				args = append(args, "--user-id", a.ID, "--expected-state-version", "1", "--expected-generation", "0")
+			}
+			rc, _ := accountCLI(t, args...)
+			if rc != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("credential command failed: %d", rc)
+			}
+			info, e := os.Stat(out)
+			if e != nil {
+				t.Fatal("credential output file missing")
+			}
+			if info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output permissions are not private")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+func TestExistingOutputAndConflictingFormatsRefuseBeforeMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"existing", "conflicting"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, s := cliStore(t)
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret")
+			args := []string{"create", "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--out-file", out}
+			if kind == "existing" {
+				if e := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("existing"), 0600); e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+			} else {
+				args = append(args, "--out", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "json-secret"))
+			}
+			rc, _ := accountCLI(t, args...)
+			if rc == 0 {
+				t.Fatal("unsafe output selection succeeded")
+			}
+			if _, e := s.GetUser("ada"); e == nil {
+				t.Fatal("output refusal happened after account mutation")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPIKeyCreateUsesExclusivePrivateOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	if dir := os.Getenv("U7_APIKEY_CHILD_DIR"); dir != "" {
+		rc := runAPIKey([]string{"create", "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--name", "fixture", "--out-file", os.Getenv("U7_APIKEY_CHILD_OUT")})
+		if rc != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("apikey create rejected its private output destination")
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	for _, existing := range []bool{false, true} {
+		name := "new"
+		if existing {
+			name = "existing"
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, st := cliStore(t)
+			if err := st.CreateAccount("ada", "Ada", "", false); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credential")
+			if existing {
+				if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("preserve"), 0600); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+			}
+			cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestAPIKeyCreateUsesExclusivePrivateOutput$")
+			cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "U7_APIKEY_CHILD_DIR="+dir, "U7_APIKEY_CHILD_OUT="+out)
+			var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+			cmd.Stdout = &stdout
+			cmd.Stderr = &stderr
+			err := cmd.Run()
+			if existing {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatal("existing output was overwritten or mutation succeeded")
+				}
+				raw, readErr := os.ReadFile(out)
+				if readErr != nil || string(raw) != "preserve" {
+					t.Fatal("existing output was modified")
+				}
+				keys, listErr := st.ListAPIKeys("ada")
+				if listErr != nil || len(keys) != 0 {
+					t.Fatal("mutation happened before output preflight")
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal("new private output was rejected")
+			}
+			info, statErr := os.Stat(out)
+			if statErr != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output missing or not private")
+			}
+			raw, readErr := os.ReadFile(out)
+			if readErr != nil || len(raw) == 0 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output empty")
+			}
+			if bytes.Contains(stdout.Bytes(), bytes.TrimSpace(raw)) {
+				t.Fatal("credential was written to stdout")
+			}
+			keys, listErr := st.ListAPIKeys("ada")
+			if listErr != nil || len(keys) != 1 {
+				t.Fatal("successful issue was not committed")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/agent-system/dispatch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestUnknownSubcommandExits(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("DISPATCH_CHILD") == "1" {
+		os.Args = []string{"agent-system", "not-a-command"}
+		main()
+		return
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=TestUnknownSubcommandExits")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "DISPATCH_CHILD=1")
+	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("未知子命令应非零退出：%s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(out), "未知子命令") {
+		t.Fatalf("输出：%s", out)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(out), "agent-system starting") || strings.Contains(string(out), "serving") {
+		t.Fatalf("未知子命令落入了服务路径：%s", out)
+	}
+}

cmd/agent-system/main.go

@@ -9,18 +9,28 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/app"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/config"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/identity"
 )
 
 var version = "0.1.0-dev"
 
 func main() {
-	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
+	if len(os.Args) > 1 && !strings.HasPrefix(os.Args[1], "-") {
 		switch os.Args[1] {
 		case "version", "--version":
+			if len(os.Args) > 2 && os.Args[2] == "--json" {
+				if err := identity.WriteDocument(os.Stdout, "agent-system", version); err != nil {
+					fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "version:", err)
+					os.Exit(1)
+				}
+				return
+			}
 			fmt.Println("agent-system", version)
 			return
 		case "serve":
@@ -31,6 +41,14 @@ func main() {
 			os.Exit(runConfig(os.Args[2:]))
 		case "user":
 			os.Exit(runUser(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "identity":
+			os.Exit(runIdentity(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "capabilities":
+			os.Exit(runCapabilities(os.Args[2:]))
+		default:
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "agent-system: 未知子命令 %s\n", os.Args[1])
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system <serve|version|identity|user|apikey|config|capabilities> [参数]")
+			os.Exit(2)
 		}
 	}
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("serve", flag.ExitOnError)
@@ -178,22 +196,47 @@ func runAPIKey(args []string) int {
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("apikey "+sub, flag.ExitOnError)
 	data := fs.String("data", "./data", "数据目录")
 	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档）")
+	dsnFile := fs.String("dsn-file", "", "0600权限的PostgreSQL DSN文件")
 	owner := fs.String("owner", "", "租户名（owner）")
 	name := fs.String("name", "default", "密钥名称")
+	outFile := fs.String("out-file", "", "把明文密钥独占写入该文件（0600）")
 	fs.Parse(args[1:])
 	if *owner == "" {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey: --owner 必填")
 		return 2
 	}
+	if sub != "create" && *outFile != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey: 此子命令不生成密钥")
+		return 2
+	}
+	resolvedDSN, err := resolveAccountDSN(*dsn, *dsnFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	*dsn = resolvedDSN
 	switch sub {
 	case "create":
+		delivery, err := reserveCredentialOutput(*outFile, "")
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		defer delivery.abort()
 		key, err := app.CreateAPIKey(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
 			return 1
 		}
 		// 明文仅此一次输出；库中只存 SHA-256 摘要。
-		fmt.Println(key)
+		if delivery.file == nil {
+			fmt.Println(key) // Existing API-key CLI compatibility; owner grants require a file.
+			return 0
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("api-key", *owner, key, nil); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
 		return 0
 	case "list":
 		keys, err := app.ListAPIKeys(*dsn, *data, *owner)
@@ -222,55 +265,222 @@ func runAPIKey(args []string) int {
 	}
 }
 
-// runUser：用户账号管理子命令（管理员发放制，R2）——create / reset-password / list。
-// 密码未显式给定时生成随机值，明文仅此一次输出；创建/重置后首次登录强制改密。
+// deliverCredential writes only to a new private file. The secret never goes
+// to stdout or an existing path; a JSON payload may include expiresAt.
+func deliverCredential(outPath, kind, owner, plaintext string, expiresAt any) error {
+	if outPath == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("protected credential delivery path required")
+	}
+	payload := map[string]any{"kind": kind, "owner": owner, "secret": plaintext}
+	if expiresAt != nil {
+		payload["expiresAt"] = expiresAt
+	}
+	buf, err := json.MarshalIndent(payload, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := writeExclusiveSecret(outPath, string(buf)); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "凭据已写入 %s（0600，仅此一次生成；勿入库勿入日志）\n", outPath)
+	return nil
+}
+
+type credentialOutput struct {
+	path    string
+	file    *os.File
+	json    bool
+	mutated bool
+}
+
+// Reserve the destination before changing the account. O_EXCL also rejects an
+// existing symlink, so an existing secret can never be overwritten.
+func reserveCredentialOutput(rawPath, jsonPath string) (*credentialOutput, error) {
+	if rawPath != "" && jsonPath != "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("--out and --out-file are mutually exclusive")
+	}
+	out := &credentialOutput{}
+	out.path, out.json = rawPath, false
+	if jsonPath != "" {
+		out.path, out.json = jsonPath, true
+	}
+	if out.path == "" {
+		return out, nil
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(out.path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out.file = f
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (out *credentialOutput) abort() {
+	if out == nil || out.file == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	info, err := out.file.Stat()
+	_ = out.file.Close()
+	if out.mutated || err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pathInfo, pathErr := os.Stat(out.path)
+	if pathErr == nil && os.SameFile(info, pathInfo) {
+		_ = os.Remove(out.path)
+	}
+}
+
+func (out *credentialOutput) deliver(kind, owner, plaintext string, expiresAt any) error {
+	if out.file == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("protected credential delivery path required")
+	}
+	out.mutated = true // Keep the private recovery artifact if delivery fails after DB commit.
+	var body []byte
+	if out.json {
+		payload := map[string]any{"kind": kind, "owner": owner, "secret": plaintext}
+		if expiresAt != nil {
+			payload["expiresAt"] = expiresAt
+		}
+		var err error
+		body, err = json.MarshalIndent(payload, "", "  ")
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		body = []byte(plaintext)
+	}
+	body = append(body, '\n')
+	if _, err := out.file.Write(body); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := out.file.Sync(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := out.file.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	out.file = nil
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "凭据已写入 %s（0600，仅此一次生成；勿入库勿入日志）\n", out.path)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// runUser：本地 owner 账号初始化、续办和只读／撤销操作。
 func runUser(args []string) int {
 	if len(args) == 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system user <create|reset-password|list> [--owner x --name y --admin --password p]")
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system user <create|initialize-account|list|revoke-login-key|bootstrap-admin> [flags]")
 		return 2
 	}
 	sub := args[0]
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("user "+sub, flag.ExitOnError)
 	data := fs.String("data", "./data", "数据目录")
-	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档）")
+	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档；已弃用，优先 AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN 或 --dsn-file）")
+	dsnFile := fs.String("dsn-file", "", "0600 权限的 DSN 文件")
 	owner := fs.String("owner", "", "用户名（owner）")
+	userID := fs.String("user-id", "", "待初始化账号稳定ID")
+	expectedStateVersion := fs.Int64("expected-state-version", 0, "待初始化账号状态版本")
+	expectedGeneration := fs.Int64("expected-generation", -1, "待初始化账号代数")
 	name := fs.String("name", "", "显示名")
-	password := fs.String("password", "", "密码（空 = 随机生成并打印一次）")
-	admin := fs.Bool("admin", false, "管理员（可管理用户与密钥）")
+	password := fs.String("password", "", "密码（已弃用；请用 --password-stdin）")
+	passwordStdin := fs.Bool("password-stdin", false, "从 stdin 读取密码")
+	outFile := fs.String("out-file", "", "把明文凭据独占写入该文件（0600）")
+	instanceID := fs.String("instance-id", "", "严格核验库内服务身份")
+	admin := fs.Bool("admin", false, "管理员")
+	role := fs.String("role", "user", "角色 user|admin")
+	openExisting := fs.Bool("open-existing", false, "兼容旧参数；账户命令始终只打开既有存储")
+	generatePassword := fs.Bool("generate-password", false, "旧随机初始密码参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.String("purpose", "recover", "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.Int("ttl-minutes", 30, "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.Bool("revoke-all-credentials", false, "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	keyID := fs.String("id", "", "revoke-login-key 凭据编号")
+	out := fs.String("out", "", "凭据保护交付文件（0600 JSON）")
 	fs.Parse(args[1:])
+	if sub == "reset-password" || sub == "issue-login-key" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: use owner initialization or owner-confirmed recovery")
+		return 2 // reject before DSN/password reads, storage opens or output reservation
+	}
+	if sub == "create" && (*password != "" || *passwordStdin || *generatePassword) {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: local creation uses trusted activation only")
+		return 2
+	}
+	resolvedDSN, err := resolveAccountDSN(*dsn, *dsnFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	resolvedPassword, err := resolveAccountPassword(*password, *passwordStdin)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	if *instanceID != "" {
+		_ = os.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID", *instanceID)
+	}
+	*dsn = resolvedDSN
+	*password = resolvedPassword
+	credentialAction := sub == "create" || sub == "initialize-account" || sub == "bootstrap-admin"
+	if credentialAction && *outFile == "" && *out == "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: --out or --out-file is required for protected credential delivery")
+		return 2
+	}
+	if !credentialAction && (*outFile != "" || *out != "") {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: 此子命令不生成凭据")
+		return 2
+	}
+	var delivery *credentialOutput
+	if credentialAction {
+		delivery, err = reserveCredentialOutput(*outFile, *out)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+			return 2
+		}
+		defer delivery.abort()
+	}
 	switch sub {
 	case "create":
 		if *owner == "" {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create: --owner 必填")
 			return 2
 		}
-		pw, err := app.CreateUserAccount(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name, *password, *admin)
+		isAdmin := *admin
+		switch *role {
+		case "user":
+		case "admin":
+			isAdmin = true
+		default:
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "user create: 未知角色 %q\n", *role)
+			return 2
+		}
+		pw, opID, err := app.CreateUserAccount(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name, *password, isAdmin, *openExisting, *generatePassword)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create:", err)
 			return 1
 		}
-		fmt.Println(pw)
-		if *password == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "初始密码仅此一次输出；该用户首次登录须修改密码。")
+		if err := delivery.deliver("login-key", *owner, pw, nil); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "operation_id=%s\n", opID)
+		return 0
+	case "initialize-account":
+		if *userID == "" || *expectedStateVersion < 1 || *expectedGeneration < 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account: --user-id、--expected-state-version、--expected-generation 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		plain, targetOwner, err := app.InitializeAccount(*dsn, *data, *userID, *expectedStateVersion, *expectedGeneration)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("activation", targetOwner, plain, time.Now().Add(30*time.Minute).UTC()); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account:", err)
+			return 1
 		}
 		return 0
 	case "reset-password":
-		if *owner == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user reset-password: --owner 必填")
-			return 2
-		}
-		pw, err := app.ResetUserPassword(*dsn, *data, *owner, *password)
-		if err != nil {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user reset-password:", err)
-			return 1
-		}
-		fmt.Println(pw)
-		if *password == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "新密码仅此一次输出；该用户下次登录须修改密码（其余会话已吊销）。")
-		}
-		return 0
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED")
+		return 2
 	case "list":
-		users, err := app.ListUserAccounts(*dsn, *data)
+		users, err := app.ListUserAccounts(*dsn, *data, *openExisting)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user list:", err)
 			return 1
@@ -278,8 +488,44 @@ func runUser(args []string) int {
 		out, _ := json.MarshalIndent(users, "", "  ")
 		fmt.Println(string(out))
 		return 0
+	case "issue-login-key":
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED")
+		return 2
+	case "revoke-login-key":
+		if *keyID == "" {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user revoke-login-key: --id 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		if err := app.RevokeUserLoginKey(*dsn, *data, *keyID, *openExisting); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user revoke-login-key:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Println("revoked")
+		return 0
+	case "bootstrap-admin":
+		if *owner == "" {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin: --owner 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		plain, err := app.BootstrapAdmin(*dsn, *data, *owner, *openExisting)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("bootstrap-admin", *owner, plain, time.Now().Add(30*time.Minute).UTC()); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		return 0
 	default:
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: 未知子命令", sub)
 		return 2
 	}
 }
+
+// runIdentity：U1 I3 服务实例库内身份（manifest.instance_id ↔ agent_system_identity）。
+// 与 serve --instance（runs 进程标识）无关。实现在 pkg/identity（公共化：下游
+// 组合仓共用同一 CLI，未知子命令 usage 退出、不落服务路径——2026-10-12 裁定）。
+func runIdentity(args []string) int {
+	return identity.Run(args)
+}

cmd/agent-system/user_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestLegacyUserCredentialCommandsStopBeforeOpeningStorage(t *testing.T) {
+	data := t.TempDir()
+	for _, args := range [][]string{
+		{"reset-password", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--password", "attacker-password"},
+		{"issue-login-key", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--purpose", "recover", "--revoke-all-credentials"},
+	} {
+		if code := runUser(args); code != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("legacy command did not reject before storage: %v code=%d", args[0], code)
+		}
+	}
+	out := filepath.Join(data, "delivery.json")
+	if code := runUser([]string{"create", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--password", "attacker-password", "--out", out}); code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("password-bearing local create accepted: %d", code)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(data, "agent-system.db")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected commands opened/created a database: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected commands wrote a delivery file: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCredentialDeliveryCreatesExclusive0600File(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	out := filepath.Join(dir, "credential.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("old"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := deliverCredential(out, "activation", "alice", "secret", nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("existing permissive file was overwritten")
+	}
+	bytes, err := os.ReadFile(out)
+	if err != nil || string(bytes) != "old" {
+		t.Fatalf("existing file changed: %q %v", bytes, err)
+	}
+	out = filepath.Join(dir, "new.json")
+	if err := deliverCredential(out, "activation", "alice", "secret", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	info, err := os.Stat(out)
+	if err != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
+		t.Fatalf("delivery mode: %v %v", info, err)
+	}
+	bytes, err = os.ReadFile(out)
+	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(bytes), `"secret": "secret"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("delivery payload: %v", err)
+	}
+}

cmd/storage-migrate/integration_test.go

@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ func TestMigrateEndToEndAndIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
 	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
 	defer cleanup()
 	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+	src, err := sql.Open("sqlite", fixture)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer src.Close()
+	var sourcePublic, sourceStaff, sourcePrivate, sourceSecret string
+	var sourceKeyVersion int64
+	if err := src.QueryRow(`SELECT public_revision,staff_no_revision,private_revision,cursor_key_version,cursor_secret FROM account_directory_revision WHERE id=1`).Scan(
+		&sourcePublic, &sourceStaff, &sourcePrivate, &sourceKeyVersion, &sourceSecret,
+	); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 
 	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-e2e"}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("首次迁移：%v", err)
@@ -61,6 +73,16 @@ func TestMigrateEndToEndAndIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
 	db := st.DB()
+	var targetPublic, targetStaff, targetPrivate, targetSecret string
+	var targetKeyVersion int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT public_revision,staff_no_revision,private_revision,cursor_key_version,cursor_secret FROM account_directory_revision WHERE id=1`).Scan(
+		&targetPublic, &targetStaff, &targetPrivate, &targetKeyVersion, &targetSecret,
+	); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if targetPublic != sourcePublic || targetStaff != sourceStaff || targetPrivate != sourcePrivate || targetKeyVersion != sourceKeyVersion || targetSecret != sourceSecret {
+		t.Fatal("迁移后的目录版本或游标密钥与源库不一致")
+	}
 	var pinned, archived bool
 	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT pinned, archived FROM conversations WHERE id='c1'`).Scan(&pinned, &archived); err != nil || !pinned || archived {
 		t.Fatalf("布尔映射：pinned=%v archived=%v err=%v", pinned, archived, err)

cmd/storage-migrate/main.go

@@ -281,16 +281,23 @@ func cmdBackup(args []string) error {
 // copyOrder：按外键依赖排序的业务表全集（projects 最先，引用方在后）。
 // admission_leases 是运行态执行许可（迁移无意义），明确排除。
 var copyOrder = []string{
-	"projects", "users", "profiles", "settings", "plugins",
+	"projects", "users", "account_directory_revision", "profiles", "settings", "plugins",
 	"conversations", "runs", "messages", "events", "artifacts",
 	"hitl_cards", "plans", "todos", "knowledge", "knowledge_vectors",
-	"activity_cards", "command_audit", "prompt_modules",
+	"activity_cards", "project_event_shares", "command_audit", "prompt_modules",
 	"sessions", "api_keys",
 	"plugin_grants", "plugin_schema", "plugin_kv", "background_tasks",
 	"memory_entries", "audit_events", "pending_confirms", "llm_usage_daily",
 	"secret_keys", "settings_snapshots", "regen_pending", "context_entries",
 	"user_commands", "pending_notices", "recovery_holds",
 	"surfaces", "surface_revisions", "surface_actions", "plugin_activation",
+	// v26 login_keys（#171 合入 main 时漏登记；本 PR 一并补齐）
+	"login_keys",
+	// U1 I3：服务实例 DB 身份（无外键；迁移须保留以免目标库丢锚）
+	"agent_system_identity",
+	"account_events",
+	"redeem_attempts",
+	"recovery_proposals", "recovery_proposal_proofs",
 }
 
 const controlDDL = `
@@ -444,6 +451,11 @@ func guardIdentity(db *sql.DB, migrationID, snapID string, srcVersion int) error
 func businessRows(db *sql.DB) (int64, error) {
 	var total int64
 	for _, t := range copyOrder {
+		// Schema setup seeds this singleton before a migration starts. It is
+		// replaced from the source during copying and is not target business data.
+		if t == "account_directory_revision" {
+			continue
+		}
 		var n int64
 		if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM "` + t + `"`).Scan(&n); err != nil {
 			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not exist") {
@@ -701,6 +713,14 @@ func copyRows(db *sql.DB, src *sql.DB, table string, cols []string) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
+	// The destination migrator creates a fresh singleton directory revision at
+	// schema startup. Replace it with the source's opaque revision so existing
+	// cursors/visible-change history remain tied to the migrated account data.
+	if table == "account_directory_revision" {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(`DELETE FROM account_directory_revision`); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
 	stmt, err := tx.Prepare(fmt.Sprintf(`INSERT INTO "%s" (%s) VALUES (%s) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, table, colList, placeholders))
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -778,7 +798,8 @@ func advanceSequences(db *sql.DB, table string) error {
 // checkOwners：业务行引用的 owner 必须存在于 users（单租户默认 ”/'local'
 // 除外）。未知 owner 阻塞迁移（U4/R7：不静默带过未知归属）。
 func checkOwners(db *sql.DB, src *sql.DB) error {
-	ownerTables := []string{"projects", "conversations", "runs", "artifacts", "knowledge", "hitl_cards", "profiles", "activity_cards", "command_audit"}
+	ownerTables := []string{"projects", "conversations", "runs", "artifacts", "knowledge", "hitl_cards", "profiles", "activity_cards",
+		"project_event_shares", "command_audit", "sessions", "api_keys", "login_keys", "account_events", "recovery_proposals"}
 	for _, t := range ownerTables {
 		if !sqliteHasTable(src, t) {
 			continue

docs/iam-u3-account-write-fence-inventory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# IAM U3 A1: account write fence inventory
+
+Status: stage 4–5 implementation inventory; the fixed candidate is the commit containing this file, and stage 6 human review remains pending. The route table records the **4053c4d baseline finding** and the intended final sink; its `Now` column is historical, not a claim about the amended candidate. Scope follows the approved Documents A1–A4 amendment `fb3a8214df963697ebd745ad11eb852ed9444fe3` and approved delegated-actor amendment `5783940e4c434102cbca8c22bd282d87b28fa840`.
+
+The 66 non-GET `/api` registrations were enumerated from `internal/server/server.go`. Paths below omit `/api`. `A` means `s.owner(r)` (auth-off: implicit `store.OwnerDefault`); `B` means body owner, `K` redeemed-key owner, `S` current password-session owner. Target resource owner never substitutes for actor. In the historical `Now` column, `T` means the baseline already had a final Store check; `M` means a Backend DB write lacked one; `E` means an external or process-local effect; `—` means no business mutation or permitted credential cleanup. `D` means a short Store transaction with actor account lock and enabled read **before** resource/scope/conversation locks; `F` means stage immutable bytes, then `D` for the visible DB reference; `X` means last effective-state check before external action plus cancellation; `C` means `D` at each command handler's actual sink; `P` means `D` for Backend projection and `X` at the separate RDM callback. `Vnn` identifies the route for traceability; verification uses representative concurrency cases and complete source-to-sink review, rather than one duplicate test per route.
+
+| # | Route → handler (source line) | Actor | Final sink | Now | Required fence | Verify |
+|---:|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 01 | `POST /auth/login` → `login` (`accounts.go:148`) | B | `CreateSessionVerified` | T | retain account/version transaction check | V01 |
+| 02 | `POST /auth/login-key/redeem` → `redeemLoginKey` (`accounts.go:106`) | K | `RedeemLoginKey`; failed-attempt security counter | T | retain account/grant transaction check | V02 |
+| 03 | `POST /auth/recovery-grants/redeem` → `redeemLoginKey` (`accounts.go:106`) | K | same as 02 | T | same as 02 | V03 |
+| 04 | `POST /auth/logout` → `logout` (`accounts.go:202`) | A | `DeleteSession` credential cleanup | — | permit cleanup after disable | V04 |
+| 05 | `POST /auth/password` → `changePassword` (`accounts.go:214`) | S | checked setup/forced/active password Store transaction | T | retain session/account recheck | V05 |
+| 06 | `POST /admin/users` → `createAdminUser` (`accounts.go:321`) | A | `CreatePendingAccount` | T | retain actor enabled/admin transaction check | V06 |
+| 07 | `PATCH /me/profile` → `patchMeProfile` (`accounts.go:394`) | S | `PatchAccountProfile` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V07 |
+| 08 | `PATCH /admin/users/{userId}/profile` → `patchAdminAccountProfile` (`accounts.go:419`) | A | `PatchAccountProfile` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V08 |
+| 09 | `PUT /admin/users/{userId}/state` → `setAdminAccountState` (`accounts.go:444`) | A | `SetAccountEnabled` | T | retain shared account lock and in-tx actor check | V09 |
+| 10 | `POST /admin/users/{userId}/recovery-proposals` → `createAdminRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:7`) | A | `CreateRecoveryProposal` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V10 |
+| 11 | `DELETE /admin/users/{userId}/recovery-proposals/{id}` → `revokeAdminRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:47`) | A | `RevokeRecoveryProposal` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V11 |
+| 12 | `POST /auth/recovery-proposals/{id}/confirm` → `confirmRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:81`) | S | `ConfirmRecoveryProposal` | T | retain owner/session proof in transaction | V12 |
+| 13 | `POST /auth/recovery-proposals/{id}/rotate-grant` → `rotateRecoveryGrant` (`recovery.go:105`) | S | `RotateRecoveryGrant` | T | retain owner/session proof in transaction | V13 |
+| 14 | `POST /admin/users/{owner}/password` → `resetAdminUserPassword` (`accounts.go:468`) | A | 410 response only | — | no business sink | V14 |
+| 15 | `POST /admin/users/{owner}/login-keys` → `issueAdminLoginKey` (`accounts.go:478`) | A | 410 response only | — | no business sink | V15 |
+| 16 | `DELETE /admin/users/{owner}/login-keys/{id}` → `revokeAdminLoginKey` (`accounts.go:494`) | A | `RevokeLoginKeyCascade` | M | D: lock/recheck admin actor too, then target/grant | V16 |
+| 17 | `POST /projects` → `createProject` (`server.go:713`) | A | `CreateProject` or RDM `Create` + Host projection | M/E | P | V17 |
+| 18 | `PATCH /projects/{id}` → `patchProject` (`server.go:734`) | A | RDM `Rename` or `RenameProject`; `UpdateProjectSettings` | M/E | P; D for every settings write | V18 |
+| 19 | `DELETE /projects/{id}` → `deleteProject` (`server.go:812`) | A | RDM `Archive` or `DeleteProject` | M/E | P | V19 |
+| 20 | `POST /projects/{id}/conversations` → `createConversation` (`server.go:875`) | A | `CreateConversation[InProject]`; RDM `Work` precheck | M | D; keep domain work check | V20 |
+| 21 | `PATCH /conversations/{id}` → `patchConversation` (`server.go:914`) | A | update, permission, note, flags: separate Store writes | M | D at each final write | V21 |
+| 22 | `DELETE /conversations/{id}` → `deleteConversation` (`server.go:950`) | A | `DeleteConversation` | M | D | V22 |
+| 23 | `POST /conversations/{id}/messages` → `postMessage` (`server.go:956`) | A | message, run, message-run link; optional Bus dispatch | M/E | D per write; C for command; actor lock before conversation lock | V23 |
+| 24 | `POST /conversations/{id}/rewind` → `rewindFiles` (`rewind.go:27`) | A | checkpoint files, then `AppendMessage` | M/E | X for rewind, D for message | V24 |
+| 25 | `POST /conversations/{id}/regenerate` → `regenerateMessage` (`borrow.go:159`) | A | message flags/exclusion, regen marker, rewind files, new run | M/E | D per write, X for rewind | V25 |
+| 26 | `POST /messages/{id}/exclude` → `excludeMessage` (`borrow.go:122`) | A | `ExcludeRunGroup(messageID)` | M | D; derive conversation owner in transaction | V26 |
+| 27 | `POST /messages/{id}/variant` → `selectVariant` (`borrow.go:146`) | A | `SelectVariant(messageID)` | M | D; derive conversation owner in transaction | V27 |
+| 28 | `POST /secrets` → `createSecret` (`borrow.go:21`) | A | `AddSecret` | M | D | V28 |
+| 29 | `POST /secrets/{id}/activate` → `activateSecret` (`borrow.go:39`) | A | `ActivateSecret` | M | D | V29 |
+| 30 | `PATCH /secrets/{id}` → `renameSecret` (`borrow.go:43`) | A | `RenameSecret` | M | D | V30 |
+| 31 | `DELETE /secrets/{id}` → `deleteSecret` (`borrow.go:54`) | A | `DeleteSecret` | M | D | V31 |
+| 32 | `POST /context-entries` → `saveContextEntry` (`borrow.go:64`) | A | `SaveContextEntry` | M | D | V32 |
+| 33 | `DELETE /context-entries/{id}` → `deleteContextEntry` (`borrow.go:78`) | A | `DeleteContextEntry` | M | D | V33 |
+| 34 | `POST /prompt-commands` → `saveUserPromptCommand` (`borrow.go:87`) | A | `SaveUserCommand`, then process Bus register | M/E | D; X before Bus mutation | V34 |
+| 35 | `DELETE /prompt-commands/{id}` → `deleteUserPromptCommand` (`borrow.go:102`) | A | `DeleteUserCommand`, then Bus unregister | M/E | D; X before Bus mutation | V35 |
+| 36 | `POST /runs/{id}/cancel` → `cancelRun` (`server.go:1278`) | A | PG `EnqueueCommand` or local cancel handle | M/E | D for enqueue with in-tx run owner; X locally | V36 |
+| 37 | `POST /hitl/{id}/resolve` → `resolveHITL` (`server.go:1314`) | A | local HITL/card/event writes or PG `EnqueueCommand` | M | D at each Store sink, including queue | V37 |
+| 38 | `POST /cards/{id}/actions/{actionId}` → `cardAction` (`server.go:1401`) | A | Cards action or Bus confirm, then receipt message | M/E | D for card/message; C for confirmed handler | V38 |
+| 39 | `POST /cards/{id}/pin` → `cardPin` (`server.go:1453`) | A | card version write | M | D | V39 |
+| 40 | `POST /cards/{id}/dismiss` → `cardDismiss` (`server.go:1462`) | A | card version/event write | M | D | V40 |
+| 41 | `POST /cards/{id}/to_project` → `cardToProject` (`server.go:1386`) | A | project card copy and original dismissal | M | D at both writes | V41 |
+| 42 | `POST /projects/{id}/uploads` → `upload` (`server.go:1469`) | A | Blob + artifact row, card, knowledge/vector index | M/E | F; D at later card/index writes | V42 |
+| 43 | `PUT /artifacts/{id}/content` → `putArtifactContent` (`server.go:1651`) | A | **in-place Blob overwrite before SQL UPDATE** | M/E | F using new immutable blob ref, guarded DB pointer swap | V43 |
+| 44 | `DELETE /artifacts/{id}` → `deleteArtifact` (`server.go:1656`) | A | metadata, index/vector rows, Blob deletion | M/E | D for visible rows; X for post-commit GC | V44 |
+| 45 | `POST /profiles` → `saveProfile` (`server.go:1667`) | A | profile Store row | M | D | V45 |
+| 46 | `DELETE /profiles/{id}` → `deleteProfile` (`server.go:1683`) | A | profile Store row | M | D | V46 |
+| 47 | `POST /prompts` → `savePromptModule` (`server.go:2023`) | A | prompt Store row | M | D | V47 |
+| 48 | `DELETE /prompts/{id}` → `deletePromptModule` (`server.go:2044`) | A | prompt Store row | M | D | V48 |
+| 49 | `PUT /settings/user` → `putSettingsUser` (`server.go:1717`) | A | settings transaction, then separate snapshot row | M | D for settings and snapshot | V49 |
+| 50 | `PUT /settings/project/{id}` → `putSettingsProject` (`server.go:1726`) | A | settings transaction, then separate snapshot row | M | D for settings and snapshot | V50 |
+| 51 | `PUT /settings/system` → `putSettingsSystem` (`server.go:1782`) | A | system settings and snapshot under synthetic owner | M | D with **request actor**, not `OwnerSystemRow` | V51 |
+| 52 | `POST /tools` → `createUserTool` (`server.go:1815`) | A | process Registry register; future HTTP tool execution | E | X for registration and each tool execution | V52 |
+| 53 | `DELETE /tools/{name}` → `deleteUserTool` (`server.go:1834`) | A | process Registry unregister | E | X | V53 |
+| 54 | `POST /plugins/{id}/enabled` → `setPluginEnabled` (`platform_api.go:132`) | A | `SetPluginEnabled` upsert | M | D | V54 |
+| 55 | `POST /plugins/{id}/activation` → `setSurfaceActivation` (`platform_api.go:251`) | A | activation transaction, separate audit row | M | D for both writes | V55 |
+| 56 | `POST /surfaces` → `submitSurface` (`platform_api.go:194`) | A | snapshot transaction, then event/pending row | M | D for snapshot/event writes | V56 |
+| 57 | `POST /surfaces/{id}/actions` → `submitSurfaceAction` (`platform_api.go:271`) | A | action insert, Bus dispatch, action-state update | M/E | D for both action writes; C for dispatch | V57 |
+| 58 | `POST /plugins/reload` → `reloadPlugins` (`server.go:1908`) | A | process registry/sidecar changes and `UpsertPlugin` | M/E | X for process changes; D for DB writes | V58 |
+| 59 | `POST /commands/{id}` → `execCommand` (`server.go:1211`) | A | Bus audit/card/pending or arbitrary command handler/RDM | M/E | C, X for external handler | V59 |
+| 60 | `POST /projects/{id}/knowledge` → `addKnowledge` (`server.go:2055`) | A | `AddKnowledge` batch transaction | M | D; in-tx project/owner check | V60 |
+| 61 | `POST /tasks` → `createBackgroundTask` (`platform_api.go:16`) | A | task insert | M | D | V61 |
+| 62 | `POST /tasks/{id}` → `updateBackgroundTask` (`platform_api.go:52`) | A | task update | M | D | V62 |
+| 63 | `POST /memory` → `putMemory` (`platform_api.go:69`) | A | memory upsert | M | D | V63 |
+| 64 | `POST /audit` → `postAudit` (`platform_api.go:112`) | A | client-origin business audit row | M | D; security-denial audit is a separate exception | V64 |
+| 65 | `POST /admin/backup` → `backup` (`server.go:2224`) | A | directory + SQLite backup file | E | X and explicit admin authorization | V65 |
+| 66 | `POST /admin/recovery-holds/{runId}/release` → `releaseRecoveryHold` (`accounts.go:526`) | A | recovery-hold UPDATE | M | D with actor admin check and run/hold owner lookup | V66 |
+
+The route count is not a full write count. `GET /api/llm/budget` → `llmBudget` (`platform_api.go`) calls `AccountTokens(owner, 0, budget)`; the amended Store returns a read-only total when tokens are zero. **V67** therefore has no business write. Ordinary authenticated GETs can refresh session `last_seen_at` as credential maintenance; session/API-key in-flight revocation remains a separate impact analysis.
+
+## Host and run manager exits
+
+| ID | Entry and actor | Final sink | Now → required fence | Verify |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| H01 | `inprocHost.KVPut`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:295`) | `PutPluginKV` | M → D | VH01 |
+| H02 | `inprocHost.Audit`, host owner; actor label is `plugin:<id>` (`hostcaps.go:309`) | `AppendAuditEvent` | M → D using host owner | VH02 |
+| H03 | `KnowledgeWrite/Publish/Delete`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:350-424`) | knowledge rows, vector rows; publish deletes then writes | M/E → D at every DB sink; X before embedding/remote model | VH03 |
+| H04 | `TaskCreate/Update`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:427-443`) | background-task rows | M → D | VH04 |
+| H05 | `EnsureProject/RenameOwnedProject`, host owner (`project_lifecycle.go:125-135`) | Backend projection rows, RDM callback upstream | M/E → actor D before project-name lock; X at callback | VH05 |
+| H06 | `SurfaceSave`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:481`) | `surfacesvc.Submit` snapshot/event | M → D at Store sinks | VH06 |
+| H07 | `Complete`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:319`) | external LLM request | E → X with context cancellation | VH07 |
+| H08 | scoped Host reconstructed from owner/plugin ID (`hostcaps.go:103`) | same H01-H07 methods | M/E → same final sink fences; early `requireEffective` alone is insufficient | VH08 |
+| G01 | `startClaimedRun`/subagent spawn, run owner (`runmgr.go:1443,1924`) | `CreateRun`, `UpdateRun` and admission rows | M → D for business state; keep failure-only cleanup explicit | VG01 |
+| G02 | `Emit`, `AskHITL`, cards, plan/todos (`runmgr.go:676-935`) | events, HITL/card, plan/todo rows | M → D at each final Store write | VG02 |
+| G03 | `WriteArtifact`, run owner (`runmgr.go:968`) | Blob, artifact, event, knowledge/vector rows | M/E → F then D for each later write | VG03 |
+| G04 | `ExecuteTool`, run owner (`runmgr.go:1080-1167`) | Registry HTTP/command/filesystem side effects, output artifacts | E/M → X before external call; C/D for command and output sinks | VG04 |
+| G05 | `stageInputs`, checkpoint recording/rewind and subagent transcript (`inputs.go:17-90`, `rewind.go:37-99`, `subagent_transcript.go:46-84`) | workspace files | E → X before each effect and cancellation; no cross-system atomic claim | VG05 |
+| G06 | `ResolveHITL`, run/card owner (`runmgr.go:1780-1860`) | HITL/card/event and possible run writes | M → D | VG06 |
+| G07 | background notice delivery and subagent completion (`runmgr.go:1982-2041,2444-2455`) | run/message/event plus transcript files | M/E → D for business rows, X for files | VG07 |
+| G08 | `settleRunWithFence`, run owner (`runmgr.go:1700-1722`) | final run + assistant message | T for enabled check in `store/recovery.go:184-220`; retain narrow failure-state exception | VG08 |
+| G09 | `OnUsage`, run owner (`app.go:668-680`) | usage and budget audit rows | M → D or documented accounting-only exception | VG09 |
+
+At the 4053c4d baseline, Host/runmgr effective-account queries were early checks, Bus confirmation and Surface writes had separate sinks, and artifact content could be overwritten in place before a checked SQL update. These are the reasons for the sink-level mapping below; file paths and old line numbers in the historical tables are navigational rather than final-SHA evidence.
+
+## Amended candidate mapping and limits
+
+This section supersedes the historical `Now` column when checking the amended candidate. V01–V15 retain their existing account/credential transaction or response-only behavior; V16 uses actor-checked login-key revocation. V17–V23 route project, conversation, message, run creation and link writes through account-checked Store entries. V24–V35 use guarded file/message and borrow/secret/context/command entries; V25 prepares the message exclusion and regeneration marker in one checked transaction, then consumes the marker only with successful run settlement. V36–V44 guard command queue, HITL, card, surface/event, artifact metadata and index writes. Artifact content updates switch immutable blob references in the checked transaction. V45–V51 guard profile, prompt, settings and snapshot writes, using the **request actor** for system settings. V52–V59 combine last checks for process/HTTP/tool effects with guarded plugin, surface, card, command pending and audit DB writes. V60–V66 use guarded knowledge, task, memory, audit and hold updates. V65 refuses whole-database backup under authenticated mode because administrator status does not grant access to other owners' business content; auth-off backup has a last check. V67 is read-only at zero tokens.
+
+VH01–VH04/VH06/VH08 use the Host owner and final Store account checks for Backend-owned rows. H05 delegated rename now derives a **single-project** projection from the current authenticated lifecycle or command Host; its final Store transaction locks the real operator and creator in stable order, checks both effective states and verifies the persisted project owner. The global `NewScopedHost` cannot derive this delegated capability; its original creator-owned methods remain. VH07 checks immediately before its external model call and passes the caller context. VG01–VG09 use checked run, admission/lease, event, HITL, card, artifact, index, notice, command and settle sinks. File staging, transcript, tool HTTP/search/code execution and overlay writeback check just before effects and propagate cancellation. Failed/cancelled/interrupted run sealing, lease release, notice deletion and failed-start marker deletion are narrowly scoped safety cleanup; positive token usage is accounting for model work already incurred.
+
+The H05/V17–V19 late-write blocker was reproduced in the earlier candidate and repaired under the separately approved Documents `5783940` plan. Tests cover creator/operator effective state, a disable between early check and final write on SQLite/PG, a two-process PG disable, opposite lock order progress, and both HTTP PATCH and no-conversation command Host sources. The RDM database authorization/intent commit is still separate from Backend's account/project transaction; a permission withdrawal or cross-database failure is handled by the existing I1 failure intent and recovery path rather than a zero-window assertion. Completion and stage 6 claims require exact-HEAD receipts and human review.
+
+The account lock closes the **account-enabled versus Backend-owned business write** race on the same database. It does not prove that a session or API key revoked after request authentication cannot complete a write while that account remains enabled; that is a distinct credential-version fence and outside this amendment's promise. RDM commits in its own database and external requests, processes and files cannot share the Backend transaction. The last check can race with those effects, and a multi-file operation can leave earlier files committed when a later check fails. No cross-database or external zero-window claim is made.
+
+**Sink discovery still required:** Backend source alone cannot enumerate every dynamically registered Bus handler, plugin sidecar command, or the RDM callback's independent database writes. V17–V19, V23, V38, V57–V59 and VH05 must record the actual composed handlers and their final sinks in the tested composition; an unknown or unguarded handler blocks the A1 completion claim. The external HTTP tool destination and filesystem actions depend on runtime configuration, so VG04/VG05 must verify the actual enabled tool set and cancellation points.
+
+## Common implementation and verification gate
+
+1. Build one short Store write-transaction primitive: `Begin` → PG actor advisory lock (`account:<owner>`) → `SELECT enabled ... FOR UPDATE` → existing resource/scope/conversation/admission locks → resource authorization and write → commit. The actor lock must precede all other PG locks, including project-name locks; participating account owners use sorted order, then bootstrap lock where required. `SetAccountEnabled` already takes the account lock (`store/account_state.go:20-45`); `lockAccountUsers` supplies sorted PG account locking (`store/account_model.go:115-145`). SQLite uses `_txlock=immediate` (`store/store.go:188-199`). In auth-off mode, only a missing `OwnerDefault` row is implicitly enabled; an existing disabled row rejects (`app/account_guard.go:10-23`). No DB connection or transaction spans request body decoding, embedding, tool execution, RDM callback, or full HTTP lifetime.
+2. Make methods with only resource IDs derive owner inside the guarded transaction. Pass actor separately for system settings (`OwnerSystemRow`), delegated Host calls, commands, queue commands, audit and background jobs. Preserve project/duty authorization as a separate condition; account enabled does not grant resource access. For files, stage invisible immutable bytes and switch the visible DB reference in `D`; failed transaction deletes staged bytes, post-commit old-blob GC may continue. RDM's independent database keeps the explicit cross-database window from the amendment.
+3. Review **every** V/VH/VG route against its final sink on the fixed candidate SHA. Use deterministic pause-and-disable tests for representative project, message/run, artifact, settings, command/surface and Host/runmgr paths on SQLite and isolated PostgreSQL. Test account lock ordering with two PG connections. Verify the existing credential routes' in-transaction ordering. For external effects, verify the last check and cancellation and state the remaining check-to-effect window. Record exact command, tested SHA and output in the Dev task card; local SELF is not independent REPLAY or CI GATE.
+
+Stage 6 stops if any Backend-owned business write lacks a final actor-enabled transaction fence, if artifact content remains visibly mutable after disable via in-place overwrite, or if an external/RDM effect is described as same-DB atomic. Session/API-key in-flight revocation is a separate amendment impact analysis; enabled checks do not prove credential-revocation fencing.

internal/app/account_directory.go

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+type accountDirectorySlot struct {
+	mu         sync.RWMutex
+	pluginID   string
+	resolver   extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver
+	secret     [32]byte
+	keyVersion int
+}
+
+func newAccountDirectorySlot(st *store.Store) (*accountDirectorySlot, error) {
+	key, err := st.GetAccountCursorKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &accountDirectorySlot{secret: key.Secret, keyVersion: key.Version}, nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) register(pluginID string, fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	if fn == nil || pluginID != "rdm" {
+		return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.resolver != nil {
+		return errors.New("account directory resolver already registered")
+	}
+	s.pluginID, s.resolver = pluginID, fn
+	return nil
+}
+
+type directoryPolicy struct {
+	allowed    map[string]bool
+	match      []string
+	candidates map[string]bool
+	owners     map[string]bool
+	rows       []store.DirectoryAccountRow
+	all        bool
+	status     string
+	version    string
+}
+
+type directoryCursor struct {
+	KeyVersion int    `json:"k"`
+	Version    string `json:"v"`
+	Owner      string `json:"o"`
+	UserID     string `json:"u"`
+}
+
+type directoryVisibleRow struct {
+	UserID  string
+	Owner   string
+	Enabled bool
+	Name    string
+	StaffNo string
+}
+
+func knownDirectoryField(field string) bool {
+	return field == "owner" || field == "name" || field == "staffNo"
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) directoryPolicy(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, loadRows bool) (directoryPolicy, error) {
+	var p directoryPolicy
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return p, err
+	}
+	if h.actor == "" || h.caps.st == nil || h.caps.directory == nil || q.SchemaVersion != extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	actor, err := h.caps.st.GetUserAuthState(h.actor)
+	if err != nil || !actor.Enabled {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if q.Mode != extension.AccountDirectoryModeExact && q.Mode != extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	if !utf8.ValidString(q.Query) || utf8.RuneCountInString(q.Query) > 128 {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	for _, r := range q.Query {
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) {
+			return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+		}
+	}
+	p.status = q.Status
+	if p.status == "" {
+		p.status = "enabled"
+	}
+	if p.status != "enabled" && p.status != "disabled" && p.status != "all" {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	var scope extension.AccountDirectoryScope
+	switch q.Purpose {
+	case extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers:
+		if !actor.IsAdmin || q.ProjectID != "" || q.DocumentID != "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		scope = extension.AccountDirectoryScope{AllowedFields: []string{"owner", "name", "staffNo"},
+			MatchFields: []string{"owner", "name", "staffNo"}, AllCandidates: true, ScopeVersion: "system.users.v1"}
+	case extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers, extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties:
+		if h.pluginID != "rdm" || q.ProjectID == "" || (q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties && q.DocumentID == "") ||
+			(q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers && q.DocumentID != "") || p.status != "enabled" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		h.caps.directory.mu.RLock()
+		resolver, pluginID := h.caps.directory.resolver, h.caps.directory.pluginID
+		h.caps.directory.mu.RUnlock()
+		if resolver == nil || pluginID != h.pluginID {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		scope, err = resolver(ctx, extension.AccountDirectoryScopeRequest{
+			Actor: h.actor, PluginID: h.pluginID, Purpose: q.Purpose, ProjectID: q.ProjectID, DocumentID: q.DocumentID,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties && scope.AllCandidates {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+	default:
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if scope.ScopeVersion == "" {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	p.allowed = map[string]bool{"owner": true}
+	for _, field := range scope.AllowedFields {
+		if !knownDirectoryField(field) {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.allowed[field] = true
+	}
+	matchAllowed := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, field := range scope.MatchFields {
+		if !knownDirectoryField(field) || !p.allowed[field] {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		matchAllowed[field] = true
+	}
+	requested := q.SearchFields
+	if len(requested) == 0 {
+		requested = []string{"owner", "name"}
+	}
+	for _, field := range requested {
+		if !matchAllowed[field] {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.match = append(p.match, field)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(p.match)
+	p.candidates = make(map[string]bool, len(scope.CandidateIDs))
+	p.owners = make(map[string]bool, len(scope.CandidateOwners))
+	for _, id := range scope.CandidateIDs {
+		if id == "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.candidates[id] = true
+	}
+	for _, owner := range scope.CandidateOwners {
+		if owner == "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.owners[owner] = true
+	}
+	p.all = scope.AllCandidates
+	if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers {
+		p.all = true
+	}
+	visible := make([]directoryVisibleRow, 0)
+	if loadRows {
+		rows, err := h.caps.st.ListDirectoryAccountRows()
+		if err != nil {
+			return p, err
+		}
+		for _, row := range rows {
+			if !directoryRowAllowed(row, p) {
+				continue
+			}
+			p.rows = append(p.rows, row)
+			item := directoryVisibleRow{UserID: row.UserID, Owner: row.Owner, Enabled: row.Enabled}
+			if p.allowed["name"] {
+				item.Name = row.Name
+			}
+			if p.allowed["staffNo"] {
+				item.StaffNo = row.StaffNo
+			}
+			visible = append(visible, item)
+		}
+	}
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(p.candidates))
+	for id := range p.candidates {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(ids)
+	owners := make([]string, 0, len(p.owners))
+	for owner := range p.owners {
+		owners = append(owners, owner)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(owners)
+	allowed := make([]string, 0, len(p.allowed))
+	for field := range p.allowed {
+		allowed = append(allowed, field)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(allowed)
+	fingerprint := struct {
+		Actor, Plugin, Purpose, Project, Document, Mode, Query, Status, Scope string
+		Match, Allowed, IDs, Owners                                           []string
+		Visible                                                               []directoryVisibleRow
+		All                                                                   bool
+	}{Actor: h.actor, Plugin: h.pluginID, Purpose: q.Purpose, Project: q.ProjectID, Document: q.DocumentID,
+		Mode: q.Mode, Query: strings.TrimSpace(q.Query), Status: p.status,
+		Scope: scope.ScopeVersion, Match: p.match, Allowed: allowed, IDs: ids, Owners: owners, Visible: visible, All: p.all}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(fingerprint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return p, err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(encoded)
+	p.version = hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+	return p, nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) encodeCursor(c directoryCursor) (string, error) {
+	c.KeyVersion = s.keyVersion
+	data, err := json.Marshal(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-directory-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data) + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)), nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) decodeCursor(token, version string) (directoryCursor, error) {
+	var c directoryCursor
+	payload, signature, found := strings.Cut(token, ".")
+	if !found {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil || len(data) > 1024 {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	provided, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(signature)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-directory-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	if !hmac.Equal(provided, mac.Sum(nil)) || json.Unmarshal(data, &c) != nil || c.KeyVersion != s.keyVersion || c.Version != version || c.Owner == "" || c.UserID == "" {
+		return directoryCursor{}, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+func directoryEntry(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, p directoryPolicy) extension.AccountDirectoryEntry {
+	entry := extension.AccountDirectoryEntry{UserID: row.UserID, Owner: row.Owner, Valid: row.Enabled}
+	if p.allowed["name"] {
+		entry.Name = row.Name
+	}
+	if p.allowed["staffNo"] {
+		entry.StaffNo = row.StaffNo
+	}
+	return entry
+}
+
+func directoryMatches(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, fields []string, mode, query string) bool {
+	for _, field := range fields {
+		value := row.Owner
+		switch field {
+		case "name":
+			value = row.Name
+		case "staffNo":
+			value = row.StaffNo
+		}
+		if mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeExact && strings.EqualFold(value, query) {
+			return true
+		}
+		if mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(value), strings.ToLower(query)) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func directoryRowAllowed(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, p directoryPolicy) bool {
+	if !p.all && !p.candidates[row.UserID] && !p.owners[row.Owner] {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.status == "all" || (p.status == "enabled" && row.Enabled) || (p.status == "disabled" && !row.Enabled)
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) QueryAccountDirectory(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery) (extension.AccountDirectoryPage, error) {
+	query := strings.TrimSpace(q.Query)
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, query != "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+	}
+	maxLimit := 50
+	if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers {
+		maxLimit = 100
+	}
+	if q.Limit == 0 {
+		q.Limit = 20
+	}
+	if q.Limit < 1 || q.Limit > maxLimit {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	page := extension.AccountDirectoryPage{Entries: []extension.AccountDirectoryEntry{}, DirectoryVersion: p.version}
+	if query == "" {
+		if q.Cursor != "" {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrConflict
+		}
+		return page, nil
+	}
+	if q.Mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy && utf8.RuneCountInString(query) < 2 {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	var after directoryCursor
+	if q.Cursor != "" {
+		after, err = h.caps.directory.decodeCursor(q.Cursor, p.version)
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	matched := make([]store.DirectoryAccountRow, 0, q.Limit+1)
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if !directoryMatches(row, p.match, q.Mode, query) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if after.Owner != "" && (row.Owner < after.Owner || (row.Owner == after.Owner && row.UserID <= after.UserID)) {
+			continue
+		}
+		matched = append(matched, row)
+		if len(matched) > q.Limit {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	more := len(matched) > q.Limit
+	if more {
+		matched = matched[:q.Limit]
+	}
+	for _, row := range matched {
+		page.Entries = append(page.Entries, directoryEntry(row, p))
+	}
+	if more {
+		last := matched[len(matched)-1]
+		page.NextCursor, err = h.caps.directory.encodeCursor(directoryCursor{Version: p.version, Owner: last.Owner, UserID: last.UserID})
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	return page, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) LookupAccountDirectory(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, userID string) (extension.AccountDirectoryLookup, error) {
+	if userID == "" || q.Cursor != "" {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, err
+	}
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if row.UserID == userID {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{Entry: directoryEntry(row, p), DirectoryVersion: p.version}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrNotFound
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, owner string) (extension.AccountDirectoryLookup, error) {
+	if owner == "" || q.Cursor != "" {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, err
+	}
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if row.Owner == owner {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{Entry: directoryEntry(row, p), DirectoryVersion: p.version}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrNotFound
+}
+
+var _ extension.AccountDirectoryProvider = inprocHost{}

internal/app/account_directory_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func openDirectoryTestStore(t *testing.T) *store.Store {
+	t.Helper()
+	dsn := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "directory.db"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+		return st
+	}
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	schema := "t_" + strings.ToLower(store.NewID("dir"))
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE SCHEMA ` + schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_, _ = admin.Exec(`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ` + schema + ` CASCADE`)
+		_ = admin.Close()
+	})
+	separator := "?"
+	if strings.Contains(dsn, "?") {
+		separator = "&"
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(dsn+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	return st
+}
+
+func TestAccountDirectoryAppliesDomainScopeBeforeSearchAndCursor(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	t.Logf("directory provider dialect=%s", st.Dialect())
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	alice, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "alice", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-a"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "bob", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-b"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outsider, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "outsider", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-x"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, pluginID: "rdm", actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+	query := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+		Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers, ProjectID: "project-1",
+		Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy, Query: "同名", Limit: 1}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("domain directory ran without trusted resolver")
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: h.caps}).RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(func(context.Context, extension.AccountDirectoryScopeRequest) (extension.AccountDirectoryScope, error) {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryScope{AllowedFields: []string{"owner", "name"}, MatchFields: []string{"owner", "name"},
+			CandidateIDs: []string{alice.ID, bob.ID}, ScopeVersion: "scope-1"}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].UserID != alice.ID || page.Entries[0].StaffNo != "" || page.NextCursor == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("first scoped page: %+v %v", page, err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = page.NextCursor
+	otherSlot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	otherSlot.pluginID, otherSlot.resolver = slot.pluginID, slot.resolver
+	otherHost := h
+	otherHost.caps.directory = otherSlot
+	second, err := otherHost.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil || len(second.Entries) != 1 || second.Entries[0].UserID != bob.ID || second.NextCursor != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("second scoped page on another host: %+v %v", second, err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = ""
+	query.Query = "hidden-x"
+	if found, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil || len(found.Entries) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("hidden staff number matched: %+v %v", found, err)
+	}
+	query.SearchFields = []string{"staffNo"}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("hidden staff number accepted as search field")
+	}
+	query.SearchFields = nil
+	query.Query = "同名"
+	if hit, err := h.LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(context.Background(), query, "alice"); err != nil || hit.Entry.UserID != alice.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit owner lookup failed to resolve stable ID: %+v %v", hit, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(context.Background(), query, "outsider"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("owner lookup leaked outsider: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.LookupAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query, "not-in-scope"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("exact lookup leaked outsider: %v", err)
+	}
+	page, err = h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion, map[string]string{"phone": "private-edit"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = page.NextCursor
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("private edit invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion+1, map[string]string{"staffNo": "still-hidden"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unavailable field invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", outsider.ID, outsider.ProfileVersion, map[string]string{"name": "out-of-scope-change"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("out-of-scope edit invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion+2, map[string]string{"name": "changed"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("visible edit did not invalidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPGDirectoryCursorContinuesInAnotherProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if baseDSN == "" {
+		t.Skip("isolated PostgreSQL test DSN required")
+	}
+	if os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CHILD") == "1" {
+		schema := os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_SCHEMA")
+		separator := "?"
+		if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+			separator = "&"
+		}
+		st, err := store.OpenExistingPostgres(baseDSN+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer st.Close()
+		slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+		q := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+			Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers, Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy,
+			Query: "same", Limit: 1, Cursor: os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CURSOR")}
+		page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), q)
+		if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].Owner != "beta" {
+			t.Fatalf("cross-process page: %+v %v", page, err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-directory-cross-process", "pg"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "Admin", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alpha", "beta"} {
+		if _, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", owner, store.AccountProfile{Name: "same"}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+	q := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+		Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers, Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy,
+		Query: "same", Limit: 1}
+	page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), q)
+	if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].Owner != "alpha" || page.NextCursor == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("initial page: %+v %v", page, err)
+	}
+	var schema string
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestPGDirectoryCursorContinuesInAnotherProcess$")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CHILD=1", "IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_SCHEMA="+schema,
+		"IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CURSOR="+page.NextCursor)
+	if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("cross-process cursor failed: %v: %s", err, strings.ReplaceAll(string(out), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_guard.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// accountEffectiveAuthorization is shared by runmgr and in-process Host
+// capabilities. The implicit local singleton is the only auth-off missing-row
+// exception; an existing disabled local account remains denied.
+func accountEffectiveAuthorization(st *store.Store, authOn bool) func(context.Context, string) (bool, error) {
+	return func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) && !authOn && owner == store.OwnerDefault {
+			return true, nil
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return false, err
+		}
+		return account.Enabled, nil
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestInprocHostRechecksEffectiveAccountOnEveryCapability(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/host.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	check := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, accountGuard: func(owner string) error {
+		valid, err := check(context.Background(), owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	if err := h.KVPut("before", "allowed"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner=?`, "alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := h.KVPut("after", "denied"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host wrote KV: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.KVGet("before"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host read KV: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.TaskCreate("test", "denied", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host created task: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.ProjectNameAvailable("denied", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host used project capability: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := h.Audit("action", "target", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host wrote audit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.Complete(context.Background(), "denied"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host reached model completion: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "", "denied", 1); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host read knowledge: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHostCompletionChecksAgainAfterModelSettingsRead(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/host-complete.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	requests := 0
+	model := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		requests++
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"late"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer model.Close()
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	set.SetSystemOverride(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "test", "baseUrl": model.URL}}})
+	checks := 0
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, set: set, accountGuard: func(string) error {
+		checks++
+		if checks >= 3 {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	if _, err := h.Complete(context.Background(), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("completion after disable: %v", err)
+	}
+	if checks != 3 || requests != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("late completion reached model: checks=%d requests=%d", checks, requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestImplicitLocalAccountExceptionIsAuthOffOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/local.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	allowed, err := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, false)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || !allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("implicit local denied: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+	allowed, err = accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) || allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("auth-on missing account allowed: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureUser(store.OwnerDefault, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner=?`, store.OwnerDefault); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	allowed, err = accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, false)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled existing local account allowed: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_lister_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-19 消费测试：inprocHost.ListAccounts——最小目录（owner/valid）、游标分页、
+// limit 钳制（1-200，缺省 50）。数据来自 users 表（真实 store，非桩）。
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestInprocHostListAccounts(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(dir + "/test.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	for _, o := range []string{"carol", "alice", "bob", "dave"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(o, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if _, err := st.CreateAPIKey(o, "e2e"); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET is_admin=TRUE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice"}
+	if _, _, err := (inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}}).ListAccounts("", 2); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("legacy directory allowed a host without a trusted dispatch actor")
+	}
+
+	// 首页（limit=2）：alice/bob，next=bob。
+	page, next, err := h.ListAccounts("", 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(page) != 2 || page[0].Owner != "alice" || page[1].Owner != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("首页不符: %+v", page)
+	}
+	for _, e := range page {
+		if !e.Valid {
+			t.Fatalf("现有账号应 valid: %+v", e)
+		}
+	}
+	if next != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("next 应为 bob, got %q", next)
+	}
+	// 次页：carol/dave，next=""（末页）。
+	page2, next2, _ := h.ListAccounts(next, 2)
+	if len(page2) != 2 || page2[0].Owner != "carol" || page2[1].Owner != "dave" || next2 != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("次页不符: %+v next=%q", page2, next2)
+	}
+	// limit 钳制：0 → 50 缺省；超 200 → 200（不炸）。
+	if p, _, _ := h.ListAccounts("", 0); len(p) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("limit=0 应取缺省（4 账号全量）, got %d", len(p))
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.ListAccounts("", 999); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("limit 超限应钳制不报错: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.ListAccounts("", 2); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("disabled administrator retained legacy directory access")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInprocHostSearchAccounts：EXT-19 扩展 SearchAccounts——账号/姓名子串
+// 检索、大小写不敏感、空 query 首页、limit 钳制（P3，2026-10-13）。
+func TestInprocHostSearchAccounts(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(dir + "/test.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("init-pass-01")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "王小明", hash, true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("bob", "李大明", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("carol", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice"}
+	if _, err := (inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}).SearchAccounts("alice", 50); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ordinary actor gained legacy system directory search")
+	}
+
+	// 姓名子串（同名区分场景）：两个"大明/小明"都以"明"命中。
+	got, err := h.SearchAccounts("明", 50)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0].Owner != "alice" || got[1].Owner != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("姓名子串命中不符: %+v", got)
+	}
+	if got[0].Name != "王小明" {
+		t.Fatalf("目录行应携带姓名: %+v", got[0])
+	}
+	// 账号子串、大小写不敏感。
+	got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("AL", 50)
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Owner != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("账号子串应命中 alice: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// 未命中。
+	if got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("不存在", 50); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("未命中应为空: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// 空 query＝首页候选（owner 升序）；姓名为空的账号 Name 为空串。
+	if got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("", 2); len(got) != 2 || got[0].Owner != "alice" || got[1].Name != "李大明" {
+		t.Fatalf("空 query 首页不符: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// ListAccounts 回归：分页行同样携带姓名。
+	page, _, _ := h.ListAccounts("", 2)
+	if page[0].Name != "王小明" {
+		t.Fatalf("ListAccounts 应携带姓名: %+v", page[0])
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_ops_existing_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestAccountMaintenanceDefaultsToNonCreatingOpen(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		run  func(string) error
+	}{
+		{"user", func(dir string) error {
+			_, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "ada", "Ada", "", false, false, false)
+			return err
+		}},
+		{"apikey", func(dir string) error {
+			_, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "ada", "test")
+			return err
+		}},
+		{"identity verify", func(dir string) error {
+			_, err := VerifySystemIdentity("", dir, "fixture", "sqlite")
+			return err
+		}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")
+			if err := tc.run(dir); err == nil {
+				t.Error("maintenance created a missing database")
+			}
+			if _, err := os.Stat(dir); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+				t.Error("failed maintenance created a directory")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+func TestAccountMaintenanceCannotImplicitlyMigrate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("test", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Roll back the newest additive migration in this private fixture only.
+	if err := st.MigrateDown(store.SchemaTarget() - 1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	if _, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "ada", "Ada", "", false, false, false); err == nil {
+		t.Error("account command implicitly migrated an older schema")
+	}
+}

internal/app/app.go

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ import (
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/tools"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/workflow"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
 	core "agent-system-core"
 )
 
@@ -199,6 +200,21 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("open store: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
+	// U1 I3：svc 注入的服务实例身份（manifest.instance_id）与库内 marker 对齐；
+	// 未设置则跳过（兼容未接线旧调用方）。与 --instance（runs 进程标识）无关。
+	if sysID := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID")); sysID != "" {
+		dbref := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DBREF"))
+		if dbref == "" {
+			if opt.StorageDSN != "" {
+				dbref = "pg"
+			} else {
+				dbref = "sqlite"
+			}
+		}
+		if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(sysID, dbref); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("system identity: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
 	pool := st.Pool()
 	if versions, verr := st.MigrationStatus(); verr == nil {
 		log.Printf("storage tier: %s (dialect=%s pool=%d/%d idleSec=%d lifetimeSec=%d schema=v%d)",
@@ -280,7 +296,12 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		if owner == "" {
 			owner = store.OwnerDefault
 		}
-		return st.ActiveSecret(owner, service)
+		if v, ok := st.ActiveSecret(owner, service); ok {
+			return v, true
+		}
+		// P2 受管：密钥统一迁入 secrets 表后，系统层受管密钥挂在系统行
+		//（owner=settings.OwnerSystemRow）；租户未单独配置时回退系统密钥。
+		return st.ActiveSecret(settings.OwnerSystemRow, service)
 	}
 	rag.SecretLookup = func(service, fallback string) string {
 		return runtime.LookupSecret(store.OwnerDefault, service, fallback)
@@ -417,7 +438,10 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("default profile: %w", err)
 	}
 	if opt.ForceMock {
-		if err := setSvc.MergeUser(store.OwnerDefault, map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}}); err != nil {
+		// runtime.* 自 #188 起为系统受管项：启动选项属受信操作员输入，
+		// 播种走系统层（对所有租户生效）；用户层写入会被受管拦截拒绝，
+		// 导致 serve --mock 直接启动失败（multi-instance 集成回归）。
+		if err := setSvc.MergeSystem(map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}}); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
@@ -426,6 +450,9 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	subRunner := &runtime.SubLLMRunner{Prompts: promptSvc, Trace: traceFn}
 	mockRunner := &runtime.MockRunner{}
 	mgr := runmgr.New(st, b, reg, profSvc, setSvc, convRunner, subRunner, mockRunner, &runtime.MockSubagent{})
+	authOn := resolved.AuthEnabled()
+	effectiveAccount := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, authOn)
+	mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(effectiveAccount, !authOn)
 	instanceID := opt.InstanceID
 	if instanceID == "" {
 		host, err := os.Hostname()
@@ -471,6 +498,9 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 			logger.Error("plugin load failed", perr, "plugin", id, "code", string(errcode.SysUnavailable))
 		}
 	}
+	// P2 受管：插件声明里带 scope=system 的设置项同样纳入受管路径
+	//（user/project 写入拒绝、生效链剥除）。
+	setSvc.SetExtraSchema(pluginHost.SettingsSchema())
 
 	// 检索管线（4.12）：分块+全文+（配置时）向量混合与 rerank；未配置自动退化为全文。
 	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, setSvc, nil, nil)
@@ -497,13 +527,25 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	// fs 预留能力沙箱根：<DataDir>/workspaces/<owner>/<conversationID>/。
 	mgr.SetWorkspaceRoot(filepath.Join(opt.DataDir, "workspaces"))
 	// 中断子代理续跑（N2 WP5）：依赖转录目录（workspaceRoot）与派生请求。
-	mgr.ResumeInterruptedChildren()
+	mgr.ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked(context.Background(), func(ctx context.Context, owner string) error {
+		valid, err := effectiveAccount(ctx, owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
 
 	// 收件箱任务卡：事件走会话事件管道（持久化/seq/重放）；关闭即 T0 基线。
 	cardSvc := cardsvc.New(st, mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	cardSvc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	cardSvc.SetProjectSharedEmitter(mgr.EmitProjectSharedCardEvent)
 	surfaceSvc := surfacesvc.New(st, mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	surfaceSvc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
 	go func() { // 启动恢复：重发「快照已落盘、事件未发出」的待恢复投影（KTD）。
-		if n, err := surfaceSvc.RecoverPendingEvents(context.Background()); err == nil && n > 0 {
+		if n, err := surfaceSvc.RecoverPendingEventsAccountChecked(context.Background(), !authOn); err == nil && n > 0 {
 			log.Printf("surface: recovered %d pending events", n)
 		}
 	}()
@@ -526,6 +568,17 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 
 	// 命令总线（提案 T3/D27/D30）：四入口同源分发 + 审计 + 危险内联确认卡。
 	bus := cmdbus.New(st, cardSvc, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+	bus.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(ctx context.Context, actor string) error {
+		valid, err := effectiveAccount(ctx, actor)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	bus.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(!authOn)
 	// U5：页面动作分发口——surfacesvc.SubmitAction 经命令总线四入口同源分发
 	//（审计信封、参数校验、DangerHigh 内联确认卡全复用；Confirmed 不透传）。
 	surfaceSvc.SetDispatcher(func(ctx context.Context, d surfacesvc.ActionDispatch) (surfacesvc.ActionOutcome, error) {
@@ -535,7 +588,11 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		if resp.Receipt.State != "" {
 			state = string(resp.Receipt.State)
 		}
-		return surfacesvc.ActionOutcome{State: state, CardID: resp.Card.ID, Receipt: resp.Receipt, Payload: resp.Payload}, nil
+		cardID := ""
+		if resp.Card != nil {
+			cardID = string(resp.Card.ID)
+		}
+		return surfacesvc.ActionOutcome{State: state, CardID: cardID, Receipt: resp.Receipt, Payload: resp.Payload}, nil
 	})
 	// U3：generative-ui 工具注入闸——activation 台账关闭时命令不投影给该 owner
 	// 的模型（禁用即不注入能力；执行端守卫仍在 surfacesvc）。
@@ -564,7 +621,22 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	pluginHost.OnCommands = bus.RegisterPluginCommands
 	// hostcaps：hostapi 闭包与进程内插件句柄共用的 owner 作用域能力（EXT-1 批注 1）。
 	authzSlot := &projectAuthz{}
-	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: setSvc, authz: authzSlot, surfaces: surfaceSvc}
+	projectSlot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	directorySlot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	caps := hostcaps{projects: projectSlot, directory: directorySlot, st: st, pipe: pipe, set: setSvc, authz: authzSlot, surfaces: surfaceSvc, allowImplicitLocal: !authOn,
+		accountGuard: func(owner string) error {
+			valid, err := effectiveAccount(context.Background(), owner)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if !valid {
+				return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+			}
+			return nil
+		}}
 	// EXT-13：回合内检索（knowledge_search / @knowledge 注入）与 HTTP/Host 检索面
 	// 同一适配器授权；槽为共享指针，扩展在 applyCompiled 期间注册后即生效。
 	mgr.SetSharedKnowledgeAllow(func(owner string, projectID core.ID) bool {
@@ -577,6 +649,16 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	// EXT-11：公开受限 Host 工厂（下游恢复路径经 extension.NewScopedHost 重建句柄）。
 	wireScopedHostFactory(caps)
 	compiledSummary := applyCompiled(skillsRoot, bus, caps)
+	mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(projectSlot.work())
+	mgr.SetKnowledgeProjectScope(func(ctx context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+		return projectSlot.resolve(ctx, caps, actor, id)
+	})
+	if authzSlot.hasV2() {
+		mgr.SetKnowledgeResourceAllow(func(actor string, d core.KnowledgeDoc) bool {
+			ok, err := authzSlot.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: actor, Action: "model-context", ResourceType: "knowledge", ResourceID: d.ID, Owner: d.Owner, ProjectID: d.ProjectID, Source: d.Source})
+			return err == nil && ok
+		})
+	}
 	mgr.OnUsage = func(owner string, tokens int) {
 		budget := int(setSvc.Effective(owner, "").GetNumber("llm.dailyTokenBudget", 0))
 		status, aerr := st.AccountTokens(owner, tokens, budget)
@@ -590,6 +672,9 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		}
 	}
 	hostSrv.Dispatch = func(ctx context.Context, pluginID, owner, commandID string, params map[string]any) error {
+		if err := caps.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		resp := bus.Dispatch(ctx, cmdbus.Request{ID: commandID, Params: params, Entrance: "api", Actor: pluginID, Owner: owner})
 		if resp.Receipt.State == "rejected" || resp.Receipt.State == "unknown" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("%s", resp.Receipt.Reason)
@@ -601,26 +686,21 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	}
 	// EXT-8 余项：hostapi 检索面同样吃适配器共享（本人 + 放行的他人项目知识）。
 	hostSrv.SharedSearch = func(ctx context.Context, owner, text string) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
-		own, err := caps.searchDefault(ctx, owner, text)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		shared, err := st.SearchKnowledgeShared(owner, core.RetrievalQuery{Text: text, TopK: 5}, func(docOwner, projectID core.ID) bool {
-			ok, aerr := authzSlot.Authorize(owner, projectID)
-			return aerr == nil && ok
-		})
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return append(own, shared...), nil
+		return caps.searchDefault(ctx, owner, text)
 	}
+
 	hostSrv.Complete = func(ctx context.Context, owner, prompt string) (string, error) {
 		return caps.complete(ctx, owner, prompt)
 	}
 
 	srv := server.New(st, mgr, reg, profSvc, setSvc, pluginHost)
+	projectSlot.wire(srv, caps)
 	// EXT-8：装载期注册的资源授权适配器注入读取入口（未注册=默认拒绝，行为不变）。
 	srv.SetProjectAuthorizer(authzSlot.Authorize)
+	// EXT-8b：资源级适配器注入读面（未注册=server 回落 V1，行为不变）。
+	if authzSlot.hasV2() {
+		srv.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(authzSlot.AuthorizeResource)
+	}
 	// EXT-9：宿主可关闭上传自动索引（发布决定移交下游命令层）。
 	srv.DisableUploadIndexing = opt.DisableUploadIndexing
 	// EXT-12 最小开关：会话卡不镜像进项目公共流（cardSvc 在上方已建）。
@@ -655,7 +735,6 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return int(setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetNumber("runtime.rateLimitPerMin", 0))
 	})
 	// 认证策略（auto）：PG 档默认开启（多用户面不能裸奔）；嵌入式档默认关闭（本地单用户）。
-	authOn := resolved.AuthEnabled()
 	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, authOn)
 	if authOn {
 		log.Printf("auth: API key required (create with: agent-system apikey create --owner <name>)")
@@ -700,48 +779,105 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// CreateUserAccount CLI 建号（管理员发放制）：未给密码则生成随机 12 位并返回明文（仅此一次输出）。
-func CreateUserAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name, password string, isAdmin bool) (string, error) {
-	if password == "" {
-		password = server.RandomPassword()
+func assertLocalAccountOwner(st *store.Store, storageDSN, dataDir string) error {
+	if storageDSN == "" {
+		storageDSN = os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN")
 	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(password)
+	if storageDSN != "" {
+		var isOwner bool
+		err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_user = pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner) FROM pg_class c WHERE c.oid='users'::regclass`).Scan(&isOwner)
+		if err != nil || !isOwner {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
+		return err
 	}
-	if err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
-		return st.CreateAccount(owner, name, hash, isAdmin)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return "", err
+	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
+	if !ok || (os.Geteuid() != 0 && stat.Uid != uint32(os.Geteuid())) {
+		return store.ErrAccountForbidden
 	}
-	return password, nil
+	return nil
 }
 
-// ResetUserPassword CLI 重置密码：must_change=1（首登强制改密），吊销全部会话。
-func ResetUserPassword(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, password string) (string, error) {
-	if password == "" {
-		password = server.RandomPassword()
+// CreateUserAccount is the local owner-only, audited pending-account path.
+// Password-bearing creation is rejected before storage is opened.
+func CreateUserAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name, password string, isAdmin, openExisting, generatePassword bool) (string, string, error) {
+	if password != "" || generatePassword {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: local creation uses trusted activation only")
 	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(password)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
-		if err := st.SetUserPassword(owner, hash); err != nil {
+	var out store.AccountOutcome
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		st.DeleteUserSessions(owner, "")
-		return nil
-	}); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return password, nil
+		_, next, err := st.CreateLocalPendingAccountWithAudit(owner, name, isAdmin, accountInstanceID())
+		out = next
+		return err
+	})
+	return out.Plain, out.OperationID, err
+}
+
+// IssueUserLoginKey is retained only as a rejecting compatibility entry.
+func IssueUserLoginKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, purpose string, openExisting, revokeAllCreds bool, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: use owner initialization or owner-confirmed recovery")
+}
+
+// InitializeAccount resumes a specific pending account. The operator identity
+// comes from the local OS UID; the target is fixed by stable user ID and CAS.
+func InitializeAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, userID string, expectedStateVersion, expectedGeneration int64) (string, string, error) {
+	var plain, owner string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		account, err := st.GetAccount(userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		out, err := st.InitializePendingAccountWithAudit(userID, expectedStateVersion, expectedGeneration, accountInstanceID())
+		plain, owner = out.Plain, account.Owner
+		return err
+	})
+	return plain, owner, err
+}
+
+// RevokeUserLoginKey CLI 撤销未使用登录 Key。
+func RevokeUserLoginKey(storageDSN, dataDir, id string, openExisting bool) error {
+	return withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		return st.RevokeLoginKey(id)
+	})
+}
+
+// BootstrapAdmin 首位管理员引导：单事务串行（KTD12——PG 咨询锁/SQLite 插入后复查），
+// 建号、激活 Key 与审计共同提交；库内已有用户即拒绝接管。
+func BootstrapAdmin(storageDSN, dataDir, owner string, openExisting bool) (string, error) {
+	var plain string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		outc, err := st.BootstrapFirstAdminWrite(store.AccountWrite{
+			Owner: owner, Name: owner, Actor: cliActor(), InstanceID: accountInstanceID(),
+		})
+		plain = outc.Plain
+		return err
+	})
+	return plain, err
+}
+
+// ResetUserPassword CLI 重置密码：单事务写 must_change=1、bump 认证版本、
+// 作废未用登录 Key、吊销全部会话并审计。
+func ResetUserPassword(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, password string, openExisting bool) (string, error) {
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: administrators cannot set another user's password")
 }
 
 // ListUserAccounts CLI 用户列表。
-func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
+func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string, openExisting bool) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
 	var out []store.AdminUser
-	err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
 		var e error
 		out, e = st.ListUsersAdmin()
 		return e
@@ -750,13 +886,12 @@ func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
 }
 
 func withStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
+	return withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, false, fn)
+}
+
+// withIdentityStore 只打开既有库：不建文件、不建目录、不迁移。
+func withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
+	st, err := store.OpenIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -764,55 +899,119 @@ func withStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
 	return fn(st)
 }
 
-// CreateAPIKey 是 apikey 子命令的实现：在指定存储档上为 owner 创建密钥（明文仅打印一次）。
-func CreateAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (string, error) {
+func withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir string, _ bool, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
 	var st *store.Store
 	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
+	// DSN 等价安全输入（KTD14）：argv 缺省时回落环境变量——凭据不落 shell history。
+	if storageDSN == "" {
+		storageDSN = os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN")
 	}
+	// Account maintenance never initializes or migrates storage; the retained
+	// CLI compatibility flag cannot opt this operation into service initialization.
+	if storageDSN != "" {
+		st, err = store.OpenExistingPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
+	} else {
+		st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
+	}
+
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
+		return err
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
-	return st.CreateAPIKey(owner, name)
+	if id := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID")); id != "" {
+		dbref := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DBREF"))
+		if dbref == "" {
+			if storageDSN != "" {
+				dbref = "pg"
+			} else {
+				dbref = "sqlite"
+			}
+		}
+		if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(id, dbref); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return fn(st)
+}
+
+// CreateAPIKey 是 apikey 子命令的实现：在指定存储档上为 owner 创建密钥（明文仅打印一次）。
+func CreateAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (string, error) {
+	var plain string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !account.Enabled || account.InitializationState == store.InitializationPending {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p, e := st.CreateAPIKey(owner, name)
+		plain = p
+		return e
+	})
+	return plain, err
 }
 
 // ListAPIKeys 列出租户密钥（摘要视图）。
 func ListAPIKeys(storageDSN, dataDir, owner string) ([]store.APIKeyInfo, error) {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	defer st.Close()
-	if _, err := st.GetUser(owner); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("owner %q 不存在（先 apikey create 创建）", owner)
-	}
-	return st.ListAPIKeys(owner)
+	var out []store.APIKeyInfo
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if _, err := st.GetUser(owner); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("owner %q 不存在（先建立账号）", owner)
+		}
+		var e error
+		out, e = st.ListAPIKeys(owner)
+		return e
+	})
+	return out, err
 }
 
 // RevokeAPIKey 撤销指定名称密钥。
 func RevokeAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (bool, error) {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	defer st.Close()
-	return st.RevokeAPIKeyByName(owner, name)
+	var ok bool
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		var e error
+		ok, e = st.RevokeAPIKeyByName(owner, name)
+		return e
+	})
+	return ok, err
+}
+
+// EnsureSystemIdentity CLI：显式建立库内服务身份（svc init / I2→I3 引导）。
+// 只打开既有库，不建库、不迁移。
+func EnsureSystemIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir, instanceID, dbref string) error {
+	return withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		return st.EnsureSystemIdentity(instanceID, dbref)
+	})
+}
+
+// VerifySystemIdentity CLI：校验库内服务身份（svc start 前；失败不插入）。
+// 只打开既有库，不建库、不迁移。schemaVersion 取身份行上的值。
+func VerifySystemIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir, instanceID, dbref string) (int, error) {
+	var schemaVersion int
+	err := withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(instanceID, dbref); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		row, err := st.GetSystemIdentity()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		schemaVersion = row.SchemaVersion
+		return nil
+	})
+	return schemaVersion, err
+}
+
+func cliActor() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
+}
+
+func accountInstanceID() string {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID"))
 }
 
 // cachedInt 带短 TTL 的整型缓存读（限流值热读取免打库）。

internal/app/compiled.go

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func (r pluginRegistry) AddCommandHandler(spec json.RawMessage, h extension.Hand
 		return fmt.Errorf("extension: command spec: %w", err)
 	}
 	return r.bus.RegisterPluginCommand(s, func(ctx context.Context, req cmdbus.Request) (any, error) {
-		host := inprocHost{caps: r.caps, pluginID: r.pluginID, owner: req.Owner, actor: req.Actor}
+		host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: r.caps, pluginID: r.pluginID, owner: req.Owner, actor: req.Actor}}
 		return h(ctx, host, extension.Request{
 			ID: req.ID, Params: req.Params, Entrance: req.Entrance,
 			Actor: req.Actor, Owner: req.Owner, ConversationID: req.ConversationID,
@@ -107,10 +107,26 @@ func (r compiledRegistry) AddCommand(spec json.RawMessage) error {
 }
 
 // RegisterResourceAuthorizer 声明式扩展无宿主进程内代码，不能提供回调（fail-closed）。
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2 声明式扩展同样不能提供资源级回调（fail-closed）。
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register resource authorizers")
+}
+
 func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizer(extension.ResourceAuthorizer) error {
 	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register resource authorizers")
 }
 
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register account directory authorization")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	if r.pluginID != "rdm" || r.caps.directory == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: account directory resolver requires trusted RDM registration")
+	}
+	return r.caps.directory.register(r.pluginID, fn)
+}
+
 // RegisterResourceAuthorizer 进程内扩展（EXT-1）：填充 EXT-8 适配器槽
 // （hostcaps.authz 共享指针；首个注册者生效，组合根已装配进 Server/runmgr）。
 // 此前 pluginRegistry 未覆盖该方法——进程内插件注册适配器会命中声明式分支的
@@ -124,6 +140,15 @@ func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizer(fn extension.ResourceAuthoriz
 	return nil
 }
 
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2 进程内扩展：填充 EXT-8b 资源级适配器槽（首注册生效）。
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(fn extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) error {
+	if fn == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: " + r.pluginID + ": nil resource authorizer v2")
+	}
+	r.caps.authz.setV2(r.pluginID, fn)
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (r compiledRegistry) Note(kind, name string, payload json.RawMessage) error {
 	log.Printf("extension: note %s %s (%d bytes)", kind, name, len(payload))
 	return nil
@@ -136,6 +161,14 @@ type recordRegistry struct {
 	sum *server.CompiledPlugin
 }
 
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	registrar, ok := r.Registry.(extension.AccountDirectoryRegistrar)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: account directory registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return registrar.RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn)
+}
+
 func (r recordRegistry) AddCommand(spec json.RawMessage) error {
 	if err := r.Registry.AddCommand(spec); err != nil {
 		return err

internal/app/delegated_project_projection.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// requestBoundHost is created only for a current lifecycle or command request.
+// A reconstructed global ScopedHost is a plain inprocHost and cannot expose
+// the delegated projection method by type assertion.
+type requestBoundHost struct{ inprocHost }
+
+// ProjectProjectionForCreator only derives from a live request Host of the
+// registered RDM provider. The operator is inherited from that Host, never
+// accepted as a caller-supplied field. RDM's project.settings decision remains
+// its own domain authority; this capability fences the Backend projection.
+func (bound requestBoundHost) ProjectProjectionForCreator(creator, projectID string) (extension.ProjectHost, error) {
+	h := bound.inprocHost
+	if h.actor == "" || h.actor != h.owner || h.pluginID != "rdm" ||
+		h.caps.projects == nil || h.caps.st == nil || creator == "" || projectID == "" {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	slot := h.caps.projects
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	registered := slot.provider != nil && slot.holder == h.pluginID
+	slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if !registered {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := h.caps.accountGuard(creator); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := h.caps.st.ProjectMetadata(projectID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if string(project.Owner) != creator || string(project.ID) != projectID {
+		return nil, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return delegatedProjectProjection{caps: h.caps, pluginID: h.pluginID,
+		actor: h.actor, creator: creator, projectID: projectID}, nil
+}
+
+// delegatedProjectProjection exposes only ProjectHost, and every method is
+// confined to the bound project. It cannot be cast to the broader Host.
+type delegatedProjectProjection struct {
+	caps      hostcaps
+	pluginID  string
+	actor     string
+	creator   string
+	projectID string
+}
+
+var _ extension.ProjectHost = delegatedProjectProjection{}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) Owner() string { return p.creator }
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) check() error {
+	if p.caps.accountGuard == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := p.caps.accountGuard(p.actor); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return p.caps.accountGuard(p.creator)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) target(id string) error {
+	if id == "" || id != p.projectID {
+		return store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) OwnedProjects() ([]core.Project, error) {
+	return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) OwnedProject(string) (core.Project, error) {
+	return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) EnsureProject(string, string) (core.Project, error) {
+	return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) ProjectMetadata(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := p.target(id); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	view := inprocHost{caps: p.caps, pluginID: p.pluginID, owner: p.creator, actor: p.actor}
+	return view.ProjectMetadata(id)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID string) (bool, error) {
+	if err := p.target(exceptID); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return p.caps.st.ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) RenameOwnedProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := p.target(id); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	return p.caps.st.RenameOwnedProjectAccountChecked(p.actor, p.creator, p.projectID, name, p.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}

internal/app/delegated_project_projection_entry_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestDelegatedProjectionIsBoundAtHTTPAndCommandEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/entries.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	httpProject, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "HTTP original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	commandProject, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Command original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !state.Enabled {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	projectFromRequest := func(h extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+		bound, ok := h.(extension.DelegatedProjectProjectionHost)
+		if !ok {
+			return core.Project{}, errors.New("request Host lost operator-bound projection")
+		}
+		projection, err := bound.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", id)
+		if err != nil {
+			return core.Project{}, err
+		}
+		return projection.RenameOwnedProject(id, name)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, set: settings.NewService(st), projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.Rename = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+		return projectFromRequest(h, id, name)
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	srv := server.New(st, nil, nil, nil, caps.set, nil)
+	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, true)
+	slot.wire(srv, caps)
+	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "delegate-entry")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/api/projects/"+string(httpProject.ID), strings.NewReader(`{"name":"via HTTP"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("HTTP lifecycle rename: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, nil)
+	bus.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, owner string) error { return check(owner) })
+	bus.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(false)
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps, compiledRegistry: compiledRegistry{bus: bus}}
+	err = reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"rdm.fixture.rename","title":"Rename"}`),
+		func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+			id, _ := req.Params["id"].(string)
+			name, _ := req.Params["name"].(string)
+			return projectFromRequest(h, id, name)
+		})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	result := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "rdm.fixture.rename", Owner: "bob", Actor: "bob",
+		Params: map[string]any{"id": string(commandProject.ID), "name": "via command"}})
+	if result.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("command rename: %+v", result.Receipt)
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ id, want string }{{string(httpProject.ID), "via HTTP"}, {string(commandProject.ID), "via command"}} {
+		project, err := st.ProjectMetadata(tc.id)
+		if err != nil || project.Name != tc.want {
+			t.Fatalf("entry %s did not reach bound projection: %+v %v", tc.id, project, err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/app/delegated_project_projection_pg_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// Two processes share one isolated PostgreSQL schema. The child has already
+// accepted a stale early account read when the parent commits disable; only
+// the final Backend transaction can stop the physical rename.
+func TestPGDelegatedProjectionDisableAcrossProcesses(t *testing.T) {
+	baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if baseDSN == "" {
+		t.Skip("isolated PostgreSQL DSN required")
+	}
+	separator := "?"
+	if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+		separator = "&"
+	}
+	if os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_CHILD") == "1" {
+		dsn := baseDSN + separator + "search_path=" + os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_SCHEMA") + ",public"
+		st, err := store.OpenExistingPostgres(dsn, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer st.Close()
+		var bobChecks atomic.Int32
+		check := func(owner string) error {
+			state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if !state.Enabled {
+				return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+			}
+			if owner == "bob" && bobChecks.Add(1) == 2 {
+				if err := os.WriteFile(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_READY"), []byte("ready"), 0o600); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+				for {
+					if _, err := os.Stat(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_RELEASE")); err == nil {
+						break
+					}
+					if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+						return errors.New("parent did not release paused child")
+					}
+					time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+				}
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+		caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+		if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+		projection, err := host.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT"), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("late physical rename was not fenced: %v", err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-delegate-two-process", "pg"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "before")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var schema string
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	barrier := t.TempDir()
+	ready, release := filepath.Join(barrier, "ready"), filepath.Join(barrier, "release")
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestPGDelegatedProjectionDisableAcrossProcesses$")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_CHILD=1", "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_SCHEMA="+schema,
+		"IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT="+string(project.ID), "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_READY="+ready, "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_RELEASE="+release)
+	var output bytes.Buffer
+	cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &output, &output
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(ready); err == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+			t.Fatalf("child did not reach stale early check: %s", strings.ReplaceAll(output.String(), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(release, []byte("release"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("child failed: %v: %s", err, strings.ReplaceAll(output.String(), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "before" {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled operator's project rename persisted: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/ext9_publish_test.go

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ func newExt9Host(t *testing.T) (interface {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	set := settings.NewService(st)
 	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, set, nil, nil)
 	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: set}, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice"}

internal/app/hostcaps.go

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/ingest"
@@ -19,18 +21,24 @@ import (
 // 同一实现同时服务 hostapi.Server 的 Search/Complete 闭包与进程内
 // inprocHost（EXT-1 批注 1：复用现有 owner 作用域函数，不新造句柄）。
 type hostcaps struct {
-	st       *store.Store
-	pipe     *rag.Pipeline
-	set      *settings.Service
-	authz    *projectAuthz       // EXT-8 适配器槽（共享指针；首个注册者生效）
-	surfaces *surfacesvc.Service // EXT-17 Surface 能力槽（nil = 未装配，明确拒绝）
+	projects           *projectLifecycleSlot
+	directory          *accountDirectorySlot
+	accountGuard       func(string) error
+	allowImplicitLocal bool
+	st                 *store.Store
+	pipe               *rag.Pipeline
+	set                *settings.Service
+	authz              *projectAuthz       // EXT-8 适配器槽（共享指针；首个注册者生效）
+	surfaces           *surfacesvc.Service // EXT-17 Surface 能力槽（nil = 未装配，明确拒绝）
 }
 
 // projectAuthz EXT-8 资源授权适配器槽：进程内扩展注册，组合根装配进 Server。
 type projectAuthz struct {
-	mu     sync.Mutex
-	holder string // 持有者 pluginID（首个注册者生效）
-	fn     extension.ResourceAuthorizer
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	holder  string // 持有者 pluginID（首个注册者生效）
+	fn      extension.ResourceAuthorizer
+	holder2 string // EXT-8b 资源级持有者（首个注册者生效）
+	fn2     extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2
 }
 
 func (a *projectAuthz) set(pluginID string, fn extension.ResourceAuthorizer) {
@@ -42,7 +50,41 @@ func (a *projectAuthz) set(pluginID string, fn extension.ResourceAuthorizer) {
 	a.holder, a.fn = pluginID, fn
 }
 
+func (a *projectAuthz) setV2(pluginID string, fn extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	if a.fn2 != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	a.holder2, a.fn2 = pluginID, fn
+}
+
+// AuthorizeResource EXT-8b 资源级判定（U9）：V2 注册时按查询六要素咨询（含
+// owner 自有命中与共享读取，fail-closed）；未注册回落 V1 的 owner×project
+// 布尔（兼容现行行为）。查询字段由执行端受信构造。
+func (a *projectAuthz) AuthorizeResource(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	fn2, fn1 := a.fn2, a.fn
+	a.mu.Unlock()
+	if fn2 != nil {
+		if q.Actor == "" || q.Action == "" || q.ResourceType == "" || q.ResourceID == "" {
+			return false, nil // 受信上下文字段缺失＝不可判定＝拒绝
+		}
+		return fn2(q)
+	}
+	if fn1 == nil || q.Owner == "" || q.ProjectID == "" {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return fn1(q.Actor, q.ProjectID)
+}
+
 // Authorize owner×project 共享读取判定；未注册一律 false（默认拒绝）。
+func (a *projectAuthz) hasV2() bool {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	return a.fn2 != nil
+}
+
 func (a *projectAuthz) Authorize(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	fn := a.fn
@@ -70,7 +112,25 @@ type sharedRetriever interface {
 }
 
 func (c hostcaps) search(ctx context.Context, owner string, projectID core.ID, text string, topK int) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
 	q := core.RetrievalQuery{ProjectID: projectID, Text: text, TopK: topK}
+	if c.projects != nil && projectID != "" {
+		id, err := c.projects.resolve(ctx, c, owner, projectID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		q.ProjectID = id
+	}
+	if c.authz != nil && c.authz.hasV2() {
+		return c.pipe.RetrieveAuthorized(ctx, core.ID(owner), q, func(d core.KnowledgeDoc) bool {
+			ok, err := c.authz.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: owner, Action: "search", ResourceType: "knowledge", ResourceID: d.ID, Owner: d.Owner, ProjectID: d.ProjectID, Source: d.Source})
+			return err == nil && ok
+		})
+	}
 	// EXT-13：进程内 Host 检索面与回合内检索同一授权口径——适配器已注册时走
 	// 共享通道（本人两路如常 + 放行的他人项目知识，与 HTTP 检索面一致）。
 	if c.authz != nil {
@@ -91,10 +151,23 @@ func (c hostcaps) searchDefault(ctx context.Context, owner, text string) ([]core
 
 // complete 经基座 LLM 路由补全（owner 的模型配置生效；未配置报错）。
 func (c hostcaps) complete(ctx context.Context, owner, prompt string) (string, error) {
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
 	route := runtime.ResolveChatModel(core.AgentProfile{}, c.set.Effective(owner, ""))
 	if route.Model == "" || route.Base == "" {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("llm route not configured")
 	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
 	return completeChat(ctx, route.Base, route.Key, route.Model, prompt)
 }
 
@@ -124,6 +197,13 @@ type inprocHost struct {
 	actor    string // EXT-18：分发主体（空＝非 dispatch 上下文）
 }
 
+func (h inprocHost) requireEffective() error {
+	if h.caps.accountGuard != nil {
+		return h.caps.accountGuard(h.owner)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (h inprocHost) PluginID() string { return h.pluginID }
 func (h inprocHost) Owner() string    { return h.owner }
 
@@ -138,36 +218,152 @@ func (h inprocHost) IsAdmin() bool {
 	if err != nil {
 		return false
 	}
-	return state.IsAdmin
+	return state.Enabled && state.IsAdmin
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() bool {
+	if h.requireEffective() != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if h.actor == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	state, err := h.caps.st.GetUserAuthState(h.actor)
+	return err == nil && state.Enabled && state.IsAdmin
+}
+
+// ListAccounts 保留 EXT-19 旧签名，仅供有受信分发主体的系统管理上下文；
+// 项目和文档候选必须走带 locator 的 AccountDirectoryProvider。
+func (h inprocHost) ListAccounts(cursor string, limit int) ([]extension.AccountEntry, string, error) {
+	if !h.legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() {
+		return nil, "", store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	users, err := h.caps.st.ListUsersAdmin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	entries := make([]extension.AccountEntry, 0, len(users))
+	for _, u := range users {
+		entries = append(entries, extension.AccountEntry{Owner: u.Owner, Name: u.Name, Valid: u.Enabled})
+	}
+	// 排序+游标（owner 升序；cursor 为上一页末 owner，空＝首页）。
+	for i := 0; i < len(entries); i++ {
+		for j := i + 1; j < len(entries); j++ {
+			if entries[j].Owner < entries[i].Owner {
+				entries[i], entries[j] = entries[j], entries[i]
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	start := 0
+	if cursor != "" {
+		for start < len(entries) && entries[start].Owner <= cursor {
+			start++
+		}
+	}
+	end := start + limit
+	if end > len(entries) {
+		end = len(entries)
+	}
+	next := ""
+	if end < len(entries) {
+		next = entries[end-1].Owner
+	}
+	return entries[start:end], next, nil
+}
+
+// SearchAccounts 实现 EXT-19 扩展 AccountSearcher（P3，2026-10-13）：账号或
+// 姓名子串检索（大小写不敏感；空 query ＝ 首页候选）。结果按 owner 升序，
+// 有效态口径与 ListAccounts 一致。
+func (h inprocHost) SearchAccounts(query string, limit int) ([]extension.AccountEntry, error) {
+	if !h.legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	users, err := h.caps.st.ListUsersAdmin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	q := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(query))
+	entries := make([]extension.AccountEntry, 0, len(users))
+	for _, u := range users {
+		if q != "" &&
+			!strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(u.Owner), q) &&
+			!strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(u.Name), q) {
+			continue
+		}
+		entries = append(entries, extension.AccountEntry{Owner: u.Owner, Name: u.Name, Valid: u.Enabled})
+	}
+	sort.Slice(entries, func(i, j int) bool { return entries[i].Owner < entries[j].Owner })
+	if len(entries) > limit {
+		entries = entries[:limit]
+	}
+	return entries, nil
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) KVPut(key, value string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.PutPluginKV(h.pluginID, h.owner, key, value)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.PutPluginKVAccountChecked(h.owner, h.pluginID, key, value, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) KVGet(key string) (string, bool, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", false, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.GetPluginKV(h.pluginID, h.owner, key)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) Audit(action, target, evidence string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.AppendAuditEvent(store.AuditEvent{
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.AppendAuditEventAccountChecked(h.owner, store.AuditEvent{
 		Owner: h.owner, Actor: "plugin:" + h.pluginID,
 		Action: action, Target: target, Evidence: evidence,
-	})
+	}, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) Complete(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (string, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
 	return h.caps.complete(ctx, h.owner, prompt)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeSearch(ctx context.Context, projectID core.ID, text string, topK int) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.search(ctx, h.owner, projectID, text, topK)
 }
 
+// knowledgeSource preserves ordinary host Source semantics. A lifecycle provider
+// introduces shared publication provenance, so plugins may only assert their own
+// namespace; another plugin cannot impersonate an RDM published row.
+func (h inprocHost) knowledgeSource(source string) error {
+	if h.caps.projects == nil || !h.caps.projects.active() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	prefix := "plugin:" + h.pluginID
+	if source == prefix || strings.HasPrefix(source, prefix+":") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("extension: knowledge source must belong to plugin %q", h.pluginID)
+}
+
 // KnowledgeWrite 强制 owner 归属：Owner 改写为本次分发 owner，Source 为空补
 // "plugin:<id>"；embed=false 只写全文行，embed=true 走 IndexChunks 建向量
 // （embedding 失败降级纯全文，不阻断写入）。
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeWrite(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, embed bool) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if len(docs) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -177,54 +373,61 @@ func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeWrite(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc
 		if docs[i].Source == "" {
 			docs[i].Source = src
 		}
+		if err := h.knowledgeSource(docs[i].Source); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 	}
 	if !embed {
-		return h.caps.st.AddKnowledge(docs...)
+		return h.caps.st.AddKnowledgeAccountChecked(h.owner, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal, docs...)
 	}
-	return h.caps.pipe.IndexChunks(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), docs)
+	return h.caps.pipe.IndexChunksAccountChecked(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), docs, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
-// KnowledgePublish 幂等发布（EXT-9）：按 docs 的 ref 整批替换——先清该 owner
-// 下同 ref 旧行与旧向量（跨来源也清：ref 是发布单元），再走 KnowledgeWrite
-// 语义（Owner/Source 强制同彼）。重试产生相同结果。
+// KnowledgePublish replaces refs and their vectors within the publication scope.
+// A registered lifecycle scopes replacement to the exact owner/project/plugin;
+// ordinary unregistered Hosts retain the legacy cross-source ref semantics.
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgePublish(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, embed bool) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if len(docs) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
-	refs := map[string]bool{}
 	for i := range docs {
 		docs[i].Owner = core.ID(h.owner)
 		if docs[i].Source == "" {
 			docs[i].Source = "plugin:" + h.pluginID
 		}
-		if docs[i].Ref != "" {
-			refs[docs[i].Ref] = true
-		}
-	}
-	for ref := range refs {
-		if err := h.caps.st.DeleteKnowledgeByRef(h.owner, ref); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if err := h.caps.st.DeleteKnowledgeVectors(ctx, h.owner, ref); err != nil {
+		if err := h.knowledgeSource(docs[i].Source); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
-	return h.KnowledgeWrite(ctx, docs, embed)
+	scoped := h.caps.projects != nil && h.caps.projects.active()
+	if embed {
+		return h.caps.pipe.PublishChunksAccountChecked(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), h.pluginID, scoped, docs, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.ReplaceKnowledgeAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID, scoped, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal, docs...)
 }
 
 // KnowledgeDelete 撤销本插件来源（EXT-9）：前缀强制 plugin:<自身ID>——manual
 // 或他人来源拒绝（fail-closed）；删行+向量，幂等。
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeDelete(ctx context.Context, sourcePrefix string) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if sourcePrefix != "plugin:"+h.pluginID {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ext-9: plugins may only delete their own source prefix, want %q", "plugin:"+h.pluginID)
 	}
-	_, err := h.caps.st.DeleteKnowledgeBySource(ctx, h.owner, sourcePrefix)
+	_, err := h.caps.st.DeleteKnowledgeBySourceAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, sourcePrefix, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 	return err
 }
 
 // TaskCreate/TaskUpdate 后台任务台账：基座只记进度/状态，执行体由下游自跑（H5）。
 func (h inprocHost) TaskCreate(kind, title, conversationID string) (string, error) {
-	t, err := h.caps.st.CreateBackgroundTask(h.owner, kind, title, conversationID)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	t, err := h.caps.st.CreateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(h.owner, kind, title, conversationID, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
@@ -232,27 +435,42 @@ func (h inprocHost) TaskCreate(kind, title, conversationID string) (string, erro
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) TaskUpdate(taskID, status string, progress int, errText string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.UpdateBackgroundTask(h.owner, taskID, status, progress, errText)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.UpdateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(h.owner, taskID, status, progress, errText, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 // ArtifactGet/ArtifactContent 工件只读（R1-3 ingest 读原件；写入属完整集）。
 func (h inprocHost) ArtifactGet(artifactID string) (core.Artifact, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Artifact{}, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.GetArtifact(h.owner, artifactID)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) ArtifactContent(artifactID string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.ArtifactContent(h.owner, artifactID)
 }
 
 // ParseDocument 内置文档解析（EXT-5）：委托 hostcaps.parse；纯计算不经存储，
 // owner 作用域由调用方经 ArtifactContent 取字节时保证。
 func (h inprocHost) ParseDocument(ctx context.Context, filename, mime string, content []byte) (core.ParsedDocument, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.ParsedDocument{}, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.parse(ctx, filename, mime, content)
 }
 
 // ---- EXT-17 Surface 能力（可选）：nil 槽=能力缺失，明确拒绝不降级 ----
 
 func (h inprocHost) surface() (*surfacesvc.Service, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	if h.caps.surfaces == nil {
 		return nil, surfacesvc.ErrUnavailable
 	}
@@ -264,11 +482,11 @@ func (h inprocHost) SurfaceSave(ctx context.Context, req extension.SurfaceSaveRe
 	if err != nil {
 		return core.SurfaceSnapshot{}, err
 	}
-	return svc.Submit(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID, surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{
+	return svc.SubmitAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID, surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{
 		SurfaceID: req.SurfaceID, ConversationID: req.ConversationID, SourceRunID: req.SourceRunID,
 		BaseRevision: req.BaseRevision, ObservedEpoch: req.ObservedEpoch,
 		ContextVersion: req.ContextVersion, SemanticText: req.SemanticText, Spec: req.Spec,
-	})
+	}, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) SurfaceGet(ctx context.Context, surfaceID core.ID) (core.SurfaceSnapshot, error) {

internal/app/inproc_host_test.go

@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ func TestInprocHostOwnerScope(t *testing.T) {
 	bus, st := newInprocTestApp(t, nil) // embedder nil：embed=true 仍只落全文（IndexChunks 降级路径）
 
 	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
 		resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
 			ID: "tst.record", Params: map[string]any{"ref": owner + "-ref"}, Owner: owner, Actor: "ui", Entrance: "chat",
 		})
@@ -157,6 +160,9 @@ func TestInprocHostKnowledgeWriteEmbedHash(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	})
 	bus, st := newInprocTestApp(t, func() string { return "hash" })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 
 	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
 		ID: "tst.embed", Params: map[string]any{"text": "Hash 向量内容"}, Owner: "alice", Entrance: "api",

internal/app/knowledge_authorization_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestHostKnowledgeV2AndProjectReplacement(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, settings.NewService(st), nil, nil)
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	alice := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, authz: auth}}
+	first := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "slice-1", ProjectID: "domain-1", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "sharedneedle one"}}
+	second := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "slice-2", ProjectID: "domain-2", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "sharedneedle two"}}
+	for _, ds := range [][]core.KnowledgeDoc{first, second, second} {
+		if err := alice.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), ds, false); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	own, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "sharedneedle"})
+	if err != nil || len(own) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("cross project publish replaced first: %+v %v", own, err)
+	}
+	auth.set("rdm", func(string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" || (q.ResourceType == "knowledge" && q.ResourceID == "slice-1" && q.ProjectID == "domain-1" && q.Actor == "bob" && q.Owner == "alice"), nil
+	})
+	bob := inprocHost{owner: "bob", pluginID: "rdm", caps: alice.caps}
+	hits, err := bob.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "", "sharedneedle", 5)
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("host V2=%+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHostKnowledgeResolvesTrustedProjectScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-current", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-current", Chunk: "scopeneedle current"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-other", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-other", Chunk: "scopeneedle other"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.List = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		if h.Owner() != "bob" {
+			t.Fatalf("wrong scope actor %q", h.Owner())
+		}
+		return []core.Project{{ID: "host-current", Settings: map[string]any{"rdm.projectId": "domain-current", "rdm.state": "ready"}}}, nil
+	}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: rag.NewPipeline(st, settings.NewService(st), nil, nil), authz: &projectAuthz{}, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	caps.authz.setV2("rdm", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "bob", pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "host-current", "scopeneedle", 5)
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("host scope: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegisteredProjectHostRejectsForeignKnowledgeSource(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: caps}
+	for _, publish := range []bool{false, true} {
+		docs := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "claimed-published", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:rdm:published", Ref: "ref", Chunk: "spoofneedle"}}
+		var err error
+		if publish {
+			err = h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), docs, false)
+		} else {
+			err = h.KnowledgeWrite(context.Background(), docs, false)
+		}
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("foreign namespace accepted publish=%v", publish)
+		}
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "spoofneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign source wrote data: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	// Existing ordinary Hosts preserve their documented caller-provided Source.
+	h.caps.projects = nil
+	if err := h.KnowledgeWrite(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{Source: "manual", Chunk: "ordinaryneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ordinary source semantics changed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectPublishPreservesForeignPluginAndScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	original := core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "rdm-published", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:rdm:published", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "originalneedle"}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(original); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.UpsertKnowledgeVector(context.Background(), "alice", original.ID, original.Ref, []float32{1, 0}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: caps}
+	replacement := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "other", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:other", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "replacementneedle"}}
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), replacement, false); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "originalneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign plugin deleted RDM publication: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledgeVectors(context.Background(), "alice", []float32{1, 0}, 5, core.RetrievalQuery{ProjectID: "domain"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != original.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign plugin deleted RDM vector: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	h.pluginID = "rdm"
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "unscoped", Source: "plugin:rdm", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "privateneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "originalneedle", ProjectID: "domain"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unscoped publication deleted scoped RDM data: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnregisteredPublishRetainsLegacyRefScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "legacy", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "old-project", Source: "manual", Ref: "same", Chunk: "legacyneedle"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: hostcaps{st: st}}
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "replacement", Source: "manual", Ref: "same", Chunk: "replacementneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "legacyneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered legacy scope changed: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "replacementneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered replacement missing: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/local_account_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestLocalOwnerAccountCreationAndReissuePreserveIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	seed, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := seed.EnsureSystemIdentity("test-local-owner", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	seed.Close()
+	bootstrap, err := BootstrapAdmin("", dir, "root", false)
+	if err != nil || bootstrap == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %v", err)
+	}
+	first, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "alice", "", "", false, true, false)
+	if err != nil || first == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("local pending create: %v", err)
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	second, owner, err := InitializeAccount("", dir, account.ID, account.StateVersion, account.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil || owner != "alice" || second == first {
+		t.Fatalf("owner reissue: owner=%s err=%v", owner, err)
+	}
+	st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	current, err := st.GetAccount(account.ID)
+	if err != nil || current.Owner != account.Owner || current.ID != account.ID || current.InitializationGeneration != account.InitializationGeneration+1 {
+		t.Fatalf("reissue changed account identity: %+v %v", current, err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(first); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("old activation grant survived reissue")
+	}
+	if _, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(second); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new activation grant failed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPIKeyCLIRequiresExistingInitializedAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("test-api-key-admission", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	if _, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("missing account was implicitly created: %v", err)
+	}
+	grant, err := BootstrapAdmin("", dir, "alice", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("pending account received a full API key: %v", err)
+	}
+	st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	token, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(grant)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("trusted-owner-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.CompleteSetPasswordChecked(token, hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if key, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); err != nil || key == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("initialized account could not receive its API key: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_lifecycle.go

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/projectscope"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type projectLifecycleSlot struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	holder   string
+	provider *extension.ProjectLifecycle
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project lifecycle")
+}
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(p extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	if r.caps.projects == nil || r.pluginID == "" {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle slot unavailable")
+	}
+	if p.List == nil || p.Create == nil || p.Rename == nil || p.Archive == nil || p.Work == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle requires all callbacks")
+	}
+	slot := r.caps.projects
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider != nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle already registered")
+	}
+	slot.holder, slot.provider = r.pluginID, &p
+	return nil
+}
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(p extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectLifecycleRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(p)
+}
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) wire(srv *server.Server, caps hostcaps) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	holder := slot.holder
+	srv.SetProjectLifecycle(*slot.provider, func(owner string) extension.Host {
+		return requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: owner, actor: owner, pluginID: holder}}
+	})
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) active() bool {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	return slot.provider != nil
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) work() func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return slot.provider.Work
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) resolve(ctx context.Context, caps hostcaps, owner string, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		slot.mu.Unlock()
+		return id, nil
+	}
+	p, holder := *slot.provider, slot.holder
+	slot.mu.Unlock()
+	return projectscope.Resolve(ctx, inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: owner, actor: owner, pluginID: holder}, p, id)
+}
+
+var _ extension.ProjectHost = inprocHost{}
+
+func (h inprocHost) OwnedProjects() ([]core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	ps, err := h.caps.st.ListProjects(h.owner)
+	for i := range ps {
+		ps[i].Owner = h.owner
+	}
+	return ps, err
+}
+func (h inprocHost) OwnedProject(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.GetProject(h.owner, id)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) ProjectMetadata(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	p, err := h.caps.st.ProjectMetadata(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.projects != nil && h.caps.projects.active() {
+		p.Settings = h.caps.set.MaskedProjectMetadata(p.Settings)
+	}
+	if p.Owner == h.owner {
+		return p, nil
+	}
+	if h.caps.authz == nil {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	ok, err := h.caps.authz.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: h.owner, Action: "read", ResourceType: "project", ResourceID: core.ID(id), Owner: p.Owner, ProjectID: core.ID(id)})
+	if err != nil || !ok {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return p, nil
+}
+func (h inprocHost) EnsureProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.actor != "" && h.actor != h.owner {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	// A creator-scoped Host is the approved I1 projection capability. RDM
+	// authorizes a delegated operator before invoking it; cross-database
+	// commit fencing remains outside U3's guarantee.
+	return h.caps.st.EnsureProjectAccountChecked(h.owner, h.owner, id, name, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) RenameOwnedProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.actor != "" && h.actor != h.owner {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.RenameOwnedProjectAccountChecked(h.owner, h.owner, id, name, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID string) (bool, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID)
+}

internal/app/project_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func completeLifecycle() extension.ProjectLifecycle {
+	return extension.ProjectLifecycle{
+		List:   func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) { return nil, nil },
+		Create: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) (core.Project, error) { return core.Project{}, nil },
+		Rename: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string, string) (core.Project, error) {
+			return core.Project{}, nil
+		},
+		Archive: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) error { return nil },
+		Work:    func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil },
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectLifecycleOptionalRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{projects: slot}}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("incomplete registration accepted")
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("duplicate registration accepted")
+	}
+	if err := (compiledRegistry{}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("declarative callback accepted")
+	}
+	rr := recordRegistry{Registry: pluginRegistry{pluginID: "other", caps: hostcaps{projects: &projectLifecycleSlot{}}}}
+	optional, ok := any(rr).(extension.ProjectLifecycleRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("record registry hides optional registration")
+	}
+	if err := optional.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectHostMetadataDoesNotGrantMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	alice := inprocHost{owner: "alice", caps: hostcaps{st: st}}
+	p, err := alice.EnsureProject("stable", "Shared")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	auth.set("rdm", func(owner string, id core.ID) (bool, error) { return owner == "bob" && id == core.ID(p.ID), nil })
+	bob := inprocHost{owner: "bob", caps: hostcaps{st: st, authz: auth}}
+	if _, err := bob.ProjectMetadata(p.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.OwnedProject(p.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("owned lookup=%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.RenameOwnedProject(p.ID, "Other"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("shared rename=%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.EnsureProject(p.ID, p.Name); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("shared ensure=%v", err)
+	}
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	if _, err := bob.ProjectMetadata(p.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("V2 denial ignored=%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectHostMetadataMasksSharedSecretsWithoutMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	raw := map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": "fixture-nested-secret"}}, "models.embedding.apiKey": "fixture-flat-secret", "legacy.token": "fixture-legacy-secret", "plugins.private": map[string]any{"credential": "fixture-schema-secret"}, "display": map[string]any{"caption": "Shared configuration"}, "rdm.projectId": "canonical", "rdm.state": "ready"}
+	if err := st.UpdateProjectSettings("alice", p.ID, raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	svc := settings.NewService(st)
+	svc.SetExtraSchema([]core.SettingDesc{{Key: "plugins.private.credential", Secret: true}})
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, set: svc, projects: slot, authz: auth}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.List = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		project, err := h.(extension.ProjectHost).ProjectMetadata(p.ID)
+		return []core.Project{project}, err
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.Actor == "bob" && q.ResourceType == "project" && q.ResourceID == p.ID, nil
+	})
+	for _, actor := range []string{"bob", "alice"} {
+		h := inprocHost{owner: actor, caps: caps}
+		view, err := h.ProjectMetadata(p.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		encoded, _ := json.Marshal(view.Settings)
+		for _, value := range []string{"fixture-nested-secret", "fixture-flat-secret", "fixture-legacy-secret", "fixture-schema-secret"} {
+			if bytes.Contains(encoded, []byte(value)) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s metadata exposed a fixture credential", actor)
+			}
+		}
+		if view.Settings["rdm.projectId"] != "canonical" || view.Settings["rdm.state"] != "ready" || view.Settings["display"].(map[string]any)["caption"] != "Shared configuration" {
+			t.Fatal("allowed service/configuration metadata changed")
+		}
+	}
+	// Exercise the real registry -> actor-scoped Host -> public HTTP list chain.
+	srv := server.New(st, nil, nil, nil, svc, nil)
+	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, true)
+	slot.wire(srv, caps)
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("bob", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	request := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/projects", nil)
+	request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(response, request)
+	if response.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("member list=%d", response.Code)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"fixture-nested-secret", "fixture-flat-secret", "fixture-legacy-secret", "fixture-schema-secret"} {
+		if bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte(value)) {
+			t.Fatal("actor-scoped lifecycle list exposed a fixture credential")
+		}
+	}
+	if !bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"rdm.projectId":"canonical"`)) {
+		t.Fatal("actor-scoped list lost canonical metadata")
+	}
+
+	owned, err := (inprocHost{owner: "alice", caps: caps}).OwnedProject(p.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	before, _ := json.Marshal(raw)
+	after, _ := json.Marshal(owned.Settings)
+	if !bytes.Equal(before, after) {
+		t.Fatal("metadata read mutated persisted owner settings")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestBoundDelegatedProjectionFencesRealOperator(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/delegated-project.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	guard := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		valid, err := guard(context.Background(), owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	request := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+	delegator, ok := any(request).(interface {
+		ProjectProjectionForCreator(creator, projectID string) (extension.ProjectHost, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("request-bound delegated projection capability missing")
+	}
+	projection, err := delegator.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if projection.Owner() != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted projection owner=%s", projection.Owner())
+	}
+	if _, ok := projection.(extension.Host); ok {
+		t.Fatal("single-project projection exposed broad creator Host capabilities")
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "delegated"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("active delegated rename: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject("another-project", "hijack"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("projection escaped bound project: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.EnsureProject("another-project", "hijack"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("projection created another project: %v", err)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled real operator renamed creator project: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "delegated" {
+		t.Fatalf("late rename changed project: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDelegatedProjectionRejectsDisableBetweenEarlyCheckAndWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	var st, other *store.Store
+	var err error
+	if baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN"); baseDSN != "" {
+		st = openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+		if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-delegated-projection", "pg"); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		var schema string
+		if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		separator := "?"
+		if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+			separator = "&"
+		}
+		other, err = store.OpenExistingPostgres(baseDSN+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "other-artifacts"))
+	} else {
+		db := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "shared.db")
+		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(db)
+		if err == nil {
+			other, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(db)
+		}
+		if st != nil {
+			defer st.Close()
+		}
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer other.Close()
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "before")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	entered, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
+	var bobChecks atomic.Int32
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !state.Enabled {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		if owner == "bob" && bobChecks.Add(1) == 2 {
+			close(entered)
+			<-release
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+	projection, err := host.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	written := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "late")
+		written <- err
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-entered:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("rename did not reach paused early account check")
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := other.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	close(release)
+	select {
+	case err := <-written:
+		if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("late delegated rename committed: %v", err)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("late rename did not return")
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "before" {
+		t.Fatalf("project changed after disable: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/resource_authz_v2_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-8b 资源级授权槽位测试（U9 首切片）：
+//  1. V2 未注册 → AuthorizeResource 回落 V1（owner×project 兼容现行）；
+//  2. V2 注册 → 按查询六要素咨询；受信字段缺失（actor/action/type/id 空）＝拒绝；
+//  3. V2 返回 error ＝ 拒绝（fail-closed）；
+//  4. 首注册者生效（后来者忽略）；
+//  5. compiledRegistry 的 V2 注册被拒（声明式无宿主回调）。
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func TestAuthorizeResourceV2FallbackAndQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	var a projectAuthz
+	// 未注册任何适配器 → 拒绝。
+	if ok, err := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); ok || err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("未注册应拒绝, got %v %v", ok, err)
+	}
+	// 仅 V1：回落 owner×project 布尔。
+	a.set("p1", func(owner string, projectID string) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("V1 允许时回落应放行")
+	}
+	// V1 路径要求 owner/project 非空。
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1"}); ok {
+		t.Fatal("V1 回落在无项目私域应拒绝")
+	}
+	// 注册 V2 → 按六要素咨询。
+	a.setV2("p1", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.Actor == "u1" && q.Action == "download" && q.ResourceType == "artifact" &&
+			q.ResourceID == "a1" && q.Owner == "u2" && q.ProjectID == "p1", nil
+	})
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("V2 六要素齐备应放行")
+	}
+	// 六要素缺一（action 空）＝拒绝（不可判定）。
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1", Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); ok {
+		t.Fatal("受信字段缺失应拒绝")
+	}
+	// V2 出错＝拒绝（fail-closed）。
+	a2 := projectAuthz{}
+	a2.setV2("p1", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, errors.New("boom") })
+	if ok, err := a2.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u", Action: "read", ResourceType: "x", ResourceID: "1"}); ok || err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("V2 error 应拒绝")
+	}
+	// 首注册者生效。
+	a3 := projectAuthz{}
+	a3.setV2("first", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	a3.setV2("second", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	if ok, _ := a3.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u", Action: "read", ResourceType: "x", ResourceID: "1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("首个 V2 注册者应生效")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCompiledRegistryRejectsV2(t *testing.T) {
+	r := compiledRegistry{}
+	if err := r.RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil }); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("声明式扩展不得注册资源级授权回调（fail-closed）")
+	}
+}

internal/app/scoped_host_test.go

@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ func TestScopedHostFactory(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	set := settings.NewService(st)
 	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, set, nil, nil)
 	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: set}
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ func TestScopedHostFactory(t *testing.T) {
 	if h.Owner() != "alice" || h.PluginID() != "rdm" {
 		t.Fatalf("Owner/PluginID = %s/%s, want alice/rdm", h.Owner(), h.PluginID())
 	}
+	if _, ok := h.(extension.DelegatedProjectProjectionHost); ok {
+		t.Fatal("globally reconstructed Host exposed request-bound projection authority")
+	}
 	// KV 往返落 owner 作用域。
 	if err := h.KVPut("k1", "v1"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)

internal/blobstore/blobstore.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 )
@@ -19,6 +20,21 @@ type Store interface {
 	Delete(ref string) error
 }
 
+// IsNil 判断对象存储是否未配置。nil 接口，以及放进接口后的带类型空指针
+// （例如未设置端点时的 (*S3)(nil)），都算未配置。已构造的实现返回 false。
+func IsNil(s Store) bool {
+	if s == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	v := reflect.ValueOf(s)
+	switch v.Kind() {
+	case reflect.Chan, reflect.Func, reflect.Interface, reflect.Map, reflect.Pointer, reflect.Slice:
+		return v.IsNil()
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
 // Local 是本地目录实现（data/artifacts；多实例时把目录指向共享卷即可）。
 type Local struct {
 	dir string
@@ -32,6 +48,12 @@ func NewLocal(dir string) (*Local, error) {
 	return &Local{dir: dir}, nil
 }
 
+// OpenLocalExisting 绑定既有目录，不 MkdirAll。目录缺失时仍返回可用句柄
+// （账户运维只碰 DB；Put 时若目录不存在会失败）。
+func OpenLocalExisting(dir string) (*Local, error) {
+	return &Local{dir: dir}, nil
+}
+
 // validID 只接受纯文件名形态的对象 id：非空、不含路径分隔符、非 . / ..。
 // Put 的 id 可能是上层透传的用户输入（如工件路径参数），先在此挡住路径穿越。
 func validID(id string) bool {

internal/blobstore/nil_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+package blobstore
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestIsNil(t *testing.T) {
+	var unset Store
+	if !IsNil(unset) {
+		t.Fatal("nil interface must count as unset")
+	}
+	var typed *S3
+	var asStore Store = typed
+	if !IsNil(asStore) {
+		t.Fatal("typed nil *S3 must count as unset")
+	}
+	local, err := NewLocal(t.TempDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if IsNil(local) {
+		t.Fatal("local store must count as configured")
+	}
+	s3, err := NewS3("http://127.0.0.1:9/bucket", "us-east-1", "access", "secret", "art/")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if IsNil(s3) {
+		t.Fatal("configured S3 must count as configured")
+	}
+}

internal/cardsvc/account_checked.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+func (s *Service) requireAccountCheckedEmitter() error {
+	if s.emit != nil && s.accountCheckedEmit == nil {
+		return ErrGuardedEmitterRequired
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *Service) ResolveByRefAccountChecked(actor, ref, actionID, answer string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	id, err := s.st.CardIDByRef(actor, ref)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if card.Status.Terminal() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	card.Status = core.CardResolved
+	if err := s.UpdateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault); errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		return nil
+	} else if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardResolved,
+		core.CardResolvedPayload{CardID: card.ID, ActionID: actionID, Answer: answer})
+}
+
+// AppendAccountChecked preserves stream-card throttling while fencing its
+// durable body update against account disable.
+func (s *Service) AppendAccountChecked(actor, id, text string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if text != "" {
+		if n := len(card.Body); n > 0 && card.Body[n-1].Type == core.UIMarkdown {
+			card.Body[n-1].Markdown += text
+		} else {
+			card.Body = append(card.Body, core.UINode{Type: core.UIMarkdown, Markdown: text})
+		}
+	}
+	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardVersionedAccountChecked(actor, &card, "", version, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if card.ConversationID == "" && card.ProjectID == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.emitMu.Lock()
+	last, seen := s.lastEmit[id]
+	emit := !seen || s.now().Sub(last) >= cardAppendWindow
+	if emit {
+		s.lastEmit[id] = s.now()
+	}
+	s.emitMu.Unlock()
+	if !emit {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) emitCardAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+	if s.accountCheckedEmit == nil || (card.ConversationID == "" && card.ProjectID == "") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if card.ConversationID != "" {
+		if err := s.accountCheckedEmit(actor, card.ConversationID, card.SourceRunID, typ, payload); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !s.MirrorConvCards {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	if card.ProjectID != "" {
+		return s.accountCheckedEmit(actor, string(core.ProjectChannelKey(card.ProjectID)), card.SourceRunID, typ, payload)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CreateAccountChecked creates a card under the actor's final Store fence.
+func (s *Service) CreateAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	if card.ID == "" {
+		card.ID = store.NewID("card")
+	}
+	now := s.now().UTC()
+	card.CreatedAt, card.UpdatedAt = now, now
+	if card.Status == "" {
+		card.Status = core.CardActive
+	}
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardAccountChecked(actor, &card, ref, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, expectedVersion int, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardVersionedAccountChecked(actor, &card, "", expectedVersion, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) UpdateVersionedAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, expectedVersion int, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	_, err := s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, expectedVersion, allowImplicitDefault)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (s *Service) SetPinnedAccountChecked(actor, id string, pinned, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.Pinned = pinned
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Service) SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.Status = status
+	if tone != "" {
+		card.Tone = tone
+	}
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardStatus,
+		core.CardStatusPayload{CardID: card.ID, Status: status, Tone: card.Tone, Note: note})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) DismissAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	return s.SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id, core.CardDismissed, "", "dismissed by user", allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+func (s *Service) ActionAccountChecked(actor, id, actionID, freeText string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, string, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, "", err
+	}
+	if card.Status != core.CardActionRequired {
+		return card, "", ErrNotAwaiting
+	}
+	label, found := actionID, false
+	for _, action := range card.Actions {
+		if action.ID == actionID {
+			label, found = action.Label, true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		if actionID == "" && freeText != "" {
+			label = freeText
+		} else {
+			return card, "", ErrNoAction
+		}
+	}
+	card.Status = core.CardResolved
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, "", err
+	}
+	err = s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardResolved,
+		core.CardResolvedPayload{CardID: card.ID, ActionID: actionID, Answer: freeText})
+	return card, label, err
+}
+
+// ToProjectAccountChecked performs the copy and dismissal in one transaction.
+// Events are published after commit through the actor-aware event sink.
+func (s *Service) ToProjectAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, err
+	}
+	archived, origin, created, err := s.st.ArchiveCardToProjectAccountChecked(actor, id, s.now().UTC(), allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil || !created {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	if err := s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, archived, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: archived}); err != nil {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	if err := s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, origin, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: origin}); err != nil {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	err = s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, origin, core.EvCardStatus,
+		core.CardStatusPayload{CardID: origin.ID, Status: core.CardDismissed, Tone: origin.Tone, Note: "已留档到项目"})
+	return archived, err
+}

internal/cardsvc/account_checked_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestAccountCheckedCardActionsUseActorEventSinkAndRespectDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/cards.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "cards")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", project.ID, "cards", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	legacyCalls := 0
+	svc := New(st, func(string, string, core.StreamEventType, any) error {
+		legacyCalls++
+		return nil
+	})
+	type emitted struct {
+		actor, channel string
+		typ            core.StreamEventType
+	}
+	var guarded []emitted
+	svc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(func(actor, channel, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+		guarded = append(guarded, emitted{actor, channel, typ})
+		return nil
+	})
+	base := core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Action",
+		Status: core.CardActionRequired, Actions: []core.UIAction{{ID: "yes", Label: "Approve"}}}
+	action, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, label, err := svc.ActionAccountChecked("alice", action.ID, "yes", "", false); err != nil || label != "Approve" {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded action: label=%q err=%v", label, err)
+	}
+	pending, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pin, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Pin"}, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := svc.SetPinnedAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, true, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := svc.DismissAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	archive, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Archive"}, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	archived, err := svc.ToProjectAccountChecked("alice", archive.ID, false)
+	if err != nil || archived.ConversationID != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded archive: %+v %v", archived, err)
+	}
+	if legacyCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded card operations used unguarded emitter %d times", legacyCalls)
+	}
+	if len(guarded) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("guarded operations published no events")
+	}
+	for _, event := range guarded {
+		if event.actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("event actor lost: %+v", event)
+		}
+	}
+	before := len(guarded)
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, mutate := range []func() error{
+		func() error { _, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false); return err },
+		func() error { _, _, err := svc.ActionAccountChecked("alice", pending.ID, "yes", "", false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.SetPinnedAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false, false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.DismissAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.ToProjectAccountChecked("alice", archive.ID, false); return err },
+	} {
+		if err := mutate(); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("disabled actor mutated card: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(guarded) != before {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor published %d events", len(guarded)-before)
+	}
+}

internal/cardsvc/cardsvc.go

@@ -17,18 +17,26 @@ import (
 // 获得持久化、seq 排序、断线重放与终态对账（Stream 契约）。
 type Emitter func(conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
 
+// AccountCheckedEmitter persists an actor-attributed event through its own
+// final account-checked Store transaction. The card write and event emission
+// are separate commits; the application wires this to its guarded event sink.
+type AccountCheckedEmitter func(actor, conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
+
 var (
-	ErrNotFound    = store.ErrNotFound // 语义对齐存储层：跨租户/不存在一律 NotFound
-	ErrNoAction    = errors.New("card: action not found")
-	ErrNotAwaiting = errors.New("card: not awaiting action")
+	ErrNotFound               = store.ErrNotFound // 语义对齐存储层：跨租户/不存在一律 NotFound
+	ErrNoAction               = errors.New("card: action not found")
+	ErrNotAwaiting            = errors.New("card: not awaiting action")
+	ErrGuardedEmitterRequired = errors.New("card: account-checked emitter required")
 )
 
 // cardAppendWindow 是流式追加（Append）的 card.updated 发布节流窗口（D45）。
 const cardAppendWindow = 250 * time.Millisecond
 
 type Service struct {
-	st   *store.Store
-	emit Emitter
+	st                 *store.Store
+	emit               Emitter
+	accountCheckedEmit AccountCheckedEmitter
+	projectSharedEmit  ProjectSharedEmitter
 	// MirrorConvCards EXT-12：会话卡是否镜像进项目公共流（缺省 true=现状全量
 	// 镜像；false 时会话卡只进本人会话流，项目级卡不受影响）。
 	MirrorConvCards bool
@@ -41,6 +49,46 @@ func New(st *store.Store, emit Emitter) *Service {
 	return &Service{st: st, emit: emit, now: time.Now, lastEmit: map[string]time.Time{}, MirrorConvCards: true}
 }
 
+func (s *Service) SetAccountCheckedEmitter(emit AccountCheckedEmitter) {
+	s.accountCheckedEmit = emit
+}
+
+// ProjectSharedEmitter is an internal trusted publication adapter. It is never
+// bound to model arguments or exposed as a mandatory extension capability.
+type ProjectSharedEmitter func(owner, producer, channel, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
+
+func (s *Service) SetProjectSharedEmitter(emit ProjectSharedEmitter) { s.projectSharedEmit = emit }
+
+// PublishProjectCard explicitly publishes a project-level structural snapshot.
+// Ordinary Create/Update remain private unless this entry issues a new proof.
+func (s *Service) PublishProjectCard(owner, producer string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if s.projectSharedEmit == nil || owner == "" || producer == "" || card.ProjectID == "" || card.ConversationID != "" {
+		return card, errors.New("card: trusted project publisher required")
+	}
+	if card.ID != "" {
+		current, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, card.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return card, err
+		}
+		if current.ProjectID != card.ProjectID || current.ConversationID != "" {
+			return card, store.ErrNotFound
+		}
+	} else {
+		card.ID = store.NewID("card")
+	}
+	now := s.now().UTC()
+	card.CreatedAt = now
+	card.UpdatedAt = now
+	if card.Status == "" {
+		card.Status = core.CardActive
+	}
+	if err := s.st.SaveCard(owner, &card, ref); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	err := s.projectSharedEmit(owner, producer, string(core.ProjectChannelKey(card.ProjectID)), card.SourceRunID, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+	return card, err
+}
+
 // emitCard 按卡归属发布卡片事件（D50）：
 //   - 会话卡 → 会话流；同时镜像项目流（伪会话键 "project:<projectId>"）——
 //     项目收件箱聚合视图（项目级卡 ∪ 各会话未决卡）的实时性依赖它；卡片事件

internal/cmdbus/account_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardRejectsBeforeDispatchEffects(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		req  Request
+		err  error
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"disabled handler", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+		{"failed lookup", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("database unavailable"), "alice"},
+		{"plugin actor uses account owner", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "plugin:rdm"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+		{"actor fallback", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+			b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+			called := 0
+			b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+				called++
+				if actor != tc.want {
+					t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q, want %q", actor, tc.want)
+				}
+				return tc.err
+			})
+			resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), tc.req)
+			if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "effective account") {
+				t.Fatalf("guard rejection: %+v", resp.Receipt)
+			}
+			if called != 1 || len(audit.logs) != 0 || len(cards.created) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("guard calls=%d audits=%d cards=%d", called, len(audit.logs), len(cards.created))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardRejectsBeforePendingConfirmAndRechecks(t *testing.T) {
+	audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+	b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+	allowed := false
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if !allowed {
+			return errors.New("disabled")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	req := Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}}
+	if r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if len(cards.created) != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 || len(audit.logs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("disabled dispatch created confirmation effects")
+	}
+	allowed = true
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req)
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted || len(cards.created) != 1 || len(b.pending) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("enabled dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	allowed = false
+	before := len(audit.logs)
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled confirm: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if len(b.pending) != 1 || len(audit.logs) != before {
+		t.Fatal("disabled confirm consumed pending request or wrote audit")
+	}
+	allowed = true
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("re-enabled confirm: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardStopsConfirmedHandlerAfterStateChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	b := New(&memAudit{}, &memCards{}, nil)
+	executed := 0
+	if err := b.RegisterPluginCommand(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.effect", Title: "Effect"}, func(context.Context, Request) (any, error) {
+		executed++
+		return "done", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	checks := 0
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		checks++
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if checks == 4 {
+			return errors.New("disabled after confirmation started")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	// Confirm passes its own check, then Dispatch must check once more before
+	// invoking the handler. A direct confirmed request takes the same path.
+	if err := b.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.high", Title: "High", Danger: agentcommand.DangerHigh}, "", func(context.Context, Request) (any, error) {
+		executed++
+		return "done", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.high", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1"})
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("initial dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	// Dispatch checks again before creating the confirmation card. Confirm's
+	// check passes; its nested Dispatch catches the fourth-state change.
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm after disable: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if executed != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("executed=%d pending=%d", executed, len(b.pending))
+	}
+	// Direct confirmed execution also passes through the same guard.
+	checks = 3
+	if r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.effect", Owner: "alice", Confirmed: true}); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || executed != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("direct confirmed dispatch: %+v executed=%d", r.Receipt, executed)
+	}
+}
+
+type trackingPendingStore struct {
+	owner, payload string
+	takes          int
+}
+
+func (p *trackingPendingStore) SavePendingConfirm(_ string, owner, payload string) error {
+	p.owner, p.payload = owner, payload
+	return nil
+}
+func (p *trackingPendingStore) TakePendingConfirm(string) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	p.takes++
+	return p.owner, p.payload, p.payload != "", nil
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardDoesNotConsumeStoredPendingOnDeniedConfirm(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newTestBus(&memAudit{}, &memCards{})
+	pendingStorage := &trackingPendingStore{}
+	b.SetPendingStore(pendingStorage)
+	allowed := true
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if !allowed {
+			return errors.New("database unavailable")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}})
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted || pendingStorage.payload == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("pending setup: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	b.pending = map[string]pending{} // force the restored path
+	allowed = false
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || pendingStorage.takes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("denied confirm: %+v takes=%d", r.Receipt, pendingStorage.takes)
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/account_write_fence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+func TestStrictAccountWritesRejectLegacyBusPorts(t *testing.T) {
+	audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+	b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+	b.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(false)
+	resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || len(cards.created) != 0 || len(audit.logs) != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy port wrote under strict mode: %+v, cards=%d audit=%d pending=%d", resp.Receipt, len(cards.created), len(audit.logs), len(b.pending))
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/cmdbus.go

@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ type CommandTool struct {
 // 不投影给该 owner 的模型。组合根按需装配（如 generative-ui 按 activation 台账）。
 type ToolGate func(owner, commandID string) bool
 
+// EffectiveAccountGuard checks the current account state before a command can
+// create a confirmation or invoke a handler. The composition root supplies the
+// check; nil keeps standalone and auth-off fixtures unchanged. The actor is
+// derived only from trusted Request identity fields, never Params. This is an
+// early check, not an atomic fence across handler databases or external calls.
+type EffectiveAccountGuard func(ctx context.Context, actor string) error
+
 // SetToolGate 装配 owner 级注入闸（组合根；启动期一次）。
 func (b *Bus) SetToolGate(g ToolGate) { b.toolGate = g }
 
@@ -108,17 +115,20 @@ type pending struct {
 }
 
 type Bus struct {
-	reg          *agentcommand.Registry
-	audit        AuditStore
-	cards        CardPort
-	now          func() time.Time
-	handlers     map[string]Handler
-	slash        map[string]string // "/x" → command id
-	pendMu       sync.Mutex
-	pending      map[string]pending
-	pendingStore PendingStore
-	intents      *IntentStore // G2-2：意图声明表（自然语言路由）
-	toolGate     ToolGate     // U3：owner 级工具注入闸（nil = 不过滤）
+	reg                 *agentcommand.Registry
+	audit               AuditStore
+	cards               CardPort
+	now                 func() time.Time
+	handlers            map[string]Handler
+	slash               map[string]string // "/x" → command id
+	pendMu              sync.Mutex
+	pending             map[string]pending
+	pendingStore        PendingStore
+	intents             *IntentStore          // G2-2：意图声明表（自然语言路由）
+	toolGate            ToolGate              // U3：owner 级工具注入闸（nil = 不过滤）
+	accountGuard        EffectiveAccountGuard // A1: optional command execution precheck
+	strictAccountWrites bool
+	allowImplicitLocal  bool
 }
 
 // PendingStore 把危险命令的确认挂起态落盘。进程内 map 仍是热路径；重启后从存储取回。
@@ -144,6 +154,70 @@ func (b *Bus) Registry() *agentcommand.Registry { return b.reg }
 // SetPendingStore 注入确认挂起态的持久化实现（nil = 仅进程内）。
 func (b *Bus) SetPendingStore(st PendingStore) { b.pendingStore = st }
 
+// SetEffectiveAccountGuard installs the composition-root check at startup.
+// Handler Store writes still need their own final transaction fence.
+func (b *Bus) SetEffectiveAccountGuard(g EffectiveAccountGuard) { b.accountGuard = g }
+
+// RequireAccountCheckedWrites makes every Bus-owned durable sink use a final
+// account transaction. The composition root enables this after wiring Store
+// and Cards; standalone in-memory fixtures retain their legacy ports.
+func (b *Bus) RequireAccountCheckedWrites(allowImplicitLocal bool) {
+	b.strictAccountWrites = true
+	b.allowImplicitLocal = allowImplicitLocal
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) createConfirmCard(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.cards.Create(actor, card, ref)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.cards.(interface {
+		CreateAccountChecked(string, core.ActivityCard, string, bool) (core.ActivityCard, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked card port required")
+	}
+	return checked.CreateAccountChecked(actor, card, ref, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) setConfirmCardStatus(actor, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.cards.SetStatus(actor, id, status, tone, note)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.cards.(interface {
+		SetStatusAccountChecked(string, string, core.CardStatus, string, string, bool) (core.ActivityCard, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked card port required")
+	}
+	return checked.SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id, status, tone, note, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) savePending(cardID, owner, payload string) error {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.pendingStore.SavePendingConfirm(cardID, owner, payload)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.pendingStore.(interface {
+		SavePendingConfirmAccountChecked(string, string, string, bool) error
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked pending store required")
+	}
+	return checked.SavePendingConfirmAccountChecked(cardID, owner, payload, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) takePending(cardID, owner string) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.pendingStore.(interface {
+		TakePendingConfirmAccountChecked(string, string, bool) (string, string, bool, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked pending store required")
+	}
+	return checked.TakePendingConfirmAccountChecked(cardID, owner, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
 // RegisterBuiltin 登记内置命令并绑定宿主处理器与 `/` 别名。
 func (b *Bus) RegisterBuiltin(spec agentcommand.CommandSpec, slash string, h Handler) error {
 	spec.Binding = agentcommand.Binding{Kind: agentcommand.BindBuiltin}
@@ -242,10 +316,16 @@ func (b *Bus) HasCommand(id string) bool {
 // List 四入口共享的命令清单（`/` 菜单、按钮、卡片 action 提示用）。
 func (b *Bus) List() []agentcommand.Registered { return b.reg.List() }
 
-// Dispatch 统一分发：校验→危险收口→执行→审计。任何路径都产出回执与审计（入口对称）。
+// Dispatch 统一分发：账号预检→校验→危险收口→执行→审计。账号预检拒绝只返回回执，
+// 避免停用账号或检查故障时继续写入审计；其余路径维持四入口审计对称。
 func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 	start := b.now()
 	req.Entrance = agentcommand.CanonicalEntrance(req.Entrance)
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+		// A rejected account cannot create a card, pending row, audit row, or
+		// invoke a handler. A failed read is also a denial.
+		return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+	}
 	receipt := func(state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reason string) Response {
 		return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, state, op, reason, start)}
 	}
@@ -261,17 +341,24 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 		if b.cards == nil || req.ConversationID == "" {
 			return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "high-danger command requires conversation context for inline confirm")
 		}
-		card, err := b.cards.Create(req.Owner, confirmCard(spec, req), "cmd:"+spec.ID)
+		if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+			return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+		}
+		card, err := b.createConfirmCard(accountActor(req), confirmCard(spec, req), "cmd:"+spec.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm card: "+err.Error())
 		}
+		if b.pendingStore != nil {
+			raw, _ := json.Marshal(req)
+			if err := b.savePending(card.ID, accountActor(req), string(raw)); err != nil {
+				return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm pending: "+err.Error())
+			}
+		} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+			return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm pending: account-checked store required")
+		}
 		b.pendMu.Lock()
 		b.pending[card.ID] = pending{req: req, cardID: card.ID}
 		b.pendMu.Unlock()
-		if b.pendingStore != nil {
-			raw, _ := json.Marshal(req)
-			_ = b.pendingStore.SavePendingConfirm(card.ID, req.Owner, string(raw))
-		}
 		r := b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateAccepted, card.ID, "awaiting explicit confirm", start)
 		return Response{Receipt: r, Card: &card}
 	}
@@ -279,6 +366,9 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 	if !ok {
 		return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "no host handler bound for "+req.ID)
 	}
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+		return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+	}
 	payload, err := h(ctx, req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "rejected: "+err.Error())
@@ -289,49 +379,98 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 
 // Confirm 确认卡回道：actionID=confirm 执行挂起请求（entrance 归一 card），其余视为取消。
 func (b *Bus) Confirm(owner, cardID, actionID string) Response {
+	return b.ConfirmContext(context.Background(), owner, cardID, actionID)
+}
+
+// ConfirmContext carries the request cancellation through the confirmed
+// handler and repeats the account check before consuming durable state.
+func (b *Bus) ConfirmContext(ctx context.Context, owner, cardID, actionID string) Response {
+	// The caller supplies the authenticated card owner. Check before even
+	// consuming a persisted pending request; Dispatch checks the stored
+	// request again immediately before executing its handler.
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, owner); err != nil {
+		return b.accountRejected("unknown", b.now())
+	}
 	b.pendMu.Lock()
 	p, ok := b.pending[cardID]
-	if ok && actionID == "confirm" {
-		delete(b.pending, cardID)
-	}
 	b.pendMu.Unlock()
-	if ok && actionID == "confirm" && b.pendingStore != nil {
-		_, _, _, _ = b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
+	if ok && p.req.Owner != "" && p.req.Owner != owner {
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: p.req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
-	if !ok && b.pendingStore != nil {
-		_, payload, found, err := b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
-		if err == nil && found {
-			var req Request
-			if json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &req) == nil {
-				p = pending{req: req, cardID: cardID}
-				ok = true
-			}
+	if b.pendingStore != nil {
+		storedOwner, payload, found, err := b.takePending(cardID, owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return b.accountRejected("unknown", b.now())
 		}
+		if found {
+			var req Request
+			if storedOwner != owner || json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &req) != nil {
+				return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "invalid pending confirm", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+			}
+			p = pending{req: req, cardID: cardID}
+			ok = true
+		} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+			ok = false
+		}
+	} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+		ok = false
 	}
 	if !ok {
 		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "no pending confirm (expired or already resolved)", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
 	req := p.req
+	if req.Owner != "" && req.Owner != owner {
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+	}
+	b.pendMu.Lock()
+	delete(b.pending, cardID)
+	b.pendMu.Unlock()
 	req.Confirmed = true
 	req.Entrance = "card"
 	if actionID != "confirm" {
 		if b.cards != nil {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "muted", "cancelled")
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "muted", "cancelled")
 		}
 		start := b.now()
 		return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "cancelled at confirm card", start)}
 	}
-	resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req)
+	resp := b.Dispatch(ctx, req)
 	if b.cards != nil {
 		if resp.Receipt.State == agentcommand.StateCommitted {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "ok", "confirmed")
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "ok", "confirmed")
 		} else {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardFailed, "danger", resp.Receipt.Reason)
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardFailed, "danger", resp.Receipt.Reason)
 		}
 	}
 	return resp
 }
 
+func accountActor(req Request) string {
+	// Plugin and delegated commands use Actor for an audit label such as a
+	// plugin ID; Owner is the effective account whose state controls effects.
+	if req.Owner != "" {
+		return req.Owner
+	}
+	return req.Actor
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) checkEffectiveAccount(ctx context.Context, actor string) error {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if b.accountGuard == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return b.accountGuard(ctx, actor)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) accountRejected(commandID string, start time.Time) Response {
+	return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{
+		CommandID: commandID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected,
+		Reason: "effective account unavailable", Time: start.UTC(),
+	}}
+}
+
 func (b *Bus) auditReceipt(req Request, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reason string, start time.Time) agentcommand.ExecReceipt {
 	env := agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{
 		Time: start.UTC(), Actor: req.Actor, CommandID: req.ID, Entrance: agentcommand.CanonicalEntrance(req.Entrance),
@@ -341,7 +480,20 @@ func (b *Bus) auditReceipt(req Request, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reas
 	if _, src, err := b.reg.Resolve(req.ID); err == nil {
 		env.Source = src
 	}
-	if err := b.audit.AppendAudit(req.Owner, env); err != nil {
+	var err error
+	if b.strictAccountWrites {
+		checked, ok := b.audit.(interface {
+			AppendAuditAccountChecked(string, agentcommand.AuditEnvelope, bool) error
+		})
+		if !ok {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked audit store required")
+		} else {
+			err = checked.AppendAuditAccountChecked(accountActor(req), env, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+		}
+	} else {
+		err = b.audit.AppendAudit(req.Owner, env)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
 		// 审计不可用：结果标记未知，不臆断成功（四态语义）。
 		return agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateUnknown, Reason: "audit unavailable: " + err.Error(), Time: b.now().UTC()}
 	}

internal/genui/genui_test.go

@@ -222,7 +222,11 @@ func (r *fakeRegistry) Note(kind, name string, p json.RawMessage) error { return
 func (r *fakeRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizer(fn extension.ResourceAuthorizer) error {
 	return nil
 }
-func (r *fakeRegistry) AddIntent(spec json.RawMessage) error { return nil }
+
+func (r *fakeRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(fn extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (r *fakeRegistry) AddIntent(spec json.RawMessage) error    { return nil }
 func (r *fakeRegistry) AddAdminZone(spec json.RawMessage) error { return nil }
 
 func TestPresentRejectsUnknownActionIDs(t *testing.T) {

internal/plugins/account_reload_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+package plugins
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestLoadDirAccountCheckedRejectsDisabledActorWithoutEffects(t *testing.T) {
+	host, reg, dir := newHost(t)
+	if err := host.st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := host.st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "hash", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	writeExamplePlugin(t, dir, "example")
+	if err := host.LoadDir()["example"]; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, _, ok := reg.Get("http_echo"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("fixture plugin was not registered")
+	}
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(dir, "example")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	root := filepath.Join(dir, "side")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	mark := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sidecar-ran")
+	manifest := `{"id":"side","name":"Side","version":"1.0.0","apiVersion":"1.0","backend":{"mode":"sidecar","command":"/bin/touch","args":["` + mark + `"],"schemaVersion":1},"provides":{}}`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "plugin.json"), []byte(manifest), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := host.st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := host.st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := host.LoadDirAccountChecked("alice", false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled reload: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, _, ok := reg.Get("http_echo"); !ok || len(host.List()) != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("disabled reload changed the existing process registry")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(mark); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled reload started sidecar: %v", err)
+	}
+	plugins, err := host.st.ListPlugins()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(plugins) != 1 || plugins[0].ID != "example" {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled reload changed plugin rows: %+v", plugins)
+	}
+	if version, err := host.st.PluginSchemaVersion("side"); err != nil || version != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled reload changed schema version: %d, %v", version, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadDirAccountCheckedWritesForEnabledActor(t *testing.T) {
+	host, _, dir := newHost(t)
+	if err := host.st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "hash", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	root := filepath.Join(dir, "plain")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	manifest := `{"id":"plain","name":"Plain","version":"1.0.0","apiVersion":"1.0","backend":{"schemaVersion":2},"provides":{}}`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "plugin.json"), []byte(manifest), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	results, err := host.LoadDirAccountChecked("alice", false)
+	if err != nil || results["plain"] != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("enabled reload: %v, %+v", err, results)
+	}
+	plugins, err := host.st.ListPlugins()
+	if err != nil || len(plugins) != 1 || plugins[0].ID != "plain" {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin row: %+v, %v", plugins, err)
+	}
+	if version, err := host.st.PluginSchemaVersion("plain"); err != nil || version != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("schema version: %d, %v", version, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadDirAccountCheckedRechecksBetweenPlugins(t *testing.T) {
+	host, _, dir := newHost(t)
+	if err := host.st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := host.st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "hash", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := host.st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	mark := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b-ran")
+	for id, manifest := range map[string]string{
+		"a": `{"id":"a","name":"A","version":"1.0.0","apiVersion":"1.0","provides":{}}`,
+		"b": `{"id":"b","name":"B","version":"1.0.0","apiVersion":"1.0","backend":{"mode":"sidecar","command":"/bin/touch","args":["` + mark + `"]},"provides":{}}`,
+	} {
+		root := filepath.Join(dir, id)
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "plugin.json"), []byte(manifest), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	callbackCount := 0
+	host.OnCommands = func([]json.RawMessage) error {
+		callbackCount++
+		_, err := host.st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false)
+		return err
+	}
+	results, err := host.LoadDirAccountChecked("alice", false)
+	if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) || results["a"] != nil || callbackCount != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("reload after callback disable: %v, %+v, callbacks=%d", err, results, callbackCount)
+	}
+	plugins, err := host.st.ListPlugins()
+	if err != nil || len(plugins) != 1 || plugins[0].ID != "a" {
+		t.Fatalf("later plugin wrote after disable: %+v, %v", plugins, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(mark); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("later sidecar started after disable: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/plugins/host.go

@@ -67,14 +67,55 @@ func New(st *store.Store, reg *tools.Registry, s *settings.Service, dir string)
 	return &Host{st: st, registry: reg, settings: s, dir: dir, loaded: map[string]*Loaded{}, sidecars: map[string]*exec.Cmd{}}
 }
 
+type loadAccountGuard struct {
+	st                   *store.Store
+	actor                string
+	allowImplicitDefault bool
+	failed               error
+}
+
+func (g *loadAccountGuard) check() error {
+	if g == nil {
+		return nil // startup and existing fixture loader retain legacy behavior
+	}
+	if g.failed != nil {
+		return g.failed
+	}
+	g.failed = g.st.CheckEffectiveAccountForExternalEffect(g.actor, g.allowImplicitDefault)
+	return g.failed
+}
+
+func (g *loadAccountGuard) record(err error) error {
+	if g != nil && err != nil {
+		g.failed = err
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
 // LoadDir 全量装载目录（启动与热加载共用）；返回每个插件的结果（失败不中断其他）。
 func (h *Host) LoadDir() map[string]error {
+	results, _ := h.loadDir(nil)
+	return results
+}
+
+// LoadDirAccountChecked reloads on behalf of an already authorized actor.
+// Each Backend-owned DB write is fenced in its final transaction; process,
+// sidecar and filesystem effects get a fresh state check immediately before
+// execution. The caller must separately enforce plugin-management authority.
+func (h *Host) LoadDirAccountChecked(actor string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (map[string]error, error) {
+	return h.loadDir(&loadAccountGuard{st: h.st, actor: actor, allowImplicitDefault: allowImplicitDefault})
+}
+
+func (h *Host) loadDir(guard *loadAccountGuard) (map[string]error, error) {
+	if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	entries, err := os.ReadDir(h.dir)
 	if err != nil {
 		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			return map[string]error{}
+			return map[string]error{}, nil
 		}
-		return map[string]error{"<dir>": err}
+		return map[string]error{"<dir>": err}, nil
 	}
 	results := map[string]error{}
 	seen := map[string]bool{}
@@ -84,12 +125,19 @@ func (h *Host) LoadDir() map[string]error {
 		}
 		id := e.Name()
 		seen[id] = true
-		results[id] = h.loadOne(filepath.Join(h.dir, id))
+		results[id] = h.loadOne(filepath.Join(h.dir, id), guard)
+		if guard != nil && guard.failed != nil {
+			return results, guard.failed
+		}
 	}
 	// 移除已消失的插件（卸载语义）。
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	for id := range h.loaded {
 		if !seen[id] {
+			if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+				h.mu.Unlock()
+				return results, err
+			}
 			delete(h.loaded, id)
 			if cmd := h.sidecars[id]; cmd != nil && cmd.Process != nil {
 				_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
@@ -104,25 +152,34 @@ func (h *Host) LoadDir() map[string]error {
 	onIntents, onCommands, onWorkflows := h.OnIntents, h.OnCommands, h.OnWorkflows
 	h.mu.Unlock()
 	if onCommands != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return results, err
+		}
 		if err := onCommands(cmdOverlay); err != nil {
 			results["<commands>"] = err
 		}
 	}
 	if onIntents != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return results, err
+		}
 		if err := onIntents(overlay); err != nil {
 			results["<intents>"] = err
 		}
 	}
 	if onWorkflows != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return results, err
+		}
 		if err := onWorkflows(defs, scripts); err != nil {
 			results["<workflows>"] = err
 		}
 	}
-	return results
+	return results, nil
 }
 
 // loadOne 装载单个插件；任何失败返回错误且不改变既有注册（fail-closed）。
-func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string) error {
+func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string, guard *loadAccountGuard) error {
 	manifestPath := filepath.Join(dir, "plugin.json")
 	raw, err := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -145,6 +202,9 @@ func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string) error {
 	ld := &Loaded{Manifest: m, Dir: dir, Cards: map[string][]core.UINode{}, Prompts: map[string]string{}, Defaults: map[string]any{}, Scripts: map[string]string{}}
 
 	// 同 ID 重载：先注销旧注册（含旧版本工具），再装载新资产。
+	if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	h.registry.UnregisterBySource(core.SourcePlugin, m.ID)
 
 	// tools/*.json：声明式 HTTP 工具（或含 parameters 的描述型工具）。
@@ -159,6 +219,9 @@ func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string) error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: tool %s: %w", m.ID, name, err)
 		}
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		if err := h.registry.Register(desc, exec); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: register tool %s: %w", m.ID, name, err)
 		}
@@ -261,10 +324,13 @@ func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := h.loadDeclared(dir, m, ld); err != nil {
+	if err := h.loadDeclared(dir, m, ld, guard); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if err := h.startSidecar(m, dir); err != nil {
+	if err := h.startSidecar(m, dir, guard); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	h.mu.Lock()
@@ -274,18 +340,31 @@ func (h *Host) loadOne(dir string) error {
 	defs, scripts := h.collectWorkflowsLocked()
 	onIntents, onCommands, onWorkflows := h.OnIntents, h.OnCommands, h.OnWorkflows
 	h.mu.Unlock()
-	_ = h.st.UpsertPlugin(m.ID, dir, m)
+	if guard == nil {
+		_ = h.st.UpsertPlugin(m.ID, dir, m)
+	} else if err := h.st.UpsertPluginAccountChecked(guard.actor, m.ID, dir, m, guard.allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return guard.record(err)
+	}
 	if onCommands != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		if err := onCommands(cmdOverlay); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: commands rejected by command bus (kept previous): %w", m.ID, err)
 		}
 	}
 	if onIntents != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		if err := onIntents(overlay); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: intents rejected by host gate (kept previous): %w", m.ID, err)
 		}
 	}
 	if onWorkflows != nil {
+		if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		if err := onWorkflows(defs, scripts); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: workflows rejected: %w", m.ID, err)
 		}

internal/plugins/host_v2.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ func (h *Host) SetHostAPI(baseURL, token string) {
 	h.hostAPI, h.hostToken = baseURL, token
 }
 
-func (h *Host) startSidecar(m core.PluginManifest, dir string) error {
+func (h *Host) startSidecar(m core.PluginManifest, dir string, guard *loadAccountGuard) error {
 	if m.Backend.Mode != "sidecar" || m.Backend.Command == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -38,10 +38,19 @@ func (h *Host) startSidecar(m core.PluginManifest, dir string) error {
 		"AGENT_HOST_TOKEN="+h.hostToken,
 		"AGENT_PLUGIN_ID="+m.ID,
 	)
+	if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("plugins: %s: sidecar: %w", m.ID, err)
 	}
 	h.mu.Lock()
+	if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+		h.mu.Unlock()
+		_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+		_ = cmd.Wait()
+		return err
+	}
 	if h.sidecars == nil {
 		h.sidecars = map[string]*exec.Cmd{}
 	}
@@ -54,7 +63,7 @@ func (h *Host) startSidecar(m core.PluginManifest, dir string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (h *Host) loadDeclared(dir string, m core.PluginManifest, ld *Loaded) error {
+func (h *Host) loadDeclared(dir string, m core.PluginManifest, ld *Loaded, guard *loadAccountGuard) error {
 	for _, name := range m.Provides.Skills {
 		body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "skills", name+".md"))
 		if err != nil {
@@ -70,9 +79,15 @@ func (h *Host) loadDeclared(dir string, m core.PluginManifest, ld *Loaded) error
 		ld.Skills[name] = string(body)
 		if h.skillsRoot != "" {
 			dest := filepath.Join(h.skillsRoot, "plugin-"+m.ID, name)
+			if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0o755); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
+			if err := guard.check(); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 			if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dest, "SKILL.md"), body, 0o644); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
@@ -131,6 +146,9 @@ func (h *Host) loadDeclared(dir string, m core.PluginManifest, ld *Loaded) error
 		ld.Pages = append(ld.Pages, item)
 	}
 	if m.Backend.SchemaVersion > 0 && h.st != nil {
+		if guard != nil {
+			return guard.record(h.st.SetPluginSchemaVersionAccountChecked(guard.actor, m.ID, m.Backend.SchemaVersion, guard.allowImplicitDefault))
+		}
 		cur, err := h.st.PluginSchemaVersion(m.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err

internal/profiles/profiles.go

@@ -74,6 +74,23 @@ func (s *Service) Save(owner string, p core.AgentProfile) error {
 
 func (s *Service) Delete(owner, id string) error { return s.st.DeleteProfile(owner, id) }
 
+// SaveAccountChecked is the user-facing write path. Builtin profiles remain
+// read-only and the Store binds the write to the actor's effective account.
+func (s *Service) SaveAccountChecked(actor string, p core.AgentProfile, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if p.ID == DefaultProfileID || p.Builtin {
+		return errReadOnly("profiles: builtin profile is read-only; duplicate and modify")
+	}
+	if p.Tools.Allow == nil {
+		p.Tools.Allow = []string{"*"}
+	}
+	p.Owner = actor
+	return s.st.SaveProfileAccountChecked(actor, p, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+func (s *Service) DeleteAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	return s.st.DeleteProfileAccountChecked(actor, id, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
 type errReadOnly string
 
 func (e errReadOnly) Error() string { return string(e) }

internal/profiles/profiles_fence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package profiles
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestProfileServiceAccountCheckedWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	svc := New(st)
+	if err := svc.EnsureDefault(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", core.AgentProfile{ID: "profile-a", Name: "A"}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := st.GetProfile("alice", "profile-a")
+	if err != nil || got.Owner != "alice" || got.Builtin || len(got.Tools.Allow) != 1 || got.Tools.Allow[0] != "*" {
+		t.Fatalf("service did not normalize actor profile: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", core.AgentProfile{ID: DefaultProfileID}, false); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("service edited builtin default")
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", core.AgentProfile{ID: "forged", Builtin: true}, false); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("service accepted forged builtin profile")
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.DeleteAccountChecked("alice", "profile-a", false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor deleted profile: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", core.AgentProfile{ID: "profile-a", Name: "late"}, false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor saved profile: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/projectscope/projectscope.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// Package projectscope resolves host retrieval filters using service-provided
+// lifecycle metadata. Stored/client settings never supply an authority mapping.
+package projectscope
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+)
+
+func Resolve(ctx context.Context, host extension.Host, p extension.ProjectLifecycle, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+	if id == "" {
+		return id, nil
+	}
+	if p.List == nil {
+		return "", store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	projects, err := p.List(ctx, host)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	for _, project := range projects {
+		domainID, _ := project.Settings["rdm.projectId"].(string)
+		if project.ID != id && domainID != id {
+			continue
+		}
+		state, _ := project.Settings["rdm.state"].(string)
+		if domainID == "" || state != "ready" {
+			return "", store.ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return core.ID(domainID), nil
+	}
+	return "", store.ErrNotFound
+}

internal/prompts/library/base-deliverables.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: base.deliverables
 layer: base
-version: 7
+version: 9
 title: 交付物工作流
 description: 生成文档、表格、演示稿的工作流、样式决策与技能入口（常驻基座）
 ---
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ description: 生成文档、表格、演示稿的工作流、样式决策与技
 - 技能目录是环境变量 `AGENT_SKILLS_DIR`（环境段会写出绝对路径）。`PYTHONPATH` 已包含其中的 `house-style`，脚本里直接 `import housestyle`。
 - **house-style**：设计系统、三套主题、模板与仿制、lint。先读 `$AGENT_SKILLS_DIR/house-style/SKILL.md`。
 - **docx-author / xlsx-author / pptx-author**：各类交付物的版面范式和最小示例。
+- **frontend-design / canvas-design / copywriting / copy-editing**（第三方 vendor，溯源见各自 UPSTREAM.md）：视觉方向与排版审美、海报/信息图等 png·pdf 视觉产物（PIL 渲染，字体已随包）、营销/商务文案的撰写改写与编辑润色。交付物主题与配色仍以 house-style 为权威；需要超出主题规范的视觉判断或文案功力时 `load_skill` 对应技能。
 - 小队角色用 `load_skill`；其他路径用 `run_shell` 查看技能文件，例如 `cat "$AGENT_SKILLS_DIR/house-style/SKILL.md"`。不要假设工作区里有 `skills/` 目录。
 - 缺库时：`pip install --user python-docx openpyxl python-pptx`。PDF 仿制可选 `pdfplumber`；没装就说明只能近似，并请用户确认主色和字体。
+- 缺库又装不上时，如实告知用户当前环境无法生成带排版的 Office 交付物并说明缺什么；禁止改用 zipfile/字符串手工拼 OOXML 充数——那样生成的包缺母版与主题，结构自检会拒绝登记。
 
 要求与边界：
 

internal/prompts/library/tool-run-python.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
 id: tool.run_python
 layer: tool
-version: 1
+version: 2
 title: run_python 工具描述
 description: Python 执行原语的模型侧说明文案
 ---
-执行完整 Python 脚本（python3，工作目录=会话工作区）。适用：数据处理、生成 Excel/PPT/图片（housestyle kit）、批量操作。Word 交付物优先写 .md 源后用 run_shell 跑 `python3 -m housestyle.build`，不要在脚本里手工拼 docx。报错先读退出码与 traceback 定位行号再改，同一错误不要原样重跑。生成带排式的文件（xlsx/pptx）先读 `$AGENT_SKILLS_DIR/house-style/SKILL.md` 的构件表，不确定签名先 `inspect.signature`。
+执行完整 Python 脚本（python3，工作目录=会话工作区）。适用：数据处理、生成 Excel/PPT/图片（housestyle kit）、批量操作。Word 交付物优先写 .md 源后用 run_shell 跑 `python3 -m housestyle.build`。任何 Office 交付物（docx/xlsx/pptx）都禁止用 zipfile 或字符串手工拼 OOXML——手拼的包缺母版与主题，register_artifact 的结构自检会直接拒绝；一律走 housestyle kit 构件。缺库先 `pip install --user python-pptx python-docx openpyxl`，装不上就如实告知用户当前环境无法生成本类交付物，不要退回手拼。报错先读退出码与 traceback 定位行号再改，同一错误不要原样重跑。生成带排版的文件（xlsx/pptx）先读 `$AGENT_SKILLS_DIR/house-style/SKILL.md` 的构件表，不确定签名先 `inspect.signature`。

internal/prompts/service.go

@@ -228,6 +228,27 @@ func (s *Service) Save(owner string, m core.PromptModule) error {
 // Delete 撤销用户覆盖（回到内置）。
 func (s *Service) Delete(owner, id string) error { return s.st.DeletePromptModule(owner, id) }
 
+// SaveAccountChecked applies the same user override rules as Save and uses
+// the Store's final actor-state transaction for the database write.
+func (s *Service) SaveAccountChecked(actor string, m core.PromptModule, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if err := validateSubagentOverride(m); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	m.Source = string(core.SourceUser)
+	m.Owner = actor
+	for _, b := range s.builtin {
+		if b.ID == m.ID {
+			m.BasedOnVersion = b.Version
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return s.st.SavePromptModuleAccountChecked(actor, m, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+func (s *Service) DeleteAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	return s.st.DeletePromptModuleAccountChecked(actor, id, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
 // MatchCommand 命令触发匹配：文本以某技能命令开头时返回该模块与剩余文本。
 func (s *Service) MatchCommand(owner, text string) (core.PromptModule, string, bool, error) {
 	mods, err := s.Effective(owner)

internal/prompts/service_fence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package prompts
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestPromptServiceAccountCheckedWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	svc, err := NewService(st, []core.PromptModule{{ID: "task.example", Layer: core.LayerTask, Version: 2}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	module := core.PromptModule{ID: "task.example", Layer: core.LayerTask, Body: "Alice"}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", module, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := st.GetPromptModule("alice", module.ID)
+	if err != nil || got.Owner != "alice" || got.Source != string(core.SourceUser) || got.BasedOnVersion != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("service did not normalize actor module: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("missing", module, false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("missing actor saved prompt: %v", err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.DeleteAccountChecked("alice", module.ID, false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor deleted prompt: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := svc.SaveAccountChecked("alice", module, false); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor saved prompt: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/rag/account_index_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package rag
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type checkedKnowledgeIndexer interface {
+	IndexDocumentAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner, projectID core.ID, source, title, ref, plainText string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error
+	IndexChunksAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, allowImplicitDefault bool) error
+	PublishChunksAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, pluginID string, scoped bool, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, allowImplicitDefault bool) error
+}
+
+func checkedIndexer(t *testing.T, p *Pipeline) checkedKnowledgeIndexer {
+	t.Helper()
+	i, ok := any(p).(checkedKnowledgeIndexer)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("Pipeline is missing account-checked indexing APIs")
+	}
+	return i
+}
+
+type disableDuringEmbed struct{ st *store.Store }
+
+func (e disableDuringEmbed) Embed(_ context.Context, texts []string) ([][]float32, error) {
+	if _, err := e.st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	vecs := make([][]float32, len(texts))
+	for i := range vecs {
+		vecs[i] = []float32{1, 0}
+	}
+	return vecs, nil
+}
+
+func TestCheckedIndexStopsVectorWriteAfterEmbeddingDisablesAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	p, st := newTestPipeline(t, nil, nil)
+	i := checkedIndexer(t, p)
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p.SetEmbedder(disableDuringEmbed{st: st})
+	err := i.IndexChunksAccountChecked(context.Background(), "alice", []core.KnowledgeDoc{
+		{ID: "knw-during-embed", Owner: "alice", Ref: "embedded", Source: "manual", Chunk: "A searchable document"},
+	}, false)
+	if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("vector write after disable: got %v, want ErrAccountForbidden", err)
+	}
+	var lexical, vectors int
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM knowledge WHERE owner='alice' AND ref='embedded'`).Scan(&lexical); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM knowledge_vectors WHERE owner='alice' AND ref='embedded'`).Scan(&vectors); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if lexical != 1 || vectors != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected pre-disable lexical commit and no late vector: lexical=%d vectors=%d", lexical, vectors)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckedIndexDocumentAndPublishUseGuardedKnowledge(t *testing.T) {
+	p, st := newTestPipeline(t, nil, nil)
+	i := checkedIndexer(t, p)
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := i.IndexDocumentAccountChecked(context.Background(), "alice", "p1", "upload", "minutes", "upload-ref", "A document with enough searchable text", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := i.PublishChunksAccountChecked(context.Background(), "alice", "alpha", true, []core.KnowledgeDoc{
+		{ID: "knw-published", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "p1", Ref: "published", Source: "plugin:alpha", Chunk: "A published document"},
+	}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var n int
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM knowledge WHERE owner='alice'`).Scan(&n); err != nil || n != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded index and publish rows=%d, %v", n, err)
+	}
+}

internal/rag/hybrid.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
 	"log"
 
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
@@ -85,6 +86,25 @@ func (p *Pipeline) IndexDocument(owner, projectID core.ID, source, title, ref, p
 	return p.IndexChunks(context.Background(), owner, docs)
 }
 
+// IndexDocumentAccountChecked is the upload/artifact indexing entry when the
+// caller has an authenticated actor. Chunking takes no DB connection; every
+// later lexical/vector write has its own final account transaction check.
+func (p *Pipeline) IndexDocumentAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner, projectID core.ID, source, title, ref, plainText string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if plainText == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	doc := core.ParsedDocument{Blocks: []core.DocBlock{{Type: core.BlockPara, Text: plainText}}}
+	chunks := p.chunker.Chunk(doc)
+	if len(chunks) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	docs := make([]core.KnowledgeDoc, len(chunks))
+	for i, c := range chunks {
+		docs[i] = core.KnowledgeDoc{Owner: owner, ProjectID: projectID, Source: source, Title: title, Ref: ref, Chunk: c.Text}
+	}
+	return p.IndexChunksAccountChecked(ctx, owner, docs, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
 // IndexChunks 写入已构造好的知识分块并建向量（EXT-1 KnowledgeWrite embed=true 的路径）。
 // AddKnowledge 原地回填 docs[i].ID；embedding 失败降级为纯全文（记日志，不阻断写入）。
 func (p *Pipeline) IndexChunks(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc) error {
@@ -118,6 +138,74 @@ func (p *Pipeline) IndexChunks(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, docs []core.K
 	return nil
 }
 
+// IndexChunksAccountChecked preserves batch atomicity for lexical rows and
+// fences each vector write after the external embedding call. Embedding cannot
+// share the DB transaction; a disable during that call leaves already
+// committed lexical rows but blocks subsequent vector publication.
+func (p *Pipeline) IndexChunksAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if len(docs) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := p.st.AddKnowledgeAccountChecked(string(owner), allowImplicitDefault, docs...); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return p.indexVectorsAccountChecked(ctx, owner, docs, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+// PublishChunksAccountChecked replaces all affected refs in one guarded Store
+// transaction, then builds vectors through individually guarded writes.
+func (p *Pipeline) PublishChunksAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, pluginID string, scoped bool, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if len(docs) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := p.st.ReplaceKnowledgeAccountChecked(ctx, string(owner), pluginID, scoped, allowImplicitDefault, docs...); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return p.indexVectorsAccountChecked(ctx, owner, docs, allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+func (p *Pipeline) indexVectorsAccountChecked(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if p.embedder == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	account, err := p.st.GetAccountByOwner(string(owner))
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) && allowImplicitDefault && owner == store.OwnerDefault {
+		err = nil
+		account.Enabled = true
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !account.Enabled {
+		return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	texts := make([]string, len(docs))
+	for i, d := range docs {
+		texts[i] = d.Chunk
+	}
+	vecs, err := p.embedder.Embed(ctx, texts)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("[rag] embedding 降级为纯全文（ref=%s）: %v", firstRef(docs), err)
+		return nil
+	}
+	model := embedderModel(p.embedder)
+	for i, v := range vecs {
+		if i >= len(docs) {
+			break
+		}
+		if len(v) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if err := p.st.UpsertKnowledgeVectorExtAccountChecked(ctx, string(owner), string(docs[i].ID), docs[i].Ref, model, contentHash(docs[i].Chunk), v, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // embedderModel 模型身份（可选接口：EmbeddingProvider 契约未含，实现侧
 // 声明；未声明=空=legacy 无身份行，向后兼容）。
 func embedderModel(e core.EmbeddingProvider) string {
@@ -174,19 +262,66 @@ func (p *Pipeline) RetrieveShared(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.Ret
 	return merged, nil
 }
 
+// RetrieveAuthorized is the resource-level path for HTTP, Host and model
+// context. It filters owned and shared candidates before external reranking.
+func (p *Pipeline) RetrieveAuthorized(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.RetrievalQuery, allow func(core.KnowledgeDoc) bool) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+	own, err := p.retrieve(ctx, owner, q, allow)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	shared, err := p.st.SearchKnowledgeSharedAuthorized(string(owner), q, allow)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if p.embedder != nil {
+		if vectors, e := p.embedder.Embed(ctx, []string{q.Text}); e == nil && len(vectors) > 0 && len(vectors[0]) > 0 {
+			topK := q.TopK
+			if topK <= 0 {
+				topK = 5
+			}
+			vs, e := p.st.SearchKnowledgeVectorsSharedAuthorized(ctx, string(owner), embedderModel(p.embedder), vectors[0], topK, q, allow)
+			if e == nil {
+				shared = rrfMerge(vs, shared)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	merged := rrfMerge(own, shared)
+	if limit := q.TopK; limit > 0 && len(merged) > limit {
+		merged = merged[:limit]
+	}
+	return merged, nil
+}
+func authorizedHits(hits []core.RetrievalHit, allow func(core.KnowledgeDoc) bool) []core.RetrievalHit {
+	if allow == nil {
+		return hits
+	}
+	out := make([]core.RetrievalHit, 0, len(hits))
+	for _, h := range hits {
+		if allow(h.Doc) {
+			out = append(out, h)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // Retrieve 统一检索（core.Retriever）。
 func (p *Pipeline) Retrieve(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.RetrievalQuery) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+	return p.retrieve(ctx, owner, q, nil)
+}
+func (p *Pipeline) retrieve(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.RetrievalQuery, allow func(core.KnowledgeDoc) bool) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
 	topK := q.TopK
 	if topK <= 0 {
 		topK = 5
 	}
 	if p.embedder == nil {
-		return p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		hits, err := p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		return authorizedHits(hits, allow), err
 	}
 	route := p.embeddingRoute(ctx)
 	offline, _ := p.embedder.(interface{ Offline() bool })
 	if !route.OK() && (offline == nil || !offline.Offline()) {
-		return p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		hits, err := p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		return authorizedHits(hits, allow), err
 	}
 	qvecs, err := p.embedder.Embed(ctx, []string{q.Text})
 	if err != nil || len(qvecs) == 0 || len(qvecs[0]) == 0 {
@@ -194,7 +329,8 @@ func (p *Pipeline) Retrieve(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.Retrieval
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Printf("[rag] query embedding fallback to fulltext: %v", err)
 		}
-		return p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		hits, err := p.st.SearchKnowledge(owner, q)
+		return authorizedHits(hits, allow), err
 	}
 	q.TopK = topK * 2 // 每路多取，融合后再裁剪
 	vhits, err := p.st.SearchKnowledgeVectorsModel(ctx, owner, embedderModel(p.embedder), qvecs[0], topK*2, q)
@@ -205,7 +341,7 @@ func (p *Pipeline) Retrieve(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.Retrieval
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	merged := rrfMerge(vhits, fhits)
+	merged := authorizedHits(rrfMerge(vhits, fhits), allow)
 	if p.reranker != nil && p.rerankRoute(ctx).OK() && len(merged) > 0 {
 		docs := make([]core.KnowledgeDoc, len(merged))
 		for i, h := range merged {

internal/rag/rag_test.go

@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ func TestRetrieveFallbackAndHybrid(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// 有 embedder 且路由已配置：查询向量 A 类 → A 文档排前（RRF 向量路主导）。
+	// P2 受管：models.* 是系统受管项，配置写入系统层行（owner=OwnerSystemRow）。
 	pipe2, st2 := newTestPipeline(t, fakeEmbedder{}, nil)
-	if err := st2.MergeSettingsScope(store.OwnerDefault, settings.ScopeUser, map[string]any{
+	if err := st2.MergeSettingsScope(settings.OwnerSystemRow, settings.ScopeSystem, map[string]any{
 		"models": map[string]any{"embedding": map[string]any{"baseUrl": "http://fake.internal", "model": "e-test"}},
 	}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)

internal/runmgr/account_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package runmgr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// A missing domain provider must not make a registered account guard optional.
+func TestAccountGuardBlocksRunToolAndQueuedHITL(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "Alice", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		a, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		return err == nil && a.Enabled, err
+	})
+	c.run.ID = store.NewID("run")
+	c.run.Status = core.RunWaitingHITL
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&c.run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := &runHandle{hitlCh: make(chan hitlAnswer, 1)}
+	c.mgr.active = map[string]*runHandle{c.run.ID: h}
+	card := core.HITLCard{ID: "disabled-card", RunID: c.run.ID, ConversationID: c.run.ConversationID}
+	if err := st.SaveHITLCard("alice", &card); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.GetConversation("alice", c.run.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := c.mgr.StartConversationRun(conv, core.Message{}, nil, nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled account started run without domain provider: %v", err)
+	}
+	res := c.ExecuteTool(core.ToolCallRequest{CallID: "disabled-tool", Name: "write_artifact", Arguments: json.RawMessage(`{"name":"denied.txt","content":"x"}`)})
+	if res.Status != "error" {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled account executed tool: %+v", res)
+	}
+	arts, err := st.ListArtifacts("alice", c.run.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || len(arts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled account wrote artifact: %+v %v", arts, err)
+	}
+
+	if _, _, err := c.mgr.ResolveHITL("alice", card.ID, core.HITLResponse{ChoiceID: "yes"}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled account resolved HITL: %v", err)
+	}
+	persisted, err := st.GetHITLCard("alice", card.ID)
+	if err != nil || persisted.Resolved || len(h.hitlCh) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled HITL changed state: %+v channel=%d err=%v", persisted, len(h.hitlCh), err)
+	}
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(HITLCommandPayload{Owner: "alice", CardID: card.ID, Kind: "yes"})
+	c.mgr.applyHITLCommand(ownedCommand{CommandID: "queued-disabled", Payload: string(payload)})
+	if len(h.hitlCh) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("queued approval delivered to disabled run")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAccountGuardStoreReadFailureBlocksOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	c.ctx = runCtx
+	c.mgr.active = map[string]*runHandle{"active": {owner: "alice", cancel: cancel}}
+	readErr := errors.New("account store unavailable")
+	c.mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(func(context.Context, string) (bool, error) { return false, readErr })
+	if err := c.Emit(core.EvToolOutput, core.ToolOutputPayload{Text: "secret"}); !errors.Is(err, readErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("store failure emitted output: %v", err)
+	}
+	if runCtx.Err() == nil {
+		t.Fatal("account-state read failure left active local run executing")
+	}
+	if err := c.SetAssistantParts([]core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "secret"}}); !errors.Is(err, readErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("store failure retained assistant output: %v", err)
+	}
+	evs, err := st.EventsAfter(c.run.ConversationID, 0, 100)
+	if err != nil || len(evs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("store failure persisted output events: %+v %v", evs, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAccountGuardBlocksRestoredNoticeOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "Alice", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		a, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		return err == nil && a.Enabled, err
+	})
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.mgr.startNoticeRun(c.run.ConversationID, []bgNotice{{owner: "alice", name: "restored", payload: core.AgentResultPayload{Summary: "must not deliver"}}}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("restored notice delivered to disabled account: %v", err)
+	}
+	msgs, err := st.ListMessages(c.run.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil || len(msgs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("restored notice persisted output: %+v %v", msgs, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAccountGuardDiscardsComposedOutputAfterDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "Alice", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		a, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		return err == nil && a.Enabled, err
+	})
+	c.run.ID = store.NewID("run")
+	c.run.Status = core.RunRunning
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&c.run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.h = &runHandle{assistant: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "must not persist"}}}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.finishRun(c, core.RunCompleted, core.Usage{}, nil)
+	got, err := st.GetRunByID(c.run.ID)
+	if err != nil || got.Status == core.RunCompleted {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled run completed: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+	msgs, err := st.ListMessages(c.run.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, msg := range msgs {
+		for _, part := range msg.Parts {
+			if part.Text == "must not persist" {
+				t.Fatal("previously composed assistant output persisted after disable")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/runmgr/admission.go

@@ -70,16 +70,23 @@ func (g *admissionGate) QueueFull() bool {
 }
 
 // acquire 阻塞获取执行许可（ctx 取消则放弃排队）。预算关闭时零开销直通。
-func (g *admissionGate) acquire(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, runID, owner string) error {
+func (g *admissionGate) acquire(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, runID, owner string, accountGuard ...bool) error {
 	if g == nil {
 		return nil
 	}
 	budget := g.budget()
 	if budget.Off() {
-		return nil
+		return ctx.Err()
 	}
 	for {
-		if err := st.TryAcquireExecutionSlot(runID, owner, budget); err == nil {
+		var err error
+		if len(accountGuard) > 0 && accountGuard[0] {
+			allowImplicit := len(accountGuard) > 1 && accountGuard[1]
+			err = st.TryAcquireExecutionSlotAccountChecked(owner, runID, budget, allowImplicit)
+		} else {
+			err = st.TryAcquireExecutionSlot(runID, owner, budget)
+		}
+		if err == nil {
 			return nil
 		} else if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrBudgetExceeded) {
 			return err // 存储故障：不放行（fail-closed，宁可拒绝执行）

internal/runmgr/background_card_test.go

@@ -120,18 +120,67 @@ func TestBackgroundCardLifecycleOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("cards = %d, want 1", len(cards))
 	}
 	card := cards[0]
-	if card.Status != core.CardDone || card.Tone != "danger" {
-		t.Fatalf("status = %s tone = %s, want done/danger", card.Status, card.Tone)
+	if card.Status != core.CardFailed || card.Tone != "danger" {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %s tone = %s, want failed/danger", card.Status, card.Tone)
 	}
 	var md string
+	statusLabel := ""
+	for _, n := range card.Body {
+		if n.Type == core.UIMarkdown {
+			md = n.Markdown
+		}
+		if n.Type == core.UIKV {
+			for _, kv := range n.KV {
+				if kv[0] == core.TaskSummaryKVStatus {
+					statusLabel = kv[1]
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(md, "执行失败") {
+		t.Fatalf("failure body = %q", md)
+	}
+	if statusLabel != core.TaskSummaryStatusFailed {
+		t.Fatalf("status kv = %q, want %q", statusLabel, core.TaskSummaryStatusFailed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBackgroundCardCreateUsesL1SkeletonNotRawTask(t *testing.T) {
+	runner := &holdRunner{release: make(chan struct{})}
+	c, _ := newCardSpawnEnv(t, runner)
+	c.mgr.runner = noopRunner{}
+	raw := "逐页解析上传材料并对照验收条件" + strings.Repeat("LONGTASK", 40)
+	if _, err := c.SpawnBackground("agent.sub.general", "深度解析员", raw, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	waitUntil(t, func() bool {
+		cards, err := c.mgr.cards.List(c.run.Owner, c.run.ConversationID)
+		return err == nil && len(cards) == 1
+	})
+	cards, err := c.mgr.cards.List(c.run.Owner, c.run.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	card := cards[0]
+	var md string
 	for _, n := range card.Body {
 		if n.Type == core.UIMarkdown {
 			md = n.Markdown
 		}
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(md, "执行失败") {
-		t.Fatalf("failure body = %q", md)
+	if strings.Contains(md, "LONGTASK") || strings.Contains(md, raw[:32]) {
+		t.Fatalf("create body still embeds raw task: %q", md)
 	}
+	if md != core.TaskSummaryNoFindingsYet {
+		t.Fatalf("create markdown = %q, want honest placeholder", md)
+	}
+	close(runner.release)
+	waitUntil(t, func() bool {
+		c.mgr.convMu.Lock()
+		busy := c.mgr.convActive[c.run.ConversationID]
+		c.mgr.convMu.Unlock()
+		return !busy
+	})
 }
 
 // TestBackgroundCardSkippedWithoutInbox：收件箱未启用（cards==nil）时后台派发

internal/runmgr/commands.go

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func (m *Manager) applyHITLCommand(c ownedCommand) {
 	_, _, err := m.ResolveHITL(p.Owner, p.CardID, resp)
 	if err != nil {
 		// 过期/未知 gate：明确销项（resolved + 注记），发出可见结论。
-		_ = m.st.ResolveHITLCard(p.Owner, p.CardID, core.HITLResolvedPayload{
+		_ = m.resolveHITLCardForEffectiveAccount(p.Owner, p.CardID, core.HITLResolvedPayload{
 			CardID: core.ID(p.CardID), Kind: "expired", Answer: "跨实例审批迟到：gate 已过期或执行已移交",
 		})
 		log.Printf("[runmgr] hitl %s (card %s) rejected: %v", c.CommandID, p.CardID, err)

internal/runmgr/events.go

@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ import (
 // 会话内事件天然单线程（一个会话至多一个在途 run，子代理在父执行栈内同步运行），
 // 少数跨 goroutine 路径（HITL resolve）与冲盘互斥由 flushing 锁保证不交叉。
 type eventBuffer struct {
-	store    *store.Store
-	bus      *bus.Bus
-	interval time.Duration // 定时冲盘窗口
-	maxBuf   int           // 单会话缓冲条数上限（触发立即冲盘）
+	store               *store.Store
+	bus                 *bus.Bus
+	accountGuardEnabled bool
+	allowImplicitLocal  bool
+	interval            time.Duration // 定时冲盘窗口
+	maxBuf              int           // 单会话缓冲条数上限（触发立即冲盘）
 	// onPersisted 落盘+本地发布后的回调（PG 档 NOTIFY 跨实例扇出；nil = 无）。
 	onPersisted func(conversationID string, evs []core.StreamEvent)
 
@@ -116,11 +118,85 @@ func (eb *eventBuffer) emit(conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventTy
 	return 0, nil
 }
 
+// emitAccountChecked flushes any earlier deltas and the new structural event
+// in one final account-checked Store transaction. A disabled owner loses its
+// buffered deltas instead of persisting them after disable.
+func (eb *eventBuffer) emitAccountChecked(actor, conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	e := core.StreamEvent{ConversationID: conversationID, RunID: runID,
+		TS: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), V: core.ProtocolVersion, Type: typ}
+	if projectID, ok := core.ProjectFromChannel(core.ID(conversationID)); ok {
+		e.ProjectID = projectID
+	}
+	if payload != nil {
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		e.Payload = raw
+	}
+	eb.flushing.Lock()
+	defer eb.flushing.Unlock()
+	eb.mu.Lock()
+	batch := append([]core.StreamEvent(nil), eb.buf[conversationID]...)
+	delete(eb.buf, conversationID)
+	eb.mu.Unlock()
+	batch = append(batch, e)
+	if _, err := eb.store.AppendEventsAccountChecked(actor, conversationID, batch, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, event := range batch {
+		eb.bus.Publish(event)
+	}
+	if eb.onPersisted != nil {
+		eb.onPersisted(conversationID, batch)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// emitProjectShared persists an explicit internal publication and its proof
+// before fan-out. A client-visible payload cannot opt itself into this path.
+func (eb *eventBuffer) emitProjectShared(owner, producer, channel, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+	project, ok := core.ProjectFromChannel(channel)
+	if !ok {
+		return store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	event := core.StreamEvent{ConversationID: channel, ProjectID: project, RunID: runID, Type: typ, Payload: encoded, TS: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), V: core.ProtocolVersion}
+	eb.flushConversation(channel)
+	eb.flushing.Lock()
+	defer eb.flushing.Unlock()
+	events := []core.StreamEvent{event}
+	if eb.accountGuardEnabled {
+		_, err = eb.store.AppendProjectSharedEventsAccountChecked(owner, producer, channel, events, eb.allowImplicitLocal)
+	} else {
+		_, err = eb.store.AppendProjectSharedEvents(owner, producer, channel, events)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, event := range events {
+		eb.bus.Publish(event)
+	}
+	if eb.onPersisted != nil {
+		eb.onPersisted(channel, events)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // append 落盘并按 seq 顺序发布。
 func (eb *eventBuffer) append(conversationID string, evs []core.StreamEvent) error {
 	eb.flushing.Lock()
 	defer eb.flushing.Unlock()
-	if _, err := eb.store.AppendEvents(conversationID, evs); err != nil {
+	var err error
+	if eb.accountGuardEnabled {
+		_, err = eb.store.AppendEventsForEffectiveChannel(conversationID, evs, eb.allowImplicitLocal)
+	} else {
+		_, err = eb.store.AppendEvents(conversationID, evs)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	for i := range evs {

internal/runmgr/exec_tool_artifact_test.go

@@ -77,9 +77,11 @@ func TestRunPythonRegisterArtifactBackfill(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := tools.RegisterInterpreterTools(c.mgr.registry); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
+	// 夹具必须是结构合法的最小 docx：登记口会做 OPC 结构自检，
+	// 伪 zip（PK 魔数+垃圾字节）现在会被拒绝而非登记。
 	py := c.ExecuteTool(core.ToolCallRequest{
 		CallID: "py1", Name: "run_python",
-		Arguments: json.RawMessage(`{"script":"open('note.docx','wb').write(b'PK\\x03\\x04hello')\n"}`),
+		Arguments: json.RawMessage(`{"script":"import zipfile\nwith zipfile.ZipFile('note.docx','w') as z:\n    z.writestr('[Content_Types].xml','<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><Types/>')\n    z.writestr('word/document.xml','<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><doc/>')\n"}`),
 	})
 	if py.Status != "ok" || !strings.Contains(py.Output, "exit=0") {
 		t.Fatalf("run_python: %s %s", py.Status, py.Output)

internal/runmgr/file_effect_account_check_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+package runmgr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type checkedFileEffects interface {
+	stageInputsChecked(ctx context.Context, conv core.Conversation, eff core.EffectiveSettings, files []WorkspaceFile, check func(context.Context) error) ([]string, error)
+	persistInputTextsChecked(ctx context.Context, owner, conversation string, attachments []core.ParsedDocument, check func(context.Context) error) error
+	writeSubagentRequestChecked(ctx context.Context, run core.Run, agentID, name, task, hint string, detach bool, check func(context.Context) error) error
+	writeSubagentTranscriptChecked(ctx context.Context, run core.Run, parts []core.Part, status string, check func(context.Context) error) error
+}
+
+func checkedFiles(t *testing.T, m *Manager) checkedFileEffects {
+	t.Helper()
+	c, ok := any(m).(checkedFileEffects)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("Manager is missing checked workspace/transcript file effects")
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+func rejectAt(n int, sentinel error) (func(context.Context) error, *int) {
+	calls := 0
+	return func(ctx context.Context) error {
+		calls++
+		if calls == n {
+			return sentinel
+		}
+		return nil
+	}, &calls
+}
+
+func TestCheckedStageInputsStopsBeforeEachFileEffect(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	m := &Manager{workspaceRoot: root}
+	c := checkedFiles(t, m)
+	conv := core.Conversation{ID: "conv", Owner: "alice"}
+	denied := errors.New("account disabled")
+	check, calls := rejectAt(3, denied)
+	paths, err := c.stageInputsChecked(context.Background(), conv, core.EffectiveSettings{}, []WorkspaceFile{
+		{Name: "first.txt", Content: []byte("first")},
+		{Name: "second.txt", Content: []byte("second")},
+	}, check)
+	if !errors.Is(err, denied) || *calls != 3 || len(paths) != 1 || paths[0] != "inputs/first.txt" {
+		t.Fatalf("late file guard: paths=%v calls=%d err=%v", paths, *calls, err)
+	}
+	dir := filepath.Join(root, "alice", "conv", "inputs")
+	if body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "first.txt")); err != nil || string(body) != "first" {
+		t.Fatalf("first file should predate rejection: %q, %v", body, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "second.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("late second file was written: %v", err)
+	}
+	cancelled, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	if _, err := c.stageInputsChecked(cancelled, core.Conversation{ID: "other", Owner: "alice"}, core.EffectiveSettings{}, nil, nil); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("cancelled stage: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "alice", "other")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("cancelled stage created directory: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckedPersistTextRejectsBeforeWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	m := &Manager{workspaceRoot: root}
+	c := checkedFiles(t, m)
+	dir := filepath.Join(root, "alice", "conv", "inputs")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	docs := []core.ParsedDocument{{
+		Meta:   core.DocMeta{Filename: "minutes.docx"},
+		Blocks: []core.DocBlock{{Type: core.BlockPara, Text: strings.Repeat("substantial meeting content ", 20)}},
+	}}
+	denied := errors.New("account disabled")
+	check, calls := rejectAt(1, denied)
+	if err := c.persistInputTextsChecked(context.Background(), "alice", "conv", docs, check); !errors.Is(err, denied) || *calls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("persist guard: calls=%d err=%v", *calls, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "minutes.md")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("persist wrote after rejection: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.persistInputTextsChecked(context.Background(), "alice", "conv", docs, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "minutes.md")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("permitted persist missing: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckedSubagentTranscriptStopsBeforeAppendAndDoneMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	m := &Manager{workspaceRoot: root}
+	c := checkedFiles(t, m)
+	run := core.Run{ID: "child", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: "conv"}
+	denied := errors.New("account disabled")
+	check, calls := rejectAt(2, denied)
+	if err := c.writeSubagentRequestChecked(context.Background(), run, "agent", "name", "task", "", true, check); !errors.Is(err, denied) || *calls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("request guard: calls=%d err=%v", *calls, err)
+	}
+	dir := filepath.Join(root, "alice", "conv", "subagents", "child")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "request.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("request written after rejection: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.writeSubagentRequestChecked(context.Background(), run, "agent", "name", "task", "", true, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	check, calls = rejectAt(4, denied) // mkdir, open, first append, second append
+	parts := []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "first"}, {Type: core.PartText, Text: "second"}}
+	if err := c.writeSubagentTranscriptChecked(context.Background(), run, parts, "completed", check); !errors.Is(err, denied) || *calls != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("append guard: calls=%d err=%v", *calls, err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "transcript.jsonl"))
+	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(body), "first") || strings.Contains(string(body), "second") {
+		t.Fatalf("transcript after rejection: %q, %v", body, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "done.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("done marker written after rejection: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckedResumePassesOwnerAndStopsBeforeRedispatch(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newSpawnEnv(t, &gateRunner{})
+	c.mgr.runner = noopRunner{}
+	c.mgr.SetWorkspaceRoot(t.TempDir())
+	parent := c.run
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&parent); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	child := core.Run{
+		ID: store.NewID("run"), ParentRunID: parent.ID, ConversationID: parent.ConversationID,
+		ProjectID: parent.ProjectID, Owner: parent.Owner, Kind: core.RunSubagent,
+		ProfileID: parent.ProfileID, Status: core.RunRunning, CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&child); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.writeSubagentRequest(child, "agent.sub.explore", "name", "task", "", true)
+	if _, err := st.SealInterrupted(child.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	before, err := st.SubagentRunIDs(parent.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	denied := errors.New("account disabled")
+	var checkedOwner string
+	c.mgr.ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked(context.Background(), func(_ context.Context, owner string) error {
+		checkedOwner = owner
+		return denied
+	})
+	if checkedOwner != child.Owner {
+		t.Fatalf("resume checked owner %q, want %q", checkedOwner, child.Owner)
+	}
+	after, err := st.SubagentRunIDs(parent.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil || len(after) != len(before) {
+		t.Fatalf("denied resume spawned child: before=%d after=%d err=%v", len(before), len(after), err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(c.mgr.subagentDir(child.Owner, child.ConversationID, child.ID), "resumed.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("denied resume wrote marker: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/runmgr/genui_auto.go

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (m *Manager) maybeGenUIAuto(owner, convID, reason string) {
 		ConversationID: convID, Role: core.RoleSystem,
 		Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: text}},
 	}
-	_ = m.st.AppendMessage(&msg)
+	_ = m.appendMessageForEffectiveAccount(owner, &msg)
 }
 
 func planStageChanged(prev, next core.PlanSnapshot) bool {

internal/runmgr/inputs.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package runmgr
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -19,10 +20,20 @@ type WorkspaceFile struct {
 // StageWorkspaceInputs 把原件和可选默认模板写到 <root>/<owner>/<conversation>/inputs/。
 // root 为空时不写（工作区未配置）。返回工作区相对路径。同一批里重名的文件加序号。
 func StageWorkspaceInputs(root, owner, conversation string, files []WorkspaceFile, templateName string, template []byte) ([]string, error) {
+	return StageWorkspaceInputsChecked(context.Background(), root, owner, conversation, files, templateName, template, nil)
+}
+
+// StageWorkspaceInputsChecked rechecks the actor immediately before each
+// directory/file mutation. The caller supplies its effective-account check;
+// check and filesystem syscall cannot be atomic with an account DB commit.
+func StageWorkspaceInputsChecked(ctx context.Context, root, owner, conversation string, files []WorkspaceFile, templateName string, template []byte, check func(context.Context) error) ([]string, error) {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(root) == "" {
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 	dir := filepath.Join(root, owner, conversation, "inputs")
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -34,6 +45,9 @@ func StageWorkspaceInputs(root, owner, conversation string, files []WorkspaceFil
 			continue
 		}
 		name = uniqueInputName(name, used)
+		if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+			return rels, err
+		}
 		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), file.Content, 0o644); err != nil {
 			return rels, err
 		}
@@ -47,6 +61,9 @@ func StageWorkspaceInputs(root, owner, conversation string, files []WorkspaceFil
 			ext = filepath.Ext(base)
 		}
 		name := "_default-template" + ext
+		if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+			return rels, err
+		}
 		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), template, 0o644); err != nil {
 			return rels, err
 		}
@@ -55,13 +72,29 @@ func StageWorkspaceInputs(root, owner, conversation string, files []WorkspaceFil
 	return rels, nil
 }
 
+func checkFileEffect(ctx context.Context, check func(context.Context) error) error {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if check != nil {
+		return check(ctx)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // PersistInputTexts 把附件解析出的纯文本写成 inputs/<原名>.md，与原件并列。
 // 后续轮次的上下文里原件只剩占位时，模型仍能读到可检索的原文文本——
 // 「根据纪要制定方案」不再只能依赖上一轮产物（实测后续轮 0 次读原件）。
 // 原本就是文本类（md/txt/csv）的跳过；解析文本过短（<200 字）视为解析失败跳过。
 func PersistInputTexts(root, owner, conversation string, attachments []core.ParsedDocument) {
+	_ = PersistInputTextsChecked(context.Background(), root, owner, conversation, attachments, nil)
+}
+
+// PersistInputTextsChecked propagates a failed final check or file write so a
+// guarded caller stops before later extracted files are published.
+func PersistInputTextsChecked(ctx context.Context, root, owner, conversation string, attachments []core.ParsedDocument, check func(context.Context) error) error {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(root) == "" {
-		return
+		return nil
 	}
 	dir := filepath.Join(root, owner, conversation, "inputs")
 	for _, doc := range attachments {
@@ -82,10 +115,14 @@ func PersistInputTexts(root, owner, conversation string, attachments []core.Pars
 		if _, err := os.Stat(out); err == nil {
 			continue // 已有同名解析文本（同一附件重发）不覆盖
 		}
-		if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte(text), 0o644); err == nil {
-			_ = out
+		if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte(text), 0o644); err != nil {
+			return err
 		}
 	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 // ListWorkspaceInputs 列出会话工作区 inputs/ 目录的相对路径（原样返回给环境段）。
@@ -110,6 +147,10 @@ func ListWorkspaceInputs(root, owner, conversation string, staged []string) []st
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) stageInputs(conv core.Conversation, eff core.EffectiveSettings, files []WorkspaceFile) ([]string, error) {
+	return m.stageInputsChecked(context.Background(), conv, eff, files, nil)
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) stageInputsChecked(ctx context.Context, conv core.Conversation, eff core.EffectiveSettings, files []WorkspaceFile, check func(context.Context) error) ([]string, error) {
 	var templateName string
 	var template []byte
 	if id := strings.TrimSpace(eff.GetString("deliverables.templateArtifactId", "")); id != "" && m.st != nil {
@@ -119,7 +160,11 @@ func (m *Manager) stageInputs(conv core.Conversation, eff core.EffectiveSettings
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	return StageWorkspaceInputs(m.workspaceRoot, conv.Owner, conv.ID, files, templateName, template)
+	return StageWorkspaceInputsChecked(ctx, m.workspaceRoot, conv.Owner, conv.ID, files, templateName, template, check)
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) persistInputTextsChecked(ctx context.Context, owner, conversation string, attachments []core.ParsedDocument, check func(context.Context) error) error {
+	return PersistInputTextsChecked(ctx, m.workspaceRoot, owner, conversation, attachments, check)
 }
 
 func safeInputName(name string) (string, bool) {

internal/runmgr/knowledge_resource_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+package runmgr
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestRunKnowledgeResourceAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "allowed-slice", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: rc.run.ProjectID, Chunk: "resourcequery published"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "private-slice", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: rc.run.ProjectID, Chunk: "resourcequery private"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "restricted-self", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: rc.run.ProjectID, Chunk: "resourcequery self"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rc.mgr.SetRetriever(rag.NewPipeline(st, rc.mgr.settings, nil, nil))
+	rc.mgr.SetSharedKnowledgeAllow(func(string, core.ID) bool { return true })
+	rc.mgr.SetKnowledgeResourceAllow(func(actor string, d core.KnowledgeDoc) bool {
+		return actor == "alice" && d.ID == "allowed-slice" && d.Owner == "bob"
+	})
+	hits, err := rc.Retrieve(core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "resourcequery"})
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "allowed-slice" {
+		t.Fatalf("model-context resources: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkRevocationGuardsDirectExecution(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	rc.mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	conv, err := st.GetConversation("alice", rc.run.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := rc.mgr.StartConversationRun(conv, core.Message{}, nil, nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("direct run should reject: %v", err)
+	}
+	res := rc.ExecuteTool(core.ToolCallRequest{Name: "write_artifact", Arguments: json.RawMessage(`{"name":"forbidden.md","content":"x"}`)})
+	if res.Status != "error" {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked execution: %+v", res)
+	}
+	artifacts, err := st.ListArtifacts("alice", rc.run.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || len(artifacts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked tool wrote: %+v %v", artifacts, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunKnowledgeResolvesTrustedProjectScope(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-current", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: "domain-current", Chunk: "scopeneedle current"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-other", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: "domain-other", Chunk: "scopeneedle other"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rc.mgr.SetRetriever(rag.NewPipeline(st, rc.mgr.settings, nil, nil))
+	rc.mgr.SetKnowledgeResourceAllow(func(string, core.KnowledgeDoc) bool { return true })
+	rc.mgr.SetKnowledgeProjectScope(func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+		if actor != "alice" || id != rc.run.ProjectID {
+			t.Fatalf("untrusted scope actor=%s project=%s", actor, id)
+		}
+		return "domain-current", nil
+	})
+	hits, err := rc.Retrieve(core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "scopeneedle"})
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("model current scope: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkRevocationBlocksQueuedHITL(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	c.run.ID = "revoked-run"
+	c.run.Status = core.RunWaitingHITL
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&c.run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := &runHandle{hitlCh: make(chan hitlAnswer, 1)}
+	c.mgr.active = map[core.ID]*runHandle{c.run.ID: h}
+	card := core.HITLCard{ID: "revoked-card", RunID: c.run.ID, ConversationID: c.run.ConversationID}
+	if err := st.SaveHITLCard("alice", &card); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(func(_ context.Context, owner string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		if owner != "alice" || id != c.run.ProjectID {
+			t.Fatalf("untrusted resolution identity owner=%s project=%s", owner, id)
+		}
+		return false, nil
+	})
+	if _, _, err := c.mgr.ResolveHITL("alice", card.ID, core.HITLResponse{ChoiceID: "yes"}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked confirmation should reject: %v", err)
+	}
+	persisted, err := st.GetHITLCard("alice", card.ID)
+	if err != nil || persisted.Resolved || len(h.hitlCh) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked confirmation changed gate: card=%+v channel=%d error=%v", persisted, len(h.hitlCh), err)
+	}
+	run, err := st.GetRunByID(c.run.ID)
+	if err != nil || run.Status != core.RunWaitingHITL {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked confirmation resumed run: %+v %v", run, err)
+	}
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(HITLCommandPayload{Owner: "alice", CardID: card.ID, Kind: "yes"})
+	c.mgr.applyHITLCommand(ownedCommand{CommandID: "queued-approval", Payload: string(payload)})
+	if len(h.hitlCh) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("queued approval delivered a revoked answer")
+	}
+	run, err = st.GetRunByID(c.run.ID)
+	if err != nil || run.Status != core.RunWaitingHITL {
+		t.Fatalf("queued approval resumed run: %+v %v", run, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkRevocationAfterToolConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, choice := range []string{"yes", "session"} {
+		t.Run(choice, func(t *testing.T) {
+			c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+			c.h = &runHandle{hitlCh: make(chan hitlAnswer, 1)}
+			c.h.hitlCh <- hitlAnswer{resp: core.HITLResponse{ChoiceID: choice}}
+			c.prof.Tools.Confirm = []string{"write_artifact"}
+			ready := true
+			c.mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { ok := ready; ready = false; return ok, nil })
+			res := c.ExecuteTool(core.ToolCallRequest{CallID: "revoked-call", Name: "write_artifact", Arguments: json.RawMessage(`{"name":"revoked.txt","content":"x"}`)})
+			artifacts, err := st.ListArtifacts("alice", c.run.ProjectID)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if res.Status != "error" || len(artifacts) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("tool executed after revoked confirmation: status=%s artifacts=%d", res.Status, len(artifacts))
+			}
+			if c.mgr.sessionAllows(c.run.ConversationID, "write_artifact") {
+				t.Fatal("revoked confirmation granted session permission")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkRevocationBlocksDirectArtifactWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	c, st := newExecEnv(t)
+	c.mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	if _, err := c.WriteArtifact("revoked.txt", "data", "text/plain", []byte("private")); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("direct artifact should reject: %v", err)
+	}
+	artifacts, err := st.ListArtifacts("alice", c.run.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || len(artifacts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked artifact was written: %+v %v", artifacts, err)
+	}
+}

internal/runmgr/material_test.go

@@ -79,7 +79,23 @@ func TestMaterialIntakeAttachmentOnlyLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	close(hold.release)
-	waitUntil(t, func() bool { return len(systemTexts(t, c)) >= 1 })
+	// 等完成去重门禁本身（CardDone + materialActive 已释放），不要等 notice
+	// 副作用——deliverNotices 早于 defer materialKeyRelease，systemTexts 先可见会 race。
+	key := materialKey(materialDocs())
+	waitUntil(t, func() bool {
+		cards, err := c.mgr.cards.List(c.run.Owner, c.run.ConversationID)
+		if err != nil || len(cards) != 1 {
+			return false
+		}
+		card := cards[0]
+		if card.Title != materialCardTitle || card.Status != core.CardDone || card.Tone == "danger" {
+			return false
+		}
+		c.mgr.materialMu.Lock()
+		active := c.mgr.materialActive != nil && c.mgr.materialActive[string(c.run.ConversationID)][key]
+		c.mgr.materialMu.Unlock()
+		return !active
+	})
 
 	// 完成后同批再发：已完成说明，同样不重跑；卡片回投保留材料键。
 	c3 := secondRunCtx(c, materialDocs(), "")
@@ -259,7 +275,7 @@ func TestMaterialQueuedWhenFull(t *testing.T) {
 			return false
 		}
 		for _, card := range cards {
-			if card.Title == materialCardTitle && card.SourceRunID != "" && strings.Contains(cardBodyText(card), "执行中") {
+			if card.Title == materialCardTitle && card.SourceRunID != "" && strings.Contains(cardBodyText(card), core.TaskSummaryStatusRunning) {
 				return true
 			}
 		}

internal/runmgr/memory.go

@@ -12,9 +12,11 @@ import (
 // storeMemory 把 agent-native 的记忆端口接到 memory_entries 表（N3 WP5）。
 // owner/项目态由适配器持有（端口本身不传租户态）。
 type storeMemory struct {
-	st        *store.Store
-	owner     string
-	projectID string
+	st                   *store.Store
+	owner                string
+	projectID            string
+	checked              bool
+	allowImplicitDefault bool
 }
 
 // NewStoreMemory 构建端口实现（owner 为空时用默认租户）。
@@ -25,6 +27,10 @@ func NewStoreMemory(st *store.Store, owner, projectID string) memory.Store {
 	return &storeMemory{st: st, owner: owner, projectID: projectID}
 }
 
+func newAccountCheckedStoreMemory(st *store.Store, owner, projectID string, allowImplicitDefault bool) memory.Store {
+	return &storeMemory{st: st, owner: owner, projectID: projectID, checked: true, allowImplicitDefault: allowImplicitDefault}
+}
+
 // Recall 按 scope 过滤（空 = 不限，保持迁移前 Memories() 的全量语义），
 // 过期与空内容条目的剔除与文案渲染在 memory.Block（同一形态）。
 func (m *storeMemory) Recall(ctx context.Context, q memory.RecallQuery) ([]memory.Entry, error) {
@@ -59,6 +65,9 @@ func (c *runCtx) StoreMemory() memory.Store {
 	if c.mgr == nil || c.mgr.st == nil {
 		return nil
 	}
+	if c.mgr.accountEffectiveAuthorization != nil {
+		return newAccountCheckedStoreMemory(c.mgr.st, c.run.Owner, c.run.ProjectID, c.mgr.accountAllowImplicitLocal)
+	}
 	return NewStoreMemory(c.mgr.st, c.run.Owner, c.run.ProjectID)
 }
 
@@ -73,10 +82,16 @@ func (m *storeMemory) Append(ctx context.Context, e memory.Entry) error {
 	if created.IsZero() {
 		created = now
 	}
-	_, err := m.st.PutMemory(m.owner, core.MemoryEntry{
+	entry := core.MemoryEntry{
 		ID: e.ID, Scope: e.Scope, ProjectID: core.ID(projectID), Type: e.Type,
 		Content: e.Content, Source: e.Source, Confidence: e.Confidence,
 		CreatedAt: created, ExpiresAt: e.ExpiresAt,
-	})
+	}
+	var err error
+	if m.checked {
+		_, err = m.st.PutMemoryAccountChecked(m.owner, entry, m.allowImplicitDefault)
+	} else {
+		_, err = m.st.PutMemory(m.owner, entry)
+	}
 	return err
 }

internal/runmgr/rewind.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package runmgr
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -80,6 +81,11 @@ func (m *Manager) RewindFiles(owner, convID, messageID string) (checkpoint.Resul
 	if err != nil {
 		return checkpoint.Result{}, err
 	}
+	if m.accountEffectiveAuthorization != nil {
+		if err := m.authorizeAccountEffective(context.Background(), owner); err != nil {
+			return checkpoint.Result{}, err
+		}
+	}
 	res, err := cpLog.Rewind(messageID, ordered)
 	if err != nil {
 		return checkpoint.Result{}, err
@@ -93,7 +99,12 @@ func (m *Manager) RewindFiles(owner, convID, messageID string) (checkpoint.Resul
 		ConversationID: convID, Role: core.RoleSystem,
 		Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: note}},
 	}
-	if err := m.st.AppendMessage(&msg); err != nil {
+	if m.accountEffectiveAuthorization != nil {
+		err = m.st.AppendMessageWithRequestAccountChecked(owner, m.accountAllowImplicitLocal, &msg, "")
+	} else {
+		err = m.st.AppendMessage(&msg)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
 		return res, err
 	}
 	return res, nil

internal/runmgr/subagent_transcript.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package runmgr
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
@@ -39,51 +40,94 @@ type subagentRequest struct {
 // writeSubagentRequest 在派生时落 request.json 与空转录（失败只记日志，
 // 不阻断派生——转录是辅助面）。
 func (m *Manager) writeSubagentRequest(run core.Run, agentID, name, task, hint string, detach bool) {
+	if err := m.writeSubagentRequestChecked(context.Background(), run, agentID, name, task, hint, detach, nil); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("[runmgr] subagent request %s: %v", run.ID, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// writeSubagentRequestChecked keeps transcript file effects behind an optional
+// live account check. Failures stop later file writes; this auxiliary record
+// cannot be committed atomically with the account database.
+func (m *Manager) writeSubagentRequestChecked(ctx context.Context, run core.Run, agentID, name, task, hint string, detach bool, check func(context.Context) error) error {
 	dir := m.subagentDir(run.Owner, run.ConversationID, run.ID)
 	if dir == "" {
-		return
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("[runmgr] subagent dir %s: %v", run.ID, err)
-		return
+		return err
 	}
 	body, _ := json.MarshalIndent(subagentRequest{
 		AgentID: agentID, Name: name, Task: task, Hint: hint, Detach: detach,
 		CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 	}, "", "  ")
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "request.json"), body, 0o644); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("[runmgr] subagent request %s: %v", run.ID, err)
+		return err
 	}
 	// 转录文件先建（append 语义清晰可见）。
-	if _, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "transcript.jsonl"), os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0o644); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("[runmgr] subagent transcript %s: %v", run.ID, err)
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "transcript.jsonl"), os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0o644)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return f.Close()
 }
 
 // writeSubagentTranscript 把本次收集到的 parts 追加进转录并落 done 标记。
 // status 是终态（completed/failed/cancelled/interrupted）。
 func (m *Manager) writeSubagentTranscript(run core.Run, parts []core.Part, status string) {
+	if err := m.writeSubagentTranscriptChecked(context.Background(), run, parts, status, nil); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("[runmgr] subagent transcript %s: %v", run.ID, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) writeSubagentTranscriptChecked(ctx context.Context, run core.Run, parts []core.Part, status string, check func(context.Context) error) error {
 	dir := m.subagentDir(run.Owner, run.ConversationID, run.ID)
 	if dir == "" {
-		return
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
-		return
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
 	f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "transcript.jsonl"), os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0o644)
 	if err != nil {
-		log.Printf("[runmgr] transcript open %s: %v", run.ID, err)
-		return
+		return err
 	}
 	enc := json.NewEncoder(f)
 	for i, p := range parts {
-		_ = enc.Encode(map[string]any{"index": i, "type": string(p.Type), "text": p.Text, "at": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
+		if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+			_ = f.Close()
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := enc.Encode(map[string]any{"index": i, "type": string(p.Type), "text": p.Text, "at": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}); err != nil {
+			_ = f.Close()
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
-	_ = f.Close()
 	done, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"status": status, "endedAt": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "done.json"), done, 0o644); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("[runmgr] done marker %s: %v", run.ID, err)
+	if err := checkFileEffect(ctx, check); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "done.json"), done, 0o644); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 // doneStatus 读 done.json 的 status（无文件或不可读按 "interrupted" 处理——
@@ -122,12 +166,24 @@ func readSubagentRequest(dir string) (*subagentRequest, error) {
 // 未完成未续跑的，用原请求重新派生（后台），并把前次转录路径写进 hint
 // 供模型读取后继续（N2 WP5 的「可恢复」）。幂等：done/resumed 标记跳过。
 func (m *Manager) ResumeInterruptedChildren() {
+	m.ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked(context.Background(), nil)
+}
+
+// ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked rechecks each run owner before redispatch
+// and before writing the resumed marker. A disable between redispatch and the
+// marker can still leave a spawned run without this file; DB/file atomicity is
+// unavailable, so callers must keep the run admission guard as well.
+func (m *Manager) ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked(ctx context.Context, check func(context.Context, string) error) {
 	runs, err := m.st.ListInterruptedSubagentRuns()
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Printf("[runmgr] resume scan: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
 	for _, run := range runs {
+		if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("[runmgr] resume cancelled: %v", err)
+			return
+		}
 		// 恢复隔离（协作存储 U3）：未知外部副作用的 run 不自动续跑——hold
 		// 未解除即跳过；判定出错同样跳过（fail-closed：宁可人工核对，不盲重派）。
 		if held, herr := m.st.HasOpenRecoveryHold(string(run.ID), string(run.ConversationID)); herr != nil || held {
@@ -162,6 +218,10 @@ func (m *Manager) ResumeInterruptedChildren() {
 		}
 		hint := req.Hint + "\n（本任务是前次中断后的自动续跑；前次转录在 " +
 			filepath.Join(dir, "transcript.jsonl") + "，可读取后继续。）"
+		if err := checkOwnerFileEffect(ctx, run.Owner, check); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("[runmgr] resume skip %s: account check: %v", run.ID, err)
+			continue
+		}
 		newID, err := m.spawnBackground(parent, req.AgentID, req.Name, req.Task, hint)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Printf("[runmgr] resume spawn %s: %v", run.ID, err)
@@ -171,6 +231,10 @@ func (m *Manager) ResumeInterruptedChildren() {
 			"newRun":    newID,
 			"resumedAt": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 		})
+		if err := checkOwnerFileEffect(ctx, run.Owner, check); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("[runmgr] resumed marker skip %s: account check: %v", run.ID, err)
+			continue
+		}
 		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "resumed.json"), marker, 0o644); err != nil {
 			log.Printf("[runmgr] resumed marker %s: %v", run.ID, err)
 		}
@@ -178,6 +242,13 @@ func (m *Manager) ResumeInterruptedChildren() {
 	}
 }
 
+func checkOwnerFileEffect(ctx context.Context, owner string, check func(context.Context, string) error) error {
+	if check == nil {
+		return checkFileEffect(ctx, nil)
+	}
+	return checkFileEffect(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error { return check(ctx, owner) })
+}
+
 func fileExists(path string) bool {
 	_, err := os.Stat(path)
 	return err == nil

internal/runtime/llm_test.go

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ type fakeRunCtx struct {
 	memEntries          []memEntry // 非空时 StoreMemory 返回之（N3 WP5 记忆注入断言用）
 	usageTotal          core.Usage // AddUsage 累计（N3 WP6 记账断言用）
 	bgCalls             int
-	runtimeExtra        map[string]any       // 覆盖 runtime 组设置（双速提醒阈值等测试用）
+	runtimeExtra        map[string]any        // 覆盖 runtime 组设置（双速提醒阈值等测试用）
 	attachments         []core.ParsedDocument // Attachments 返回值（双速入口前置提示测试用）
 	spawnAgentFn        func(agentID, name, task, hint string) (core.AgentResultPayload, error)
 	execStatus          string // 非空时覆盖 ExecuteTool 状态（R4 失败链测试）

internal/server/account_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestAdminAccountSearchFiltersAndVersionedCursor(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	alice, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "alice-search", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", Phone: "private-needle"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "bob-search", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", Phone: "other"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	search := func(query url.Values) (int, struct {
+		Accounts []struct {
+			UserID string `json:"userId"`
+			Owner  string `json:"owner"`
+		} `json:"accounts"`
+		NextCursor string `json:"nextCursor"`
+	}) {
+		response := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/users/search?"+query.Encode(), "", admin)
+		var page struct {
+			Accounts []struct {
+				UserID string `json:"userId"`
+				Owner  string `json:"owner"`
+			} `json:"accounts"`
+			NextCursor string `json:"nextCursor"`
+		}
+		_ = json.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &page)
+		return response.Code, page
+	}
+	params := url.Values{"query": {"同名"}, "mode": {"fuzzy"}, "fields": {"name"}, "limit": {"1"}}
+	code, first := search(params)
+	if code != http.StatusOK || len(first.Accounts) != 1 || first.Accounts[0].UserID != alice.ID || first.NextCursor == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("first search page: %d %+v", code, first)
+	}
+	params.Set("cursor", first.NextCursor)
+	other := New(st, srv.mgr, srv.reg, srv.prof, srv.set, srv.plugins)
+	other.Auth = srv.Auth
+	h = other.Handler()
+	code, second := search(params)
+	if code != http.StatusOK || len(second.Accounts) != 1 || second.Accounts[0].UserID != bob.ID || second.NextCursor != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("second search page on another server: %d %+v", code, second)
+	}
+	params.Del("cursor")
+	params.Set("query", "private-needle")
+	params.Set("fields", "phone")
+	params.Set("mode", "exact")
+	code, contact := search(params)
+	if code != http.StatusOK || len(contact.Accounts) != 1 || contact.Accounts[0].UserID != alice.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("authorized contact search: %d %+v", code, contact)
+	}
+	params.Set("query", "同名")
+	params.Set("fields", "name")
+	params.Set("mode", "fuzzy")
+	params.Set("cursor", first.NextCursor)
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion, map[string]string{"phone": "changed-private"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	code, _ = search(params)
+	if code != http.StatusConflict {
+		t.Fatalf("private profile edit did not expire system cursor: %d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSelfProfileRequiresPasswordAuthenticatedFullSession(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("self-profile-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("legacy-self", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("legacy-self"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	legacyCookie, err := st.CreateSession("legacy-self")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/me", "", legacyCookie); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("historical full session lost ordinary identity: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/me/profile", "", legacyCookie); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown session lineage read profile: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "PATCH", "/api/me/profile", `{"expectedProfileVersion":1,"patch":{"name":"injected"}}`, legacyCookie); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown session lineage edited profile: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	login := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"legacy-self","password":"self-profile-password"}`, "")
+	if login.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("password login: %d %s", login.Code, login.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/me/profile", "", cookieOf(login)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verified password session could not read profile: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAccountHTTPPendingCreateProfileAndDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	adminCookie := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	for _, body := range []string{
+		`{"owner":"blocked-password","password":"old-pass-9"}`,
+		`{"owner":"blocked-admin","isAdmin":true}`,
+	} {
+		if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/admin/users", body, adminCookie); rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("unsafe create accepted: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := st.GetUser("blocked-password"); err != store.ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("unsafe create had side effect: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice","profile":{"name":"同名"}}`, adminCookie)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("pending create: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	var created struct {
+		UserID         string `json:"userId"`
+		Owner          string `json:"owner"`
+		ProfileVersion int64  `json:"profileVersion"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &created); err != nil || created.UserID == "" || created.Owner != "alice" || created.ProfileVersion != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("create projection: %+v %v", created, err)
+	}
+	rec = do(h, "PATCH", "/api/admin/users/"+created.UserID+"/profile", `{"expectedProfileVersion":1,"patch":{"phone":"123"}}`, adminCookie)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("profile patch: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	rec = do(h, "PATCH", "/api/admin/users/"+created.UserID+"/profile", `{"expectedProfileVersion":2,"patch":{"isAdmin":"true"}}`, adminCookie)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("privilege field accepted: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	rec = do(h, "PUT", "/api/admin/users/"+created.UserID+"/state", `{"expectedStateVersion":1,"enabled":false}`, adminCookie)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("disable: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccount(created.UserID)
+	if err != nil || account.Enabled || account.Profile.Phone != "123" {
+		t.Fatalf("state/profile after disable: %+v %v", account, err)
+	}
+}

internal/server/account_effect_guard.go

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+package server
+
+// checkActorBeforeExternalEffect is the last effective-state check before a
+// process-local or filesystem effect. Such effects cannot share the account
+// database transaction, so callers must also use cancellation where available.
+func (s *Server) checkActorBeforeExternalEffect(actor string) error {
+	return s.st.CheckEffectiveAccountForExternalEffect(actor, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
+}

internal/server/account_search.go

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"sort"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+type adminSearchCursor struct {
+	KeyVersion int    `json:"k"`
+	Version    string `json:"v"`
+	Owner      string `json:"o"`
+	UserID     string `json:"u"`
+}
+
+func (s *Server) signAdminCursor(cursor adminSearchCursor) string {
+	cursor.KeyVersion = s.accountSearchKey.Version
+	data, _ := json.Marshal(cursor)
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.accountSearchKey.Secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-admin-search-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data) + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) parseAdminCursor(encoded, version string) (adminSearchCursor, bool) {
+	var cursor adminSearchCursor
+	payload, signature, found := strings.Cut(encoded, ".")
+	if !found {
+		return cursor, false
+	}
+	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil || len(data) > 1024 {
+		return cursor, false
+	}
+	provided, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(signature)
+	if err != nil {
+		return cursor, false
+	}
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.accountSearchKey.Secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-admin-search-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	if !hmac.Equal(provided, mac.Sum(nil)) || json.Unmarshal(data, &cursor) != nil || cursor.KeyVersion != s.accountSearchKey.Version || cursor.Version != version || cursor.Owner == "" || cursor.UserID == "" {
+		return adminSearchCursor{}, false
+	}
+	return cursor, true
+}
+
+func searchAccountField(account store.Account, field string) string {
+	switch field {
+	case "userId":
+		return account.ID
+	case "owner":
+		return account.Owner
+	case "name":
+		return account.Profile.Name
+	case "phone":
+		return account.Profile.Phone
+	case "email":
+		return account.Profile.Email
+	case "staffNo":
+		return account.Profile.StaffNo
+	case "department":
+		return account.Profile.Department
+	case "notes":
+		return account.Profile.Notes
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func (s *Server) searchAdminUsers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.accountSearchKeyErr != nil || s.accountSearchKey.Version < 1 {
+		http.Error(w, "account directory signing unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	params := r.URL.Query()
+	query := strings.TrimSpace(params.Get("query"))
+	if !utf8.ValidString(query) || utf8.RuneCountInString(query) > 128 {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid account search query", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	for _, ch := range query {
+		if unicode.IsControl(ch) {
+			http.Error(w, "invalid account search query", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	mode := params.Get("mode")
+	if mode == "" {
+		mode = "fuzzy"
+	}
+	if mode != "exact" && mode != "fuzzy" {
+		http.Error(w, "unknown account search mode", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	status := params.Get("status")
+	if status == "" {
+		status = "all"
+	}
+	if status != "all" && status != "enabled" && status != "disabled" {
+		http.Error(w, "unknown account status filter", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	limit := 20
+	if raw := params.Get("limit"); raw != "" {
+		parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
+		if err != nil || parsed < 1 || parsed > 100 {
+			http.Error(w, "invalid account search limit", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		limit = parsed
+	}
+	fields := []string{"owner", "name", "userId"}
+	if raw := params.Get("fields"); raw != "" {
+		fields = strings.Split(raw, ",")
+	}
+	allowed := map[string]bool{"owner": true, "name": true, "userId": true, "phone": true, "email": true,
+		"staffNo": true, "department": true, "notes": true}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, field := range fields {
+		if !allowed[field] || seen[field] {
+			http.Error(w, "unknown or duplicate account search field", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		seen[field] = true
+	}
+	sort.Strings(fields)
+	accounts, revision, err := s.st.ListAdminAccountsForActor(actor)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	visibleRevision := sha256.Sum256([]byte(revision.Private))
+	directoryVersion := hex.EncodeToString(visibleRevision[:])
+	fingerprint, _ := json.Marshal(struct {
+		Actor, Query, Mode, Status, Revision string
+		Fields                               []string
+	}{actor, query, mode, status, directoryVersion, fields})
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(fingerprint)
+	version := hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+	var after adminSearchCursor
+	if token := params.Get("cursor"); token != "" {
+		var valid bool
+		after, valid = s.parseAdminCursor(token, version)
+		if !valid {
+			http.Error(w, "account search cursor expired or invalid", http.StatusConflict)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	page := make([]store.Account, 0, limit+1)
+	for _, account := range accounts {
+		if status == "enabled" && !account.Enabled || status == "disabled" && account.Enabled {
+			continue
+		}
+		if after.Owner != "" && (account.Owner < after.Owner || account.Owner == after.Owner && account.ID <= after.UserID) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if query != "" {
+			matched := false
+			for _, field := range fields {
+				value := searchAccountField(account, field)
+				if mode == "exact" && strings.EqualFold(value, query) || mode == "fuzzy" && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(value), strings.ToLower(query)) {
+					matched = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !matched {
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		page = append(page, account)
+		if len(page) > limit {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	more := len(page) > limit
+	if more {
+		page = page[:limit]
+	}
+	items := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(page))
+	for _, account := range page {
+		items = append(items, accountProfileJSON(account))
+	}
+	next := ""
+	if more {
+		last := page[len(page)-1]
+		next = s.signAdminCursor(adminSearchCursor{Version: version, Owner: last.Owner, UserID: last.ID})
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"accounts": items, "nextCursor": next, "directoryVersion": directoryVersion})
+}

internal/server/account_sse_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestAccountDisableStopsNextSSEBusinessFrame(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "admin-hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("sse-user", "", "user-hash", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("sse-user"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	user, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("sse-user")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("sse-user", "stream")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("sse-user", project.ID, "stream", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	selected := make(chan core.StreamEvent, 1)
+	srv.Subscribe = func(string) (<-chan core.StreamEvent, func()) { return selected, func() {} }
+	token, err := st.CreateSession("sse-user")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	httpServer := httptest.NewServer(srv.Handler())
+	defer httpServer.Close()
+	request, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, httpServer.URL+"/api/events?conversationId="+conv.ID, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: token})
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 3 * time.Second}
+	response, err := client.Do(request)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	reader := bufio.NewReader(response.Body)
+	first, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
+	if err != nil || !strings.HasPrefix(first, "retry:") {
+		t.Fatalf("SSE did not open: %q %v", first, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", user.ID, user.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	selected <- core.StreamEvent{ConversationID: conv.ID, Seq: 1, Type: core.EvToolOutput,
+		Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"text":"must-not-stream"}`)}
+	tail, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked stream did not close: %v", err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(tail), "must-not-stream") {
+		t.Fatal("disabled account received the next SSE business frame")
+	}
+	if _, _, ok := st.SessionInfo(token); ok {
+		t.Fatal("disabled account session still authenticates")
+	}
+}

internal/server/account_write_fence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type pausedRequestBody struct {
+	reader  io.Reader
+	entered chan struct{}
+	release chan struct{}
+	once    sync.Once
+}
+
+func (b *pausedRequestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	b.once.Do(func() { close(b.entered) })
+	<-b.release
+	return b.reader.Read(p)
+}
+
+func (*pausedRequestBody) Close() error { return nil }
+
+func TestProjectCreateCannotCommitAfterAccountDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	_ = bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("actor-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("actor", "Actor", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("actor"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("actor", "request")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("actor")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body := &pausedRequestBody{reader: strings.NewReader(`{"name":"late-project"}`), entered: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/projects", body)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		close(done)
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-body.entered:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("project request never reached its body")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	close(body.release)
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("request did not finish after disable")
+	}
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled request committed: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	var n int
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM projects WHERE owner='actor'`).Scan(&n); err != nil || n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("late project row count=%d err=%v", n, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUserMessageCannotCommitAfterAccountDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	_ = bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "actor", "request")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("actor")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("actor", "fixture")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := st.CreateConversation("actor", string(project.ID), "fixture", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body := &pausedRequestBody{reader: strings.NewReader(`{"text":"late message"}`), entered: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/conversations/"+string(conversation.ID)+"/messages", body)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		close(done)
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-body.entered:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("message request never reached its body")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	close(body.release)
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("message request did not finish after disable")
+	}
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled message request committed: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	var n int
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM messages WHERE conversation_id=?`, conversation.ID).Scan(&n); err != nil || n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("late message count=%d err=%v", n, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAdminCannotDownloadOtherOwnersThroughDatabaseBackup(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	rec := do(h, http.MethodPost, "/api/admin/backup", "{}", admin)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("system admin received all-owner database backup: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegenerationCannotChangeMessageAfterAccountDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	_ = bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "actor", "regenerate")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("actor")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("actor", "fixture")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("actor", string(project.ID), "fixture", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	user := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleUser, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "question"}}}
+	target := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleAssistant, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "answer"}}}
+	if err := st.AppendMessage(&user); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.AppendMessage(&target); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body := &pausedRequestBody{reader: strings.NewReader(`{"messageId":"` + target.ID + `"}`), entered: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/conversations/"+string(conv.ID)+"/regenerate", body)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		close(done)
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-body.entered:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("regeneration request never reached its body")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	close(body.release)
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("regeneration did not finish after disable")
+	}
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled regeneration status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	got, err := st.MessageByID(target.ID)
+	if err != nil || got.Excluded || got.VariantGroup != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected regeneration changed target: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+	if _, _, ok := st.PeekRegenPending(string(conv.ID)); ok {
+		t.Fatal("rejected regeneration left marker")
+	}
+}

internal/server/accounts.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
+	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -23,6 +24,19 @@ func decodeJSON(r *http.Request, v any) error {
 	return json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(v)
 }
 
+func decodeStrictJSON(r *http.Request, v any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(v); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	var extra any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&extra); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return errors.New("exactly one JSON object required")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // 登录失败退避（进程内；管理员发放制下用户量小，进程内即可，实例重启清零）。
 var loginGuard = struct {
 	sync.Mutex
@@ -60,20 +74,75 @@ func loginClear(owner string) {
 	delete(loginGuard.fails, owner)
 }
 
-func setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, token string, maxAge int) {
+// 兑换入口退避：共享库窗口计数（v29 redeem_attempts），多实例共担同一限流；
+// Key 无属主可先行归因，只能按来源 IP 限流。
+const (
+	redeemMaxFails = 10
+	redeemWindow   = loginLockWindow
+)
+
+// requestSecure 判断请求是否经 HTTPS（直连 TLS 或反代 X-Forwarded-Proto 标头）。
+func requestSecure(r *http.Request) bool {
+	return r.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
+}
+
+func setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token string, maxAge int) {
 	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
 		Name: SessionCookie, Value: token, Path: "/", HttpOnly: true,
-		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, MaxAge: maxAge,
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, MaxAge: maxAge, Secure: requestSecure(r),
 	})
 }
 
 func authStateJSON(st store.UserAuthState) map[string]any {
 	return map[string]any{
 		"owner": st.Owner, "name": st.Name, "isAdmin": st.IsAdmin,
-		"mustChangePassword": st.MustChangePassword, "auth": true,
+		"mustChangePassword": st.MustChangePassword, "passwordSet": st.HasPassword,
+		"auth": true,
 	}
 }
 
+// redeemLoginKey：一次性登录 Key → set_password_only 会话（专用 body，不经 Bearer）。
+// 请求只有 Key：身份由服务端绑定记录确定；按来源 IP 退避防爆破。
+func (s *Server) redeemLoginKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	if s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled {
+		http.Error(w, "auth disabled (embedded single-tenant mode)", http.StatusPreconditionFailed)
+		return
+	}
+	ip, _, _ := strings.Cut(r.RemoteAddr, ":")
+	if xf := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xf != "" {
+		ip = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(xf, ",")[0])
+	}
+	if blocked, err := s.st.RedeemBlocked(ip, redeemMaxFails, redeemWindow); err == nil && blocked {
+		http.Error(w, "too many failed attempts; retry later", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		Key string `json:"key"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	token, owner, err := s.st.RedeemLoginKey(strings.TrimSpace(req.Key))
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = s.st.RecordRedeemFailure(ip) // 尽力记录；限流判定的权威在 RedeemBlocked
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+			http.Error(w, "login key already used", http.StatusConflict)
+			return
+		}
+		http.Error(w, "invalid or expired login key", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	setSessionCookie(w, r, token, int(10*60))
+	st, _ := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+	out := authStateJSON(st)
+	out["sessionScope"] = store.SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly
+	out["passwordChangeMode"] = store.PasswordChangeModeGrantSetup
+	out["reloginRequired"] = false
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
+}
+
 // login：用户名+密码 → 会话。失败统一 401（不区分账号是否存在）；
 // 连续失败触发进程内退避（429）。
 func (s *Server) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -98,20 +167,35 @@ func (s *Server) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "too many failed attempts; retry later", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 		return
 	}
-	st, ok := s.st.VerifyLogin(owner, req.Password)
+	st, ver, ok := s.st.VerifyLoginWithVersion(owner, req.Password)
 	if !ok {
 		loginFail(owner)
 		http.Error(w, "invalid owner or password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 		return
 	}
 	loginClear(owner)
-	token, err := s.st.CreateSession(owner)
+	// 待改密/未设密：建受限会话（只能设密）；否则正常会话。会话创建绑定
+	// 认证版本——密码验证在途期间账户被恢复/重置时本请求不得再建会话。
+	scope := store.SessionScopeFull
+	maxAge := 7 * 24 * 3600
+	if st.MustChangePassword || !st.HasPassword {
+		scope = store.SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly
+		maxAge = 10 * 60
+	}
+	token, err := s.st.CreateSessionVerified(owner, scope, time.Duration(maxAge)*time.Second, ver)
 	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+			http.Error(w, "credentials changed concurrently; retry login", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
-	setSessionCookie(w, token, 7*24*3600)
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, authStateJSON(st))
+	setSessionCookie(w, r, token, maxAge)
+	out := authStateJSON(st)
+	out["sessionScope"] = scope
+	out["passwordChangeMode"] = store.PasswordChangeModeCurrentRequired
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
 }
 
 // logout：注销当前会话。
@@ -119,23 +203,30 @@ func (s *Server) logout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if tok := sessionToken(r); tok != "" {
 		s.st.DeleteSession(tok)
 	}
-	setSessionCookie(w, "", -1)
+	setSessionCookie(w, r, "", -1)
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
 }
 
-// changePassword：会话登录者改密。校验当前密码 → 新哈希落库 → 清 must_change →
-// 吊销其余会话（保留当前）。重置后的首登改密走同一路径。
+// changePassword：会话登录者改密。
+//   - 受限会话或 must_change/未设密：不要求 current；事务内复验会话与认证版本，
+//     完成后销毁全部会话，要求重新密码登录（reloginRequired=true）。
+//   - 普通主动改密：要求 current；单事务完成校验、更新、吊销其他会话（保留当前）。
 func (s *Server) changePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	tok := sessionToken(r)
 	if tok == "" {
 		http.Error(w, "session login required (API keys do not own passwords)", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 		return
 	}
-	owner, ok := s.st.SessionOwner(tok)
+	owner, scope, ok := s.st.SessionInfo(tok)
 	if !ok {
 		http.Error(w, "session expired", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 		return
 	}
+	mode, err := s.st.SessionPasswordChangeMode(tok)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
 	var req struct {
 		Current string `json:"current"`
 		Next    string `json:"next"`
@@ -144,10 +235,6 @@ func (s *Server) changePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if _, ok := s.st.VerifyLogin(owner, req.Current); !ok {
-		http.Error(w, "current password incorrect", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-		return
-	}
 	if err := validPassword(req.Next); err != nil {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
@@ -157,18 +244,48 @@ func (s *Server) changePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.st.SetUserPassword(owner, hash); err != nil {
+	if scope == store.SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly {
+		var completeErr error
+		switch mode {
+		case store.PasswordChangeModeGrantSetup:
+			_, completeErr = s.st.CompleteSetPasswordChecked(tok, hash)
+		case store.PasswordChangeModeCurrentRequired:
+			_, completeErr = s.st.CompleteForcedPasswordChecked(tok, req.Current, hash)
+		default:
+			http.Error(w, "unsupported password change mode", http.StatusForbidden)
+			return
+		}
+		if completeErr != nil {
+			if errors.Is(completeErr, store.ErrBadCredentials) {
+				http.Error(w, "current password incorrect", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+				return
+			}
+			if errors.Is(completeErr, store.ErrNotFound) {
+				http.Error(w, "session expired", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+				return
+			}
+			writeStoreErr(w, completeErr)
+			return
+		}
+		setSessionCookie(w, r, "", -1)
+		st, _ := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+		out := authStateJSON(st)
+		out["reloginRequired"] = true
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.st.ChangeUserPasswordActive(owner, req.Current, hash, tok); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrBadCredentials) {
+			http.Error(w, "current password incorrect", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	// SetUserPassword 置了 must_change=1（重置语义）；本人主动改密后即清除。
-	if err := s.st.ClearMustChangePassword(owner); err != nil {
-		writeStoreErr(w, err)
-		return
-	}
-	s.st.DeleteUserSessions(owner, tok)
 	st, _ := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, authStateJSON(st))
+	out := authStateJSON(st)
+	out["reloginRequired"] = false
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
 }
 
 func validPassword(pw string) error {
@@ -186,7 +303,7 @@ func validPassword(pw string) error {
 func (s *Server) requireAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
 	owner := s.owner(r)
 	st, err := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
-	if err != nil || !st.IsAdmin {
+	if err != nil || !st.Enabled || !st.IsAdmin || s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled {
 		http.Error(w, "admin required", http.StatusForbidden)
 		return "", false
 	}
@@ -202,16 +319,15 @@ func (s *Server) listAdminUsers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 }
 
 func (s *Server) createAdminUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); !ok {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
 	var req struct {
-		Owner    string `json:"owner"`
-		Name     string `json:"name"`
-		Password string `json:"password"`
-		IsAdmin  bool   `json:"isAdmin"`
+		Owner   string               `json:"owner"`
+		Profile store.AccountProfile `json:"profile"`
 	}
-	if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
@@ -220,57 +336,171 @@ func (s *Server) createAdminUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "owner required (no spaces or slashes)", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := validPassword(req.Password); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, "initial password must be 8+ characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(req.Password)
+	account, err := s.st.CreatePendingAccount(actor, req.Owner, req.Profile)
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := s.st.CreateAccount(req.Owner, strings.TrimSpace(req.Name), hash, req.IsAdmin); err != nil {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	st, _ := s.st.GetUserAuthState(req.Owner)
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"owner": st.Owner, "name": st.Name, "isAdmin": st.IsAdmin,
-		"mustChangePassword": st.MustChangePassword,
-	})
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accountProfileJSON(account))
 }
 
-// resetAdminUserPassword：管理员重置密码 → must_change=1，吊销该用户全部会话。
-func (s *Server) resetAdminUserPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+func accountProfileJSON(account store.Account) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"userId": account.ID, "owner": account.Owner, "profile": account.Profile,
+		"profileVersion": account.ProfileVersion, "enabled": account.Enabled,
+		"stateVersion": account.StateVersion, "isAdmin": account.IsAdmin,
+		"passwordSet": account.HasPassword, "initializationState": account.InitializationState,
+		"initializationGeneration": account.InitializationGeneration,
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *Server) requireFullPasswordSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
+	if s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled || AuthVia(r) != AuthViaSession || SessionScope(r) != store.SessionScopeFull {
+		http.Error(w, "full password session required", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return "", false
+	}
+	token := sessionToken(r)
+	owner, scope, valid := s.st.SessionInfo(token)
+	if !valid || scope != store.SessionScopeFull || owner != s.owner(r) {
+		http.Error(w, "full password session required", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return "", false
+	}
+	st, err := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+	if err != nil || !st.Enabled || st.MustChangePassword || !st.HasPassword {
+		http.Error(w, "full password session required", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return "", false
+	}
+	method, err := s.st.SessionAuthMethod(token)
+	if err != nil || method != store.AuthMethodPassword {
+		http.Error(w, "password-authenticated session required", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return owner, true
+}
+
+func (s *Server) meProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	owner, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	account, err := s.st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accountProfileJSON(account))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) patchMeProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	owner, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	account, err := s.st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	s.patchAccountProfile(w, r, owner, account.ID)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) adminAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	owner := r.PathValue("owner")
-	var req struct {
-		Password string `json:"password"`
-	}
-	if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := validPassword(req.Password); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, "new password must be 8+ characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(req.Password)
+	account, err := s.st.GetAccount(r.PathValue("userId"))
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := s.st.SetUserPassword(owner, hash); err != nil {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	s.st.DeleteUserSessions(owner, "")
-	st, _ := s.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"owner": st.Owner, "mustChangePassword": st.MustChangePassword,
-	})
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accountProfileJSON(account))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) patchAdminAccountProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	s.patchAccountProfile(w, r, actor, r.PathValue("userId"))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) patchAccountProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, actor, userID string) {
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedProfileVersion int64             `json:"expectedProfileVersion"`
+		Patch                  map[string]string `json:"patch"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil || req.Patch == nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid profile patch", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	account, err := s.st.PatchAccountProfile(actor, userID, req.ExpectedProfileVersion, req.Patch)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accountProfileJSON(account))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) setAdminAccountState(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedStateVersion int64 `json:"expectedStateVersion"`
+		Enabled              *bool `json:"enabled"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil || req.Enabled == nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid state change", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	account, err := s.st.SetAccountEnabled(actor, r.PathValue("userId"), req.ExpectedStateVersion, *req.Enabled)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accountProfileJSON(account))
+}
+
+// resetAdminUserPassword：管理员直接重置密码（兼容保留的既有入口；常规恢复
+// 走签发一次性登录 Key）。单事务：must_change=1、bump auth_version、作废未用
+// 登录 Key、吊销全部会话、审计。
+func (s *Server) resetAdminUserPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); ok {
+		http.Error(w, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: propose recovery instead", http.StatusGone)
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- 管理员：一次性登录 Key（恢复流程主入口）----
+
+// issueAdminLoginKey：为指定既有用户签发恢复 Key（明文仅本次响应返回）。
+// 同事务撤销旧恢复 Key 及其受限会话；不改密码、不吊销正常会话、不动业务数据。
+func (s *Server) issueAdminLoginKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); ok {
+		http.Error(w, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: propose recovery instead", http.StatusGone)
+	}
+}
+
+// listAdminLoginKeys：指定用户的 Key 状态与有效期（不返回明文）。
+func (s *Server) listAdminLoginKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	keys, err := s.st.ListLoginKeys(r.PathValue("owner"))
+	writeJSONOr(w, map[string]any{"keys": keys}, err)
+}
+
+// revokeAdminLoginKey：撤销 Key 并作废其关联受限会话。
+func (s *Server) revokeAdminLoginKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.st.RevokeLoginKeyCascadeAdmin(actor, r.PathValue("owner"), r.PathValue("id")); err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
 }
 
 // RandomPassword 生成随机初始密码（管理员/CLI 未显式给定密码时）。
@@ -294,7 +524,8 @@ func (s *Server) listRecoveryHolds(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // releaseRecoveryHold 人工解除单条 hold（幂等）；解除后该 run 才可能被再次
 // 续跑/接管。副作用未核对就解除的风险由操作者承担——与 task-close 同级谨慎。
 func (s *Server) releaseRecoveryHold(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	if _, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r); !ok {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
 	runID := r.PathValue("runId")
@@ -302,5 +533,5 @@ func (s *Server) releaseRecoveryHold(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ReleaseRecoveryHold(runID))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ReleaseRecoveryHoldAccountChecked(actor, runID, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }

internal/server/adminzone_test.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func TestListAdminZoneSections(t *testing.T) {
 		}},
 	}
 	h := srv.Handler()
-	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}

internal/server/api_key_fixture_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// createLegacyAPIKeyFixture creates the historical integration identity
+// explicitly before exercising the formal, non-creating key issuance path.
+func createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, owner, name string) (string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return st.CreateAPIKey(owner, name)
+}

internal/server/audit_scope_test.go

@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ func TestCommandAuditOwnerScoping(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
 
-	aliceKey, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	aliceKey, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	bobKey, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "e2e")
+	bobKey, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}

internal/server/auth.go

@@ -14,13 +14,16 @@ type ownerCtxKey struct{}
 // authViaCtxKey 携带凭证通道（AuthViaKey / AuthViaSession；未启用认证与豁免路径为空）。
 type authViaCtxKey struct{}
 
+// sessionScopeCtxKey 携带会话 scope（full / set_password_only）。
+type sessionScopeCtxKey struct{}
+
 // 凭证通道值：/api/me 的 authVia 字段；前端据此区分「改密门」只对会话登录者放行。
 const (
 	AuthViaKey     = "key"
 	AuthViaSession = "session"
 )
 
-// Authenticator 是 API key 认证（阶段 1：user 即租户）。
+// Authenticator 是 API key 认证（阶段 1：owner 即租户）。
 // Enabled=false（嵌入式档默认，回环本地单用户）时全部请求回落默认租户。
 // SSE 的 EventSource 无法带 Authorization 头，允许 ?key= 查询参数兜底。
 type Authenticator struct {
@@ -41,41 +44,97 @@ func (a *Authenticator) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(withOwner(r, store.OwnerDefault)))
 			return
 		}
-		// 豁免：静态前端（登录页须可加载）与登录入口本身。
 		p := r.URL.Path
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/") || p == "/api/auth/login" {
+		// 豁免：静态前端、登录、一次性 Key 兑换（body 专用，不走 Bearer）。
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/") || p == "/api/auth/login" || p == "/api/auth/login-key/redeem" || p == "/api/auth/recovery-grants/redeem" {
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 			return
 		}
-		// 凭证二选一：Authorization: Bearer <api key>（程序化；?key= 兼容 SSE 老客户端）
-		// 或会话 cookie（浏览器登录；2026-09-30 R2 管理员发放制）。
-		// 失效 key 不一票否决：浏览器 localStorage 可能残留已吊销 key（前端对所有请求
-		// 附加 Bearer 头），会话 cookie 仍有效时回落会话；程序化客户端不带 cookie，
-		// 行为不变（两者都无效才 401）。
 		key := bearerKey(r)
 		if key == "" {
 			key = r.URL.Query().Get("key")
 		}
+		if key != "" && sessionToken(r) != "" {
+			http.Error(w, "conflicting credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
+		// 一次性登录 Key 不得经 Bearer / ?key= 使用。
+		if strings.HasPrefix(key, "alk_") {
+			http.Error(w, "unauthorized: one-time login keys must use /api/auth/login-key/redeem", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
+		var owner string
+		var via string
+		var scope string
+		ok := false
 		if key != "" {
-			if owner, ok := a.st.AuthOwner(key); ok {
-				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(withAuthVia(withOwner(r, owner), AuthViaKey)))
+			if o, keyOK := a.st.AuthOwner(key); keyOK {
+				owner, via, scope, ok = o, AuthViaKey, store.SessionScopeFull, true
+			} else {
+				http.Error(w, "unauthorized: invalid or revoked API key", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 				return
 			}
-			if owner, ok := cookieOwner(r, a.st); ok {
-				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(withAuthVia(withOwner(r, owner), AuthViaSession)))
-				return
-			}
-			http.Error(w, "unauthorized: invalid or revoked API key", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		} else if o, sc, sessOK := cookieSession(r, a.st); sessOK {
+			owner, via, scope, ok = o, AuthViaSession, sc, true
+		}
+		if !ok {
+			http.Error(w, "unauthorized: login required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 			return
 		}
-		if owner, ok := cookieOwner(r, a.st); ok {
-			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(withAuthVia(withOwner(r, owner), AuthViaSession)))
+		ctx := withAuthVia(withOwner(r, owner), via)
+		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, sessionScopeCtxKey{}, scope)
+		if err := a.enforcePasswordGate(w, r, owner, via, scope, p); err != nil {
 			return
 		}
-		http.Error(w, "unauthorized: login required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
 	})
 }
 
+func (a *Authenticator) enforcePasswordGate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, owner, via, scope, path string) error {
+	allow := path == "/api/me" || path == "/api/auth/password" || path == "/api/auth/logout" ||
+		path == "/api/health"
+	if scope == store.SessionScopeSetPasswordOnly {
+		if !allow {
+			http.Error(w, "forbidden: set-password session only", http.StatusForbidden)
+			return errGate
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	st, err := a.st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+	if err != nil || !st.Enabled {
+		http.Error(w, "unauthorized: account unavailable", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return errGate
+	}
+	// 长期 API Key：仅当 must_change（已有密码待改）时拒绝业务，防止绕过改密门；
+	// 无密码的纯集成账户仍可走 Key（与历史 apikey 语义兼容）。
+	if via == AuthViaKey {
+		if st.MustChangePassword && !allow {
+			http.Error(w, "forbidden: password change required", http.StatusForbidden)
+			return errGate
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	// 会话：待改密或尚未设密 → 只允许身份/设密/退出。
+	if (st.MustChangePassword || !st.HasPassword) && !allow {
+		http.Error(w, "forbidden: password setup required", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return errGate
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+var errGate = errorsGate{}
+
+type errorsGate struct{}
+
+func (errorsGate) Error() string { return "gate" }
+
+func cookieSession(r *http.Request, st *store.Store) (owner, scope string, ok bool) {
+	if tok := sessionToken(r); tok != "" {
+		return st.SessionInfo(tok)
+	}
+	return "", "", false
+}
+
 // cookieOwner 会话 cookie 有效时返回其 owner。
 func cookieOwner(r *http.Request, st *store.Store) (string, bool) {
 	if tok := sessionToken(r); tok != "" {
@@ -108,6 +167,14 @@ func AuthVia(r *http.Request) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// SessionScope 返回当前会话 scope（非会话为空）。
+func SessionScope(r *http.Request) string {
+	if v, ok := r.Context().Value(sessionScopeCtxKey{}).(string); ok {
+		return v
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
 func bearerKey(r *http.Request) string {
 	h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
 	if strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {

internal/server/auth_e2e_test.go

@@ -36,7 +36,11 @@ func newAuthTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	return newAuthTestServerOnStore(t, st, dir), st
+}
 
+func newAuthTestServerOnStore(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, dir string) *Server {
+	t.Helper()
 	b := bus.New()
 	reg := tools.NewRegistry()
 	reg.RegisterBuiltin()
@@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ func newAuthTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store) {
 	srv := New(st, mgr, reg, profSvc, setSvc, ph)
 	srv.Auth = NewAuthenticator(st, true)
 	srv.Subscribe = func(cid string) (<-chan core.StreamEvent, func()) { return b.Subscribe(cid) }
-	return srv, st
+	return srv
 }
 
 func TestAuthMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// 创建密钥。
-	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -103,8 +107,8 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
 func TestTenantIsolationHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
-	keyA, _ := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "a")
-	keyB, _ := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "b")
+	keyA, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "a")
+	keyB, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "b")
 
 	do := func(key, method, path string, body any) int {
 		var buf bytes.Buffer
@@ -321,21 +325,47 @@ func TestAdminAccountFlow(t *testing.T) {
 		return rec
 	}
 
-	// 会话可访问 API；/api/me 携带身份与管理员位。
+	// /api/me 允许 must_change；业务 API 拒绝（U4 设密门）。
 	if rec := session("GET", "/api/me", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"isAdmin":true`) {
 		t.Fatalf("me via session: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
+	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice","name":"爱丽丝","password":"alice-init-01"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("must_change admin must be gated before create: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	// 历史初始密码必须提供 current；成功后销毁会话，须重新密码登录。
+	if rec := session("POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"boot-pass-00","next":"admin-final-9"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK ||
+		!strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"reloginRequired":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("admin force set-password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := session("GET", "/api/me", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("admin session must die after set-password: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"admin","password":"admin-final-9"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("admin relogin after set-password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	tok = strings.Split(strings.Split(rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie"), SessionCookie+"=")[1], ";")[0]
 
-	// 管理员建号（普通用户，初始密码）。
-	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice","name":"爱丽丝","password":"alice-init-01"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+	// 管理员只建无凭据的普通账号；历史强制改密夹具由 Store 直接设置。
+	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice","profile":{"name":"爱丽丝"}}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Fatalf("admin create user: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
 	// 重名冲突 409。
-	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-init-01"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
+	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"alice"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
 		t.Fatalf("duplicate owner must 409: %d", rec.Code)
 	}
+	legacyHash, err := store.HashPassword("alice-init-01")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.SetUserPassword("alice", legacyHash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 
-	// alice 首登：mustChangePassword=true；改密后清除。
+	// alice 首登：mustChangePassword=true；业务 API 被设密门拒绝。
 	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-init-01"}`))
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -358,16 +388,19 @@ func TestAdminAccountFlow(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
 		t.Fatalf("alice first login must force change: %s", rec.Body.String())
 	}
-	// alice 非管理员：建号被拒 403。
 	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"bob","password":"bob-init-001"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
-		t.Fatalf("non-admin create must 403: %d", rec.Code)
+		t.Fatalf("must_change non-admin create must 403: %d", rec.Code)
 	}
-	// alice 改密（错误当前密码 → 401；成功 → must_change 清除）。
-	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"bad","next":"alice-final-9"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-		t.Fatalf("wrong current password: %d", rec.Code)
+	// must_change 改密要求 current；短密码拒绝；成功后 reloginRequired。
+	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"short"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("short password must 400: %d", rec.Code)
 	}
-	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"alice-init-01","next":"alice-final-9"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
-		t.Fatalf("alice change password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"alice-init-01","next":"alice-final-9"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK ||
+		!strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"reloginRequired":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("alice force set-password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := alice("GET", "/api/me", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("alice session must die after set-password: %d", rec.Code)
 	}
 	// 旧密码不能再登录；新密码可以且无需改密。
 	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-init-01"}`))
@@ -377,24 +410,36 @@ func TestAdminAccountFlow(t *testing.T) {
 	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
 		t.Fatalf("old password must fail after change: %d", rec.Code)
 	}
-
-	// 管理员重置 alice 密码 → 其旧会话吊销 + 首登再改密。
-	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users/alice/password", `{"password":"reset-init-02"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("admin reset: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
-	}
-	if rec := alice("GET", "/api/me", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-		t.Fatalf("alice old session must be revoked after reset: %d", rec.Code)
-	}
-	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"reset-init-02"}`))
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-final-9"}`))
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
-		t.Fatalf("reset must force change on next login: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("alice relogin: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	aliceTok = strings.Split(strings.Split(rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie"), SessionCookie+"=")[1], ";")[0]
+	// 已设密普通用户：建号仍 403（非管理员）。
+	if rec := alice("POST", "/api/admin/users", `{"owner":"bob","password":"bob-init-001"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("non-admin create must 403: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+
+	// 旧管理员重置入口关闭，不能动 alice 的密码与当前会话。
+	if rec := session("POST", "/api/admin/users/alice/password", `{"password":"reset-init-02"}`); rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
+		t.Fatalf("admin reset must be closed: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := alice("GET", "/api/me", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("closed reset must preserve alice session: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-final-9"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"mustChangePassword":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("closed reset must preserve normal login: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
 
 	// API key 通道兼容：密钥登录照旧（并具备其 owner 身份）。
-	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("admin", "cli")
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "admin", "cli")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -413,7 +458,7 @@ func TestAdminAccountFlow(t *testing.T) {
 		rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
 		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
 	}
-	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"reset-init-02"}`))
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"alice","password":"alice-final-9"}`))
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
@@ -430,8 +475,8 @@ func TestAdminAccountFlow(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestStaleKeySessionFallback：浏览器残留失效 Bearer key 时，有效会话不被一票否决；
-// /api/me 的 authVia 区分凭证通道（key / session），供前端区分改密门放行范围。
+// TestStaleKeySessionFallback：混合 Bearer 与 cookie 的认证上下文不确定，必须拒绝。
+// /api/me 的 authVia 仍区分单独有效的 key / session。
 func TestStaleKeySessionFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
@@ -452,14 +497,14 @@ func TestStaleKeySessionFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	tok := strings.Split(strings.Split(rec.Header().Get("Set-Cookie"), SessionCookie+"=")[1], ";")[0]
 
-	// 会话 + 失效 key：回落会话（200，authVia=session），不再被 key 一票否决。
+	// 会话 + 失效 key：拒绝混合凭证，不把有效 cookie 当证明兜底。
 	req = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/me", nil)
 	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: tok})
 	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer ask_stale_key")
 	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"authVia":"session"`) {
-		t.Fatalf("stale key + valid session must fall back to session: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("stale key + valid session must be rejected: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
 
 	// 失效 key 且无会话：仍 401（key 专属文案）。
@@ -472,7 +517,7 @@ func TestStaleKeySessionFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// 有效 key：authVia=key。
-	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("carol", "cli")
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "carol", "cli")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -493,3 +538,79 @@ func TestStaleKeySessionFallback(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("me via session: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
 	}
 }
+
+// TestSystemSettingsAdminGate：P2 系统设置面按管理员准入——普通账号 403，
+// 管理员可读写且值对所有租户生效；普通账号写受管项仍 400。
+func TestSystemSettingsAdminGate(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("init-pass-01")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("boss", "管理员甲", hash, true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("dave", "普通乙", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	keyBoss, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "boss", "cli")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	keyDave, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "dave", "cli")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// 初始密码改密门不参与本测试对象（受管拦截语义），先解除。
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("boss"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("dave"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	do := func(key, method, path string, body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		var rd io.Reader
+		if body != "" {
+			rd = strings.NewReader(body)
+		}
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, rd)
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+		if body != "" {
+			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		}
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		return rec
+	}
+
+	// 普通账号：读写系统面均 403；写受管项走 user 面仍是 400（先于管理员判定也成立）。
+	if rec := do(keyDave, "GET", "/api/settings/system", ""); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("dave get system: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if rec := do(keyDave, "PUT", "/api/settings/system", `{"models":{"chat":{"model":"m-dave"}}}`); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("dave put system: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if rec := do(keyDave, "PUT", "/api/settings/user", `{"models":{"chat":{"model":"m-dave"}}}`); rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("dave managed via user: %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(keyDave, "PUT", "/api/settings/user", `{"ui":{"theme":"light"}}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("dave non-managed via user: %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// 管理员：写入生效，系统读面掩码返回，dave 的有效设置拿到系统值。
+	if rec := do(keyBoss, "PUT", "/api/settings/system", `{"models":{"chat":{"model":"m-boss","apiKey":"sk-boss-secret"}}}`); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("boss put system: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	rec := do(keyBoss, "GET", "/api/settings/system", "")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("boss get system: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "sk-boss-secret") {
+		t.Fatalf("system read leaked secret key")
+	}
+	if eff := settings.NewService(st).Effective("dave", ""); eff.GetString("models.chat.model", "") != "m-boss" {
+		t.Fatalf("system value not effective for dave: %q", eff.GetString("models.chat.model", ""))
+	}
+}

internal/server/borrow.go

@@ -28,16 +28,20 @@ func (s *Server) createSecret(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	sec, err := s.st.AddSecret(s.owner(r), req.Service, req.Label, req.Value)
+	if strings.TrimSpace(req.Service) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(req.Value) == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "store: secret service and value are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	sec, err := s.st.AddSecretAccountChecked(s.owner(r), req.Service, req.Label, req.Value, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, sec)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) activateSecret(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ActivateSecret(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id")))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ActivateSecretAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) renameSecret(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -48,11 +52,11 @@ func (s *Server) renameSecret(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.RenameSecret(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), req.Label))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.RenameSecretAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), req.Label, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) deleteSecret(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.DeleteSecret(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id")))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.DeleteSecretAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) listContextEntries(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -67,16 +71,20 @@ func (s *Server) saveContextEntry(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	saved, err := s.st.SaveContextEntry(s.owner(r), e)
+	if strings.TrimSpace(e.Content) == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "store: entry content required", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	saved, err := s.st.SaveContextEntryAccountChecked(s.owner(r), e, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, saved)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) deleteContextEntry(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.DeleteContextEntry(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id")))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.DeleteContextEntryAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) listUserPromptCommands(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -90,31 +98,46 @@ func (s *Server) saveUserPromptCommand(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	saved, err := s.st.SaveUserCommand(s.owner(r), c)
-	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+	if strings.TrimSpace(c.Template) == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "store: command template required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	s.registerUserPrompt(saved)
+	owner := s.owner(r)
+	allowImplicitDefault := s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled
+	saved, err := s.st.SaveUserCommandAccountChecked(owner, c, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if s.Bus != nil {
+		// The Bus is outside the database transaction. Recheck immediately before
+		// mutation; a disable between this check and RegisterUser remains possible.
+		if err := s.st.CheckEffectiveAccountForExternalEffect(owner, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+			writeStoreErr(w, err)
+			return
+		}
+		s.registerUserPrompt(saved)
+	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, saved)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) deleteUserPromptCommand(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	owner := s.owner(r)
 	id := r.PathValue("id")
-	list, _ := s.st.ListUserCommands(owner)
-	var name string
-	for _, c := range list {
-		if c.ID == id {
-			name = c.Name
-		}
-	}
-	if err := s.st.DeleteUserCommand(owner, id); err != nil {
+	allowImplicitDefault := s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled
+	deleted, err := s.st.DeleteUserCommandAccountChecked(owner, id, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	if s.Bus != nil && name != "" {
-		s.Bus.UnregisterUser(userCommandID(name), name)
+	if s.Bus != nil && deleted.Name != "" {
+		// The account check is the last database action before the Bus mutation;
+		// the two systems cannot share an atomic commit.
+		if err := s.st.CheckEffectiveAccountForExternalEffect(owner, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+			writeStoreErr(w, err)
+			return
+		}
+		s.Bus.UnregisterUser(userCommandID(deleted.Name), deleted.Name)
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"deleted": id})
 }
@@ -140,7 +163,7 @@ func (s *Server) excludeMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ExcludeRunGroup(msg.ID, excluded))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.ExcludeRunGroupAccountChecked(s.owner(r), msg.ID, excluded, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) selectVariant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -153,7 +176,7 @@ func (s *Server) selectVariant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
-	writeOKOr(w, s.st.SelectVariant(msg.ID))
+	writeOKOr(w, s.st.SelectVariantAccountChecked(s.owner(r), msg.ID, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled))
 }
 
 func (s *Server) regenerateMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -164,6 +187,10 @@ func (s *Server) regenerateMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
+	if err := s.projectWork(r.Context(), owner, conv.ProjectID); err != nil {
+		writeProjectErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
 	var req struct {
 		MessageID string `json:"messageId"`
 	}
@@ -183,11 +210,7 @@ func (s *Server) regenerateMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	var user core.Message
 	found := false
-	maxIndex := target.VariantIndex
 	for _, m := range hist {
-		if m.VariantGroup != "" && m.VariantGroup == target.VariantGroup && m.VariantIndex > maxIndex {
-			maxIndex = m.VariantIndex
-		}
 		if m.ID == target.ID {
 			found = true
 		}
@@ -199,19 +222,8 @@ func (s *Server) regenerateMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "no user turn to regenerate", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	group := target.VariantGroup
-	if group == "" {
-		group = "var_" + target.ID
-	}
-	if err := s.st.SetMessageFlags(target.ID, true, group, target.VariantIndex); err != nil {
-		writeStoreErr(w, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := s.st.ExcludeRunGroup(target.ID, true); err != nil {
-		writeStoreErr(w, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := s.st.SetRegenPending(convID, group, maxIndex+1); err != nil {
+	group, index, err := s.st.PrepareRegenerationAccountChecked(owner, convID, target.ID, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
+	if err != nil {
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -220,7 +232,7 @@ func (s *Server) regenerateMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	run, err := s.mgr.StartConversationRun(conv, user, nil, nil)
 	if err != nil {
-		_, _, _ = s.st.TakeRegenPending(convID)
+		_ = s.st.ClearRegenPendingAfterFailedStart(owner, convID, group, index, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -277,6 +289,11 @@ func (s *Server) appendUserPromptCommands(owner string, out []map[string]any) []
 		return out
 	}
 	for _, c := range list {
+		if s.Bus != nil {
+			if err := s.st.CheckEffectiveAccountForExternalEffect(owner, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled); err != nil {
+				return out
+			}
+		}
 		s.registerUserPrompt(c)
 		out = append(out, map[string]any{
 			"id": userCommandID(c.Name), "name": c.Name, "title": c.Title,

internal/server/borrow_account_write_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestBorrowWritesCannotCommitAfterAccountDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, path, body, table string
+	}{
+		{"secret", "/api/secrets", `{"service":"late","value":"hidden"}`, "secret_keys"},
+		{"context", "/api/context-entries", `{"content":"late"}`, "context_entries"},
+		{"command", "/api/prompt-commands", `{"name":"late","template":"late"}`, "user_commands"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+			h := srv.Handler()
+			_ = bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+			key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "actor", "borrow")
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("actor")
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			body := &pausedRequestBody{reader: strings.NewReader(tc.body), entered: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, tc.path, body)
+			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			done := make(chan struct{})
+			go func() {
+				h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+				close(done)
+			}()
+			select {
+			case <-body.entered:
+			case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("request did not reach its body")
+			}
+			if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			close(body.release)
+			select {
+			case <-done:
+			case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("request did not finish")
+			}
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Fatalf("late write status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			var count int
+			if err := st.DB().QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM " + tc.table + " WHERE owner='actor'").Scan(&count); err != nil || count != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("late rows=%d err=%v", count, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBorrowImplicitLocalCannotWriteWhenExplicitlyDisabled(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newTestServer(t)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	secret, err := st.AddSecret(store.OwnerDefault, "service", "original", "hidden")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	entry, err := st.SaveContextEntry(store.OwnerDefault, store.ContextEntry{Content: "original"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	command, err := st.SaveUserCommand(store.OwnerDefault, store.UserCommand{Name: "original", Template: "original"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureUser(store.OwnerDefault, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ method, path, body string }{
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/secrets", `{"service":"late","value":"hidden"}`},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/secrets/" + secret.ID + "/activate", ""},
+		{http.MethodPatch, "/api/secrets/" + secret.ID, `{"label":"late"}`},
+		{http.MethodDelete, "/api/secrets/" + secret.ID, ""},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/context-entries", `{"content":"late"}`},
+		{http.MethodDelete, "/api/context-entries/" + entry.ID, ""},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/prompt-commands", `{"name":"late","template":"late"}`},
+		{http.MethodDelete, "/api/prompt-commands/" + command.ID, ""},
+	} {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, strings.NewReader(tc.body)))
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Fatalf("disabled local account wrote %s: %d %s", tc.path, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if value, ok := st.ActiveSecret(store.OwnerDefault, "service"); !ok || value != "hidden" {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected secret mutations changed active value: %q %v", value, ok)
+	}
+	entries, err := st.ListContextEntries(store.OwnerDefault, "", "")
+	if err != nil || len(entries) != 1 || entries[0].Content != "original" {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected context mutations changed rows: %+v %v", entries, err)
+	}
+	commands, err := st.ListUserCommands(store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || len(commands) != 1 || commands[0].Template != "original" {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected command mutations changed rows: %+v %v", commands, err)
+	}
+	srv.appendUserPromptCommands(store.OwnerDefault, nil)
+	for _, registered := range srv.Bus.List() {
+		if registered.Spec.ID == "user.original" {
+			t.Fatal("disabled account registered a command during listing")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBorrowPromptCommandBusFollowsCommittedWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/prompt-commands", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"local","template":"hello"}`)))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("save command: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	commands, err := st.ListUserCommands(store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || len(commands) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("saved command missing: %+v %v", commands, err)
+	}
+	registered := false
+	for _, command := range srv.Bus.List() {
+		registered = registered || command.Spec.ID == "user.local"
+	}
+	if !registered {
+		t.Fatal("committed command was not registered in the Bus")
+	}
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/prompt-commands/"+commands[0].ID, nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("delete command: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	for _, command := range srv.Bus.List() {
+		if command.Spec.ID == "user.local" {
+			t.Fatal("deleted command remained registered in the Bus")
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/server/compiled_list_test.go

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func TestListPluginsMergesCompiled(t *testing.T) {
 		{ID: "generative-ui", Commands: []string{"generative-ui.present"}},
 	}
 	h := srv.Handler()
-	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	key, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}

internal/server/e2e_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 
 	agentcommand "agent-command"
@@ -48,15 +49,27 @@ func newTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
-	_ = st.MergeSettingsScope(store.OwnerDefault, settings.ScopeUser, map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}})
-
 	b := bus.New()
 	reg := tools.NewRegistry()
 	reg.RegisterBuiltin()
 	setSvc := settings.NewService(st)
+	// P2 受管：runtime.mock 是系统受管项，mock 驱动改经系统层写入（对所有租户生效）。
+	if err := setSvc.MergeSystem(map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	profSvc := profiles.New(st)
 	profSvc.EnsureDefault()
 	mgr := runmgr.New(st, b, reg, profSvc, setSvc, &runtime.LLMRunner{}, &runtime.SubLLMRunner{}, &runtime.MockRunner{}, &runtime.MockSubagent{})
+	mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) && owner == store.OwnerDefault {
+			return true, nil
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return false, err
+		}
+		return account.Enabled, nil
+	}, true)
 	pluginDir := filepath.Join(dir, "plugins")
 	os.MkdirAll(pluginDir, 0o755)
 	ph := plugins.New(st, reg, setSvc, pluginDir)
@@ -64,6 +77,7 @@ func newTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store) {
 	// 生产同款装配（app.go）：卡片事件经 runmgr 事件缓冲持久化/发布——项目流
 	//（project:<id> 伪键，D50）依赖它；此前为 no-op emitter，事件不入库。
 	cardSvc := cardsvc.New(st, mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	cardSvc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
 	srv.Cards = cardSvc
 	mgr.SetCards(cardSvc) // run 内产卡（摄取/编排/submit_card）经 runmgr，与 app.go 装配一致
 	srv.Bus = cmdbus.New(st, srv.Cards, nil)
@@ -1010,41 +1024,59 @@ func TestSquadOrchestration(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Fatal("squad deliverable artifact not found")
 }
 
-// TestModelRoutingOverrideChain：设置覆盖链集成（defaults → user → project）
-// 与画像层最终覆盖——经由真实 run 的失败信息携带解析出的模型名取证。
+// TestModelRoutingOverrideChain：P2 受管语义下的模型配置链路——models.* 是系统
+// 受管项，user/project 层整笔拒绝（含嵌套与点路径），仅系统层可写；画像层模型名
+// 仍是最终覆盖。经由真实 run 的失败信息携带解析出的模型名取证。
 func TestModelRoutingOverrideChain(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
 	projectID, convID := setupConversation(t, h)
 
-	set := func(body map[string]any, path string) {
-		code, out := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", path, body)
-		if code != 200 {
-			t.Fatalf("PUT %s: %d %v", path, code, out)
+	// user/project 层写受管项 → 400（含点路径与整体子树覆盖）。
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		path string
+		body map[string]any
+	}{
+		{"nested user", "/api/settings/user", map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "model-A"}}}},
+		{"dotted user", "/api/settings/user", map[string]any{"models.chat.model": "model-A"}},
+		{"nested project", "/api/settings/project/" + projectID, map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "model-B"}}}},
+		{"subtree smash user", "/api/settings/user", map[string]any{"models": "smash"}},
+	} {
+		code, out := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", tc.path, tc.body)
+		if code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: PUT %s = %d %v，want 400", tc.name, tc.path, code, out)
 		}
 	}
 
-	// user 层：model-A。
-	set(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "model-A"}}}, "/api/settings/user")
-	eff := settings.NewService(st).Effective(store.OwnerDefault, projectID)
-	if got := eff.GetString("models.chat.model", ""); got != "model-A" {
-		t.Fatalf("user layer: %q", got)
-	}
-	// project 层：model-B（覆盖 user）。
-	set(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "model-B"}}}, "/api/settings/project/"+projectID)
-	eff = settings.NewService(st).Effective(store.OwnerDefault, projectID)
-	if got := eff.GetString("models.chat.model", ""); got != "model-B" {
-		t.Fatalf("project layer should win: %q", got)
-	}
-	// 设置 API 呈现两层。
-	code, out := doJSON(t, h, "GET", "/api/settings?project="+projectID, nil)
+	// 系统层（无认证测试档 = 本机管理员）写入生效。
+	code, out := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/system", map[string]any{
+		"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "model-SYS"}},
+	})
 	if code != 200 {
-		t.Fatal("get settings failed")
+		t.Fatalf("system write: %d %v", code, out)
+	}
+	if eff := settings.NewService(st).Effective(store.OwnerDefault, projectID); eff.GetString("models.chat.model", "") != "model-SYS" {
+		t.Fatalf("system layer not effective: %q", eff.GetString("models.chat.model", ""))
+	}
+	// 系统 GET 面：schema 携带 scope，系统值脱敏返回。
+	code, out = doJSON(t, h, "GET", "/api/settings/system", nil)
+	if code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("get system: %d %v", code, out)
+	}
+	sysView := out
+	if sysView["system"] == nil || sysView["schema"] == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("system view malformed: %#v", sysView)
+	}
+	// 非受管项仍可走 user 层（回归）。
+	if code, _ := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/user", map[string]any{"ui": map[string]any{"theme": "light"}}); code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("non-managed user write rejected")
 	}
-	_ = out
 
-	// 画像层：model-C 为最终覆盖。关 mock → 发消息 → run 失败信息携带解析结果。
-	set(map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": false}}, "/api/settings/user")
+	// 画像层：model-C 为最终覆盖。关 mock（系统层）→ 发消息 → run 失败信息携带解析结果。
+	if code, _ := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/system", map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": false}}); code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal("disable mock via system layer failed")
+	}
 	prof := mustCode(t, h, "POST", "/api/profiles", map[string]any{
 		"id": "prof_route_c", "name": "路由C", "systemPrompt": "x",
 		"model":   map[string]any{"chat": "model-C"},
@@ -1205,18 +1237,27 @@ func TestProjectInbox(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestSettingsDottedKeyAndSecretMask：点路径写入生效、嵌套胜出、掩码不回写、GET 不回明文。
+// TestSettingsDottedKeyAndSecretMask：点路径写入生效、受管密钥归系统层、
+// 掩码不回写、user/system 读面均不回明文、user 面不回显受管项（P2）。
 func TestSettingsDottedKeyAndSecretMask(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
+	svc := settings.NewService(st)
+
 	set := func(body map[string]any) {
 		t.Helper()
 		code, out := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/user", body)
 		if code != 200 {
-			t.Fatalf("PUT: %d %v", code, out)
+			t.Fatalf("PUT user: %d %v", code, out)
+		}
+	}
+	setSys := func(body map[string]any) {
+		t.Helper()
+		code, out := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/system", body)
+		if code != 200 {
+			t.Fatalf("PUT system: %d %v", code, out)
 		}
 	}
-	svc := settings.NewService(st)
 
 	set(map[string]any{"runtime.entry": "squad"})
 	if got := svc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetString("runtime.entry", ""); got != "squad" {
@@ -1232,21 +1273,25 @@ func TestSettingsDottedKeyAndSecretMask(t *testing.T) {
 
 	const pool = "tvly-should-not-leak"
 	const modelKey = "sk-should-not-leak"
-	set(map[string]any{"tools": map[string]any{"tavily": map[string]any{"apiKeys": pool}}})
-	set(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": modelKey}}})
-	set(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": settings.MaskPlaceholder}}})
-	set(map[string]any{
-		"tools":                map[string]any{"tavily": map[string]any{"apiKeys": "nested-wins"}},
-		"tools.tavily.apiKeys": "flat-loses",
-	})
+	// P2 受管：密钥项 user 层整笔拒绝，系统层写入生效。
+	if code, _ := doJSON(t, h, "PUT", "/api/settings/user", map[string]any{
+		"tools": map[string]any{"tavily": map[string]any{"apiKeys": pool}},
+	}); code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("managed pool write via user should 400, got %d", code)
+	}
+	setSys(map[string]any{"tools": map[string]any{"tavily": map[string]any{"apiKeys": pool}}})
+	setSys(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": modelKey}}})
+	// 掩码回写经系统层：不覆盖已存明文。
+	setSys(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": settings.MaskPlaceholder}}})
 	eff := svc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
 	if got := eff.GetString("models.chat.apiKey", ""); got != modelKey {
 		t.Fatalf("mask writeback overwrote key: %q", got)
 	}
-	if got := eff.GetString("tools.tavily.apiKeys", ""); got != "nested-wins" {
-		t.Fatalf("nested form should win, got %q", got)
+	if got := eff.GetString("tools.tavily.apiKeys", ""); got != pool {
+		t.Fatalf("system pool not effective: %q", got)
 	}
 
+	// 读面：user 面不回显受管项；系统面返回掩码；两个面都不泄漏明文。
 	code, out := doJSON(t, h, "GET", "/api/settings", nil)
 	if code != 200 {
 		t.Fatalf("GET settings: %d", code)
@@ -1255,19 +1300,36 @@ func TestSettingsDottedKeyAndSecretMask(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	for _, secret := range []string{pool, modelKey, "nested-wins", "flat-loses"} {
+	for _, secret := range []string{pool, modelKey} {
 		if strings.Contains(string(blob), secret) {
-			t.Fatalf("GET leaked %q", secret)
+			t.Fatalf("GET /api/settings leaked %q", secret)
 		}
 	}
 	user := out["user"].(map[string]any)
-	tavily := user["tools"].(map[string]any)["tavily"].(map[string]any)
-	if tavily["apiKeys"] != settings.MaskPlaceholder {
-		t.Fatalf("apiKeys mask = %v", tavily["apiKeys"])
+	if user["models"] != nil || user["tools"] != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("managed subtrees exposed in user scope: %#v", user)
 	}
-	chat := user["models"].(map[string]any)["chat"].(map[string]any)
+	code, sys := doJSON(t, h, "GET", "/api/settings/system", nil)
+	if code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("GET system: %d", code)
+	}
+	sysBlob, err := json.Marshal(sys)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, secret := range []string{pool, modelKey} {
+		if strings.Contains(string(sysBlob), secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("GET /api/settings/system leaked %q", secret)
+		}
+	}
+	sysValues := sys["system"].(map[string]any)
+	tavily := sysValues["tools"].(map[string]any)["tavily"].(map[string]any)
+	if tavily["apiKeys"] != settings.MaskPlaceholder {
+		t.Fatalf("system apiKeys mask = %v", tavily["apiKeys"])
+	}
+	chat := sysValues["models"].(map[string]any)["chat"].(map[string]any)
 	if chat["apiKey"] != settings.MaskPlaceholder {
-		t.Fatalf("apiKey mask = %v", chat["apiKey"])
+		t.Fatalf("system apiKey mask = %v", chat["apiKey"])
 	}
 }
 

internal/server/ext9_upload_switch_test.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
 func TestUploadPreIndexSwitch(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
-	alice, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	alice, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}

internal/server/login_key_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestRedeemLoginKeyRestrictedSession(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "admin-hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "carol", store.AccountProfile{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	plain, err := st.InitializePendingAccount(account.ID, account.StateVersion, account.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"key": plain})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("redeem: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	cookie := rec.Result().Cookies()
+	var sess string
+	for _, c := range cookie {
+		if c.Name == SessionCookie {
+			sess = c.Value
+		}
+	}
+	if sess == "" {
+		t.Fatal("missing session cookie")
+	}
+	// 业务拒绝
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/projects", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: sess})
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("projects want 403, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	// me 允许
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/me", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: sess})
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("me: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	// 设密后要求重新登录
+	pwBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"next": "carol-final-99"})
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/password", bytes.NewReader(pwBody))
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: sess})
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !bytes.Contains(rec.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"reloginRequired":true`)) {
+		t.Fatalf("set password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}

internal/server/login_recovery_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+package server
+
+// 登录恢复流程 HTTP 合同（2026-10-13）：管理员签发一次性登录 Key → 用户兑换 →
+// 受限会话强制设密 → 重新密码登录；must-change 首登同样建受限会话。
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// bootAdmin：建管理员并完成首登改密，返回已放行的会话 cookie 值。
+func bootAdmin(t *testing.T, h http.Handler, st *store.Store) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	bootHash, err := store.HashPassword("boot-pass-00")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", bootHash, true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"admin","password":"boot-pass-00"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("boot login: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	tok := cookieOf(rec)
+	if tok == "" {
+		t.Fatal("missing session cookie")
+	}
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/password", strings.NewReader(`{"current":"boot-pass-00","next":"admin-final-9"}`))
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: tok})
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("boot set password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"admin","password":"admin-final-9"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("relogin: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	return cookieOf(rec)
+}
+
+func cookieOf(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
+	for _, ck := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
+		if ck.Name == SessionCookie {
+			return ck.Value
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func reqWithCookie(method, path, body, cookie string) *http.Request {
+	var rdr *bytes.Reader
+	if body != "" {
+		rdr = bytes.NewReader([]byte(body))
+	} else {
+		rdr = bytes.NewReader(nil)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, rdr)
+	if cookie != "" {
+		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: cookie})
+	}
+	if body != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	}
+	return req
+}
+
+func do(h http.Handler, method, path, body, cookie string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, reqWithCookie(method, path, body, cookie))
+	return rec
+}
+
+// 管理员签发 → 列表无明文 → 兑换 → 受限 → 设密 → 新密码登录。
+func TestAdminLoginKeyRecoveryFlow(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("victim-old-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("victim", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	legacy, _, err := st.IssueLoginKey("victim", store.LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "legacy-admin", 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/admin/users/victim/login-keys", `{}`, admin); rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
+		t.Fatalf("administrator secret issuance must be closed: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", `{"key":"`+legacy+`"}`, ""); rec.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatal("legacy administrator key redeemed after cutover")
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/users/victim/login-keys", "", admin); rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), legacy) {
+		t.Fatalf("metadata lookup leaked secret: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAdminLoginKeyReissueAndRevoke(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("victim", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	legacy, meta, err := st.IssueLoginKey("victim", store.LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "legacy-admin", 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "DELETE", "/api/admin/users/other/login-keys/"+meta.ID, "", admin); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("path owner mismatch revoked key: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "DELETE", "/api/admin/users/victim/login-keys/"+meta.ID, "", admin); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy metadata revoke: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", `{"key":"`+legacy+`"}`, ""); rec.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatal("revoked legacy key redeemed")
+	}
+}
+
+// must-change 首登：登录即建受限会话（sessionScope 回传），设密后重新登录为 full。
+func TestLoginMustChangeCreatesRestrictedSession(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	bootHash, err := store.HashPassword("temp-pass-00")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("oscar", "", bootHash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"oscar","password":"temp-pass-00"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"sessionScope":"set_password_only"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("must-change login must create restricted session: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	tok := cookieOf(rec)
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/projects", "", tok); rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("business api before set: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	rec = do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"temp-pass-00","next":"oscar-final-9"}`, tok)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("set password: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"oscar","password":"oscar-final-9"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"sessionScope":"full"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("full login after set: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// 主动改密：必须带正确 current；成功保留当前会话。
+func TestActiveChangePasswordRequiresCurrent(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	_ = srv
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "admin-hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "petra", store.AccountProfile{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	plain, err := st.InitializePendingAccount(account.ID, account.StateVersion, account.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", strings.NewReader(`{"key":"`+plain+`"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	tok := cookieOf(rec)
+	rec = do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"petra-first-8"}`, tok)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("initial set: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	// 重新登录得 full 会话。
+	req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/auth/login", strings.NewReader(`{"owner":"petra","password":"petra-first-8"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	tok = cookieOf(rec)
+	// 缺 current / 错 current 拒绝。
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"petra-second-9"}`, tok); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("active change without current: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"wrong-current","next":"petra-second-9"}`, tok); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("active change with wrong current: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	// 正确 current 成功且当前会话保留。
+	rec = do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"petra-first-8","next":"petra-second-9"}`, tok)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"reloginRequired":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("active change: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "GET", "/api/me", "", tok); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("current session must survive active change: %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/server/platform_api.go

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ func (s *Server) createBackgroundTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "kind required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	task, err := s.st.CreateBackgroundTask(s.owner(r), body.Kind, body.Title, body.ConversationID)
+	task, err := s.st.CreateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(s.owner(r), body.Kind, body.Title, body.ConversationID, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, task)
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ func (s *Server) updateBackgroundTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "status required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.st.UpdateBackgroundTask(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Status, body.Progress, body.Error); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
+	if err := s.st.UpdateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Status, body.Progress, body.Error, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled); err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	s.getBackgroundTask(w, r)
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ func (s *Server) putMemory(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if e.Source == "" {
 		e.Source = "manual"
 	}
-	saved, err := s.st.PutMemory(s.owner(r), e)
+	saved, err := s.st.PutMemoryAccountChecked(s.owner(r), e, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, saved)
@@ -119,11 +119,11 @@ func (s *Server) postAudit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "action required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.st.AppendAuditEvent(store.AuditEvent{
+	if err := s.st.AppendAuditEventAccountChecked(s.owner(r), store.AuditEvent{
 		Owner: s.owner(r), Actor: s.owner(r), Action: body.Action, Target: body.Target,
 		Evidence: body.Evidence, TraceID: r.Header.Get("X-Trace-Id"),
-	}); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled); err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ func (s *Server) setPluginEnabled(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "bad json", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.st.SetPluginEnabled(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Enabled); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	if err := s.st.SetPluginEnabledAccountChecked(s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Enabled, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled); err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -210,11 +210,11 @@ func (s *Server) submitSurface(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "pluginId and spec required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	snap, err := s.Surfaces.Submit(r.Context(), s.owner(r), body.PluginID, surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{
+	snap, err := s.Surfaces.SubmitAccountChecked(r.Context(), s.owner(r), body.PluginID, surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{
 		SurfaceID: core.ID(body.SurfaceID), ConversationID: core.ID(body.ConversationID),
 		BaseRevision: body.BaseRevision, ObservedEpoch: body.ObservedEpoch,
 		ContextVersion: body.ContextVersion, SemanticText: body.SemanticText, Spec: body.Spec,
-	})
+	}, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.writeSurfaceError(w, err)
 		return
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ func (s *Server) setSurfaceActivation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "enabled required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	row, err := s.Surfaces.SetActivation(r.Context(), s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Enabled)
+	row, err := s.Surfaces.SetActivationAccountChecked(r.Context(), s.owner(r), r.PathValue("id"), body.Enabled, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.writeSurfaceError(w, err)
 		return
@@ -273,6 +273,20 @@ func (s *Server) submitSurfaceAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "surface capability not enabled", http.StatusNotImplemented)
 		return
 	}
+	if s.projectLifecycle != nil {
+		snap, err := s.Surfaces.Get(r.Context(), s.owner(r), core.ID(r.PathValue("id")))
+		if err != nil {
+			s.writeSurfaceError(w, err)
+			return
+		}
+		if snap.Identity.ProjectID != "" {
+			if err := s.projectWork(r.Context(), s.owner(r), snap.Identity.ProjectID); err != nil {
+				writeProjectErr(w, err)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// 注意：本端点不绑定任何 confirmed 类字段——高危确认只能经既有确认卡回道
 	// （bus.Confirm）置位，客户端/模型无法伪造（U5 提案第二节第 2 条红测）。
 	var body struct {
@@ -285,10 +299,10 @@ func (s *Server) submitSurfaceAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "actionId and requestId required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	res, err := s.Surfaces.SubmitAction(r.Context(), s.owner(r), surfacesvc.SubmitActionRequest{
+	res, err := s.Surfaces.SubmitActionAccountChecked(r.Context(), s.owner(r), surfacesvc.SubmitActionRequest{
 		SurfaceID: core.ID(r.PathValue("id")), ActionID: body.ActionID,
 		Revision: body.Revision, RequestID: body.RequestID, Data: body.Data,
-	})
+	}, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.writeSurfaceError(w, err)
 		return

internal/server/project_events.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// projectStreamMembership consults the registered resource authorizer using the
+// physical project's trusted owner, never the event publisher or payload claims.
+func (s *Server) projectStreamMembership(actor, project string) bool {
+	p, err := s.st.ProjectMetadata(project)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return s.authorizeSharedResource(actor, "stream", "project", project, p.Owner, project)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) projectEventVisible(actor string, event core.StreamEvent) bool {
+	if s.projectLifecycle == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	access, err := s.st.ResolveProjectEventAccess(event)
+	if err != nil || access.Owner == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	if access.Owner == actor {
+		return true
+	}
+	project, ok := core.ProjectFromChannel(event.ConversationID)
+	return ok && access.Shared && s.projectStreamMembership(actor, project)
+}

internal/server/project_events_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cardsvc"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func projectStreamReplay(t *testing.T, s *Server, key, project string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/events?scope=project&projectId="+project+"&since=0", nil)
+	r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	// Replay can pass more than a thousand private events before the first
+	// visible frame; account checks on CI and under -race need headroom.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 2*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
+	return w
+}
+func projectEventFixture(t *testing.T) (*Server, string, string, string, *atomic.Bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	bob, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	s.Cards = cardsvc.New(st, s.mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	s.Cards.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(s.mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	s.Cards.SetProjectSharedEmitter(s.mgr.EmitProjectSharedCardEvent)
+	member := &atomic.Bool{}
+	member.Store(true)
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" && q.ProjectID == p.ID && (q.Actor == "alice" || (q.Actor == "bob" && member.Load())), nil
+	})
+	return s, alice, bob, p.ID, member
+}
+func TestProjectEventsLegacyReplayIsPrivate(t *testing.T) {
+	s, alice, bob, p, _ := projectEventFixture(t)
+	s.DisableUploadIndexing = true
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, alice, p, "legacy-owner-private.txt", "PRIVATE"); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatal(w.Code)
+	}
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil }}, nil)
+	member := projectStreamReplay(t, s, bob, p)
+	if member.Code != 200 || bytes.Contains(member.Body.Bytes(), []byte("legacy-owner-private.txt")) || bytes.Contains(member.Body.Bytes(), []byte("builtin:txt")) {
+		t.Fatal("legacy private upload leaked to member")
+	}
+	owner := projectStreamReplay(t, s, alice, p)
+	if owner.Code != 200 || !bytes.Contains(owner.Body.Bytes(), []byte("legacy-owner-private.txt")) {
+		t.Fatal("owner lost private history")
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectEventsSharedProofAndPrivatePagination(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, bob, p, _ := projectEventFixture(t)
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}, nil)
+	card, err := s.Cards.Create("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "PRIVATE HISTORY"}, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"card": card, "owner": "bob", "shared": true, "producer": "plugin:rdm:structure"})
+	private := make([]core.StreamEvent, 1001)
+	for i := range private {
+		private[i] = core.StreamEvent{Type: core.EvCardUpdated, Payload: payload, TS: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), V: 1}
+	}
+	if _, err := s.st.AppendEvents(core.ProjectChannelKey(p), private); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.Cards.PublishProjectCard("alice", "plugin:rdm:structure", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "EXPLICIT SHARED"}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	w := projectStreamReplay(t, s, bob, p)
+	if w.Code != 200 || bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte("PRIVATE HISTORY")) || !bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte("EXPLICIT SHARED")) {
+		t.Fatalf("private pagination/spoof proof failed: code=%d private=%t shared=%t bytes=%d", w.Code,
+			bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte("PRIVATE HISTORY")), bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte("EXPLICIT SHARED")), w.Body.Len())
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectEventsLivePrivacyAndRevocation(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, bob, p, member := projectEventFixture(t)
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}, nil)
+	httpServer := httptest.NewServer(s.Handler())
+	defer httpServer.Close()
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", httpServer.URL+"/api/events?scope=project&projectId="+p, nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+	response, err := httpServer.Client().Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	if _, err := s.Cards.Create("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "LIVE PRIVATE"}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.Cards.PublishProjectCard("alice", "plugin:rdm:structure", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "LIVE SHARED"}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	reader := bufio.NewReader(response.Body)
+	var before bytes.Buffer
+	for {
+		line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("live shared event did not arrive: %v", err)
+		}
+		before.WriteString(line)
+		if bytes.Contains([]byte(line), []byte("LIVE SHARED")) {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if bytes.Contains(before.Bytes(), []byte("LIVE PRIVATE")) {
+		t.Fatal("live private frame leaked before revocation")
+	}
+	member.Store(false)
+	if _, err := s.Cards.PublishProjectCard("alice", "plugin:rdm:structure", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "AFTER REMOVAL"}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked stream did not stop: %v", err)
+	}
+	if bytes.Contains(body, []byte("LIVE PRIVATE")) || bytes.Contains(body, []byte("AFTER REMOVAL")) {
+		t.Fatal("live private/revoked event leaked")
+	}
+}
+func TestUnregisteredProjectEventsRetainLegacyReads(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, bob, p, _ := projectEventFixture(t)
+	if _, err := s.Cards.Create("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p, Title: "LEGACY BASE"}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	w := projectStreamReplay(t, s, bob, p)
+	if w.Code != 200 || !bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte("LEGACY BASE")) {
+		t.Fatal("unregistered project stream changed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectEventsIdleStreamStopsAfterMembershipRemoval(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := sseAuthRecheck
+	sseAuthRecheck = 20 * time.Millisecond
+	defer func() { sseAuthRecheck = previous }()
+	s, _, bob, p, member := projectEventFixture(t)
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}, nil)
+	httpServer := httptest.NewServer(s.Handler())
+	defer httpServer.Close()
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	request, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", httpServer.URL+"/api/events?scope=project&projectId="+p, nil)
+	request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+	response, err := httpServer.Client().Do(request)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	member.Store(false)
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(response.Body)
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Contains(body, []byte("project-access-revoked")) {
+		t.Fatal("idle project stream kept revoked member connected")
+	}
+}

internal/server/project_lifecycle.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+)
+
+// SetProjectLifecycle is wired only for a registered in-process provider. The
+// optional host factory constructs a capability scoped to this request's actor.
+func (s *Server) SetProjectLifecycle(p extension.ProjectLifecycle, host func(string) extension.Host) {
+	s.projectLifecycle = &p
+	s.projectHost = host
+}
+func (s *Server) lifecycleHost(owner string) extension.Host {
+	if s.projectHost == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.projectHost(owner)
+}
+func (s *Server) projectWork(ctx context.Context, owner, projectID string) error {
+	if s.projectLifecycle == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if s.projectLifecycle.Work == nil {
+		return store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	ok, err := s.projectLifecycle.Work(ctx, owner, core.ID(projectID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		return store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// createPrivateConversation is shared by the API and /new. Only live work
+// authorization grants member creation; the resulting conversation stays owned.
+func (s *Server) createPrivateConversation(ctx context.Context, owner, projectID, title, profile string) (core.Conversation, error) {
+	if s.projectLifecycle != nil {
+		if err := s.projectWork(ctx, owner, projectID); err != nil {
+			return core.Conversation{}, err
+		}
+		return s.st.CreateConversationAccountChecked(owner, projectID, title, profile, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled, false)
+	}
+	c, err := s.st.CreateConversationAccountChecked(owner, projectID, title, profile, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled, true)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) && s.authorizeSharedResource(owner, "read", "project", core.ID(projectID), "", core.ID(projectID)) {
+		return s.st.CreateConversationAccountChecked(owner, projectID, title, profile, s.Auth == nil || !s.Auth.Enabled, false)
+	}
+	return c, err
+}
+func writeProjectErr(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
+	var coded interface{ StatusCode() int }
+	if errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		switch code := coded.StatusCode(); code {
+		case 400, 403, 404, 409, 503:
+			http.Error(w, err.Error(), code)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	writeStoreErr(w, err)
+}
+func writeProjectJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, p any, err error) {
+	if err != nil {
+		writeProjectErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, p)
+}
+
+// publicProjectMetadata also masks provider-returned metadata, since providers
+// may obtain raw owner-management rows before producing a shared public view.
+func (s *Server) publicProjectMetadata(p core.Project) core.Project {
+	if s.projectLifecycle != nil {
+		p.Settings = s.set.MaskedProjectMetadata(p.Settings)
+	}
+	return p
+}

internal/server/project_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cardsvc"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type lifecycleStatusError int
+
+func (e lifecycleStatusError) Error() string   { return "provider refusal" }
+func (e lifecycleStatusError) StatusCode() int { return int(e) }
+func lifecycleRequest(t *testing.T, s *Server, key, method, path, body string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, bytes.NewBufferString(body))
+	r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	return w
+}
+func TestProjectLifecycleDelegatesAndPreservesArchiveHistory(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Original")
+	c, _ := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "Private", "")
+	calls := []string{}
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{
+		List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+			calls = append(calls, "list")
+			return []core.Project{{ID: p.ID, Owner: "alice", Name: "Decorated", Settings: map[string]any{"rdm.state": "ready"}}}, nil
+		},
+		Create: func(_ context.Context, _ extension.Host, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+			calls = append(calls, "create")
+			return core.Project{ID: "provider-created", Name: name}, nil
+		},
+		Rename: func(_ context.Context, _ extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+			calls = append(calls, "rename")
+			return core.Project{ID: id, Name: name}, nil
+		},
+		Archive: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) error { calls = append(calls, "archive"); return nil },
+		Work:    func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil },
+	}, nil)
+	for _, q := range []struct{ method, path, body string }{{"GET", "/api/projects", ""}, {"POST", "/api/projects", `{"name":"  New  "}`}, {"PATCH", "/api/projects/" + p.ID, `{"name":"Renamed"}`}, {"DELETE", "/api/projects/" + p.ID, ""}} {
+		w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, q.method, q.path, q.body)
+		if w.Code != 200 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: %d %s", q.method, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if len(calls) != 4 || calls[0] != "list" || calls[1] != "create" || calls[2] != "rename" || calls[3] != "archive" {
+		t.Fatalf("calls=%v", calls)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.GetConversation("alice", c.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("archive removed history: %v", err)
+	}
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Create: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) (core.Project, error) {
+		return core.Project{}, fmtWrap(lifecycleStatusError(409))
+	}}, nil)
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "POST", "/api/projects", `{"name":"dup"}`); w.Code != 409 {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted status=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+func fmtWrap(err error) error { return errors.Join(errors.New("wrapped"), err) }
+func TestProjectLifecycleMemberPrivateWork(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	bob, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	mallory, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "mallory", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	ac, _ := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "Alice private", "")
+	ready := true
+	s.SetProjectAuthorizer(func(string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return ready && (actor == "alice" || actor == "bob") && id == core.ID(p.ID), nil
+	}}, nil)
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "POST", "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/conversations", `{"title":"Bob private"}`)
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("member create=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var bc core.Conversation
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &bc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	w = lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "GET", "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/conversations", "")
+	var cs []core.Conversation
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &cs)
+	if w.Code != 200 || len(cs) != 1 || cs[0].ID != bc.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("member list=%d %+v", w.Code, cs)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "GET", "/api/conversations/"+ac.ID, ""); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("private history=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, mallory, "POST", "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/conversations", `{}`); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("nonmember create=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, mallory, "GET", "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/conversations", ""); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("nonmember list=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	s.Bus = cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Now() })
+	s.WireBuiltinCommands()
+	w = lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "POST", "/api/conversations/"+bc.ID+"/messages", `{"text":"/new"}`)
+	if w.Code != 200 || !bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"conversation"`)) {
+		t.Fatalf("/new=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	ready = false
+	for _, q := range []struct{ key, method, path, body string }{{bob, "POST", "/api/projects/" + p.ID + "/conversations", `{}`}, {bob, "GET", "/api/projects/" + p.ID + "/conversations", ""}, {alice, "POST", "/api/conversations/" + ac.ID + "/messages", `{"text":"new work"}`}, {bob, "POST", "/api/commands/conversation.create", `{"conversationId":"` + bc.ID + `"}`}} {
+		w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, q.key, q.method, q.path, q.body)
+		if w.Code != 404 {
+			t.Fatalf("revoked %s=%d %s", q.path, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "GET", "/api/conversations/"+bc.ID, ""); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("owned revoked history=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectLifecycleReadOnlyAuthorizerDoesNotGrantWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	s.SetProjectAuthorizer(func(string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}, nil)
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, http.MethodPost, "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/conversations", `{}`); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("read-only write=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if cs, err := st.ListConversations("bob", p.ID); err != nil || len(cs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("denial wrote state: %v %v", cs, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleRevocationGuardsExecutionResumption(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	conv, _ := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "Private", "")
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil }}, nil)
+	card := core.HITLCard{ID: "hitl-revoked", ConversationID: conv.ID, RunID: "run-revoked", Kind: "confirm"}
+	if err := st.SaveHITLCard("alice", &card); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, q := range []struct{ path, body string }{{"/api/conversations/" + conv.ID + "/regenerate", `{}`}, {"/api/hitl/" + card.ID + "/resolve", `{"choiceId":"yes"}`}} {
+		w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "POST", q.path, q.body)
+		if w.Code != 404 {
+			t.Fatalf("resumption %s=%d %s", q.path, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleRevocationGuardsSurfaceAction(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	conv, _ := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "Private", "")
+	svc := surfacesvc.New(st, nil)
+	s.Surfaces = svc
+	if _, err := svc.SetActivation(context.Background(), "alice", "generative-ui", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	snap, err := svc.Submit(context.Background(), "alice", "generative-ui", surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{ConversationID: conv.ID, Spec: json.RawMessage(`{"title":"Page","nodes":[{"type":"actions","id":"a1","actions":[{"id":"generative-ui.submit","label":"Submit"}]}]}`)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil }}, nil)
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "POST", "/api/surfaces/"+snap.Identity.SurfaceID+"/actions", `{"actionId":"generative-ui.submit","revision":1,"requestId":"request"}`)
+	if w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked surface action=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleSettingsRetainServiceMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if current.Settings == nil {
+			current.Settings = map[string]any{}
+		}
+		current.Settings["rdm.projectId"] = "canonical"
+		current.Settings["rdm.state"] = "ready"
+		return []core.Project{current}, nil
+	}}, nil)
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "PATCH", "/api/projects/"+p.ID, `{"settings":{"rdm.projectId":"forged","example":true}}`)
+	var got core.Project
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &got)
+	if w.Code != 200 || got.Settings["rdm.projectId"] != "canonical" || got.Settings["example"] != true {
+		t.Fatalf("settings lost service metadata: %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecyclePublicMetadataMasksSecrets(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	bob, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	raw := map[string]any{"models.chat.apiKey": "fixture-key", "custom": map[string]any{"token": "fixture-token"}, "custom.api_key": "fixture-flat-token", "plugin.private.credential": "fixture-schema-token", "display": map[string]any{"caption": "Shared"}, "rdm.projectId": "canonical", "rdm.state": "ready"}
+	if err := st.UpdateProjectSettings("alice", p.ID, raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.set.SetExtraSchema([]core.SettingDesc{{Key: "plugin.private.credential", Secret: true}})
+	read := func() (core.Project, error) { return st.GetProject("alice", p.ID) }
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		current, err := read()
+		return []core.Project{current}, err
+	}, Create: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) (core.Project, error) { return read() }, Rename: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string, string) (core.Project, error) { return read() }}, nil)
+	for _, q := range []struct{ key, method, path, body string }{{bob, "GET", "/api/projects", ""}, {alice, "GET", "/api/projects", ""}, {alice, "POST", "/api/projects", `{"name":"New"}`}, {alice, "PATCH", "/api/projects/" + p.ID, `{"name":"Renamed"}`}, {alice, "PATCH", "/api/projects/" + p.ID, `{"settings":{"display":{"caption":"Updated"}}}`}} {
+		w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, q.key, q.method, q.path, q.body)
+		if w.Code != 200 {
+			t.Fatalf("public metadata %s=%d", q.method, w.Code)
+		}
+		for _, secret := range []string{"fixture-key", "fixture-token", "fixture-flat-token", "fixture-schema-token"} {
+			if bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte(secret)) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s %s leaked a fixture credential", q.method, q.path)
+			}
+		}
+		if !bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"rdm.projectId":"canonical"`)) || !bytes.Contains(w.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"rdm.state":"ready"`)) {
+			t.Fatal("service metadata lost")
+		}
+	}
+	owned, err := read()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if owned.Settings["models.chat.apiKey"] != "fixture-key" || owned.Settings["custom"].(map[string]any)["token"] != "fixture-token" {
+		t.Fatal("public metadata masking changed stored credentials")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenericProjectPatchRejectsManagedSettingsAtomically(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, registered := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprint(registered), func(t *testing.T) {
+			s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+			key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+			p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Original")
+			s.set.SetExtraSchema([]core.SettingDesc{{Key: "plugins.private.managed", Scope: core.SettingScopeSystem}})
+			if registered {
+				s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+					current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+					return []core.Project{current}, err
+				}, Rename: func(_ context.Context, _ extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+					if err := st.RenameProject("alice", id, name); err != nil {
+						return core.Project{}, err
+					}
+					return st.GetProject("alice", id)
+				}}, nil)
+			}
+			for _, body := range []string{`{"name":"Changed","settings":{"models":{"chat":{"apiKey":"fixture-key"}},"display":{"caption":"Forbidden partial write"}}}`, `{"settings":{"models.chat.apiKey":"fixture-key"}}`, `{"settings":{"models":"smash"}}`, `{"settings":{"plugins.private.managed":"override"}}`} {
+				w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "PATCH", "/api/projects/"+p.ID, body)
+				if w.Code != 400 {
+					t.Fatalf("managed patch=%d", w.Code)
+				}
+				current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if current.Name != "Original" || len(current.Settings) != 0 {
+					t.Fatal("rejected managed patch applied a partial mutation")
+				}
+			}
+			w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "PATCH", "/api/projects/"+p.ID, `{"settings":{"custom.caption":"Allowed"}}`)
+			if w.Code != 200 {
+				t.Fatalf("allowed patch=%d", w.Code)
+			}
+			current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+			if err != nil || current.Settings["custom.caption"] != "Allowed" {
+				t.Fatal("allowed metadata shape changed")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenericProjectPatchAcceptsNestedMaskedWriteback(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, registered := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprint(registered), func(t *testing.T) {
+			s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+			key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+			p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+			if err := st.UpdateProjectSettings("alice", p.ID, map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": "fixture-persisted-key"}}, "display": map[string]any{"caption": "Original"}}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if registered {
+				s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+					current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+					return []core.Project{current}, err
+				}}, nil)
+			}
+			for _, tc := range []struct{ body, caption string }{
+				{`{"settings":{"models":{"chat":{"apiKey":"••••••"}},"display":{"caption":"Nested updated"}}}`, "Nested updated"},
+				{`{"settings":{"models.chat":{"apiKey":"••••••"},"display":{"caption":"Mixed updated"}}}`, "Mixed updated"},
+				{`{"settings":{"models":{"chat.apiKey":"••••••"},"display":{"caption":"Mixed leaf updated"}}}`, "Mixed leaf updated"},
+			} {
+				w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "PATCH", "/api/projects/"+p.ID, tc.body)
+				if w.Code != 200 {
+					t.Fatalf("masked writeback rejected legal edit: %d", w.Code)
+				}
+				current, err := st.GetProject("alice", p.ID)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if current.Settings["models"].(map[string]any)["chat"].(map[string]any)["apiKey"] != "fixture-persisted-key" || current.Settings["display"].(map[string]any)["caption"] != tc.caption {
+					t.Fatalf("masked writeback secret preserved=%v caption=%q expected=%q", current.Settings["models"].(map[string]any)["chat"].(map[string]any)["apiKey"] == "fixture-persisted-key", current.Settings["display"].(map[string]any)["caption"], tc.caption)
+				}
+			}
+			for _, body := range []string{`{"settings":{"models":{}}}`, `{"settings":{"models":{"chat":{}}}}`, `{"settings":{"models.chat":{}}}`, `{"settings":{"models":{"chat":{"apiKey":"••••••","model":"Overwrite"}}}}`} {
+				if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "PATCH", "/api/projects/"+p.ID, body); w.Code != 400 {
+					t.Fatalf("explicit empty/real managed write accepted: %d", w.Code)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func lifecycleUpload(t *testing.T, s *Server, key, projectID, name, content string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	var body bytes.Buffer
+	writer := multipart.NewWriter(&body)
+	file, err := writer.CreateFormFile("file", name)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := file.Write([]byte(content)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := writer.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/projects/"+projectID+"/uploads", &body)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", writer.FormDataContentType())
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	return rec
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleMemberUploadStaysPrivate(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	bob, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	mallory, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "mallory", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	ready := true
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return ready && id == p.ID && (actor == "alice" || actor == "bob"), nil
+	}}, nil)
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		if q.ResourceType == "artifact" {
+			return q.Actor == q.Owner, nil
+		}
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" && q.ProjectID == p.ID && (q.Actor == "alice" || q.Actor == "bob"), nil
+	})
+	s.DisableUploadIndexing = true
+	w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, bob, p.ID, "member-private.txt", "QA_MEMBER_PRIVATE_ORIGINAL")
+	if w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("member upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	var info core.UploadInfo
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &info); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	artifact, err := st.GetArtifact("bob", info.ArtifactID)
+	if err != nil || artifact.ProjectID != p.ID || artifact.Owner != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("upload ownership/target incorrect: %+v %v", artifact, err)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, bob, "GET", "/api/artifacts/"+info.ArtifactID+"/content", ""); w.Code != 200 || w.Body.String() != "QA_MEMBER_PRIVATE_ORIGINAL" {
+		t.Fatalf("owner original read=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	for _, key := range []string{alice, mallory} {
+		for _, suffix := range []string{"", "/content"} {
+			if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/artifacts/"+info.ArtifactID+suffix, ""); w.Code != 404 {
+				t.Fatalf("other actor read private original=%d", w.Code)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, mallory, p.ID, "forbidden.txt", "DENIED"); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("nonmember upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	ready = false
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, bob, p.ID, "revoked.txt", "DENIED"); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	artifacts, err := st.ListProjectArtifactsAll(p.ID)
+	if err != nil || len(artifacts) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("denied upload wrote artifacts: count=%d error=%v", len(artifacts), err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleUploadSuppressesPrivateProjectCards(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	bob, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return id == p.ID && (actor == "alice" || actor == "bob"), nil
+	}}, nil)
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" && q.ProjectID == p.ID && (q.Actor == "alice" || q.Actor == "bob"), nil
+	})
+	s.Cards = cardsvc.New(st, s.mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	s.Cards.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(s.mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	s.Cards.SetProjectSharedEmitter(s.mgr.EmitProjectSharedCardEvent)
+	s.DisableUploadIndexing = true
+	if _, err := s.Cards.PublishProjectCard("alice", "plugin:rdm:structure", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: p.ID, Title: "Shared structure", Kind: core.CardKindProgress}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The owner path already admitted upload before the member authorization fix.
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, alice, p.ID, "owner-private-filename.txt", "PRIVATE ORIGINAL"); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("owner upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, bob, p.ID, "member-private-filename.txt", "MEMBER PRIVATE ORIGINAL"); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("member upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		cards, err := st.ListProjectCards(owner, p.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		expected := 0
+		if owner == "alice" {
+			expected = 1
+		}
+		if len(cards) != expected {
+			t.Fatal("private upload added project card history")
+		}
+		for _, card := range cards {
+			if card.Title != "Shared structure" {
+				t.Fatal("private filename/parser card entered project history")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	events, err := st.EventsAfter(core.ProjectChannelKey(p.ID), 0, 100)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(events) != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("private upload added project events")
+	}
+	for _, event := range events {
+		if bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte("owner-private-filename.txt")) || bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte("member-private-filename.txt")) {
+			t.Fatal("private upload metadata entered persisted project stream")
+		}
+	}
+	request := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/events?scope=project&projectId="+p.ID, nil)
+	request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(request.Context(), 20*time.Millisecond)
+	defer cancel()
+	request = request.WithContext(ctx)
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(response, request)
+	if response.Code != 200 || !bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte("Shared structure")) {
+		t.Fatalf("member structural stream did not replay: %d", response.Code)
+	}
+	if bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte("owner-private-filename.txt")) || bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte("member-private-filename.txt")) {
+		t.Fatal("another member's SSE exposed private upload metadata")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnregisteredUploadKeepsLegacyCardsAndValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Private")
+	s.Cards = cardsvc.New(st, s.mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	s.Cards.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(s.mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	s.DisableUploadIndexing = true
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, key, p.ID, "legacy-upload.txt", "Original"); w.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered owner upload=%d", w.Code)
+	}
+	cards, err := st.ListProjectCards("alice", p.ID)
+	if err != nil || len(cards) != 1 || cards[0].Title != "legacy-upload.txt" {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered ingestion card changed: count=%d error=%v", len(cards), err)
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "POST", "/api/projects/missing/uploads", "not multipart"); w.Code != 400 {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy missing-file validation changed: %d", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectLifecycleUploadRechecksBeforePersistence(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	ready := true
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{Work: func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		allowed := ready
+		ready = false
+		return allowed, nil
+	}}, nil)
+	if w := lifecycleUpload(t, s, key, p.ID, "revoked-during-upload.txt", "PRIVATE"); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("upload persisted after authorization changed: %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	artifacts, err := st.ListProjectArtifactsAll(p.ID)
+	if err != nil || len(artifacts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("revoked upload created an artifact")
+	}
+}

internal/server/project_resource_filter_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestKnowledgeV2UsesDocumentIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	docs := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "published-slice", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-p", Chunk: "sharedneedle published"}, {ID: "private-draft", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-p", Chunk: "sharedneedle draft"}, {ID: "self-denied", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: "domain-p", Chunk: "sharedneedle own restricted"}, {ID: "self-allowed", Owner: "bob", ProjectID: "domain-p", Chunk: "sharedneedle own"}}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(docs...); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetProjectAuthorizer(func(string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	seen := map[string]extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{}
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		seen[q.ResourceID] = q
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" || q.ResourceID == "published-slice" || q.ResourceID == "self-allowed", nil
+	})
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/knowledge/search?q=sharedneedle", "")
+	var hits []core.RetrievalHit
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &hits)
+	if w.Code != 200 || len(hits) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("V2 filtered hits=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	for _, hit := range hits {
+		if hit.Doc.ID != "published-slice" && hit.Doc.ID != "self-allowed" {
+			t.Fatalf("private leak: %+v", hit.Doc)
+		}
+	}
+	q := seen["published-slice"]
+	if q.ResourceType != "knowledge" || q.Actor != "bob" || q.Action != "search" || q.Owner != "alice" || q.ProjectID != "domain-p" {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted doc query: %+v", q)
+	}
+}
+func TestArtifactListV2FiltersEachResource(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	p, _ := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	private := core.Artifact{Owner: "alice", ProjectID: p.ID, Name: "Private", MIME: "text/plain"}
+	public := core.Artifact{Owner: "alice", ProjectID: p.ID, Name: "Shared", MIME: "text/plain"}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(&private, []byte("private")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(&public, []byte("shared")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" || (q.ResourceType == "artifact" && q.Action == "list" && q.ResourceID == public.ID && q.Owner == "alice"), nil
+	})
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/projects/"+p.ID+"/artifacts", "")
+	var as []core.Artifact
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &as)
+	if w.Code != 200 || len(as) != 1 || as[0].ID != public.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("artifact list=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKnowledgeV2ResolvesTrustedProjectScope(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-current", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-current", Chunk: "scopeneedle current"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-other", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-other", Chunk: "scopeneedle other"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return q.ResourceType == "knowledge", nil })
+	s.SetProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{List: func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		return []core.Project{{ID: "host-current", Settings: map[string]any{"rdm.projectId": "domain-current", "rdm.state": "ready"}}, {ID: "host-other", Settings: map[string]any{"rdm.projectId": "domain-other", "rdm.state": "ready"}}}, nil
+	}}, nil)
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/knowledge/search?q=scopeneedle&project=host-current", "")
+	var hits []core.RetrievalHit
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &hits)
+	if w.Code != 200 || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("current scope=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/knowledge/search?q=scopeneedle&project=unknown", ""); w.Code != 404 {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown scope=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKnowledgeV2UsesStoredPublicationSource(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	key, _ := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "test")
+	// A known published identity replaced by a private row must lose sharing.
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "known-published-id", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "manual", Chunk: "sourceneedle private"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "real-published-id", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:rdm:published", Chunk: "sourceneedle public"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "knowledge" && q.Source == "plugin:rdm:published", nil
+	})
+	w := lifecycleRequest(t, s, key, "GET", "/api/knowledge/search?q=sourceneedle", "")
+	var hits []core.RetrievalHit
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &hits)
+	if w.Code != 200 || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "real-published-id" {
+		t.Fatalf("actual stored source=%d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}

internal/server/recovery.go

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+)
+
+func (s *Server) createAdminRecoveryProposal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedStateVersion int64  `json:"expectedStateVersion"`
+		IdempotencyKey       string `json:"idempotencyKey"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid recovery proposal", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	proposal, err := s.st.CreateRecoveryProposal(actor, r.PathValue("userId"), req.ExpectedStateVersion, req.IdempotencyKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, proposal)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) getAdminRecoveryProposal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	proposal, err := s.st.GetRecoveryProposalForAdmin(actor, r.PathValue("userId"), r.PathValue("id"))
+	writeJSONOr(w, proposal, err)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) listAdminRecoveryProposals(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	proposals, err := s.st.ListRecoveryProposalsForAdmin(actor, r.PathValue("userId"))
+	writeJSONOr(w, map[string]any{"proposals": proposals}, err)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) revokeAdminRecoveryProposal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	actor, ok := s.requireAdmin(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedVersion int64 `json:"expectedVersion"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid recovery revocation", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	proposal, err := s.st.RevokeRecoveryProposal(actor, r.PathValue("userId"), r.PathValue("id"), req.ExpectedVersion)
+	writeJSONOr(w, proposal, err)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) listMyRecoveryProposals(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	owner, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	proposals, err := s.st.ListOwnerRecoveryProposals(owner)
+	writeJSONOr(w, map[string]any{"proposals": proposals}, err)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) getMyRecoveryProposal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	owner, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	proposal, err := s.st.GetOwnerRecoveryProposal(owner, r.PathValue("id"))
+	writeJSONOr(w, proposal, err)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) confirmRecoveryProposal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if _, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r); !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedVersion int64 `json:"expectedVersion"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid recovery confirmation", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	plain, proposal, err := s.st.ConfirmRecoveryProposal(sessionToken(r), r.PathValue("id"), req.ExpectedVersion)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	out := map[string]any{"proposal": proposal}
+	if plain != "" {
+		out["grant"] = plain
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) rotateRecoveryGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if _, ok := s.requireFullPasswordSession(w, r); !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req struct {
+		ExpectedVersion    int64 `json:"expectedVersion"`
+		ExpectedGeneration int64 `json:"expectedGeneration"`
+	}
+	if err := decodeStrictJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid recovery grant rotation", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	plain, proposal, err := s.st.RotateRecoveryGrant(sessionToken(r), r.PathValue("id"), req.ExpectedVersion, req.ExpectedGeneration)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeStoreErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	out := map[string]any{"proposal": proposal}
+	if plain != "" {
+		out["grant"] = plain
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
+}

internal/server/recovery_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestOwnerConfirmedRecoveryHTTPKeepsGrantFromAdministrator(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	pending, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "recovery-user", store.AccountProfile{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	activation, err := st.InitializePendingAccount(pending.ID, pending.StateVersion, pending.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	setup := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", `{"key":"`+activation+`"}`, "")
+	if setup.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(setup.Body.String(), `"passwordChangeMode":"grant_setup"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("activation redeem: %d %s", setup.Code, setup.Body.String())
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"alice-initial-password"}`, cookieOf(setup)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("initial set: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	ownerLogin := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"recovery-user","password":"alice-initial-password"}`, "")
+	if ownerLogin.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted owner login: %d %s", ownerLogin.Code, ownerLogin.Body.String())
+	}
+	ownerCookie := cookieOf(ownerLogin)
+	account, err := st.GetAccount(pending.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	proposalResponse := do(h, "POST", "/api/admin/users/"+pending.ID+"/recovery-proposals",
+		`{"expectedStateVersion":`+jsonNumber(account.StateVersion)+`,"idempotencyKey":"http-request-1"}`, admin)
+	if proposalResponse.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(proposalResponse.Body.String(), "grant") {
+		t.Fatalf("administrator proposal leaked grant: %d %s", proposalResponse.Code, proposalResponse.Body.String())
+	}
+	var proposal store.RecoveryProposal
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(proposalResponse.Body.Bytes(), &proposal); err != nil || proposal.ID == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("proposal metadata: %+v %v", proposal, err)
+	}
+	if got := do(h, "GET", "/api/admin/users/"+pending.ID+"/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID, "", admin); got.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(got.Body.String(), "grant") {
+		t.Fatalf("administrator status leaked grant: %d %s", got.Code, got.Body.String())
+	}
+	confirmed := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID+"/confirm", `{"expectedVersion":1}`, ownerCookie)
+	if confirmed.Code != http.StatusOK || confirmed.Header().Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
+		t.Fatalf("owner confirm: %d %s", confirmed.Code, confirmed.Body.String())
+	}
+	var confirmation struct {
+		Proposal store.RecoveryProposal `json:"proposal"`
+		Grant    string                 `json:"grant"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(confirmed.Body.Bytes(), &confirmation); err != nil || confirmation.Grant == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("confirmation secret response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if duplicate := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID+"/confirm", `{"expectedVersion":1}`, ownerCookie); duplicate.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(duplicate.Body.String(), `"grant"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate confirmation replayed grant: %d %s", duplicate.Code, duplicate.Body.String())
+	}
+	if got := do(h, "GET", "/api/me/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID, "", ownerCookie); got.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(got.Body.String(), confirmation.Grant) {
+		t.Fatalf("owner status replayed grant: %d %s", got.Code, got.Body.String())
+	}
+	rotated := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID+"/rotate-grant",
+		`{"expectedVersion":`+jsonNumber(confirmation.Proposal.Version)+`,"expectedGeneration":`+jsonNumber(confirmation.Proposal.Generation)+`}`, ownerCookie)
+	if rotated.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("owner rotate: %d %s", rotated.Code, rotated.Body.String())
+	}
+	var rotation struct {
+		Grant string `json:"grant"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(rotated.Body.Bytes(), &rotation); err != nil || rotation.Grant == "" || rotation.Grant == confirmation.Grant {
+		t.Fatalf("rotation grant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if duplicate := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID+"/rotate-grant",
+		`{"expectedVersion":`+jsonNumber(confirmation.Proposal.Version)+`,"expectedGeneration":`+jsonNumber(confirmation.Proposal.Generation)+`}`, ownerCookie); duplicate.Code != http.StatusOK || strings.Contains(duplicate.Body.String(), `"grant"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate rotation replayed grant: %d %s", duplicate.Code, duplicate.Body.String())
+	}
+	if old := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-grants/redeem", `{"key":"`+confirmation.Grant+`"}`, ""); old.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatal("old recovery grant remained usable")
+	}
+	redeemed := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-grants/redeem", `{"key":"`+rotation.Grant+`"}`, "")
+	if redeemed.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("recovery redeem: %d %s", redeemed.Code, redeemed.Body.String())
+	}
+	if done := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"alice-recovered-password"}`, cookieOf(redeemed)); done.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("recovery finish: %d %s", done.Code, done.Body.String())
+	}
+	if login := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"recovery-user","password":"alice-recovered-password"}`, ""); login.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("relogin: %d %s", login.Code, login.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func jsonNumber(v int64) string { return strconv.FormatInt(v, 10) }
+
+func TestLegacyAdministratorRecoveryEntrancesAreClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	admin := bootAdmin(t, h, st)
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("old-victim-pass")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("victim", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ClearMustChangePassword("victim"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, route := range []struct{ path, body string }{
+		{"/api/admin/users/victim/password", `{"password":"attacker-pass"}`},
+		{"/api/admin/users/victim/login-keys", `{"purpose":"recover"}`},
+		{"/api/admin/users/victim/login-keys", `{"purpose":"activate"}`},
+	} {
+		rec := do(h, "POST", route.path, route.body, admin)
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusGone || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED") {
+			t.Fatalf("legacy route remained active: %s %d %s", route.path, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if _, ok := st.VerifyLogin("victim", "old-victim-pass"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("closed routes changed existing password")
+	}
+	if keys, err := st.ListLoginKeys("victim"); err != nil || len(keys) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("closed routes issued a grant: %+v %v", keys, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLegacyGrantAndRestrictedSessionCannotSkipCurrentPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("old-victim-pass")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("victim", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	grant, _, err := st.IssueLoginKey("victim", store.LoginKeyPurposeRecover, "legacy-admin", 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", `{"key":"`+grant+`"}`, ""); rec.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatal("legacy administrator grant created a restricted session")
+	}
+	if err := st.SetUserPassword("victim", hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	login := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"victim","password":"old-victim-pass"}`, "")
+	if login.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(login.Body.String(), `"passwordChangeMode":"current_required"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy forced login mode: %d %s", login.Code, login.Body.String())
+	}
+	cookie := cookieOf(login)
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"victim-new-pass"}`, cookie); rec.Code == http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatal("forced password session skipped current password")
+	}
+	if rec := do(h, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"current":"old-victim-pass","next":"victim-new-pass"}`, cookie); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy forced change with current failed: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if _, ok := st.VerifyLogin("victim", "victim-new-pass"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("current-required password change did not complete")
+	}
+}

internal/server/recovery_multi_instance_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func twinRecoveryStores(t *testing.T) (*store.Store, *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dsn := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "shared.db")
+		first, err := store.OpenSQLite(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		second, err := store.OpenSQLite(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			first.Close()
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Cleanup(func() { second.Close(); first.Close() })
+		return first, second
+	}
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	schema := "t_" + strings.ToLower(store.NewID("recovery"))
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE SCHEMA ` + schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = admin.Exec(`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ` + schema + ` CASCADE`); admin.Close() })
+	isolate := store.AppendPGRuntimeParam(dsn, "search_path", schema+",public")
+	first, err := store.OpenPostgres(isolate, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a-artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	second, err := store.OpenPostgres(isolate, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b-artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		first.Close()
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { second.Close(); first.Close() })
+	return first, second
+}
+
+func TestRecoveryAcrossTwoHTTPInstancesAndIndependentPools(t *testing.T) {
+	first, second := twinRecoveryStores(t)
+	t.Logf("recovery HTTP dialect=%s two independent stores", first.Dialect())
+	hA := newAuthTestServerOnStore(t, first, t.TempDir()).Handler()
+	hB := newAuthTestServerOnStore(t, second, t.TempDir()).Handler()
+	adminCookie := bootAdmin(t, hA, first)
+	account, err := first.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "two-instance-owner", store.AccountProfile{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	activation, err := first.InitializePendingAccount(account.ID, account.StateVersion, account.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	setup := do(hB, "POST", "/api/auth/login-key/redeem", `{"key":"`+activation+`"}`, "")
+	if setup.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second instance activation redeem: %d %s", setup.Code, setup.Body.String())
+	}
+	if done := do(hA, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"two-instance-initial"}`, cookieOf(setup)); done.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first instance initial set: %d %s", done.Code, done.Body.String())
+	}
+	login := do(hA, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"two-instance-owner","password":"two-instance-initial"}`, "")
+	if login.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first instance login: %d %s", login.Code, login.Body.String())
+	}
+	ownerCookie := cookieOf(login)
+	current, err := second.GetAccount(account.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	proposalResponse := do(hA, "POST", "/api/admin/users/"+account.ID+"/recovery-proposals",
+		`{"expectedStateVersion":`+jsonNumber(current.StateVersion)+`,"idempotencyKey":"two-instance-proposal"}`, adminCookie)
+	if proposalResponse.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("proposal: %d %s", proposalResponse.Code, proposalResponse.Body.String())
+	}
+	var proposal store.RecoveryProposal
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(proposalResponse.Body.Bytes(), &proposal); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	confirmation := do(hB, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-proposals/"+proposal.ID+"/confirm", `{"expectedVersion":1}`, ownerCookie)
+	if confirmation.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second instance confirm: %d %s", confirmation.Code, confirmation.Body.String())
+	}
+	var confirmed struct {
+		Grant string `json:"grant"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(confirmation.Body.Bytes(), &confirmed); err != nil || confirmed.Grant == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("grant response: %v", err)
+	}
+	redeemed := do(hA, "POST", "/api/auth/recovery-grants/redeem", `{"key":"`+confirmed.Grant+`"}`, "")
+	if redeemed.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first instance grant redeem: %d %s", redeemed.Code, redeemed.Body.String())
+	}
+	if completed := do(hB, "POST", "/api/auth/password", `{"next":"two-instance-recovered"}`, cookieOf(redeemed)); completed.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second instance recovery completion: %d %s", completed.Code, completed.Body.String())
+	}
+	if old := do(hB, "GET", "/api/me", "", ownerCookie); old.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("old proof session survived: %d", old.Code)
+	}
+	if fresh := do(hA, "POST", "/api/auth/login", `{"owner":"two-instance-owner","password":"two-instance-recovered"}`, ""); fresh.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("recovered password login: %d %s", fresh.Code, fresh.Body.String())
+	}
+	after, err := first.GetAccount(account.ID)
+	if err != nil || after.CredentialOrigin != store.CredentialOriginOwnerRecovery || after.ID != account.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("persistent identity or provenance changed: %+v %v", after, err)
+	}
+}

internal/server/resource_authz_consumption_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+package server
+
+// EXT-8b 读面消费红测（方案 r1 U9 第二切片）：五处共享读路径在 V2 注册后按
+// 资源级查询咨询（Actor/Action/ResourceType/ResourceID/Owner/ProjectID 由
+// 受信上下文构造）；V2 拒绝压过 V1 放行（资源级权威）；V2 未注册时五处全部
+// 回落 V1（兼容现行，RDM 现网行为不变）。红：当前 server 尚无 V2 槽位与
+// AuthorizeResource 消费——注册接口不存在，编译红先行。
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func newV2CaptureServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store, string, string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
+	alice, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bob, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "e2e")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pj, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "资源级项目")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return srv, st, alice, bob, pj.ID
+}
+
+func TestSharedReadPathsConsultV2WithResourceContext(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st, alice, bob, pid := newV2CaptureServer(t)
+	_ = alice
+
+	// 项目内造一个工件（供 download 路径取元数据）。
+	art := &core.Artifact{ProjectID: core.ID(pid), Owner: "alice", Name: "res.txt", Kind: "file", MIME: "text/plain"}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(art, []byte("body")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	var got []extension.ResourceAuthzQuery
+	srv.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		got = append(got, q)
+		return true, nil
+	})
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	call := func(method, path string) int {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		return rec.Code
+	}
+
+	// ① 工件下载（owner 自有未命中 → 资源级咨询）。
+	code := call(http.MethodGet, "/api/artifacts/"+string(art.ID)+"/content?download=1")
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("download: %d", code)
+	}
+	// ② 项目工件清单。
+	call(http.MethodGet, "/api/projects/"+pid+"/artifacts")
+	// ③ 共享项目建会话。
+	call(http.MethodPost, "/api/projects/"+pid+"/conversations")
+
+	byAction := map[string]extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{}
+	for _, q := range got {
+		byAction[q.Action] = q
+	}
+	dl := byAction["download"]
+	if dl.Actor != "bob" || dl.ResourceType != "artifact" || dl.ResourceID != art.ID || dl.ProjectID != pid || dl.Owner != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("download 查询六要素不符: %+v", dl)
+	}
+	ls := byAction["list"]
+	if ls.Actor != "bob" || ls.ResourceType != "artifact" || ls.ResourceID != art.ID || ls.ProjectID != pid || ls.Owner != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("list 查询不符: %+v", ls)
+	}
+	rd := byAction["read"]
+	if rd.Actor != "bob" || rd.ResourceType != "project" || rd.ResourceID != pid {
+		t.Fatalf("read(conversation) 查询不符: %+v", rd)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestV2DenyOverridesV1Allow(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st, alice, bob, pid := newV2CaptureServer(t)
+	_ = alice
+	art := &core.Artifact{ProjectID: core.ID(pid), Owner: "alice", Name: "d.txt", Kind: "file"}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(art, []byte("body")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// V1 全放行、V2 全拒绝——资源级权威必须压过 V1。
+	srv.SetProjectAuthorizer(func(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return true, nil
+	})
+	srv.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return false, nil
+	})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/artifacts/"+string(art.ID)+"/content?download=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("V2 拒绝须压过 V1 放行并保持 404（不泄露存在性）, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestV2AbsentFallsBackToV1(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st, alice, bob, pid := newV2CaptureServer(t)
+	_ = alice
+	art := &core.Artifact{ProjectID: core.ID(pid), Owner: "alice", Name: "f.txt", Kind: "file"}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(art, []byte("body")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	srv.SetProjectAuthorizer(func(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return owner == "bob" && string(projectID) == pid, nil
+	})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/artifacts/"+string(art.ID)+"/content?download=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bob)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("V2 未注册应回落 V1（现行行为）, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/server/resource_authz_test.go

@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@ func TestProjectResourceAuthorizerSharesReads(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
 
-	alice, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	alice, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	bob, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "e2e")
+	bob, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	carol, err := st.CreateAPIKey("carol", "e2e")
+	carol, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "carol", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}

internal/server/rewind.go

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func (s *Server) rewindFiles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "messageId required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.mgr.ClaimConversation(id); err != nil {
+	if err := s.mgr.ClaimConversation(id, owner); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, runmgr.ErrConversationBusy) {
 			http.Error(w, "conversation busy", http.StatusConflict)
 			return

internal/server/run_process_events_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestRunProcessEventsAreOrderedAndBoundToConversation(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, st := newTestServer(t)
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	_, convID := setupConversation(t, h)
+	_, otherConvID := setupConversation(t, h)
+	runID := postMessage(t, h, convID, "整理材料")
+	waitRunTerminal(t, h, runID, 5*time.Second)
+	events := []core.StreamEvent{
+		{RunID: runID, Type: core.EvThinkingDelta, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"index":0,"text":"先核对日期"}`)},
+		{RunID: runID, Type: core.EvToolOutput, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"callId":"call-1","stream":"stdout","text":"完整工具输出"}`)},
+	}
+	if _, err := st.AppendEvents(convID, events); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The runner may persist its terminal event after its status becomes terminal.
+	// Anchor paging to the events this test appended, not an earlier snapshot.
+	path := "/api/conversations/" + convID + "/runs/" + runID + "/events?after=" + strconv.FormatInt(events[0].Seq-1, 10) + "&limit=1"
+	code, first := doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first page: %d %v", code, first)
+	}
+	page := first["events"].([]any)
+	if len(page) != 1 || page[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != string(core.EvThinkingDelta) {
+		t.Fatalf("first page: %v", page)
+	}
+	seq := int64(page[0].(map[string]any)["seq"].(float64))
+	code, second := doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, "/api/conversations/"+convID+"/runs/"+runID+"/events?after="+strconv.FormatInt(seq, 10)+"&limit=1", nil)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second page: %d %v", code, second)
+	}
+	page = second["events"].([]any)
+	if len(page) != 1 || page[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != string(core.EvToolOutput) {
+		t.Fatalf("second page: %v", page)
+	}
+	if payload := page[0].(map[string]any)["payload"].(map[string]any); payload["text"] != "完整工具输出" {
+		t.Fatalf("payload: %v", payload)
+	}
+	parent, err := st.GetRunByID(runID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	child := core.Run{ID: "run_child_process", ParentRunID: parent.ID, ConversationID: parent.ConversationID,
+		ProjectID: parent.ProjectID, Owner: parent.Owner, Kind: core.RunSubagent, Status: core.RunCompleted}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&child); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	childEvents := []core.StreamEvent{
+		{RunID: child.ID, Type: core.EvAgentProgress, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"agentRun":"run_child_process","note":"正在核对附录"}`)},
+		{RunID: child.ID, Type: core.EvToolOutput, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"callId":"hidden","text":"child raw output"}`)},
+		{RunID: child.ID, Type: core.EvAgentResult, Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"agentRun":"run_child_process","status":"completed","summary":"附录已核对"}`)},
+	}
+	if _, err := st.AppendEvents(convID, childEvents); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	code, childPage := doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, "/api/conversations/"+convID+"/runs/"+runID+"/events?after="+strconv.FormatInt(events[1].Seq, 10), nil)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("child page: %d %v", code, childPage)
+	}
+	childRows := childPage["events"].([]any)
+	if len(childRows) != 2 || childRows[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != string(core.EvAgentProgress) || childRows[1].(map[string]any)["type"] != string(core.EvAgentResult) {
+		t.Fatalf("child progress/result not retained or raw child output leaked: %v", childRows)
+	}
+	code, _ = doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, "/api/conversations/"+otherConvID+"/runs/"+runID+"/events", nil)
+	if code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("mismatched conversation exposed run: %d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunProcessEventsRejectsDisabledImplicitLocal(t *testing.T) {
+	first, second := twinRecoveryStores(t)
+	t.Logf("process-event replay dialect=%s independent stores", first.Dialect())
+	if err := first.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := first.EnsureUser(store.OwnerDefault, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := first.CreateProject(store.OwnerDefault, "Project")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := first.CreateConversation(store.OwnerDefault, project.ID, "Process", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run := core.Run{ID: "run_local_process", ConversationID: conversation.ID, ProjectID: project.ID,
+		Owner: store.OwnerDefault, Kind: core.RunConversation, Status: core.RunCompleted}
+	if err := first.CreateRun(&run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := first.AppendEvents(conversation.ID, []core.StreamEvent{{RunID: run.ID, Type: core.EvThinkingDelta,
+		Payload: json.RawMessage(`{"index":0,"text":"private process"}`)}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	srv := newAuthTestServerOnStore(t, second, t.TempDir())
+	h := srv.Handler()
+	path := "/api/conversations/" + conversation.ID + "/runs/" + run.ID + "/events"
+	code, _ := doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+	if code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("auth-on replay without credential: %d", code)
+	}
+	srv.Auth.Enabled = false
+	code, _ = doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("enabled local account could not read process events: %d", code)
+	}
+	account, err := first.GetAccountByOwner(store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := first.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	code, _ = doJSON(t, h, http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+	if code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled local account read process events: %d", code)
+	}
+}

internal/server/shared_projects_test.go

@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ import (
 func TestSharedProjectListAndConversation(t *testing.T) {
 	srv, st := newAuthTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.Handler()
-	alice, err := st.CreateAPIKey("alice", "e2e")
+	alice, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "alice", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	bob, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "e2e")
+	bob, err := createLegacyAPIKeyFixture(t, st, "bob", "e2e")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}