Merge pull request 'Integrate the shared document renderer and two-trees project work' (#209) from feature/unified-document-renderer-task10 into main

Why: the previous commit archived the card without its closure line.
Evidence: card text only.
Impact: none outside .task.
Refs: PR #209
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

.gitea/workflows/governance.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+name: governance
+on:
+  pull_request:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+jobs:
+  governance:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    env:
+      GOPROXY: https://goproxy.cn,direct
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # 只物化两个治理 gitlink（Guidelines 与 deps/development-manager），非递归；
+          # 其它 gitlink 不物化、不取回。凭据只以 URL 限定的 extraheader 存在于本进程树内。
+          python3 - <<'PY_CHECKOUT'
+          import os
+          from pathlib import Path
+          import re
+          import subprocess
+          import sys
+          from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+          # 服务端基址取运行器注入的 GITHUB_SERVER_URL（平台控制、候选 PR 不可影响）。
+          SERVER = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", "").rstrip("/")
+          parsed_server = urlsplit(SERVER)
+          if parsed_server.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed_server.netloc:
+              sys.exit("Checkout server must be the platform-injected http(s) URL")
+          SSH = "ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          # 审查过的白名单，独立于候选 .gitmodules：仅列出两个治理 gitlink。
+          REPOSITORIES = {
+              "deps/development-guidelines": "Development-Guidelines",
+              "deps/development-manager": "Development-Manager",
+          }
+          TARGET = "weichen/Agent-System-Backend"
+          root_token = os.environ.pop("TOKEN", "")
+          component_token = os.environ.pop("SUBMODULE_TOKEN", "")
+          if not root_token or not component_token:
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires TOKEN and SUBMODULE_TOKEN")
+          if os.environ.get("GITHUB_REPOSITORY") != TARGET:
+              sys.exit("Checkout repository is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+          sha = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SHA", "")
+          if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", sha):
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires a fixed commit SHA")
+
+          # 丢弃继承的 Git 追踪/配置/SSH 钩子；凭据只存在于单个 Git 进程树的精确 URL 头中。
+          clean_env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if not k.startswith("GIT_")}
+          clean_env.update(GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM="1", GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM="/dev/null",
+                           GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL="/dev/null", GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT="0")
+          config = {
+              "core.hooksPath": "/dev/null", "core.fsmonitor": "false",
+              "init.templateDir": "", "credential.helper": "",
+              "fetch.recurseSubmodules": "false", "submodule.recurse": "false",
+              "http.followRedirects": "false", "protocol.allow": "never",
+              "protocol." + urlsplit(SERVER).scheme + ".allow": "always",
+          }
+
+
+          def git(repo, *args, extra=None):
+              values = config | (extra or {})
+              env = clean_env | {"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": str(len(values))}
+              for index, (key, value) in enumerate(values.items()):
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_{index}"] = key
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_{index}"] = value
+              return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], env=env,
+                                    check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout
+
+
+          def materialize_governance(root):
+              # -r 列出任意深度的 gitlink，但不进入 submodule 内部；其它 gitlink 只记录、从不取回。
+              links = {}
+              for entry in git(root, "ls-tree", "-rz", "HEAD").split(b"\0"):
+                  if not entry:
+                      continue
+                  metadata, path = entry.split(b"\t", 1)
+                  mode, kind, commit = metadata.decode().split()
+                  if mode == "160000":
+                      links[path.decode()] = commit
+              for name in REPOSITORIES:
+                  if name not in links:
+                      raise ValueError("Governance gitlink is missing from the fixed commit")
+              raw = git(root, "config", "--no-includes", "--blob", "HEAD:.gitmodules", "--null", "--list")
+              entries = {}
+              for item in raw.split(b"\0"):
+                  if not item:
+                      continue
+                  key, value = item.decode().split("\n", 1)
+                  match = re.fullmatch(r"submodule\.(.+)\.(path|url)", key)
+                  if not match:
+                      continue
+                  name, field = match.groups()
+                  if name not in REPOSITORIES:
+                      continue
+                  if field in entries.setdefault(name, {}):
+                      raise ValueError("Duplicate candidate .gitmodules setting")
+                  entries[name][field] = value
+              # 先整体校验两个治理条目，再进行任何带凭据的取回。
+              for name, repository in REPOSITORIES.items():
+                  fields = entries.get(name, {})
+                  if fields.get("path") != name:
+                      raise ValueError("Governance submodule path is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+                  trusted_url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{repository}.git"
+                  if fields.get("url") not in {SSH + repository + ".git", trusted_url}:
+                      raise ValueError("Governance submodule URL is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+              for name, repository in REPOSITORIES.items():
+                  url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{repository}.git"
+                  # 仅持久化审查过的公开 URL，使 Git 在进程级配置消失后仍识别该 submodule。
+                  git(root, "config", f"submodule.{name}.url", url)
+                  git(root, "submodule", "update", "--init", "--checkout", "--", name,
+                      extra={f"submodule.{name}.url": url,
+                             f"submodule.{name}.update": "checkout",
+                             f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + component_token})
+                  child = root / name
+                  if git(child, "rev-parse", "HEAD").decode().strip() != links[name]:
+                      raise ValueError("Materialized governance gitlink does not match the fixed SHA")
+
+
+          try:
+              root = Path.cwd()
+              # 必须是干净的临时工作区；不复用既有 Git 状态。
+              if (root / ".git").exists():
+                  raise ValueError("Checkout requires a fresh workspace")
+              git(root, "init", "-q")
+              url = f"{SERVER}/{TARGET}.git"
+              git(root, "remote", "add", "origin", url)
+              git(root, "fetch", "--depth=1", "origin", sha,
+                  extra={f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + root_token})
+              git(root, "checkout", "-q", "--detach", "FETCH_HEAD")
+              materialize_governance(root)
+          except (ValueError, OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+              sys.exit(f"Checkout refused: {error}")
+          print("Checkout complete; credentials were not persisted in Git configuration")
+          PY_CHECKOUT
+          unset TOKEN SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+      - name: Install Go 1.27.1
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          curl -fsSL -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz" https://mirrors.aliyun.com/golang/go1.27.1.linux-amd64.tar.gz
+          tar -C /usr/local -xzf "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz"
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
+      - name: Validate agent execution configuration
+        run: scripts/agent-exec validate --repo .
+      - name: Governance check
+        run: scripts/dm governance check --repo .

.gitmodules

@@ -19,3 +19,12 @@
 [submodule "deps/agent-command"]
 	path = deps/agent-command
 	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Command.git
+[submodule "deps/agent-document-renderer"]
+	path = deps/agent-document-renderer
+	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-Document-Renderer.git
+[submodule "deps/development-guidelines"]
+	path = deps/development-guidelines
+	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Development-Guidelines.git
+[submodule "deps/development-manager"]
+	path = deps/development-manager
+	url = ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Development-Manager.git

.task/archive/feature-governance-adoption.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Agent-System-Backend 采纳 development-governance-v2 治理套件 任务卡
+
+任务主记录：本文件随 PR 描述维护（PR 链接见下方"结果与验证"）。
+状态：进行中；owner：weichen。
+
+## 基线与授权
+
+- 权威仓：weichen/Agent-System-Backend；root_target：main；immediate_target：main
+- branch_kind：initiative；initiative_id：governance-adoption-Agent-System-Backend
+- R0（initial_main_sha）：7aa624370af347c3dd3740d7453b13af54ae3ed6；工作区：/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-governance-adoption（worktree）；分支：feature/governance-adoption
+- 父任务信息（仅子任务填写）：无
+- accepting_requirements：false（单仓采纳 initiative，范围固定为下列十步，不接收新需求）
+- 需求分流：verdict=NEW；selected_initiative=无；候选=无；理由=development-governance-v2 Phase 6 每个正式仓库独立 initiative；triage 收据=无（本仓采纳前尚无 triage 入口）
+- 授权与交付终点：owner 已授权 development-governance-v2 全部实施（Agent-System-Dev 主记录 docs/superpowers/plans/2026-10-16-development-governance-v2-master.md）；终点为本 PR 合入 main 且采纳状态 active。分支保护与 tag 由用户执行。
+- 实施执行：agent-per-unit（配置：AGENT-EXECUTION.md；外部 Agent 一单元一新进程/会话/工作区）
+
+## 目标与非目标
+
+目标（Phase 6 十步）：固定 Guidelines SHA（deps/development-guidelines @ 2688fd2be6a52c0bf110e7e6366b6f291ab5e4eb）；增加 AGENT-EXECUTION.md；增加共享执行器薄入口（deps/development-manager @ bd3a7de57a3a9e1a4495b94c5fa5c08d71e7be8c + scripts/dm、scripts/agent-exec、scripts/task）；四条路由（implementation/repair/test/review）；任务卡模板与分支元数据；CI 中启用 schema 校验（.gitea/workflows/governance.yml：agent-exec validate + governance check）；一次正例运行；负例（缺配置、坏收据、越界路径、未知副作用）；独立 Review + CI；采纳状态 active。
+
+非目标：不改业务代码与既有测试；不改分支保护（由用户执行）；不发布 tag。
+
+引导说明：AGENT-EXECUTION.md 由 host 以固定版本治理套件（dm-server governance init @ bd3a7de57a3a9e1a4495b94c5fa5c08d71e7be8c）生成并作为引导配置提交（执行器运行前必须存在有效配置；沿用 DM 采纳先例）；其余文件由实施单元生成。
+
+## Agent 实施收据
+
+| 单元 ID | 预期范围 | 角色 | 候选顺序 | attempt | CLI/模型 | 终态 | transport | fallback | 源码外收据路径 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| governance-adoption-Agent-System-Backend-r1 | 13 个允许路径（治理文件 + 两个 gitlink） | 39c17561 | implementation | cursor→antigravity→pi | run a1d7d74c（dm-server pinned，attempts=1） | cursor / not-observable | success | 472e5ab31331（apply 快进） | 否 | /tmp/gov-receipt-Agent-System-Backend-r1.json |
+
+## 同步记录
+
+| 节点 | sync_base_sha | tested_head_sha | checked_at | 结果 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 启动 | 7aa624370af347c3dd3740d7453b13af54ae3ed6 | 7aa624370af347c3dd3740d7453b13af54ae3ed6 | 2026-10-17T06:53:54Z | 一致 |
+
+## 结果与验证（完成后填写）
+
+- 结果：NOT_RUN
+- 验证：见下表（命令输出由 /tmp/gov-neg/ev.sh 写入 .task/evidence/governance-adoption/，SELF 除非另注）。
+- 影响与剩余项：NOT_RUN
+
+| 时间(UTC) | 命令 | 被测 HEAD | exit | 来源 | 摘要/位置 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 20261017T071539Z | `scripts/dm governance check --repo .` | 472e5ab31331 | 0 | SELF | ok fixtures；[输出](evidence/governance-adoption/00-20261017T071539Z.log) sha256:f7016c2e2af62a17 |
+| 20261017T071539Z | `scripts/agent-exec validate --repo .` | 472e5ab31331 | 0 | SELF | validate: ok；[输出](evidence/governance-adoption/01-20261017T071539Z.log) sha256:6ded2d91ffdfe365 |
+| 20261017T071539Z | `python3 /tmp/gov-neg/adopt_cases.py .` | 472e5ab31331 | 0 | SELF | [verdict] ALL PASS cases=5；[输出](evidence/governance-adoption/02-20261017T071539Z.log) sha256:2834e3639ade85b8 |

.task/archive/feature-rdm-two-trees-project-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# W9 Backend project audit candidate
+
+- 状态：已完成（合入前闭合，2026-10-18）。本 W9 增量随统一渲染器 Backend 分支经 PR #209 合入 main；合入前已同步 Backend main `56a7f9f`（合并提交 `84a6f6f`，当前 HEAD CI vet-and-test/governance 成功）。同步时 main 的迁移 36 `instance_guard` 保持不变，本分支迁移整体顺延为 37–48（文中 v33/v34 等编号为同步前历史编号），跑过旧编号未合入构建的数据库须重建。用户 2026-10-18 授权按计划完成并收尾、业务验收在部署上自行进行；受信 tag `v0.6.0` 由用户亲手发布。
+- Scope: TT-A01/A02/A04/U04, approved stage 5 W9. Stage 6 local implementation; human review, formal acceptance, PR, CI, tag, and deployment are pending.
+- Branch/worktree: `feature/rdm-two-trees-project-audit` at `/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-rdm-two-trees-project-audit`.
+- R0: Backend authoritative `origin/main` `5d5fc9891c0eb8994545ccb8b740535d9b99fb0e`; main was clean and equal to the fetched remote before this worktree was created. Core gitlink in this worktree is `5773e74086791731059730bd3726dc8c9cd1381f`.
+- Startup receipt: `/tmp/backend-w9-precheck-20261014-01.json` (SELF, exit 2, `SYNC_REQUIRED` for the separate Dev checkout `feature/rdm-increment-acceptance-note`, six commits behind Dev `origin/main`). This Backend task uses the independent-development path in Backend `AGENTS.md`; it does not write that Dev checkout or its task card. The receipt is preserved as a failure, not relabeled READY.
+- Approved affected design: `rdm-two-trees-stage6-audit-link-design-adjustment-r1.md`, SHA256 `385d9d7570217ddcce9fe60a60c99dc58c9a4875ad790584a724d09a210a6e52`; user approval in the task session covers this local Backend increment, not tag publication or Stage 7 acceptance.
+- Approved PostgreSQL cutoff adjustment: `rdm-two-trees-stage6-w9-pg-audit-cutoff-adjustment-r1.md`, SHA256 `2357b715a7c8f3451b34cc25a578d655e8a48f3f26d9cf7561ea7a13998ca857`; scope is isolated Backend implementation/testing, with no real database migration or release authorization.
+- Approved all-writers affected design: `rdm-two-trees-stage6-w9-all-writers-cutoff-adjustment-r1.md`, SHA256 `44f6f7cd34bf95a9c1eb844bfdd70a5c2233e1b5ffc89b3091359dcb5fc3b5d8`; the direct user approval allows the local v34 correction and isolated tests only.
+
+## Implemented local slice
+
+- Optional `ProjectAuditHost` and domain `audit.read` registration. A different plugin, absent registration, or unbound actor cannot read.
+- Store write snapshots the project from the owner-matched conversation; query requires the authenticated actor's owner and that immutable project. This deliberately excludes other members' private conversations and unbound historical rows, and does not move old receipts when a conversation changes projects.
+- Command audit stores the current verified account display name at write time; old rows expose `not-recorded`. Public receipts omit raw payload and parameter digest. Cursor uses project-and-owner scoped source cutoff.
+- Initial commit `c8dd169a1fdc1451fab3b475c14f9636a7f5bf6c` exposed only the actor-owned project slice. The next local increment fixes button actor propagation and adds a trusted domain-commit link publisher, verifier callback, exact linked metadata read, current `audit.read` and per-object metadata checks, and durable idempotency. Unlinked personal conversations remain private.
+- Trusted command dispatch now creates an operation ID before calling the compiled handler and passes that ID through `extension.Request`. The handler can commit the same ID with its domain event/outbox; the final Backend audit/receipt uses it. Client `params.operationId` is ignored. An outbox link request with `HostAuditOffset=0` resolves a unique committed host row by owner, fixed project, and operation ID; a missing row returns retryable `ErrProjectAuditPending`, while duplicate rows fail closed. The separate idempotency key still controls retry equivalence.
+- Independent review of `a8fa2fe` found two P2 security defects: clock-based operation IDs could collide; and `NewScopedHost(owner,"rdm")` let another compiled plugin self-report the publisher's plugin ID. The new local increment uses 192 bits from `crypto/rand` for each host-generated operation ID. Both zero-offset and explicit-offset publication require a unique committed row for owner/project/operation; a historical duplicate rejects publication, including attempts to link another private command. Verifier registration returns a private `ProjectAuditPublisherFactory` for the registering plugin's background outbox; a generic scoped Host has no publisher method. Fixed-clock concurrent IDs, forged params, ambiguous private offset, forged scoped Host, and legitimate registered publisher each have focused tests.
+- The minted publisher exposes only `ProjectAuditPublisher`, not the full owner-scoped `Host`; tests reject attempts to use `NewScopedHost` with a self-reported `rdm` string as publisher authority. A publisher is a registration-time capability, while `IdempotencyKey` remains the separate retry identity.
+- Exact-source linked reads do not enumerate hidden links or reveal raw payload, private conversation ID, or content. Body disclosure and a broad project link list are not implemented; the public coverage reports the narrower capability.
+- A PostgreSQL-only v33 default function takes a table-specific transaction advisory lock before assigning `command_audit.id`, making supported implicit-ID writes commit in source-offset order. Migration and each PG append/project page verify CACHE 1, ascending non-cyclic positive IDs, the exact guarded default expression, and the next ID above the committed maximum; unsafe drift fails closed. SQLite remains single-writer. The owner-only project page reports `committed-prefix` only after runtime checks. v34 below closes the explicit-ID bypass; online sequence maintenance remains prohibited.
+- Isolated PG RED receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-explicit-low-red-20261014-01.json` proved v33 still misreported `committed-prefix`: explicit ID 3 committed after normal ID 4 and disappeared across pages. Local v34 adds `ENABLE ALWAYS` insert and append-only mutation triggers. Every online INSERT checks READ COMMITTED, obtains the same transaction lock, and rejects a nonpositive, nonmonotone, or beyond-reserved ID. UPDATE/DELETE reject. PG append and every strong project page verify both trigger identities, exact event shape, and enablement; the existing default allocator also checks this guard. This is a local candidate, not yet independently reviewed or deployed.
+- `storage-migrate` now copies `command_audit` within one ACCESS EXCLUSIVE transaction: it disables only the named insert guard, copies explicit IDs, verifies count and checksum, advances the owned sequence only forward, restores and verifies the guard, and records done before commit. Failure rolls back table data, trigger state, and done; nontransactional `setval` may leave a safe forward gap. Idempotent done checks guard health before reporting success. Other tables retain their existing path.
+
+## Verification and remaining work
+
+- The session saw RED for the missing store and host interfaces, unscoped cutoff, cross-member private disclosure, and conversation-project reassignment before the respective fixes. These RED outputs were not captured by `make evidence`, so this card does not use them as formal evidence.
+- SELF receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-go-test-20261014-01.json`: `go test ./...`, exit 0, run on the pre-commit worktree based on R0.
+- SELF receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-build-20261014-01.json`: `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system`, exit 0, run on that pre-commit tree. Generated local binary removed after the build.
+- Historical SELF PostgreSQL receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-cutoff-20261014-01.json`: isolated PostgreSQL 18.6 instance on port 55442 reproduced a low-ID transaction committing after a higher visible ID. `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-link-20261014-02.json` verifies the link table, retry/conflict behavior, and the pre-v33 cutoff counterexample. These receipts describe the old `offset-upper-bound-only` candidate, not the new v33 guarantee.
+- SELF PostgreSQL receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-migrate-20261014-01.json`: isolated SQLite→PostgreSQL migration preserved one linked receipt and advanced its target sequence; the same migration ID replayed idempotently. The temporary PG instance was stopped and removed after verification.
+- SELF PostgreSQL receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-operation-20261014-01.json`: a fresh isolated PG instance reran the link lookup, idempotency/conflict, and low-ID late-commit checks after trusted operation-offset resolution was added. The instance was stopped and removed.
+- New PG cross-page RED receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-crosspage-red-20261014-01.json`: before v33, page 1 returned offsets 4 and 2, page 2 returned 1 after offset 3 committed, and the paged view omitted 3. The same test now passes with v33. Isolated PG tests also cover CACHE 10 counterexample/rejection, CACHE 1, sequence rewind into a vacant low ID, down/up with unchanged link IDs, advisory-lock timeout and rollback gaps, and SQLite→PG explicit-ID migration.
+- Historical pre-commit SELF load receipt `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-load-precommit-20261014-01.json` captured an initial v33 variant whose unlocked status function later produced false `cutoff unsafe` errors under concurrency; it is **not** valid performance acceptance evidence. The corrected status check reads committed MAX before non-MVCC sequence state and does not lock readers; the default ID allocator alone holds the transaction advisory lock and rechecks after `nextval`. `TestProjectAuditConcurrentReadWriteNeverReportsFalseDrift` and repeated PG load/cross-page runs protect that ordering. Three-condition pre-commit SELF raw receipts: `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-load-readlock-precommit-20261014-01.json` uses a test-only locked status wrapper, while `/tmp/backend-w9-pg-load-unlocked2-precommit-20261014-01.json` uses the final MAX-first unlocked status; each run also logs its v32 direct-INSERT baseline, PostgreSQL 18.6 version, 192 writes per mode/8 workers, elapsed time, p95, and throughput. The wrapper adds overhead and all measurements vary with hardware/load; no performance threshold has been approved, so they are Stage 6 cost evidence only.
+- Pre-commit SELF `/tmp/backend-w9-default-drift-red-20261014-01.json` showed that a replacement default containing the guarded function name but executing unguarded `nextval` was accepted; `/tmp/backend-w9-default-drift-green-20261014-01.json` verifies exact-expression rejection. Pre-commit SELF `/tmp/backend-w9-precommit-all-20261014-02.json` and `/tmp/backend-w9-precommit-pg-20261014-02.json` passed before this last guard tightening; fixed-HEAD runs are required below.
+- After the guard tightening, pre-commit SELF receipts `/tmp/backend-w9-precommit-all-final-20261014-01.json` (`go test ./... -count=1`), `/tmp/backend-w9-precommit-pg-final-20261014-01.json` (isolated PG store/storage-migrate), and `/tmp/backend-w9-precommit-pg-race-20261014-01.json` (cross-page/concurrent read-write with race detector) all exited 0. These still identify the dirty pre-commit tree, so they do not replace fixed-HEAD verification.
+- v34 pre-commit SELF `/tmp/backend-w9-allwriters-load-precommit-20261014-01.json` records isolated PostgreSQL 18.6, three runs of 192 writes per mode with 8 workers, comparing v32 direct INSERT with v34 guarded `Store.AppendAudit`; it also logs three mixed runs of 180 writes with 6 writers and 160 200-row pages with 4 readers. Protected write throughput ranged about 2.7–3.0k/s, write p95 6.4–6.6ms, and mixed large-page p95 1.2–1.9ms on this one host. These are SELF cost signals with no approved threshold and no Stage 7 acceptance meaning; fixed-HEAD tests still follow.
+- Integration constraint: this branch uses schema v31 (audit attribution), v32 (links), v33 (PG implicit cutoff), and v34 (all-writer guard), while the independent W6 Backend branch also has a local v31. Neither branch has consumed the other's unmerged work. After the first branch lands, the later branch owner must sync the new main, renumber its unpublished migrations without rewriting an already released version, and rerun fresh/old SQLite and PG migration plus combined regression on the actual merged source. These isolated tests do not prove W6+W9 compatibility.
+- Required next W9 work: real RDM committed-event verifier/outbox consumer, Backend project-event source, run ID propagation, model/tool/background receipts, body/detail disclosure, broad authorized linked-operation pagination, history/export, and combined product verification remain unfinished. A domain commit followed by a lost Backend audit append leaves the link pending; recovery must retain and reconcile that unknown state without claiming a host receipt. Exact-link and owner-only paging do not satisfy Stage 7 audit acceptance. PostgreSQL v33 adds a global command-audit append lock; its measured wait/throughput cost has no approved performance threshold and needs human Stage 6 review.

.task/evidence/governance-adoption/00-20261017T071539Z.log

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+command: scripts/dm governance check --repo . 
+cwd: /home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-governance-adoption
+head: 472e5ab313318181f1ecad1a351a0c612c453ac0
+exit: 0
+utc: 20261017T071539Z
+---
+ok gitlink deps/development-guidelines
+ok gitlink deps/development-manager
+ok agent-execution
+ok file AGENTS.md
+ok file PROJECT.md
+ok file policy/guidelines-adoption.md
+ok file .task/templates/task-card.md
+ok executable scripts/agent-exec
+ok executable scripts/hooks/pre-commit
+ok executable scripts/dm
+ok executable scripts/task
+ok adoption status
+ok fixtures

.task/evidence/governance-adoption/01-20261017T071539Z.log

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+command: scripts/agent-exec validate --repo . 
+cwd: /home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-governance-adoption
+head: 472e5ab313318181f1ecad1a351a0c612c453ac0
+exit: 0
+utc: 20261017T071539Z
+---
+validate: ok

.task/evidence/governance-adoption/02-20261017T071539Z.log

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+command: python3 /tmp/gov-neg/adopt_cases.py . 
+cwd: /home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-governance-adoption
+head: 472e5ab313318181f1ecad1a351a0c612c453ac0
+exit: 0
+utc: 20261017T071539Z
+---
+[object] Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-governance-adoption HEAD=472e5ab313318181f1ecad1a351a0c612c453ac0
+PASS positive-run-apply: run exit=0 terminal=success apply exit=0 head=cb5172f341c9
+PASS missing-config: run exit=2 terminal=invalid-config validate exit=2
+PASS bad-receipt: apply exit=4 head_unchanged=True msg=apply: no local integrity record: changed paths do not match the transport diff
+PASS out-of-scope-path: run exit=5 terminal=scope-expansion transport=False
+PASS unknown-side-effect: run exit=4 terminal=failed-unknown transport=False
+[verdict] ALL PASS cases=5

.task/feature-regulations-kb-ext20.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# feature/regulations-kb-ext20 任务卡
+
+任务主记录：本文件随 PR 描述维护。
+状态：已完成（合入前闭合）；owner：weichen。PR：https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/weichen/Agent-System-Backend/pulls/212
+
+## 基线与授权
+
+- 权威仓：ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/Agent-System-Backend.git；root_target：main；immediate_target：main
+- branch_kind：standalone；跨仓总任务：Agent-System-Dev `feature/regulations-kb`（[Dev PR #614](https://git-home.u1680832.nyat.app:30319/weichen/Agent-System-Dev/pulls/614)）
+- R0（initial_main_sha）：cac60c0；工作区：/home/weichen/projects/Agent-System-Backend-wt-feature-regulations-kb-ext20；分支：feature/regulations-kb-ext20
+- 授权与交付终点：用户 2026-10-18 /goal 指示按法规知识库计划实现全部内容；本任务交付 U9 的基座公开契约 EXT-20（提案：Documents `docs/proposals/2026-10-18-ext-20-regulations-provider.md`，分支 `feature/regulations-kb-u9-contract`），经 PR 合入 main。不含法规提供方实现（属 KB 仓）与 RDM 消费（U6）。
+- 实施执行：agent-per-unit（配置：AGENT-EXECUTION.md）
+
+## 目标与非目标
+
+- 目标：`pkg/extension` 新增 `RegulationsProvider`/`RegulationsRegistrar`/`RegulationsHost` 与 DTO；进程内注册槽仅接受插件 `kbreg` 且只注册一次；分发 Host 实现四个方法并强制调用方身份、查询最小化（机密词拒绝、长度限制）、状态透传与无明文审计；快照、边界与契约/兼容测试。
+- 非目标：不实现搜索或语料检索；不改 `KnowledgeSearch` 语义。
+
+## Agent 实施收据
+
+| 单元 ID | 预期范围 | 角色 | 候选顺序 | attempt | CLI/模型 | 终态 | transport | fallback | 源码外收据路径 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| backend-ext20-regulations-provider | pkg/extension、internal/app | implementation | cursor, antigravity, pi | 1 | cursor-agent-stable / auto（session not-observable，新进程） | success | refs/agent-exec/cfc2e055f212789112cf11716f5649c5/c04b36e76696 → aaed108（apply 快进） | 否 | /tmp/regkb-u9-receipt.json |
+
+## 结果与验证（完成后填写）
+
+- 结果：`pkg/extension/regulations.go`（EXT-20 接口、DTO、状态常量、`ErrRegulationsUnavailable`）、`surface.txt` 与 `SurfaceVersion` 2.15.0-experimental；`internal/app/regulations.go` 注册槽（仅 kbreg、一次、非 nil；声明式拒绝）与 inprocHost 四方法（有效账户检查、调用方取自分发上下文、schema 校验、查询去空白/1–256 字符/排除词拒绝且不调用提供方、状态透传、审计仅含修订/计数/状态/查询 sha256）；单元与兼容测试。
+- 验证（SELF，host 于 HEAD aaed108）：`go vet ./pkg/extension/ ./internal/app/` 与 `go test ./pkg/extension/... ./internal/app/...` PASS；全量 `GOWORK=off go vet ./... && go test -count=1 ./...` 40 包 ok，仅 `pkg/identity TestDSNFileMode` 失败——在未改动基线 cac60c0 上同样失败（本机环境问题，本变更未触及 pkg/identity），以 CI（GATE）为准。
+- Review：host 主模型审阅实际 diff（base 3187a00 / head aaed108），与提案第 2、4、5 节一致，无阻塞项。
+- 影响与剩余项：新增可选能力，未注册提供方时返回不可用，既有行为不变。

.task/templates/task-card.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# <任务标题> 任务卡
+
+任务主记录：<Issue/PR 链接，或注明"本文件随 PR 描述维护">。
+状态：<进行中 / 待审核 / 已合入 / 已放弃>；owner：<填写>。
+
+## 基线与授权
+
+- 权威仓：<仓 URL 或逻辑 ID>；root_target：main；immediate_target：<main 或 feature/initiative>
+- branch_kind：<initiative | child | standalone>；initiative_id：<稳定 ID，普通任务为空>
+- R0（initial_main_sha）：<完整 SHA>；工作区：<路径>（worktree / clone）；分支：<feature|fix|hotfix/...>
+- 父任务信息（仅子任务填写）：parent_branch=<父分支>；parent_head_sha=<SHA>；parent_pr=<父 PR>
+- accepting_requirements：<true | false>（仅 initiative 可为 true；冻结后为 false）
+- 需求分流：verdict=<JOIN | NEW>；selected_initiative=<分支或无>；候选=<分支@HEAD 列表或无>；理由=<不适配/适配依据>；triage 收据=<源码外路径与摘要>
+- 授权与交付终点：<本次允许的动作与终点；未授权事项写明>
+- 实施执行：agent-per-unit（配置：AGENT-EXECUTION.md；外部 Agent 一单元一新进程/会话/工作区）
+
+## 目标与非目标
+
+<预期结果、受影响入口/模块/契约；明确不做什么。>
+
+## Agent 实施收据
+
+按根目录 AGENT-EXECUTION.md 路由；外部 Agent 一单元一新进程/会话/隔离工作区。实施、修复与测试必须通过登记的候选执行；未配置或候选安全耗尽停在 unavailable/blocked，禁止 host 隐式代写。
+
+| 单元 ID | 预期范围 | 角色 | 候选顺序 | attempt | CLI/模型 | 终态 | transport | fallback | 源码外收据路径 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 待定义 | — | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | NOT_RUN | — |
+
+## 复用材料（task-start 自动检索结果摘录）
+
+- 相关近期提交：<git log -- <paths> 命中；无则写无>。
+- 相关经验条目：<检索命中；无则写无>。
+
+## 同步记录
+
+| 节点 | sync_base_sha | tested_head_sha | checked_at | 结果 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 启动 | <R0> | <HEAD> | <日期时间> | <一致/已同步> |
+| 验收前 | <填写> | <填写> | <填写> | <填写> |
+
+字段没有发生的写"无"，不省略。本卡与 PR 描述同源：开 PR 时将"目标与非目标、结果与验证、影响与剩余项"复制进 PR 描述，不另写第二份。
+
+## 交付调度（有多个就绪任务时）
+
+- 调度记录 / entry_id / 当前 attempt_id：<平台或调度服务链接及标识；未入队写无>。
+- 入队源 HEAD / owner / 依赖：<完整 SHA、身份、依赖或无>。
+- 固定候选引用：<调度尝试中的 base/head、组件与配置；未固定写无>。
+- 窗口、最终 CI、Review 与真实合入结果：<引用调度记录及原始证据，不复制全队列>。
+
+定义见 [合入调度与 CI 分配](../standards/merge-queue.md)。本段在候选固定前整理；固定后先使用源码之外的记录保存运行结果，再按项目闭合流程回填。
+
+## 结果与验证（完成后填写）
+
+- 结果：<交付了什么；未发生写无>。
+- 验证：<结论性摘要：PASS/FAIL/SKIP/NOT_RUN 逐项；逐条证据见下表，来源标注与写入规则见 [按影响选择验证与证据](../standards/verification.md)>。
+- 影响与剩余项：<影响面、遗留风险、后续任务>。
+
+| 时间(UTC) | 命令 | 被测 HEAD | exit | 来源 | 摘要/位置 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| <时间> | <命令；由项目 evidence 工具写入，无工具时附命令+对象 SHA+输出 digest 并标 SELF> | <HEAD> | <exit> | GATE/REPLAY/SELF | <摘要/位置> |
+
+## 回收（task-finish）
+
+- 合入核对：<分支已包含于目标分支的核对输出>。
+- 未跟踪/ignored 文件处置：<归档/可再生/存疑 逐项；无则写无>。
+- 回收动作：<worktree remove、分支删除、prune；放弃路径注明原因>。

AGENT-EXECUTION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Project Agent Execution Configuration
+# 项目工程 Agent 执行路由配置
+
+适用范围：定义本项目中由 AI / Agent 主导的代码实施、修复、测试与审阅所调用的 Agent CLI 路由。
+解析器识别正文中唯一一个 ```agent-execution 代码块。正文外的说明文字可根据项目需要调整。
+
+通用硬规则见 Development-Guidelines 的 [Agent 执行与协作契约](deps/development-guidelines/standards/agent-execution.md)。
+本配置为项目本地路由权威，声明具体的候选 profile、尝试次数上限、超时、集成入口与豁免路径；
+代码块须通过 `deps/development-guidelines/templates/schemas/agent-execution.schema.json` 校验后才能登记为 active。
+`fallback_to_host` 只能为 `never`；旧值 `all-unavailable` 仅供迁移工具读取，不能通过准入。
+下例的 CLI 名称、命令与路径均为占位，按项目实际执行器替换。
+
+```agent-execution
+schema: agent-execution/v1
+
+execution:
+  fresh_process_per_unit: true
+  permission: run-everything
+  fallback_to_host: never
+  max_parallel: 3
+  timeout_seconds: 7200
+  idle_timeout_seconds: 600
+  summary_bytes: 16384
+  raw_output_bytes: 10485760
+  max_attempts_per_profile: 3
+  emergency_profile: codex
+
+roles:
+  implementation: [cursor, antigravity, pi]
+  repair: [cursor, antigravity, pi]
+  test: [pi, antigravity, cursor]
+  review: [pi, antigravity, cursor, codex]
+
+profiles:
+  cursor:
+    adapter: cursor
+    executable: "cursor-agent-stable"
+    model: auto
+    enabled: true
+
+  antigravity:
+    adapter: antigravity
+    executable: agy
+    model: auto
+    enabled: true
+
+  pi:
+    adapter: pi
+    executable: pi
+    model: auto
+    enabled: true
+
+  codex:
+    adapter: codex
+    executable: codex
+    model: auto
+    enabled: true
+
+integration:
+  exempt_paths: [".task/**", "docs/superpowers/specs/**", "docs/superpowers/plans/**"]
+  transport:
+    command: "scripts/agent-exec apply"
+  admission:
+    command: "scripts/agent-exec admit"
+  cleanup:
+    command: "scripts/agent-exec cleanup"
+```

AGENTS.md

@@ -34,3 +34,21 @@
 - **SSH key**：`~/.ssh/home_gitea`（ED25519，公钥指纹
   `SHA256:GYXaOXIMeloQ1fKSfdJ/ndgPQzs/Ix7Hk62ekfkfQ20`，Gitea 侧密钥名 GMKtec）；
   `~/.ssh/config` 已有 `git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app` 主机条目，克隆/推送直接可用。
+
+## Agent 执行与新项目准入（强制）
+
+1. 缺 Guidelines 固定版本（`deps/development-guidelines` gitlink 未就绪或 HEAD 不符）时，Agent 只能只读分析，不得实施。
+2. 缺有效 `AGENT-EXECUTION.md`（`scripts/dm governance check` 未通过）时禁止 AI 实施。
+3. 缺共享执行器（`scripts/agent-exec` 或 `deps/development-manager` 不可用）时，状态为 `blocked/unavailable`，不得改由 host 替代。
+4. 不允许 host 代写实施单元；实施、修复与测试必须经 `AGENT-EXECUTION.md` 登记的候选执行。
+5. 人类直接开发按其自身授权与项目规则进行，不受本条款约束。
+6. 分支保护与规范 tag 由用户负责设置与维护，Agent 不得代为设置。
+
+入口：
+
+- 需求分流：`scripts/task triage discover|decide|verify`
+- 任务启动：`scripts/task start …`
+- PR 检查：`scripts/task pr-check …`
+- Agent 执行：`scripts/agent-exec run|apply|admit|validate`
+
+AI 实施单元仅通过 `scripts/agent-exec run` 运行（见 AGENT-EXECUTION.md），其结果经 `scripts/agent-exec apply` 集成。

PROJECT.md

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 
 - `go test ./...` — 单元 + 端到端（mock runner 全链路：流式/折叠部件/HITL 三分支/子代理任务树/工件/上传解析/中文检索/SSE 在线与重放/命令路由/插件装卸 fail-closed）。
 - `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/agent-system` — 单二进制（静态，内嵌前端后）。
+- `scripts/agent-exec validate --repo .` — 校验 AGENT-EXECUTION.md 执行路由配置。
+- `scripts/dm governance check --repo .` — 只读核验治理文件与 gitlink（CI：.gitea/workflows/governance.yml）。
 - 存储：嵌入式 SQLite（modernc.org/sqlite，纯 Go）；FTS5 全文 + CJK LIKE 兜底。
 - 依赖：agent-system-core（deps submodule + replace）、agent-native（runtime/llm 复用）。
 

cmd/agent-system/account_io.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+func runCapabilities(args []string) int {
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("capabilities", flag.ExitOnError)
+	asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "以 JSON 打印能力，不打开数据库")
+	_ = fs.Parse(args)
+	caps := map[string]any{
+		"accountTransaction": true,
+		"accountAudit":       true,
+		"accountOpsOpen":     true,
+		"passwordStdin":      true,
+		"dsnFile":            true,
+		"outFile":            true,
+	}
+	if !*asJSON {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system capabilities --json")
+		return 2
+	}
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout)
+	enc.SetIndent("", "  ")
+	if err := enc.Encode(caps); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "capabilities:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func resolveAccountDSN(flagDSN, dsnFile string) (string, error) {
+	if flagDSN != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "warning: --dsn is deprecated; use AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN or --dsn-file")
+	}
+	if dsnFile != "" {
+		info, err := os.Stat(dsnFile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("dsn file %s must be mode 0600", dsnFile)
+		}
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(dsnFile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		return string(trimNewline(raw)), nil
+	}
+	if env := os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN"); env != "" {
+		return env, nil
+	}
+	return flagDSN, nil
+}
+
+func resolveAccountPassword(flagPassword string, fromStdin bool) (string, error) {
+	if flagPassword != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "warning: --password is deprecated; use --password-stdin")
+	}
+	if !fromStdin {
+		return flagPassword, nil
+	}
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return string(trimNewline(raw)), nil
+}
+
+func writeExclusiveSecret(path, body string) error {
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	_, err = io.WriteString(f, body+"\n")
+	return err
+}
+
+func trimNewline(raw []byte) []byte {
+	for len(raw) > 0 && (raw[len(raw)-1] == '\n' || raw[len(raw)-1] == '\r') {
+		raw = raw[:len(raw)-1]
+	}
+	return raw
+}

cmd/agent-system/account_io_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func accountCLI(t *testing.T, args ...string) (int, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	out, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "capture-")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer out.Close()
+	oldOut, oldErr := os.Stdout, os.Stderr
+	os.Stdout = out
+	os.Stderr = out
+	defer func() { os.Stdout = oldOut; os.Stderr = oldErr }()
+	rc := runUser(args)
+	out.Seek(0, 0)
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return rc, string(raw)
+}
+func cliStore(t *testing.T) (string, *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	s, e := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if e != nil {
+		t.Fatal(e)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { s.Close() })
+	if e := s.EnsureSystemIdentity("fixture", "sqlite"); e != nil {
+		t.Fatal(e)
+	}
+	return dir, s
+}
+func TestOutputFileAppliesToEveryCredentialCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, sub := range []string{"create", "initialize-account", "bootstrap-admin"} {
+		t.Run(sub, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, s := cliStore(t)
+			if sub != "bootstrap-admin" {
+				if _, e := s.BootstrapFirstAdminWrite(store.AccountWrite{Owner: "root", Name: "Root", Actor: "test"}); e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+			}
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret")
+			args := []string{sub, "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--out-file", out}
+			if sub == "initialize-account" {
+				a, e := s.CreatePendingAccount("root", "ada", store.AccountProfile{Name: "Ada"})
+				if e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+				args = append(args, "--user-id", a.ID, "--expected-state-version", "1", "--expected-generation", "0")
+			}
+			rc, _ := accountCLI(t, args...)
+			if rc != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("credential command failed: %d", rc)
+			}
+			info, e := os.Stat(out)
+			if e != nil {
+				t.Fatal("credential output file missing")
+			}
+			if info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output permissions are not private")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+func TestExistingOutputAndConflictingFormatsRefuseBeforeMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"existing", "conflicting"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, s := cliStore(t)
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret")
+			args := []string{"create", "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--out-file", out}
+			if kind == "existing" {
+				if e := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("existing"), 0600); e != nil {
+					t.Fatal(e)
+				}
+			} else {
+				args = append(args, "--out", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "json-secret"))
+			}
+			rc, _ := accountCLI(t, args...)
+			if rc == 0 {
+				t.Fatal("unsafe output selection succeeded")
+			}
+			if _, e := s.GetUser("ada"); e == nil {
+				t.Fatal("output refusal happened after account mutation")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPIKeyCreateUsesExclusivePrivateOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	if dir := os.Getenv("U7_APIKEY_CHILD_DIR"); dir != "" {
+		rc := runAPIKey([]string{"create", "--data", dir, "--owner", "ada", "--name", "fixture", "--out-file", os.Getenv("U7_APIKEY_CHILD_OUT")})
+		if rc != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("apikey create rejected its private output destination")
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	for _, existing := range []bool{false, true} {
+		name := "new"
+		if existing {
+			name = "existing"
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir, st := cliStore(t)
+			if err := st.CreateAccount("ada", "Ada", "", false); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credential")
+			if existing {
+				if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("preserve"), 0600); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+			}
+			cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestAPIKeyCreateUsesExclusivePrivateOutput$")
+			cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "U7_APIKEY_CHILD_DIR="+dir, "U7_APIKEY_CHILD_OUT="+out)
+			var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+			cmd.Stdout = &stdout
+			cmd.Stderr = &stderr
+			err := cmd.Run()
+			if existing {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatal("existing output was overwritten or mutation succeeded")
+				}
+				raw, readErr := os.ReadFile(out)
+				if readErr != nil || string(raw) != "preserve" {
+					t.Fatal("existing output was modified")
+				}
+				keys, listErr := st.ListAPIKeys("ada")
+				if listErr != nil || len(keys) != 0 {
+					t.Fatal("mutation happened before output preflight")
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal("new private output was rejected")
+			}
+			info, statErr := os.Stat(out)
+			if statErr != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output missing or not private")
+			}
+			raw, readErr := os.ReadFile(out)
+			if readErr != nil || len(raw) == 0 {
+				t.Fatal("credential output empty")
+			}
+			if bytes.Contains(stdout.Bytes(), bytes.TrimSpace(raw)) {
+				t.Fatal("credential was written to stdout")
+			}
+			keys, listErr := st.ListAPIKeys("ada")
+			if listErr != nil || len(keys) != 1 {
+				t.Fatal("successful issue was not committed")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/agent-system/dispatch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestUnknownSubcommandExits(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("DISPATCH_CHILD") == "1" {
+		os.Args = []string{"agent-system", "not-a-command"}
+		main()
+		return
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=TestUnknownSubcommandExits")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "DISPATCH_CHILD=1")
+	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("未知子命令应非零退出：%s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(out), "未知子命令") {
+		t.Fatalf("输出：%s", out)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(out), "agent-system starting") || strings.Contains(string(out), "serving") {
+		t.Fatalf("未知子命令落入了服务路径：%s", out)
+	}
+}

cmd/agent-system/env.go

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/execenv"
+)
+
+func runEnv(args []string) int {
+	if len(args) == 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system env <ensure|lock|gc|doctor|rebase|python> --root <dir>")
+		return 2
+	}
+	sub := args[0]
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("env "+sub, flag.ExitOnError)
+	rootPath := fs.String("root", "", "环境根目录")
+	ttl := fs.Duration("ttl", 7*24*time.Hour, "gc 保留窗口")
+	bin := fs.String("bin", "", "python link 要指向的解释器")
+	_ = fs.Parse(args[1:])
+	if *rootPath == "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env: --root 必填")
+		return 2
+	}
+	root, err := execenv.Open(*rootPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	switch sub {
+	case "ensure":
+		py, err := root.EnsurePython(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env ensure:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		id, err := execenv.NewBroker(root, nil, execenv.Pip{Python: py}).EnsureBase(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env ensure:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Println(id)
+		return runDoctor(ctx, root, py, true)
+	case "lock":
+		id, err := root.CurrentBase()
+		if err != nil || id == "" {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env lock: 没有 current 基础层")
+			return 1
+		}
+		lock, err := root.ReadLock(id)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env lock:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout)
+		enc.SetIndent("", "  ")
+		if err := enc.Encode(lock); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env lock:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		return 0
+	case "gc":
+		removed, err := execenv.NewBroker(root, nil, execenv.Pip{}).GC(*ttl)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env gc:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		for _, id := range removed {
+			fmt.Println(id)
+		}
+		return 0
+	case "doctor":
+		py, ok := root.PythonBin()
+		if !ok {
+			py = "/usr/bin/python3"
+		}
+		return runDoctor(ctx, root, py, true)
+	case "rebase":
+		py, err := root.EnsurePython(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env rebase:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		id, err := execenv.NewBroker(root, nil, execenv.Pip{Python: py}).Rebase(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env rebase:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Println(id)
+		return 0
+	case "python":
+		action := "install"
+		if fs.NArg() > 0 {
+			action = fs.Arg(0)
+		}
+		switch action {
+		case "install":
+			py, err := root.EnsurePython(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env python:", err)
+				return 1
+			}
+			fmt.Println(py)
+			return 0
+		case "link":
+			if *bin == "" {
+				fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env python link: --bin 必填")
+				return 2
+			}
+			if err := root.LinkPython(*bin); err != nil {
+				fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env python link:", err)
+				return 1
+			}
+			fmt.Println(*bin)
+			return 0
+		default:
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env python: install | link")
+			return 2
+		}
+	default:
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "env: 未知动作 %s\n", sub)
+		return 2
+	}
+}
+
+func runDoctor(ctx context.Context, root *execenv.Root, py string, sandbox bool) int {
+	var pyPath []string
+	if id, err := root.CurrentBase(); err == nil && id != "" {
+		pyPath = append(pyPath, root.LayerDir(id))
+	}
+	mounts := append([]string{}, pyPath...)
+	if prefix := root.PythonPrefix(); prefix != "" {
+		mounts = append(mounts, prefix)
+	}
+	if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(py); err == nil {
+		py = resolved
+	}
+	if err := execenv.Doctor(ctx, py, pyPath, nil, sandbox, mounts); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "env doctor:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Println("doctor ok")
+	return 0
+}

cmd/agent-system/main.go

@@ -9,17 +9,29 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/app"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/config"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/identity"
 )
 
 var version = "0.1.0-dev"
 
 func main() {
-	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
+	if len(os.Args) > 1 && !strings.HasPrefix(os.Args[1], "-") {
 		switch os.Args[1] {
 		case "version", "--version":
+			if len(os.Args) > 2 && os.Args[2] == "--json" {
+				if err := identity.WriteDocument(os.Stdout, "agent-system", version); err != nil {
+					fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "version:", err)
+					os.Exit(1)
+				}
+				return
+			}
 			fmt.Println("agent-system", version)
 			return
 		case "serve":
@@ -30,6 +42,18 @@ func main() {
 			os.Exit(runConfig(os.Args[2:]))
 		case "user":
 			os.Exit(runUser(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "identity":
+			os.Exit(runIdentity(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "capabilities":
+			os.Exit(runCapabilities(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "env":
+			os.Exit(runEnv(os.Args[2:]))
+		case "migrate":
+			os.Exit(runMigrate(os.Args[2:]))
+		default:
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "agent-system: 未知子命令 %s\n", os.Args[1])
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system <serve|version|identity|user|apikey|config|capabilities|env|migrate> [参数]")
+			os.Exit(2)
 		}
 	}
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("serve", flag.ExitOnError)
@@ -44,22 +68,90 @@ func main() {
 	instance := fs.String("instance", "", "本进程标识（空 = 主机名:监听地址；启动对账只收口这个实例的 run）")
 	insecure := fs.Bool("insecure-listen", false, "允许在非回环地址上不开启认证（每次启动都会警告）")
 	allowedHosts := fs.String("allowed-hosts", "", "逗号分隔的额外主机名，供反向代理的 Host 与 Origin 校验")
+	noExec := fs.Bool("disable-exec-tools", false, "硬关闭执行原语 run_shell/run_python/register_artifact（用户设置无法覆盖；多用户部署在执行隔离就位前建议开启）")
+	execBackend := fs.String("exec-backend", "", "执行后端：direct（默认，现状直启）| sandbox（bwrap 隔离档：断网、只读系统根、仅会话目录可写、进程数限额）")
+	execDepsDir := fs.String("exec-deps-dir", "", "sandbox 档只读依赖层目录（site-packages 等；空=不挂载）")
+	execWorkspace := fs.String("exec-workspace", "", "sandbox 档工作区模式：空=直写会话目录 | overlay=冻结基底+私有 upper+CAS 回收（S0）")
+	execEnvRoot := fs.String("exec-env-root", "", "分层 Python 环境根（解释器、基础层、扩展层；空=不启用）")
+	tier := fs.String("tier", "", "部署档：空=auto（DSN→PG，否则 SQLite）| local（SQLite，不允许 DSN）| team（PG fail-closed：缺 DSN/未认证拒绝启动，PG 故障拒绝就绪）")
+	pgMaxOpen := fs.Int("pg-max-open", 0, "PG 最大打开连接（0=默认 16）")
+	pgMaxIdle := fs.Int("pg-max-idle", 0, "PG 最大空闲连接（0=默认 8）")
+	pgIdleSec := fs.Int("pg-conn-max-idle-sec", 0, "PG 空闲连接回收秒数（0=默认 300）")
+	pgLifetimeSec := fs.Int("pg-conn-max-lifetime-sec", 0, "PG 连接最长生命周期秒数（0=不限）")
+	pgQueryTimeoutSec := fs.Int("pg-query-timeout-sec", 0, "PG statement_timeout 秒数（0=不限；覆盖全部业务查询）")
+	adoptGuard := fs.Bool("adopt-instance-guard", false, "数据库被替换或锁文件被重建后，显式重写 SQLite 活动服务守卫")
+	extension.RegisterCLIFlags(fs)
 	fs.Parse(os.Args[1:])
+	handled, hookErr := extension.RunCLIHooks(extension.Options{
+		Addr: *addr, DataDir: *data, PluginsDir: *pluginsDir, Mock: *mock,
+		StorageDSN: *dsn, AuthMode: *auth, DisableExecTools: *noExec, ExecBackend: *execBackend,
+	})
+	if hookErr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", hookErr)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	if handled {
+		return
+	}
 	cliSet := visited(fs)
+	delete(cliSet, "adopt-instance-guard")
 
 	resolved, err := config.Load(*cfgFile, os.LookupEnv, config.Config{
 		Addr: *addr, DataDir: *data, PluginsDir: *pluginsDir, Mock: *mock,
 		StorageDSN: *dsn, ArtifactsDir: *artifacts, AuthMode: *auth, Instance: *instance,
-		InsecureListen: *insecure, AllowedHostsRaw: *allowedHosts,
+		InsecureListen: *insecure, AllowedHostsRaw: *allowedHosts, DisableExecTools: *noExec,
+		ExecBackend: *execBackend, ExecDepsDir: *execDepsDir, ExecWorkspace: *execWorkspace, ExecEnvRoot: *execEnvRoot,
+		Tier: *tier, PGMaxOpen: *pgMaxOpen, PGMaxIdle: *pgMaxIdle,
+		PGConnMaxIdleSec: *pgIdleSec, PGConnMaxLifetimeSec: *pgLifetimeSec, PGQueryTimeoutSec: *pgQueryTimeoutSec,
 	}, cliSet)
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
+	if msgs := resolved.TierProblems(); len(msgs) > 0 {
+		for _, msg := range msgs {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system: tier guard:", msg)
+		}
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	pluginDefaults, merr := extension.MergeHostOptions(extension.Options{})
+	if merr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", merr)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	disableExec := resolved.DisableExecTools
+	if !cliSet["disableExecTools"] {
+		disableExec = disableExec || pluginDefaults.DisableExecTools
+	}
+	execBackendResolved := resolved.ExecBackend
+	if !cliSet["execBackend"] && execBackendResolved == "" {
+		execBackendResolved = pluginDefaults.ExecBackend
+	}
+	extOpt := extension.Options{
+		Addr: resolved.Addr, DataDir: resolved.DataDir, PluginsDir: resolved.PluginsDir,
+		DisableUploadIndexing: pluginDefaults.DisableUploadIndexing,
+		DisableConvCardMirror: pluginDefaults.DisableConvCardMirror,
+		DisableExecTools:      disableExec, ExecBackend: execBackendResolved,
+	}
+	if err := extension.PrepareCompiled(&extOpt); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
 	if err := app.Run(app.Options{
 		Addr: resolved.Addr, DataDir: resolved.DataDir, PluginsDir: resolved.PluginsDir, ForceMock: resolved.Mock,
 		StorageDSN: resolved.StorageDSN, ArtifactsDir: resolved.ArtifactsDir, AuthMode: resolved.AuthMode,
 		InstanceID: resolved.Instance, InsecureListen: resolved.InsecureListen, AllowedHosts: resolved.AllowedHosts(),
+		DisableUploadIndexing: extOpt.DisableUploadIndexing,
+		DisableConvCardMirror: extOpt.DisableConvCardMirror,
+		DisableExecTools:      extOpt.DisableExecTools, ExecBackend: extOpt.ExecBackend, ExecDepsDir: resolved.ExecDepsDir,
+		ExecWorkspace: resolved.ExecWorkspace, ExecEnvRoot: resolved.ExecEnvRoot,
+		Tier:               resolved.Tier,
+		AdoptInstanceGuard: *adoptGuard,
+		PGPool: store.PoolOptions{
+			MaxOpenConn: resolved.PGMaxOpen, MaxIdleConn: resolved.PGMaxIdle,
+			ConnMaxIdleTimeSec: resolved.PGConnMaxIdleSec, ConnMaxLifetimeSec: resolved.PGConnMaxLifetimeSec,
+			QueryTimeoutSec: resolved.PGQueryTimeoutSec,
+		},
 	}); err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
@@ -76,6 +168,26 @@ func visited(fs *flag.FlagSet) map[string]bool {
 			name = "insecureListen"
 		case "allowed-hosts":
 			name = "allowedHosts"
+		case "disable-exec-tools":
+			name = "disableExecTools"
+		case "exec-backend":
+			name = "execBackend"
+		case "exec-deps-dir":
+			name = "execDepsDir"
+		case "exec-workspace":
+			name = "execWorkspace"
+		case "exec-env-root":
+			name = "execEnvRoot"
+		case "pg-max-open":
+			name = "pgMaxOpen"
+		case "pg-max-idle":
+			name = "pgMaxIdle"
+		case "pg-conn-max-idle-sec":
+			name = "pgConnMaxIdleSec"
+		case "pg-conn-max-lifetime-sec":
+			name = "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec"
+		case "pg-query-timeout-sec":
+			name = "pgQueryTimeoutSec"
 		}
 		set[name] = true
 	})
@@ -100,11 +212,25 @@ func runConfig(args []string) int {
 	instance := fs.String("instance", "", "")
 	insecure := fs.Bool("insecure-listen", false, "")
 	allowedHosts := fs.String("allowed-hosts", "", "")
+	noExec := fs.Bool("disable-exec-tools", false, "")
+	execBackend := fs.String("exec-backend", "", "")
+	execDepsDir := fs.String("exec-deps-dir", "", "")
+	execWorkspace := fs.String("exec-workspace", "", "")
+	execEnvRoot := fs.String("exec-env-root", "", "")
+	tier := fs.String("tier", "", "")
+	pgMaxOpen := fs.Int("pg-max-open", 0, "")
+	pgMaxIdle := fs.Int("pg-max-idle", 0, "")
+	pgIdleSec := fs.Int("pg-conn-max-idle-sec", 0, "")
+	pgLifetimeSec := fs.Int("pg-conn-max-lifetime-sec", 0, "")
+	pgQueryTimeoutSec := fs.Int("pg-query-timeout-sec", 0, "")
 	fs.Parse(args[1:])
 	resolved, err := config.Load(*cfgFile, os.LookupEnv, config.Config{
 		Addr: *addr, DataDir: *data, PluginsDir: *pluginsDir, Mock: *mock,
 		StorageDSN: *dsn, ArtifactsDir: *artifacts, AuthMode: *auth, Instance: *instance,
-		InsecureListen: *insecure, AllowedHostsRaw: *allowedHosts,
+		InsecureListen: *insecure, AllowedHostsRaw: *allowedHosts, DisableExecTools: *noExec,
+		ExecBackend: *execBackend, ExecDepsDir: *execDepsDir, ExecWorkspace: *execWorkspace, ExecEnvRoot: *execEnvRoot,
+		Tier: *tier, PGMaxOpen: *pgMaxOpen, PGMaxIdle: *pgMaxIdle,
+		PGConnMaxIdleSec: *pgIdleSec, PGConnMaxLifetimeSec: *pgLifetimeSec, PGQueryTimeoutSec: *pgQueryTimeoutSec,
 	}, visited(fs))
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", err)
@@ -125,22 +251,47 @@ func runAPIKey(args []string) int {
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("apikey "+sub, flag.ExitOnError)
 	data := fs.String("data", "./data", "数据目录")
 	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档）")
+	dsnFile := fs.String("dsn-file", "", "0600权限的PostgreSQL DSN文件")
 	owner := fs.String("owner", "", "租户名（owner）")
 	name := fs.String("name", "default", "密钥名称")
+	outFile := fs.String("out-file", "", "把明文密钥独占写入该文件（0600）")
 	fs.Parse(args[1:])
 	if *owner == "" {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey: --owner 必填")
 		return 2
 	}
+	if sub != "create" && *outFile != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey: 此子命令不生成密钥")
+		return 2
+	}
+	resolvedDSN, err := resolveAccountDSN(*dsn, *dsnFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	*dsn = resolvedDSN
 	switch sub {
 	case "create":
+		delivery, err := reserveCredentialOutput(*outFile, "")
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		defer delivery.abort()
 		key, err := app.CreateAPIKey(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
 			return 1
 		}
 		// 明文仅此一次输出；库中只存 SHA-256 摘要。
-		fmt.Println(key)
+		if delivery.file == nil {
+			fmt.Println(key) // Existing API-key CLI compatibility; owner grants require a file.
+			return 0
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("api-key", *owner, key, nil); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "apikey create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
 		return 0
 	case "list":
 		keys, err := app.ListAPIKeys(*dsn, *data, *owner)
@@ -169,55 +320,222 @@ func runAPIKey(args []string) int {
 	}
 }
 
-// runUser：用户账号管理子命令（管理员发放制，R2）——create / reset-password / list。
-// 密码未显式给定时生成随机值，明文仅此一次输出；创建/重置后首次登录强制改密。
+// deliverCredential writes only to a new private file. The secret never goes
+// to stdout or an existing path; a JSON payload may include expiresAt.
+func deliverCredential(outPath, kind, owner, plaintext string, expiresAt any) error {
+	if outPath == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("protected credential delivery path required")
+	}
+	payload := map[string]any{"kind": kind, "owner": owner, "secret": plaintext}
+	if expiresAt != nil {
+		payload["expiresAt"] = expiresAt
+	}
+	buf, err := json.MarshalIndent(payload, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := writeExclusiveSecret(outPath, string(buf)); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "凭据已写入 %s（0600，仅此一次生成；勿入库勿入日志）\n", outPath)
+	return nil
+}
+
+type credentialOutput struct {
+	path    string
+	file    *os.File
+	json    bool
+	mutated bool
+}
+
+// Reserve the destination before changing the account. O_EXCL also rejects an
+// existing symlink, so an existing secret can never be overwritten.
+func reserveCredentialOutput(rawPath, jsonPath string) (*credentialOutput, error) {
+	if rawPath != "" && jsonPath != "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("--out and --out-file are mutually exclusive")
+	}
+	out := &credentialOutput{}
+	out.path, out.json = rawPath, false
+	if jsonPath != "" {
+		out.path, out.json = jsonPath, true
+	}
+	if out.path == "" {
+		return out, nil
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(out.path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out.file = f
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (out *credentialOutput) abort() {
+	if out == nil || out.file == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	info, err := out.file.Stat()
+	_ = out.file.Close()
+	if out.mutated || err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pathInfo, pathErr := os.Stat(out.path)
+	if pathErr == nil && os.SameFile(info, pathInfo) {
+		_ = os.Remove(out.path)
+	}
+}
+
+func (out *credentialOutput) deliver(kind, owner, plaintext string, expiresAt any) error {
+	if out.file == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("protected credential delivery path required")
+	}
+	out.mutated = true // Keep the private recovery artifact if delivery fails after DB commit.
+	var body []byte
+	if out.json {
+		payload := map[string]any{"kind": kind, "owner": owner, "secret": plaintext}
+		if expiresAt != nil {
+			payload["expiresAt"] = expiresAt
+		}
+		var err error
+		body, err = json.MarshalIndent(payload, "", "  ")
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		body = []byte(plaintext)
+	}
+	body = append(body, '\n')
+	if _, err := out.file.Write(body); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := out.file.Sync(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := out.file.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	out.file = nil
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "凭据已写入 %s（0600，仅此一次生成；勿入库勿入日志）\n", out.path)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// runUser：本地 owner 账号初始化、续办和只读／撤销操作。
 func runUser(args []string) int {
 	if len(args) == 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system user <create|reset-password|list> [--owner x --name y --admin --password p]")
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "用法：agent-system user <create|initialize-account|list|revoke-login-key|bootstrap-admin> [flags]")
 		return 2
 	}
 	sub := args[0]
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("user "+sub, flag.ExitOnError)
 	data := fs.String("data", "./data", "数据目录")
-	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档）")
+	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL 档 DSN（空 = 嵌入式档；已弃用，优先 AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN 或 --dsn-file）")
+	dsnFile := fs.String("dsn-file", "", "0600 权限的 DSN 文件")
 	owner := fs.String("owner", "", "用户名（owner）")
+	userID := fs.String("user-id", "", "待初始化账号稳定ID")
+	expectedStateVersion := fs.Int64("expected-state-version", 0, "待初始化账号状态版本")
+	expectedGeneration := fs.Int64("expected-generation", -1, "待初始化账号代数")
 	name := fs.String("name", "", "显示名")
-	password := fs.String("password", "", "密码（空 = 随机生成并打印一次）")
-	admin := fs.Bool("admin", false, "管理员（可管理用户与密钥）")
+	password := fs.String("password", "", "密码（已弃用；请用 --password-stdin）")
+	passwordStdin := fs.Bool("password-stdin", false, "从 stdin 读取密码")
+	outFile := fs.String("out-file", "", "把明文凭据独占写入该文件（0600）")
+	instanceID := fs.String("instance-id", "", "严格核验库内服务身份")
+	admin := fs.Bool("admin", false, "管理员")
+	role := fs.String("role", "user", "角色 user|admin")
+	openExisting := fs.Bool("open-existing", false, "兼容旧参数；账户命令始终只打开既有存储")
+	generatePassword := fs.Bool("generate-password", false, "旧随机初始密码参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.String("purpose", "recover", "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.Int("ttl-minutes", 30, "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	fs.Bool("revoke-all-credentials", false, "旧 issue-login-key 参数（现已拒绝）")
+	keyID := fs.String("id", "", "revoke-login-key 凭据编号")
+	out := fs.String("out", "", "凭据保护交付文件（0600 JSON）")
 	fs.Parse(args[1:])
+	if sub == "reset-password" || sub == "issue-login-key" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: use owner initialization or owner-confirmed recovery")
+		return 2 // reject before DSN/password reads, storage opens or output reservation
+	}
+	if sub == "create" && (*password != "" || *passwordStdin || *generatePassword) {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: local creation uses trusted activation only")
+		return 2
+	}
+	resolvedDSN, err := resolveAccountDSN(*dsn, *dsnFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	resolvedPassword, err := resolveAccountPassword(*password, *passwordStdin)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	if *instanceID != "" {
+		_ = os.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID", *instanceID)
+	}
+	*dsn = resolvedDSN
+	*password = resolvedPassword
+	credentialAction := sub == "create" || sub == "initialize-account" || sub == "bootstrap-admin"
+	if credentialAction && *outFile == "" && *out == "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: --out or --out-file is required for protected credential delivery")
+		return 2
+	}
+	if !credentialAction && (*outFile != "" || *out != "") {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: 此子命令不生成凭据")
+		return 2
+	}
+	var delivery *credentialOutput
+	if credentialAction {
+		delivery, err = reserveCredentialOutput(*outFile, *out)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user:", err)
+			return 2
+		}
+		defer delivery.abort()
+	}
 	switch sub {
 	case "create":
 		if *owner == "" {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create: --owner 必填")
 			return 2
 		}
-		pw, err := app.CreateUserAccount(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name, *password, *admin)
+		isAdmin := *admin
+		switch *role {
+		case "user":
+		case "admin":
+			isAdmin = true
+		default:
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "user create: 未知角色 %q\n", *role)
+			return 2
+		}
+		pw, opID, err := app.CreateUserAccount(*dsn, *data, *owner, *name, *password, isAdmin, *openExisting, *generatePassword)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create:", err)
 			return 1
 		}
-		fmt.Println(pw)
-		if *password == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "初始密码仅此一次输出；该用户首次登录须修改密码。")
+		if err := delivery.deliver("login-key", *owner, pw, nil); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user create:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "operation_id=%s\n", opID)
+		return 0
+	case "initialize-account":
+		if *userID == "" || *expectedStateVersion < 1 || *expectedGeneration < 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account: --user-id、--expected-state-version、--expected-generation 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		plain, targetOwner, err := app.InitializeAccount(*dsn, *data, *userID, *expectedStateVersion, *expectedGeneration)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("activation", targetOwner, plain, time.Now().Add(30*time.Minute).UTC()); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user initialize-account:", err)
+			return 1
 		}
 		return 0
 	case "reset-password":
-		if *owner == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user reset-password: --owner 必填")
-			return 2
-		}
-		pw, err := app.ResetUserPassword(*dsn, *data, *owner, *password)
-		if err != nil {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user reset-password:", err)
-			return 1
-		}
-		fmt.Println(pw)
-		if *password == "" {
-			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "新密码仅此一次输出；该用户下次登录须修改密码（其余会话已吊销）。")
-		}
-		return 0
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED")
+		return 2
 	case "list":
-		users, err := app.ListUserAccounts(*dsn, *data)
+		users, err := app.ListUserAccounts(*dsn, *data, *openExisting)
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user list:", err)
 			return 1
@@ -225,8 +543,44 @@ func runUser(args []string) int {
 		out, _ := json.MarshalIndent(users, "", "  ")
 		fmt.Println(string(out))
 		return 0
+	case "issue-login-key":
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED")
+		return 2
+	case "revoke-login-key":
+		if *keyID == "" {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user revoke-login-key: --id 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		if err := app.RevokeUserLoginKey(*dsn, *data, *keyID, *openExisting); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user revoke-login-key:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		fmt.Println("revoked")
+		return 0
+	case "bootstrap-admin":
+		if *owner == "" {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin: --owner 必填")
+			return 2
+		}
+		plain, err := app.BootstrapAdmin(*dsn, *data, *owner, *openExisting)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		if err := delivery.deliver("bootstrap-admin", *owner, plain, time.Now().Add(30*time.Minute).UTC()); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user bootstrap-admin:", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		return 0
 	default:
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "user: 未知子命令", sub)
 		return 2
 	}
 }
+
+// runIdentity：U1 I3 服务实例库内身份（manifest.instance_id ↔ agent_system_identity）。
+// 与 serve --instance（runs 进程标识）无关。实现在 pkg/identity（公共化：下游
+// 组合仓共用同一 CLI，未知子命令 usage 退出、不落服务路径——2026-10-12 裁定）。
+func runIdentity(args []string) int {
+	return identity.Run(args)
+}

cmd/agent-system/migrate.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/app"
+)
+
+func runMigrate(args []string) int {
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("migrate", flag.ExitOnError)
+	data := fs.String("data", "./data", "数据目录（SQLite 档）")
+	dsn := fs.String("dsn", "", "PostgreSQL DSN（空则读 AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN）")
+	adopt := fs.Bool("adopt-instance-guard", false, "数据库被替换或锁文件被重建后，显式重写守卫")
+	_ = fs.Parse(args)
+	storage := *dsn
+	if storage == "" {
+		storage = os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN")
+	}
+	if err := app.Migrate(app.Options{
+		DataDir:            *data,
+		StorageDSN:         storage,
+		AdoptInstanceGuard: *adopt,
+	}); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "agent-system:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	return 0
+}

cmd/agent-system/user_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestLegacyUserCredentialCommandsStopBeforeOpeningStorage(t *testing.T) {
+	data := t.TempDir()
+	for _, args := range [][]string{
+		{"reset-password", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--password", "attacker-password"},
+		{"issue-login-key", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--purpose", "recover", "--revoke-all-credentials"},
+	} {
+		if code := runUser(args); code != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("legacy command did not reject before storage: %v code=%d", args[0], code)
+		}
+	}
+	out := filepath.Join(data, "delivery.json")
+	if code := runUser([]string{"create", "--data", data, "--owner", "victim", "--password", "attacker-password", "--out", out}); code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("password-bearing local create accepted: %d", code)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(data, "agent-system.db")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected commands opened/created a database: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected commands wrote a delivery file: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCredentialDeliveryCreatesExclusive0600File(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	out := filepath.Join(dir, "credential.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(out, []byte("old"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := deliverCredential(out, "activation", "alice", "secret", nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("existing permissive file was overwritten")
+	}
+	bytes, err := os.ReadFile(out)
+	if err != nil || string(bytes) != "old" {
+		t.Fatalf("existing file changed: %q %v", bytes, err)
+	}
+	out = filepath.Join(dir, "new.json")
+	if err := deliverCredential(out, "activation", "alice", "secret", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	info, err := os.Stat(out)
+	if err != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
+		t.Fatalf("delivery mode: %v %v", info, err)
+	}
+	bytes, err = os.ReadFile(out)
+	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(bytes), `"secret": "secret"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("delivery payload: %v", err)
+	}
+}

cmd/storage-migrate/integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func TestMigrateTrustedContextManifestWithoutRawScope(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+	src, err := store.OpenSQLite(fixture)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	m := extension.ProjectContextManifest{ProjectID: "p1", AttemptID: "model-attempt", InputSHA256: "request-hash", Delivery: "attempted",
+		Included: []extension.ProjectContextManifestEntry{{SourceID: "source-a", Revision: "r1", SourceHash: "ha", InputSHA256: "input-hash"}}}
+	if err := src.AppendContextManifestWithScope("alice", "r1", m, store.ContextManifestScope{Bound: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	m.Delivery = "responded"
+	if err := src.AppendContextManifestWithScope("alice", "r1", m, store.ContextManifestScope{Bound: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	task, err := src.CreateWorkTask("alice", "rdm", "p1", "c1", "document", "Prepare document")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	stepHash := strings.Repeat("a", 64)
+	if _, err := src.DB().Exec(`INSERT INTO workflow_step_sources(run_id,step_id,owner,project_id,step_attempt_id,output_sha256,attempt_id,authorization_epoch,publication_epoch,watermark,version,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`,
+		"r1", "draft", "alice", "p1", "step-attempt", stepHash, "model-attempt", "auth-1", "pub-1", "water-1", "v1", "2026-10-14T00:00:00Z"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := src.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	snapshot := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snapshot.db")
+	if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", fixture, "--out", snapshot}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", snapshot, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "context-copy"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pg, err := store.OpenPostgres(target, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer pg.Close()
+	receipts, err := pg.ListContextManifests("alice", "r1")
+	if err != nil || len(receipts) != 2 || len(receipts[1].Included) != 1 || receipts[1].Included[0].SourceID != "source-a" {
+		t.Fatalf("content-free model receipts not copied: count=%d err=%v", len(receipts), err)
+	}
+	workScope, err := pg.WorkTaskScope("alice", "rdm", task.ID)
+	if err != nil || workScope.ProjectID != "p1" || workScope.ConversationID != "c1" {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted work task binding not copied: scope=%+v err=%v", workScope, err)
+	}
+	stepSource, err := pg.WorkflowStepSource("alice", "r1", "draft")
+	if err != nil || stepSource.StepAttemptID != "step-attempt" || stepSource.AttemptID != "model-attempt" || stepSource.ProjectID != "p1" {
+		t.Fatalf("workflow step source not copied: source=%+v err=%v", stepSource, err)
+	}
+	var rawColumns int
+	if err := pg.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema=current_schema() AND table_name='context_manifests' AND column_name IN ('resolve_goal','resolve_target_id')`).Scan(&rawColumns); err != nil || rawColumns != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("migrated PG schema has raw prompt columns: count=%d err=%v", rawColumns, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// U4 集成（环境门控 AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN：CI test-pg job / 本机隔离实例）：
+// 夹具 → 受管迁移 → 校验和验证 → 幂等重跑 → 断点续传 → 非空目标拒绝 →
+// 未知 owner 阻塞。每用例独立 PG schema（与 store 测试同隔离约定）。
+
+func pgSchemaDSN(t *testing.T) (string, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dsn := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Skip("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN 未设置：真库集成由 CI 的必跑 job 覆盖")
+	}
+	schema := "mig_" + strings.ToLower(store.NewID("t")) + "_" + fmt.Sprint(os.Getpid())
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm`); err != nil {
+		admin.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("preinstall pg_trgm: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.Exec("CREATE SCHEMA " + schema); err != nil {
+		admin.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("create schema: %v", err)
+	}
+	cleanup := func() {
+		admin.Exec("DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS " + schema + " CASCADE")
+		admin.Close()
+	}
+	return store.AppendPGRuntimeParam(dsn, "search_path", schema+",public"), cleanup
+}
+
+func TestMigrateEndToEndAndIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+	src, err := sql.Open("sqlite", fixture)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer src.Close()
+	var sourcePublic, sourceStaff, sourcePrivate, sourceSecret string
+	var sourceKeyVersion int64
+	if err := src.QueryRow(`SELECT public_revision,staff_no_revision,private_revision,cursor_key_version,cursor_secret FROM account_directory_revision WHERE id=1`).Scan(
+		&sourcePublic, &sourceStaff, &sourcePrivate, &sourceKeyVersion, &sourceSecret,
+	); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-e2e"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("首次迁移：%v", err)
+	}
+	// 幂等重跑（同身份）：表级 done 对账，零重复行。
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-e2e"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("幂等重跑：%v", err)
+	}
+	// 目标侧关键断言：布尔映射、NULL 保留、Unicode、BLOB、SERIAL 序列推进、
+	// 复合主键事件序。
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(target, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	db := st.DB()
+	var targetPublic, targetStaff, targetPrivate, targetSecret string
+	var targetKeyVersion int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT public_revision,staff_no_revision,private_revision,cursor_key_version,cursor_secret FROM account_directory_revision WHERE id=1`).Scan(
+		&targetPublic, &targetStaff, &targetPrivate, &targetKeyVersion, &targetSecret,
+	); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if targetPublic != sourcePublic || targetStaff != sourceStaff || targetPrivate != sourcePrivate || targetKeyVersion != sourceKeyVersion || targetSecret != sourceSecret {
+		t.Fatal("迁移后的目录版本或游标密钥与源库不一致")
+	}
+	var pinned, archived bool
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT pinned, archived FROM conversations WHERE id='c1'`).Scan(&pinned, &archived); err != nil || !pinned || archived {
+		t.Fatalf("布尔映射：pinned=%v archived=%v err=%v", pinned, archived, err)
+	}
+	var title, note string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT title, session_note FROM conversations WHERE id='c1'`).Scan(&title, &note); err != nil || !strings.Contains(note, "注") {
+		t.Fatalf("Unicode：title=%q note=%q err=%v", title, note, err)
+	}
+	var vec []byte
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT vec FROM knowledge_vectors WHERE doc_id='k1'`).Scan(&vec); err != nil || len(vec) != 12 {
+		t.Fatalf("BLOB 向量：len=%d err=%v", len(vec), err)
+	}
+	var ended sql.NullString
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT ended_at FROM runs WHERE id='r1'`).Scan(&ended); err != nil || ended.Valid {
+		t.Fatalf("NULL 保留：ended=%v err=%v", ended, err)
+	}
+	var seqMax int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT MAX(seq) FROM events WHERE conversation_id='c1'`).Scan(&seqMax); err != nil || seqMax != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("事件复合主键序：max=%d err=%v", seqMax, err)
+	}
+	// 复制的显式 id 之后，应用侧插入不撞序列（command_audit.id=7 已复制）。
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO command_audit (time, command_id, source, entrance, state, operation_id, conversation_id, payload, owner) VALUES ('2026-10-11T03:00:00Z','cmd-2','http','chat','done','op-2','c1','{}','alice')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("序列推进失败（复制后插入撞主键）：%v", err)
+	}
+	var linkedResource string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT resource_id FROM project_audit_links WHERE host_audit_offset=7 AND source_id='commit-1'`).Scan(&linkedResource); err != nil || linkedResource != "doc-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("审计链接迁移丢失: resource=%q err=%v", linkedResource, err)
+	}
+	var newLinkID int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO project_audit_links(host_audit_offset,project_id,owner,source_kind,source_id,operation_id,resource_kind,resource_id,run_id,disclosure_class,idempotency_key,created_at)
+		VALUES (7,'p1','alice','domain-commit','commit-2','op-1','document','doc-2','','metadata','outbox-2','2026-10-11T03:00:01Z') RETURNING id`).Scan(&newLinkID); err != nil || newLinkID <= 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("审计链接序列未推进: id=%d err=%v", newLinkID, err)
+	}
+	// 报告不含秘密值。
+	var report string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT report FROM migration_control WHERE migration_id='mig-e2e'`).Scan(&report); err != nil || strings.Contains(report, "sk-secret-value") {
+		t.Fatalf("报告泄密：err=%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCommandAuditExclusiveCopyRollsBackAndNeverRewindsSequence(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+	src, err := openSourceRO(fixture)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer src.Close()
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(target, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	db := st.DB()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(controlDDL); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cols, pk, err := targetColumns(db, "command_audit")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bools, err := boolColumns(db, "command_audit", cols)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	count, checksum, err := sourceScan(src, "command_audit", cols, pk, bools)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	blocker, err := db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var existing int
+	if err := blocker.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM command_audit`).Scan(&existing); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	timeoutDB, err := sql.Open("pgx", store.AppendPGRuntimeParam(target, "lock_timeout", "100"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := migrateCommandAudit(timeoutDB, src, "retry-audit", cols, pk, bools, count, checksum); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "lock timeout") {
+		t.Fatalf("exclusive copy did not fail on a held reader: %v", err)
+	}
+	timeoutDB.Close()
+	if err := blocker.Rollback(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := migrateCommandAudit(db, src, "retry-audit", cols, pk, bools, count+1, checksum); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("mismatched copy committed despite in-transaction target count check")
+	}
+	var rows, done int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM command_audit`).Scan(&rows); err != nil || rows != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("failed copy left rows: %d %v", rows, err)
+	}
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM migration_table_state WHERE table_name='command_audit'`).Scan(&done); err != nil || done != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("failed copy recorded done: %d %v", done, err)
+	}
+	var enabled string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT tgenabled FROM pg_trigger WHERE tgrelid='command_audit'::regclass AND tgname='project_audit_insert_guard_v1'`).Scan(&enabled); err != nil || enabled != "A" {
+		t.Fatalf("failed copy left guard disabled: %q %v", enabled, err)
+	}
+	var seq string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT pg_get_serial_sequence('command_audit','id')`).Scan(&seq); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// setval is non-transactional; an interrupted offline attempt can leave a
+	// forward gap even though its rows and trigger-state changes roll back.
+	tx, err := db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`LOCK TABLE command_audit IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`ALTER TABLE command_audit DISABLE TRIGGER project_audit_insert_guard_v1`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`SELECT setval($1::regclass,50,true)`, seq); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := tx.Rollback(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := migrateCommandAudit(db, src, "retry-audit", cols, pk, bools, count, checksum); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("retry after rollback: %v", err)
+	}
+	var last int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT last_value FROM ` + seq).Scan(&last); err != nil || last < 50 {
+		t.Fatalf("copy rewound sequence: last=%d err=%v", last, err)
+	}
+	var nextID int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO command_audit(time,command_id,source,entrance,state,operation_id,conversation_id,owner,payload)
+		VALUES ('2026-10-14T00:00:00Z','after-copy','','','committed','','','alice','{}') RETURNING id`).Scan(&nextID); err != nil || nextID <= 50 {
+		t.Fatalf("post-copy ID did not advance: id=%d err=%v", nextID, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMigrateResumeAfterInterrupt(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-resume"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// 模拟断点：messages 已 done 后被部分回退（行删一半、状态回 pending），
+	// 重跑只重做该表，终态校验仍全绿。
+	db, err := sql.Open("pgx", target)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM messages WHERE id='m3'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE migration_table_state SET state='pending' WHERE migration_id='mig-resume' AND table_name='messages'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-resume"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("断点续跑：%v", err)
+	}
+	var n int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM messages`).Scan(&n); err != nil || n != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("续跑后 messages=%d：重做该表应恢复 3 行", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMigrateRefusesForeignDataAndWrongSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+
+	// 非空目标（人工数据、无迁移身份）：拒绝。
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(target, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	db, err := sql.Open("pgx", target)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO projects (id, name, settings, created_at, updated_at, owner) VALUES ('foreign', '外来', '{}', '2026-10-11T00:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T00:00:00Z', 'alice')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	err = cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-x"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "非空目标") {
+		t.Fatalf("非空目标应拒绝：%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM projects WHERE id='foreign'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// 同 migration_id 换快照：拒绝（仅同一冻结快照可续传）。
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", fixture, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-snap"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	other := buildFixture(t) // 不同文件 ⇒ 不同 snapshot_id
+	err = cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", other, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-snap"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "快照不同") {
+		t.Fatalf("换快照应拒绝：%v", err)
+	}
+
+	// 其他 migration_id 已存在：拒绝。
+	err = cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", other, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-other"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "其他迁移记录") {
+		t.Fatalf("他身份应拒绝：%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMigrateBlocksUnknownOwner(t *testing.T) {
+	target, cleanup := pgSchemaDSN(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	fixture := buildFixture(t)
+	// 在夹具里造一个 users 之外的 owner 行（直接写源库）。
+	srcPath := fixture
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(srcPath) // 普通打开（夹具可写）
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`INSERT INTO knowledge (id, project_id, source, title, ref, chunk, created_at, owner) VALUES
+		('k_ghost', 'p1', 'upload', '幽灵', 'g.md', '…', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'ghost-user')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	err = cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", srcPath, "--target", target, "--migration-id", "mig-ghost"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "未知 owner") {
+		t.Fatalf("未知 owner 应阻塞：%v", err)
+	}
+}

cmd/storage-migrate/main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// U4 迁移工具测试：夹具覆盖全部当前 schema 的边值（布尔/空值/时间/JSON/
+// Unicode/二进制向量/秘密字段），以及 inventory/backup 的行为面。
+// 真库端到端（幂等/续传/非空拒/未知 owner）在 integration_test.go（PG 门控）。
+
+// buildFixture：建一个全 schema 的 SQLite 库并填充边值行，返回路径。
+func buildFixture(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "fixture.db")
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	seedEdgeRows(t, st)
+	return path
+}
+
+func TestMigrateRejectsSourceLedgerNameCollisionBeforeTargetOpen(t *testing.T) {
+	source := buildFixture(t)
+	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", source)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE schema_migrations SET name='work_task_bindings' WHERE version=35`); err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	db.Close()
+	err = cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", source, "--target", "invalid://target", "--migration-id", "name-collision"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "source migration identity mismatch") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "legacy feature migration numbering") {
+		t.Fatalf("candidate branch ledger was not rejected before opening target: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func seedEdgeRows(t *testing.T, st *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	// users（含 is_admin/must_change 布尔）与单租户默认身份。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO users (id, owner, name, created_at, password_hash, password_set_at, must_change_password, is_admin) VALUES
+		('u1', 'alice', '爱丽丝', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'sha256:…', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', false, true),
+		('u2', 'bob',   'Bob 😊',  '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', '', '', true, false)`)
+	// 项目与会话（布尔 pinned/archived/allow_cross_read/cross_private、空 JSON）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO projects (id, name, settings, created_at, updated_at, owner) VALUES
+		('p1', '项目一', '{}', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'alice'),
+		('p2', 'Emoji 项目 🚀', '{"a":null,"b":[1,2,"三"]}', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '')`)
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO conversations (id, project_id, title, profile_id, created_at, updated_at, owner, pinned, archived, allow_cross_read, cross_private, permission_mode, session_note) VALUES
+		('c1', 'p1', '会话', '', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'alice', true, false, false, true, '', 'note—注'),
+		('c2', 'p2', '', '', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '', false, true, true, false, 'strict', '')`)
+	// 消息（request_id 幂等、parts JSON 含空对象/空数组/Unicode）与 seq 顺序。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO messages (id, conversation_id, run_id, role, parts, seq, created_at, request_id) VALUES
+		('m1', 'c1', '', 'user', '[{"type":"text","text":"你好"}]', 1, '2026-10-11T01:00:01Z', 'req-1'),
+		('m2', 'c1', '', 'assistant', '[{"type":"kv","kv":[]},{"type":"text","text":""}]', 2, '2026-10-11T01:00:02Z', ''),
+		('m3', 'c2', '', 'system', '[]', 1, '2026-10-11T02:00:01Z', 'req-2')`)
+	// runs（NULL ended_at/usage/error）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO runs (id, parent_run_id, conversation_id, project_id, owner, kind, profile_id, status, phase, agent_name, created_at, instance_id) VALUES
+		('r1', '', 'c1', 'p1', 'alice', 'conversation', '', 'completed', '', '', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'host:1'),
+		('r2', 'r1', 'c1', 'p1', 'alice', 'subagent', '', 'running', 'thinking', '检索', '2026-10-11T01:00:03Z', 'host:2')`)
+	// events（复合主键 (conversation_id, seq)）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO events (conversation_id, seq, run_id, ts, v, type, payload) VALUES
+		('c1', 1, 'r1', '2026-10-11T01:00:01Z', 1, 'run.phase', '{"phase":"thinking"}'),
+		('c1', 2, 'r1', '2026-10-11T01:00:02Z', 1, 'message.appended', NULL),
+		('c2', 1, '', '2026-10-11T02:00:01Z', 1, 'x', '{}')`)
+	// 工件（size 0 与大值）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO artifacts (id, project_id, name, kind, mime, size, source_run, content_path, created_at, updated_at, owner) VALUES
+		('a1', 'p1', '报告.md', 'doc', 'text/markdown', 0, 'r1', 'art/a1', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'alice'),
+		('a2', 'p2', '数据.xlsx', 'doc', '', 2147483647, '', '', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T02:00:00Z', '')`)
+	// HITL 卡（resolved=0、resolution NULL）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO hitl_cards (id, run_id, conversation_id, payload, created_at, resolved, resolution, owner) VALUES
+		('h1', 'r2', 'c1', '{"q":"继续？"}', '2026-10-11T01:00:04Z', 0, NULL, 'alice')`)
+	// 知识 + 向量（BLOB 二进制：float32 little-endian）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO knowledge (id, project_id, source, title, ref, chunk, created_at, owner) VALUES
+		('k1', 'p1', 'upload', '标题', 'doc.md', '正文内容…', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'alice')`)
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO knowledge_vectors (doc_id, owner, ref, dim, vec, created_at) VALUES
+		('k1', 'alice', 'doc.md', 3, x'0000803F0000003F000080BF', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z')`)
+	// 活动卡（pinned 布尔）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO activity_cards (id, project_id, conversation_id, ref, owner, payload, status, pinned, created_at, updated_at, version) VALUES
+		('ac1', 'p1', 'c1', '', 'alice', '{"title":"卡"}', 'active', 1, '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 2)`)
+	// 命令审计（SERIAL 主键：显式 id 插入）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO command_audit (id, time, command_id, source, entrance, state, operation_id, conversation_id, payload, owner, project_id, actor_name) VALUES
+		(7, '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z', 'cmd-1', 'http', 'chat', 'committed', 'op-1', 'c1', '{"actor":"alice","commandId":"cmd-1","operationId":"op-1","state":"committed","conversationId":"c1"}', 'alice', 'p1', '爱丽丝')`)
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO project_audit_links (id,host_audit_offset,project_id,owner,source_kind,source_id,operation_id,resource_kind,resource_id,run_id,disclosure_class,idempotency_key,created_at) VALUES
+		(3,7,'p1','alice','domain-commit','commit-1','op-1','document','doc-1','','metadata','outbox-1','2026-10-11T01:00:01Z')`)
+	// 设置（'' 默认租户 scope）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO settings (owner, scope, "values") VALUES ('', 'runtime', '{"rateLimitPerMin":0}')`)
+	// 秘密字段（值不外泄：迁移按行复制，报告无正文）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO secret_keys (id, owner, service, label, value, active, created_at) VALUES
+		('sk1', 'alice', 'openai', 'main', 'sk-secret-value-不打印', 1, '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z')`)
+	// 恢复隔离（业务态，应随迁）。
+	mustExec(t, st, `INSERT INTO recovery_holds (run_id, owner, conversation_id, reason, created_at) VALUES
+		('rh1', 'alice', 'c1', '副作用未知', '2026-10-11T01:00:00Z')`)
+}
+
+func must(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// mustExec：夹具直接走底层连接写行（业务代码不得如此；见 store.DB 注释）。
+func mustExec(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, q string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(q); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- inventory ----
+
+func TestInventoryReport(t *testing.T) {
+	path := buildFixture(t)
+	db, err := openSourceRO(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	rep, err := inventoryReport(db, path, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rep["source_schema_version"].(int) < 20 {
+		t.Fatalf("schema version: %v", rep["source_schema_version"])
+	}
+	counts := rep["table_counts"].(map[string]int64)
+	if counts["messages"] != 3 || counts["events"] != 3 || counts["users"] != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("counts: %v", counts)
+	}
+	b, _ := json.Marshal(rep)
+	if strings.Contains(string(b), "sk-secret-value") {
+		t.Fatal("inventory 报告不得包含秘密值")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInventoryMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := openSourceRO(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope.db")); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("缺文件应报错")
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- backup ----
+
+func TestBackupVerifiesAndSnapshotsConsistent(t *testing.T) {
+	path := buildFixture(t)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snap.db")
+	if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", path, "--out", out}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	snap, err := openSourceRO(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer snap.Close()
+	var n int
+	if err := snap.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM messages`).Scan(&n); err != nil || n != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("snap messages: %d %v", n, err)
+	}
+	// 已存在的输出拒绝覆盖。
+	if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", path, "--out", out}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("已存在快照应拒绝")
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- 夹具即文档：确认全部业务表在 copyOrder 内（防新表漏迁） ----
+
+func TestCopyOrderCoversAllFixtureTables(t *testing.T) {
+	path := buildFixture(t)
+	db, err := openSourceRO(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	rows, err := db.Query(`SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name NOT LIKE 'sqlite_%'`)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	known := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, t := range copyOrder {
+		known[t] = true
+	}
+	known["schema_migrations"] = true         // 迁移器管理，不随迁
+	known["context_scope_scrub_state"] = true // SQLite 候选原文物理清理状态，不随迁
+	// 运行态表不随迁：执行许可是进程瞬态；执行租约与跨实例命令属当前
+	// 实例的调度现场（接管语义在 U5 内由 lease/fencing 处理，不复制历史）。
+	for _, rt := range []string{"admission_leases", "conversation_executions", "run_commands"} {
+		known[rt] = true
+	}
+	// FTS5 虚表影子表：SQLite 内部结构，PG 侧由 v4 生成列/索引从 knowledge
+	// 行自动重建，不随迁。
+	for _, shadow := range []string{"knowledge_fts", "knowledge_fts_data", "knowledge_fts_idx", "knowledge_fts_docsize", "knowledge_fts_config"} {
+		known[shadow] = true
+	}
+	var missing []string
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var name string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&name); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !known[name] {
+			missing = append(missing, name)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(missing) > 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("copyOrder 漏表（新表加入 schema 后须同步工具清单）：%v", missing)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBackupAndMigrateRejectCandidateRawContextScope(t *testing.T) {
+	path := buildFixture(t)
+	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`ALTER TABLE context_manifests ADD COLUMN resolve_goal TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`ALTER TABLE context_manifests ADD COLUMN resolve_target_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version=41`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO context_manifests(id,attempt_id,owner,target_id,project_id,input_sha256,delivery,manifest_json,created_at,scope_bound,resolve_goal,resolve_target_id) VALUES('candidate-ctx','candidate-attempt','alice','r1','p1','input-hash','attempted','{}','2026-10-14T00:00:00Z',1,'OLD_RESTRICTED_BODY','doc-private')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "unsafe-backup.db")
+	if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", path, "--out", out}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "candidate context scope text") {
+		t.Fatalf("backup accepted candidate v38 raw scope: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected backup still created output: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", path, "--target", "postgres://invalid", "--migration-id", "unsafe"}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "candidate context scope text") {
+		t.Fatalf("migration accepted candidate v38 raw source: %v", err)
+	}
+	scrubbed, err := store.OpenSQLite(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := scrubbed.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", path, "--out", out}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("scrubbed source rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if bytes.Contains(data, []byte("OLD_RESTRICTED_BODY")) {
+		t.Fatal("backup retained candidate raw scope body")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBackupAndMigrateRejectPendingOrMissingContextScrubMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	path := buildFixture(t)
+	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, query := range []string{
+		`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS context_scope_scrub_state(id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,pending INTEGER NOT NULL)`,
+		`INSERT OR REPLACE INTO context_scope_scrub_state(id,pending) VALUES(1,1)`,
+	} {
+		if _, err := db.Exec(query); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assertRejected := func(name string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), name+".db")
+		if err := cmdBackup([]string{"--source", path, "--out", out}); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("backup accepted %s context scrub state", name)
+		}
+		if _, err := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			t.Fatalf("rejected %s backup created output: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if err := cmdMigrate([]string{"--source", path, "--target", "postgres://invalid", "--migration-id", name}); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("migration accepted %s context scrub state", name)
+		}
+	}
+	assertRejected("pending")
+	db, err = sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DROP TABLE context_scope_scrub_state`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assertRejected("missing")
+	db, err = sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version=41`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assertRejected("v38-missing")
+}

docs/iam-u3-account-write-fence-inventory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# IAM U3 A1: account write fence inventory
+
+Status: stage 4–5 implementation inventory; the fixed candidate is the commit containing this file, and stage 6 human review remains pending. The route table records the **4053c4d baseline finding** and the intended final sink; its `Now` column is historical, not a claim about the amended candidate. Scope follows the approved Documents A1–A4 amendment `fb3a8214df963697ebd745ad11eb852ed9444fe3` and approved delegated-actor amendment `5783940e4c434102cbca8c22bd282d87b28fa840`.
+
+The 66 non-GET `/api` registrations were enumerated from `internal/server/server.go`. Paths below omit `/api`. `A` means `s.owner(r)` (auth-off: implicit `store.OwnerDefault`); `B` means body owner, `K` redeemed-key owner, `S` current password-session owner. Target resource owner never substitutes for actor. In the historical `Now` column, `T` means the baseline already had a final Store check; `M` means a Backend DB write lacked one; `E` means an external or process-local effect; `—` means no business mutation or permitted credential cleanup. `D` means a short Store transaction with actor account lock and enabled read **before** resource/scope/conversation locks; `F` means stage immutable bytes, then `D` for the visible DB reference; `X` means last effective-state check before external action plus cancellation; `C` means `D` at each command handler's actual sink; `P` means `D` for Backend projection and `X` at the separate RDM callback. `Vnn` identifies the route for traceability; verification uses representative concurrency cases and complete source-to-sink review, rather than one duplicate test per route.
+
+| # | Route → handler (source line) | Actor | Final sink | Now | Required fence | Verify |
+|---:|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 01 | `POST /auth/login` → `login` (`accounts.go:148`) | B | `CreateSessionVerified` | T | retain account/version transaction check | V01 |
+| 02 | `POST /auth/login-key/redeem` → `redeemLoginKey` (`accounts.go:106`) | K | `RedeemLoginKey`; failed-attempt security counter | T | retain account/grant transaction check | V02 |
+| 03 | `POST /auth/recovery-grants/redeem` → `redeemLoginKey` (`accounts.go:106`) | K | same as 02 | T | same as 02 | V03 |
+| 04 | `POST /auth/logout` → `logout` (`accounts.go:202`) | A | `DeleteSession` credential cleanup | — | permit cleanup after disable | V04 |
+| 05 | `POST /auth/password` → `changePassword` (`accounts.go:214`) | S | checked setup/forced/active password Store transaction | T | retain session/account recheck | V05 |
+| 06 | `POST /admin/users` → `createAdminUser` (`accounts.go:321`) | A | `CreatePendingAccount` | T | retain actor enabled/admin transaction check | V06 |
+| 07 | `PATCH /me/profile` → `patchMeProfile` (`accounts.go:394`) | S | `PatchAccountProfile` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V07 |
+| 08 | `PATCH /admin/users/{userId}/profile` → `patchAdminAccountProfile` (`accounts.go:419`) | A | `PatchAccountProfile` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V08 |
+| 09 | `PUT /admin/users/{userId}/state` → `setAdminAccountState` (`accounts.go:444`) | A | `SetAccountEnabled` | T | retain shared account lock and in-tx actor check | V09 |
+| 10 | `POST /admin/users/{userId}/recovery-proposals` → `createAdminRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:7`) | A | `CreateRecoveryProposal` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V10 |
+| 11 | `DELETE /admin/users/{userId}/recovery-proposals/{id}` → `revokeAdminRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:47`) | A | `RevokeRecoveryProposal` | T | retain actor/target transaction check | V11 |
+| 12 | `POST /auth/recovery-proposals/{id}/confirm` → `confirmRecoveryProposal` (`recovery.go:81`) | S | `ConfirmRecoveryProposal` | T | retain owner/session proof in transaction | V12 |
+| 13 | `POST /auth/recovery-proposals/{id}/rotate-grant` → `rotateRecoveryGrant` (`recovery.go:105`) | S | `RotateRecoveryGrant` | T | retain owner/session proof in transaction | V13 |
+| 14 | `POST /admin/users/{owner}/password` → `resetAdminUserPassword` (`accounts.go:468`) | A | 410 response only | — | no business sink | V14 |
+| 15 | `POST /admin/users/{owner}/login-keys` → `issueAdminLoginKey` (`accounts.go:478`) | A | 410 response only | — | no business sink | V15 |
+| 16 | `DELETE /admin/users/{owner}/login-keys/{id}` → `revokeAdminLoginKey` (`accounts.go:494`) | A | `RevokeLoginKeyCascade` | M | D: lock/recheck admin actor too, then target/grant | V16 |
+| 17 | `POST /projects` → `createProject` (`server.go:713`) | A | `CreateProject` or RDM `Create` + Host projection | M/E | P | V17 |
+| 18 | `PATCH /projects/{id}` → `patchProject` (`server.go:734`) | A | RDM `Rename` or `RenameProject`; `UpdateProjectSettings` | M/E | P; D for every settings write | V18 |
+| 19 | `DELETE /projects/{id}` → `deleteProject` (`server.go:812`) | A | RDM `Archive` or `DeleteProject` | M/E | P | V19 |
+| 20 | `POST /projects/{id}/conversations` → `createConversation` (`server.go:875`) | A | `CreateConversation[InProject]`; RDM `Work` precheck | M | D; keep domain work check | V20 |
+| 21 | `PATCH /conversations/{id}` → `patchConversation` (`server.go:914`) | A | update, permission, note, flags: separate Store writes | M | D at each final write | V21 |
+| 22 | `DELETE /conversations/{id}` → `deleteConversation` (`server.go:950`) | A | `DeleteConversation` | M | D | V22 |
+| 23 | `POST /conversations/{id}/messages` → `postMessage` (`server.go:956`) | A | message, run, message-run link; optional Bus dispatch | M/E | D per write; C for command; actor lock before conversation lock | V23 |
+| 24 | `POST /conversations/{id}/rewind` → `rewindFiles` (`rewind.go:27`) | A | checkpoint files, then `AppendMessage` | M/E | X for rewind, D for message | V24 |
+| 25 | `POST /conversations/{id}/regenerate` → `regenerateMessage` (`borrow.go:159`) | A | message flags/exclusion, regen marker, rewind files, new run | M/E | D per write, X for rewind | V25 |
+| 26 | `POST /messages/{id}/exclude` → `excludeMessage` (`borrow.go:122`) | A | `ExcludeRunGroup(messageID)` | M | D; derive conversation owner in transaction | V26 |
+| 27 | `POST /messages/{id}/variant` → `selectVariant` (`borrow.go:146`) | A | `SelectVariant(messageID)` | M | D; derive conversation owner in transaction | V27 |
+| 28 | `POST /secrets` → `createSecret` (`borrow.go:21`) | A | `AddSecret` | M | D | V28 |
+| 29 | `POST /secrets/{id}/activate` → `activateSecret` (`borrow.go:39`) | A | `ActivateSecret` | M | D | V29 |
+| 30 | `PATCH /secrets/{id}` → `renameSecret` (`borrow.go:43`) | A | `RenameSecret` | M | D | V30 |
+| 31 | `DELETE /secrets/{id}` → `deleteSecret` (`borrow.go:54`) | A | `DeleteSecret` | M | D | V31 |
+| 32 | `POST /context-entries` → `saveContextEntry` (`borrow.go:64`) | A | `SaveContextEntry` | M | D | V32 |
+| 33 | `DELETE /context-entries/{id}` → `deleteContextEntry` (`borrow.go:78`) | A | `DeleteContextEntry` | M | D | V33 |
+| 34 | `POST /prompt-commands` → `saveUserPromptCommand` (`borrow.go:87`) | A | `SaveUserCommand`, then process Bus register | M/E | D; X before Bus mutation | V34 |
+| 35 | `DELETE /prompt-commands/{id}` → `deleteUserPromptCommand` (`borrow.go:102`) | A | `DeleteUserCommand`, then Bus unregister | M/E | D; X before Bus mutation | V35 |
+| 36 | `POST /runs/{id}/cancel` → `cancelRun` (`server.go:1278`) | A | PG `EnqueueCommand` or local cancel handle | M/E | D for enqueue with in-tx run owner; X locally | V36 |
+| 37 | `POST /hitl/{id}/resolve` → `resolveHITL` (`server.go:1314`) | A | local HITL/card/event writes or PG `EnqueueCommand` | M | D at each Store sink, including queue | V37 |
+| 38 | `POST /cards/{id}/actions/{actionId}` → `cardAction` (`server.go:1401`) | A | Cards action or Bus confirm, then receipt message | M/E | D for card/message; C for confirmed handler | V38 |
+| 39 | `POST /cards/{id}/pin` → `cardPin` (`server.go:1453`) | A | card version write | M | D | V39 |
+| 40 | `POST /cards/{id}/dismiss` → `cardDismiss` (`server.go:1462`) | A | card version/event write | M | D | V40 |
+| 41 | `POST /cards/{id}/to_project` → `cardToProject` (`server.go:1386`) | A | project card copy and original dismissal | M | D at both writes | V41 |
+| 42 | `POST /projects/{id}/uploads` → `upload` (`server.go:1469`) | A | Blob + artifact row, card, knowledge/vector index | M/E | F; D at later card/index writes | V42 |
+| 43 | `PUT /artifacts/{id}/content` → `putArtifactContent` (`server.go:1651`) | A | **in-place Blob overwrite before SQL UPDATE** | M/E | F using new immutable blob ref, guarded DB pointer swap | V43 |
+| 44 | `DELETE /artifacts/{id}` → `deleteArtifact` (`server.go:1656`) | A | metadata, index/vector rows, Blob deletion | M/E | D for visible rows; X for post-commit GC | V44 |
+| 45 | `POST /profiles` → `saveProfile` (`server.go:1667`) | A | profile Store row | M | D | V45 |
+| 46 | `DELETE /profiles/{id}` → `deleteProfile` (`server.go:1683`) | A | profile Store row | M | D | V46 |
+| 47 | `POST /prompts` → `savePromptModule` (`server.go:2023`) | A | prompt Store row | M | D | V47 |
+| 48 | `DELETE /prompts/{id}` → `deletePromptModule` (`server.go:2044`) | A | prompt Store row | M | D | V48 |
+| 49 | `PUT /settings/user` → `putSettingsUser` (`server.go:1717`) | A | settings transaction, then separate snapshot row | M | D for settings and snapshot | V49 |
+| 50 | `PUT /settings/project/{id}` → `putSettingsProject` (`server.go:1726`) | A | settings transaction, then separate snapshot row | M | D for settings and snapshot | V50 |
+| 51 | `PUT /settings/system` → `putSettingsSystem` (`server.go:1782`) | A | system settings and snapshot under synthetic owner | M | D with **request actor**, not `OwnerSystemRow` | V51 |
+| 52 | `POST /tools` → `createUserTool` (`server.go:1815`) | A | process Registry register; future HTTP tool execution | E | X for registration and each tool execution | V52 |
+| 53 | `DELETE /tools/{name}` → `deleteUserTool` (`server.go:1834`) | A | process Registry unregister | E | X | V53 |
+| 54 | `POST /plugins/{id}/enabled` → `setPluginEnabled` (`platform_api.go:132`) | A | `SetPluginEnabled` upsert | M | D | V54 |
+| 55 | `POST /plugins/{id}/activation` → `setSurfaceActivation` (`platform_api.go:251`) | A | activation transaction, separate audit row | M | D for both writes | V55 |
+| 56 | `POST /surfaces` → `submitSurface` (`platform_api.go:194`) | A | snapshot transaction, then event/pending row | M | D for snapshot/event writes | V56 |
+| 57 | `POST /surfaces/{id}/actions` → `submitSurfaceAction` (`platform_api.go:271`) | A | action insert, Bus dispatch, action-state update | M/E | D for both action writes; C for dispatch | V57 |
+| 58 | `POST /plugins/reload` → `reloadPlugins` (`server.go:1908`) | A | process registry/sidecar changes and `UpsertPlugin` | M/E | X for process changes; D for DB writes | V58 |
+| 59 | `POST /commands/{id}` → `execCommand` (`server.go:1211`) | A | Bus audit/card/pending or arbitrary command handler/RDM | M/E | C, X for external handler | V59 |
+| 60 | `POST /projects/{id}/knowledge` → `addKnowledge` (`server.go:2055`) | A | `AddKnowledge` batch transaction | M | D; in-tx project/owner check | V60 |
+| 61 | `POST /tasks` → `createBackgroundTask` (`platform_api.go:16`) | A | task insert | M | D | V61 |
+| 62 | `POST /tasks/{id}` → `updateBackgroundTask` (`platform_api.go:52`) | A | task update | M | D | V62 |
+| 63 | `POST /memory` → `putMemory` (`platform_api.go:69`) | A | memory upsert | M | D | V63 |
+| 64 | `POST /audit` → `postAudit` (`platform_api.go:112`) | A | client-origin business audit row | M | D; security-denial audit is a separate exception | V64 |
+| 65 | `POST /admin/backup` → `backup` (`server.go:2224`) | A | directory + SQLite backup file | E | X and explicit admin authorization | V65 |
+| 66 | `POST /admin/recovery-holds/{runId}/release` → `releaseRecoveryHold` (`accounts.go:526`) | A | recovery-hold UPDATE | M | D with actor admin check and run/hold owner lookup | V66 |
+
+The route count is not a full write count. `GET /api/llm/budget` → `llmBudget` (`platform_api.go`) calls `AccountTokens(owner, 0, budget)`; the amended Store returns a read-only total when tokens are zero. **V67** therefore has no business write. Ordinary authenticated GETs can refresh session `last_seen_at` as credential maintenance; session/API-key in-flight revocation remains a separate impact analysis.
+
+## Host and run manager exits
+
+| ID | Entry and actor | Final sink | Now → required fence | Verify |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| H01 | `inprocHost.KVPut`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:295`) | `PutPluginKV` | M → D | VH01 |
+| H02 | `inprocHost.Audit`, host owner; actor label is `plugin:<id>` (`hostcaps.go:309`) | `AppendAuditEvent` | M → D using host owner | VH02 |
+| H03 | `KnowledgeWrite/Publish/Delete`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:350-424`) | knowledge rows, vector rows; publish deletes then writes | M/E → D at every DB sink; X before embedding/remote model | VH03 |
+| H04 | `TaskCreate/Update`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:427-443`) | background-task rows | M → D | VH04 |
+| H05 | `EnsureProject/RenameOwnedProject`, host owner (`project_lifecycle.go:125-135`) | Backend projection rows, RDM callback upstream | M/E → actor D before project-name lock; X at callback | VH05 |
+| H06 | `SurfaceSave`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:481`) | `surfacesvc.Submit` snapshot/event | M → D at Store sinks | VH06 |
+| H07 | `Complete`, host owner (`hostcaps.go:319`) | external LLM request | E → X with context cancellation | VH07 |
+| H08 | scoped Host reconstructed from owner/plugin ID (`hostcaps.go:103`) | same H01-H07 methods | M/E → same final sink fences; early `requireEffective` alone is insufficient | VH08 |
+| G01 | `startClaimedRun`/subagent spawn, run owner (`runmgr.go:1443,1924`) | `CreateRun`, `UpdateRun` and admission rows | M → D for business state; keep failure-only cleanup explicit | VG01 |
+| G02 | `Emit`, `AskHITL`, cards, plan/todos (`runmgr.go:676-935`) | events, HITL/card, plan/todo rows | M → D at each final Store write | VG02 |
+| G03 | `WriteArtifact`, run owner (`runmgr.go:968`) | Blob, artifact, event, knowledge/vector rows | M/E → F then D for each later write | VG03 |
+| G04 | `ExecuteTool`, run owner (`runmgr.go:1080-1167`) | Registry HTTP/command/filesystem side effects, output artifacts | E/M → X before external call; C/D for command and output sinks | VG04 |
+| G05 | `stageInputs`, checkpoint recording/rewind and subagent transcript (`inputs.go:17-90`, `rewind.go:37-99`, `subagent_transcript.go:46-84`) | workspace files | E → X before each effect and cancellation; no cross-system atomic claim | VG05 |
+| G06 | `ResolveHITL`, run/card owner (`runmgr.go:1780-1860`) | HITL/card/event and possible run writes | M → D | VG06 |
+| G07 | background notice delivery and subagent completion (`runmgr.go:1982-2041,2444-2455`) | run/message/event plus transcript files | M/E → D for business rows, X for files | VG07 |
+| G08 | `settleRunWithFence`, run owner (`runmgr.go:1700-1722`) | final run + assistant message | T for enabled check in `store/recovery.go:184-220`; retain narrow failure-state exception | VG08 |
+| G09 | `OnUsage`, run owner (`app.go:668-680`) | usage and budget audit rows | M → D or documented accounting-only exception | VG09 |
+
+At the 4053c4d baseline, Host/runmgr effective-account queries were early checks, Bus confirmation and Surface writes had separate sinks, and artifact content could be overwritten in place before a checked SQL update. These are the reasons for the sink-level mapping below; file paths and old line numbers in the historical tables are navigational rather than final-SHA evidence.
+
+## Amended candidate mapping and limits
+
+This section supersedes the historical `Now` column when checking the amended candidate. V01–V15 retain their existing account/credential transaction or response-only behavior; V16 uses actor-checked login-key revocation. V17–V23 route project, conversation, message, run creation and link writes through account-checked Store entries. V24–V35 use guarded file/message and borrow/secret/context/command entries; V25 prepares the message exclusion and regeneration marker in one checked transaction, then consumes the marker only with successful run settlement. V36–V44 guard command queue, HITL, card, surface/event, artifact metadata and index writes. Artifact content updates switch immutable blob references in the checked transaction. V45–V51 guard profile, prompt, settings and snapshot writes, using the **request actor** for system settings. V52–V59 combine last checks for process/HTTP/tool effects with guarded plugin, surface, card, command pending and audit DB writes. V60–V66 use guarded knowledge, task, memory, audit and hold updates. V65 refuses whole-database backup under authenticated mode because administrator status does not grant access to other owners' business content; auth-off backup has a last check. V67 is read-only at zero tokens.
+
+VH01–VH04/VH06/VH08 use the Host owner and final Store account checks for Backend-owned rows. H05 delegated rename now derives a **single-project** projection from the current authenticated lifecycle or command Host; its final Store transaction locks the real operator and creator in stable order, checks both effective states and verifies the persisted project owner. The global `NewScopedHost` cannot derive this delegated capability; its original creator-owned methods remain. VH07 checks immediately before its external model call and passes the caller context. VG01–VG09 use checked run, admission/lease, event, HITL, card, artifact, index, notice, command and settle sinks. File staging, transcript, tool HTTP/search/code execution and overlay writeback check just before effects and propagate cancellation. Failed/cancelled/interrupted run sealing, lease release, notice deletion and failed-start marker deletion are narrowly scoped safety cleanup; positive token usage is accounting for model work already incurred.
+
+The H05/V17–V19 late-write blocker was reproduced in the earlier candidate and repaired under the separately approved Documents `5783940` plan. Tests cover creator/operator effective state, a disable between early check and final write on SQLite/PG, a two-process PG disable, opposite lock order progress, and both HTTP PATCH and no-conversation command Host sources. The RDM database authorization/intent commit is still separate from Backend's account/project transaction; a permission withdrawal or cross-database failure is handled by the existing I1 failure intent and recovery path rather than a zero-window assertion. Completion and stage 6 claims require exact-HEAD receipts and human review.
+
+The account lock closes the **account-enabled versus Backend-owned business write** race on the same database. It does not prove that a session or API key revoked after request authentication cannot complete a write while that account remains enabled; that is a distinct credential-version fence and outside this amendment's promise. RDM commits in its own database and external requests, processes and files cannot share the Backend transaction. The last check can race with those effects, and a multi-file operation can leave earlier files committed when a later check fails. No cross-database or external zero-window claim is made.
+
+**Sink discovery still required:** Backend source alone cannot enumerate every dynamically registered Bus handler, plugin sidecar command, or the RDM callback's independent database writes. V17–V19, V23, V38, V57–V59 and VH05 must record the actual composed handlers and their final sinks in the tested composition; an unknown or unguarded handler blocks the A1 completion claim. The external HTTP tool destination and filesystem actions depend on runtime configuration, so VG04/VG05 must verify the actual enabled tool set and cancellation points.
+
+## Common implementation and verification gate
+
+1. Build one short Store write-transaction primitive: `Begin` → PG actor advisory lock (`account:<owner>`) → `SELECT enabled ... FOR UPDATE` → existing resource/scope/conversation/admission locks → resource authorization and write → commit. The actor lock must precede all other PG locks, including project-name locks; participating account owners use sorted order, then bootstrap lock where required. `SetAccountEnabled` already takes the account lock (`store/account_state.go:20-45`); `lockAccountUsers` supplies sorted PG account locking (`store/account_model.go:115-145`). SQLite uses `_txlock=immediate` (`store/store.go:188-199`). In auth-off mode, only a missing `OwnerDefault` row is implicitly enabled; an existing disabled row rejects (`app/account_guard.go:10-23`). No DB connection or transaction spans request body decoding, embedding, tool execution, RDM callback, or full HTTP lifetime.
+2. Make methods with only resource IDs derive owner inside the guarded transaction. Pass actor separately for system settings (`OwnerSystemRow`), delegated Host calls, commands, queue commands, audit and background jobs. Preserve project/duty authorization as a separate condition; account enabled does not grant resource access. For files, stage invisible immutable bytes and switch the visible DB reference in `D`; failed transaction deletes staged bytes, post-commit old-blob GC may continue. RDM's independent database keeps the explicit cross-database window from the amendment.
+3. Review **every** V/VH/VG route against its final sink on the fixed candidate SHA. Use deterministic pause-and-disable tests for representative project, message/run, artifact, settings, command/surface and Host/runmgr paths on SQLite and isolated PostgreSQL. Test account lock ordering with two PG connections. Verify the existing credential routes' in-transaction ordering. For external effects, verify the last check and cancellation and state the remaining check-to-effect window. Record exact command, tested SHA and output in the Dev task card; local SELF is not independent REPLAY or CI GATE.
+
+Stage 6 stops if any Backend-owned business write lacks a final actor-enabled transaction fence, if artifact content remains visibly mutable after disable via in-place overwrite, or if an external/RDM effect is described as same-DB atomic. Session/API-key in-flight revocation is a separate amendment impact analysis; enabled checks do not prove credential-revocation fencing.

eval/ab.go

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+package eval
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// ab.go — 任务级 A/B 双跑 harness（Q3 WP5）：同一批任务分别经两个入口
+// （direct 对话循环 / squad 编译图）执行，逐任务记录差异（不要求字节级
+// 相同），汇总为两份 EntryScore 交 DecideSwitch 裁决默认入口切换。
+// 本包保持纯机制（不依赖 runtime/squad）；两侧 RunFunc 由调用方装配。
+
+// ABTask 是对照批中的一个任务。
+type ABTask struct {
+	ID   string
+	Goal string
+	// Themes 期望产出要点（短词，非整句照抄）：打分用 MissingThemes，
+	// 差异记录用要点覆盖对比。
+	Themes []string
+}
+
+// ABOutcome 是一个入口对一个任务的执行结果（调用方 RunFunc 填写）。
+type ABOutcome struct {
+	// Completed 任务是否正常收口（失败/取消 = false）。
+	Completed bool
+	// Summary 交付摘要（要点覆盖打分的对象；调用方可拼接工件正文）。
+	Summary string
+	// FirstToken 首字延迟（入口收到任务到首个可见输出）。
+	FirstToken time.Duration
+	// Err 失败原因（Completed=false 时填写）。
+	Err string
+}
+
+// RunFunc 是一个入口的执行侧（direct 或 squad 编译图）。
+type RunFunc func(ctx context.Context, task ABTask) (ABOutcome, error)
+
+// ABTaskRecord 是一个任务的双跑对照记录（差异记录单位）。
+type ABTaskRecord struct {
+	Task   ABTask
+	Direct ABOutcome
+	Squad  ABOutcome
+	// Diffs 差异注记（状态 / 要点覆盖 / 首字延迟），空 = 两侧一致。
+	Diffs []string
+	// DirectPoints / SquadPoints 单任务得分（满分 100：完成 + 要点全覆盖；
+	// 未完成 0 分；完成但缺要点按缺失比例扣）。
+	DirectPoints int
+	SquadPoints  int
+}
+
+// ABReport 是一批双跑的对照报告（切换裁决的证据形态）。
+type ABReport struct {
+	Records  []ABTaskRecord
+	Direct   EntryScore
+	Squad    EntryScore
+	Decision SwitchDecision
+	// Text 是可附在切换 PR / 任务卡上的短报告（Report(Decision) + 差异清单）。
+	Text string
+}
+
+// RunAB 双跑同一批任务并汇总对照报告。任一侧 RunFunc 返回 error 视为该侧
+// 该任务失败（记录进 outcome.Err），不中断整批（对照要的是全批差异面）。
+func RunAB(ctx context.Context, tasks []ABTask, direct, squad RunFunc) ABReport {
+	rep := ABReport{}
+	if len(tasks) == 0 {
+		rep.Decision = DecideSwitch(nil, nil)
+		rep.Text = Report(rep.Decision)
+		return rep
+	}
+	var directFT, squadFT []time.Duration
+	var directSum, squadSum int
+	for _, task := range tasks {
+		rec := ABTaskRecord{Task: task}
+		rec.Direct = runOne(ctx, task, direct)
+		rec.Squad = runOne(ctx, task, squad)
+		rec.DirectPoints = scoreOutcome(rec.Direct, task.Themes)
+		rec.SquadPoints = scoreOutcome(rec.Squad, task.Themes)
+		rec.Diffs = diffRecord(rec)
+		rep.Records = append(rep.Records, rec)
+		directSum += rec.DirectPoints
+		squadSum += rec.SquadPoints
+		directFT = append(directFT, rec.Direct.FirstToken)
+		squadFT = append(squadFT, rec.Squad.FirstToken)
+	}
+	rep.Direct = EntryScore{Name: "direct", Score: directSum / len(tasks), FirstTokenP50: p50(directFT)}
+	rep.Squad = EntryScore{Name: "squad", Score: squadSum / len(tasks), FirstTokenP50: p50(squadFT)}
+	rep.Decision = DecideSwitch(&rep.Direct, &rep.Squad)
+	rep.Text = renderReport(rep)
+	return rep
+}
+
+func runOne(ctx context.Context, task ABTask, fn RunFunc) ABOutcome {
+	if fn == nil {
+		return ABOutcome{Err: "入口未装配"}
+	}
+	out, err := fn(ctx, task)
+	if err != nil {
+		out.Completed = false
+		if out.Err == "" {
+			out.Err = err.Error()
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// scoreOutcome 单任务打分：未完成 0；完成 = 100 - 缺失要点比例 × 100。
+func scoreOutcome(out ABOutcome, themes []string) int {
+	if !out.Completed {
+		return 0
+	}
+	if len(themes) == 0 {
+		return 100
+	}
+	missing := MissingThemes(out.Summary, themes)
+	return 100 - len(missing)*100/len(themes)
+}
+
+// diffRecord 逐任务差异注记（状态 / 要点 / 首字延迟；不要求字节级相同）。
+func diffRecord(rec ABTaskRecord) []string {
+	var diffs []string
+	if rec.Direct.Completed != rec.Squad.Completed {
+		diffs = append(diffs, fmt.Sprintf("状态：direct=%v squad=%v（%s / %s）",
+			rec.Direct.Completed, rec.Squad.Completed, rec.Direct.Err, rec.Squad.Err))
+	}
+	if len(rec.Task.Themes) > 0 {
+		dm := MissingThemes(rec.Direct.Summary, rec.Task.Themes)
+		sm := MissingThemes(rec.Squad.Summary, rec.Task.Themes)
+		if strings.Join(dm, ",") != strings.Join(sm, ",") {
+			diffs = append(diffs, fmt.Sprintf("要点缺失：direct=%v squad=%v", dm, sm))
+		}
+	}
+	gap := rec.Squad.FirstToken - rec.Direct.FirstToken
+	if gap < 0 {
+		gap = -gap
+	}
+	if gap > time.Second {
+		diffs = append(diffs, fmt.Sprintf("首字延迟差：%s（direct=%s squad=%s）",
+			gap, rec.Direct.FirstToken, rec.Squad.FirstToken))
+	}
+	if rec.Direct.Completed && rec.Squad.Completed &&
+		strings.TrimSpace(rec.Direct.Summary) != strings.TrimSpace(rec.Squad.Summary) {
+		diffs = append(diffs, "摘要文本不同（记录在案，不要求字节级相同）")
+	}
+	return diffs
+}
+
+func p50(ds []time.Duration) time.Duration {
+	if len(ds) == 0 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	sorted := append([]time.Duration(nil), ds...)
+	sort.Slice(sorted, func(i, j int) bool { return sorted[i] < sorted[j] })
+	return sorted[len(sorted)/2]
+}
+
+// renderReport 报告全文：裁决 + 分数 + 逐任务差异清单。
+func renderReport(rep ABReport) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.WriteString(Report(rep.Decision))
+	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n分数：direct=%d squad=%d；首字P50：direct=%s squad=%s\n",
+		rep.Direct.Score, rep.Squad.Score, rep.Direct.FirstTokenP50, rep.Squad.FirstTokenP50)
+	for _, rec := range rep.Records {
+		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s：direct %d 分 / squad %d 分", rec.Task.ID, rec.DirectPoints, rec.SquadPoints)
+		if len(rec.Diffs) == 0 {
+			b.WriteString("（无差异注记）")
+		}
+		b.WriteString("\n")
+		for _, d := range rec.Diffs {
+			fmt.Fprintf(&b, "  - %s\n", d)
+		}
+	}
+	return strings.TrimRight(b.String(), "\n")
+}

eval/ab_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package eval
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// ab_test.go — Q3 WP5：A/B 双跑 harness 机制面（差异记录 / 打分 / P50 /
+// DecideSwitch 联动）。真实入口的集成对照在 internal/wfcompile 的
+// demo.brief 双跑测试。
+
+func stubRun(completed bool, summary string, ft time.Duration, errText string) RunFunc {
+	return func(context.Context, ABTask) (ABOutcome, error) {
+		return ABOutcome{Completed: completed, Summary: summary, FirstToken: ft, Err: errText}, nil
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunABRecordsDiffsAndScores(t *testing.T) {
+	tasks := []ABTask{
+		{ID: "t1", Goal: "写简报", Themes: []string{"太空电梯", "核对标记"}},
+		{ID: "t2", Goal: "查资料", Themes: []string{"三来源"}},
+	}
+	direct := func(_ context.Context, task ABTask) (ABOutcome, error) {
+		switch task.ID {
+		case "t1":
+			return ABOutcome{Completed: true, Summary: "关于太空电梯的简报，核对标记：P4", FirstToken: 100 * time.Millisecond}, nil
+		default:
+			return ABOutcome{Completed: true, Summary: "对照完成，三来源齐", FirstToken: 200 * time.Millisecond}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	squad := func(_ context.Context, task ABTask) (ABOutcome, error) {
+		switch task.ID {
+		case "t1":
+			// 完成但缺一个要点 → 扣分 + 差异注记。
+			return ABOutcome{Completed: true, Summary: "关于太空电梯的简报", FirstToken: 100 * time.Millisecond}, nil
+		default:
+			return ABOutcome{Completed: false, Err: "编译图步骤失败", FirstToken: 0}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	rep := RunAB(context.Background(), tasks, direct, squad)
+	if len(rep.Records) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("records = %d", len(rep.Records))
+	}
+	r1 := rep.Records[0]
+	if r1.DirectPoints != 100 || r1.SquadPoints != 50 {
+		t.Fatalf("t1 points = %d/%d", r1.DirectPoints, r1.SquadPoints)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(r1.Diffs, ";"), "要点缺失") {
+		t.Fatalf("t1 diffs = %v", r1.Diffs)
+	}
+	r2 := rep.Records[1]
+	if r2.SquadPoints != 0 || !strings.Contains(strings.Join(r2.Diffs, ";"), "状态") {
+		t.Fatalf("t2 = %d %v", r2.SquadPoints, r2.Diffs)
+	}
+	// 分数汇总：direct 100，squad (50+0)/2=25 → 不达标，保持 direct。
+	if rep.Direct.Score != 100 || rep.Squad.Score != 25 {
+		t.Fatalf("scores = %d/%d", rep.Direct.Score, rep.Squad.Score)
+	}
+	if rep.Decision.Met || !strings.Contains(rep.Decision.Reason, "低于") {
+		t.Fatalf("decision = %+v", rep.Decision)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(rep.Text, "保持 direct") {
+		t.Fatalf("report = %s", rep.Text)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunABSwitchMetWhenEqual(t *testing.T) {
+	tasks := []ABTask{{ID: "t1", Goal: "g", Themes: []string{"要点"}}}
+	fn := stubRun(true, "覆盖要点的产出", 50*time.Millisecond, "")
+	rep := RunAB(context.Background(), tasks, fn, fn)
+	if rep.Direct.Score != 100 || rep.Squad.Score != 100 {
+		t.Fatalf("scores = %d/%d", rep.Direct.Score, rep.Squad.Score)
+	}
+	if !rep.Decision.Met {
+		t.Fatalf("同分同延迟应达标：%+v", rep.Decision)
+	}
+	if len(rep.Records[0].Diffs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("同产出应无差异注记：%v", rep.Records[0].Diffs)
+	}
+	if rep.Direct.FirstTokenP50 != 50*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Fatalf("p50 = %s", rep.Direct.FirstTokenP50)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunABLatencyGate(t *testing.T) {
+	tasks := []ABTask{{ID: "t1", Goal: "g"}}
+	direct := stubRun(true, "ok", 100*time.Millisecond, "")
+	squad := stubRun(true, "ok", 4*time.Second, "") // 额外首字 > 3s
+	rep := RunAB(context.Background(), tasks, direct, squad)
+	if rep.Decision.Met || !strings.Contains(rep.Decision.Reason, "超过 3 秒") {
+		t.Fatalf("decision = %+v", rep.Decision)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(rep.Records[0].Diffs, ";"), "首字延迟差") {
+		t.Fatalf("diffs = %v", rep.Records[0].Diffs)
+	}
+}
+
+// RunFunc 返回 error：记为该侧失败，不中断整批。
+func TestRunABToleratesRunFuncError(t *testing.T) {
+	tasks := []ABTask{{ID: "t1"}, {ID: "t2"}}
+	direct := stubRun(true, "ok", 0, "")
+	squad := func(_ context.Context, task ABTask) (ABOutcome, error) {
+		if task.ID == "t1" {
+			return ABOutcome{}, context.DeadlineExceeded
+		}
+		return ABOutcome{Completed: true, Summary: "ok"}, nil
+	}
+	rep := RunAB(context.Background(), tasks, direct, squad)
+	if rep.Records[0].SquadPoints != 0 || rep.Records[0].Squad.Err == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("t1 = %+v", rep.Records[0].Squad)
+	}
+	if rep.Records[1].SquadPoints != 100 {
+		t.Fatalf("t2 应不受 t1 失败影响：%+v", rep.Records[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunABEmptyBatch(t *testing.T) {
+	rep := RunAB(context.Background(), nil, nil, nil)
+	if rep.Decision.Met {
+		t.Fatal("空批不得达标（无实测分数）")
+	}
+}

eval/live/helpers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+//go:build live
+
+package live
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/runtime"
+)
+
+// upload 上传一个材料文件，返回 artifact id。
+func (c *client) upload(t *testing.T, projectID, name string, content []byte) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	w := multipart.NewWriter(&buf)
+	fw, err := w.CreateFormFile("file", name)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("multipart field: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := fw.Write(content); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("multipart write: %v", err)
+	}
+	w.Close()
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", c.base+"/api/projects/"+projectID+"/uploads", &buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("upload request: %v", err)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", w.FormDataContentType())
+	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("upload: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("upload %s: %s: %s", name, resp.Status, truncate(string(raw), 300))
+	}
+	var out struct {
+		ID       string `json:"artifactId"`
+		LegacyID string `json:"id"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("upload response: %v %s", err, truncate(string(raw), 300))
+	}
+	if out.ID == "" {
+		out.ID = out.LegacyID
+	}
+	if out.ID == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("upload response missing artifact id: %s", truncate(string(raw), 300))
+	}
+	return out.ID
+}
+
+// runTurn 发一轮消息并等到 run 终态；期间自动应答 HITL 卡。
+func runTurn(t *testing.T, c *client, projectID, convID, text string, attachmentIDs []string, turnTimeout time.Duration) turnResult {
+	t.Helper()
+	started := time.Now()
+	var out struct {
+		Message message `json:"message"`
+		Run     run     `json:"run"`
+	}
+	body := map[string]any{"text": text, "requestId": fmt.Sprintf("eval-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())}
+	if len(attachmentIDs) > 0 {
+		body["attachmentIds"] = attachmentIDs
+	}
+	if err := c.do("POST", "/api/conversations/"+convID+"/messages", body, &out); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("post message: %v", err)
+	}
+	runID := out.Run.ID
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(turnTimeout)
+	var cur run
+	for {
+		var resp struct {
+			Run run `json:"run"`
+		}
+		if err := c.do("GET", "/api/runs/"+runID, nil, &resp); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("get run: %v", err)
+		}
+		cur = resp.Run
+		if isTerminal(cur.Status) {
+			break
+		}
+		autoResolveHITL(t, c, convID)
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("run %s timed out after %s (status=%s)", runID, turnTimeout, cur.Status)
+		}
+		time.Sleep(3 * time.Second)
+	}
+	detail := struct {
+		Messages   []message  `json:"messages"`
+		ActiveHitl []hitlCard `json:"activeHitl"`
+	}{}
+	if err := c.do("GET", "/api/conversations/"+convID, nil, &detail); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("conversation detail: %v", err)
+	}
+	var assistant *message
+	for i := range detail.Messages {
+		m := detail.Messages[i]
+		if m.RunID == runID && m.Role == "assistant" && !m.Excluded {
+			assistant = &detail.Messages[i]
+		}
+	}
+	tr := turnResult{User: text, RunID: runID, Status: cur.Status, DurationMs: time.Since(started).Milliseconds()}
+	if cur.Usage != nil {
+		tr.Usage = &cur
+	}
+	if assistant == nil {
+		tr.Issues = append(tr.Issues, "没有找到本回合的助手消息")
+		return tr
+	}
+	collectMetrics(&tr, assistant)
+	// 工件清单：本 run 产出的。
+	var arts []artifactMeta
+	if err := c.do("GET", "/api/projects/"+projectID+"/artifacts", nil, &arts); err == nil {
+		for _, a := range arts {
+			if a.SourceRun == runID {
+				tr.Artifacts = append(tr.Artifacts, a.Name)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if cur.Status != "completed" {
+		tr.Issues = append(tr.Issues, "run 终态="+cur.Status)
+	}
+	return tr
+}
+
+func isTerminal(status string) bool {
+	switch status {
+	case "completed", "failed", "cancelled":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// autoResolveHITL 无人值守：有活动确认卡时选第一个选项（没有选项给自由文本同意）。
+func autoResolveHITL(t *testing.T, c *client, convID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	detail := struct {
+		ActiveHitl []hitlCard `json:"activeHitl"`
+	}{}
+	if err := c.do("GET", "/api/conversations/"+convID, nil, &detail); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, card := range detail.ActiveHitl {
+		resp := map[string]string{}
+		if len(card.Choices) > 0 {
+			resp["choiceId"] = card.Choices[0].ID
+		} else if card.AllowFreeInput {
+			resp["freeText"] = "同意继续（评测自动应答）"
+		} else {
+			continue
+		}
+		_ = c.do("POST", "/api/hitl/"+card.ID+"/resolve", resp, nil)
+	}
+}
+
+func collectMetrics(tr *turnResult, m *message) {
+	for _, p := range m.Parts {
+		switch p.Type {
+		case "text":
+			if !p.Process && strings.TrimSpace(p.Text) != "" {
+				tr.FinalText = p.Text
+			}
+		case "tool_call":
+			if p.ToolCall == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			tr.Metrics.ToolCalls++
+			args := p.ToolCall.Arguments
+			switch p.ToolCall.Name {
+			case "update_plan", "update_todos":
+				tr.Metrics.PlanUpdates++
+			case "run_python":
+				if strings.Contains(args, "new_document(") || strings.Contains(args, "new_presentation(") || strings.Contains(args, "new_workbook(") {
+					tr.Metrics.FullRegens++
+				}
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(args, "dir(") || strings.Contains(args, "inspect.signature") || strings.Contains(args, "help(") {
+				tr.Metrics.APIDiscovery++
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(args, "inputs/") {
+				tr.Metrics.ReadsOriginal++
+			}
+		case "tool_result":
+			if p.ToolResult == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			s := p.ToolResult.Summary
+			if p.ToolResult.Status == "error" || strings.HasPrefix(s, "exit=1") || strings.Contains(s, "Traceback") || strings.Contains(s, "ModuleNotFoundError") {
+				tr.Metrics.ToolFailures++
+			}
+		case "check":
+			if p.Check == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			tr.Metrics.VerifierChecks++
+			tr.Checks = append(tr.Checks, checkRecord{Passed: p.Check.Passed, Reason: p.Check.Reason})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func lastArtifactTurn(tr taskResult) *turnResult {
+	for i := len(tr.Turns) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		if len(tr.Turns[i].Artifacts) > 0 {
+			return &tr.Turns[i]
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func downloadArtifactText(t *testing.T, c *client, projectID, name string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var arts []artifactMeta
+	if err := c.do("GET", "/api/projects/"+projectID+"/artifacts", nil, &arts); err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	for _, a := range arts {
+		if a.Name != name {
+			continue
+		}
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", c.base+"/api/artifacts/"+a.ID+"/content", nil)
+		resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		raw, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		resp.Body.Close()
+		if strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(a.Name), ".docx") {
+			return docxTextIfDocx(t, a.Name, raw)
+		}
+		return string(raw)
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// ---- 文本抽取与事实核查 ----
+
+// docxTextIfDocx：docx 抽纯文本（标题行带 # 前缀）；其他类型原样返回。
+func docxTextIfDocx(t *testing.T, name string, raw []byte) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(name), ".docx") {
+		return string(raw)
+	}
+	zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), int64(len(raw)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	for _, f := range zr.File {
+		if f.Name != "word/document.xml" {
+			continue
+		}
+		rc, err := f.Open()
+		if err != nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		defer rc.Close()
+		dec := xml.NewDecoder(rc)
+		var b strings.Builder
+		var para strings.Builder
+		style, inPara := "", false
+		flush := func() {
+			text := strings.TrimSpace(para.String())
+			if text != "" {
+				if lvl := docxHeadingLevel(style); lvl > 0 {
+					b.WriteString(strings.Repeat("#", lvl) + " ")
+				}
+				b.WriteString(text + "\n")
+			}
+			para.Reset()
+			style = ""
+		}
+		for {
+			tok, err := dec.Token()
+			if err != nil {
+				break
+			}
+			switch el := tok.(type) {
+			case xml.StartElement:
+				switch el.Name.Local {
+				case "p":
+					inPara, style = true, ""
+					para.Reset()
+				case "pStyle":
+					if inPara {
+						for _, at := range el.Attr {
+							if at.Name.Local == "val" {
+								style = at.Value
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			case xml.EndElement:
+				if el.Name.Local == "p" {
+					inPara = false
+					flush()
+				}
+			case xml.CharData:
+				if inPara {
+					para.Write(bytes.TrimSpace(el))
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		flush()
+		return b.String()
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func docxHeadingLevel(style string) int {
+	switch {
+	case style == "Title":
+		return 1
+	case style == "Subtitle":
+		return 2
+	case strings.HasPrefix(style, "Heading"):
+		n := 0
+		for _, ch := range style[len("Heading"):] {
+			if ch < '0' || ch > '9' {
+				return 0
+			}
+			n = n*10 + int(ch-'0')
+		}
+		if n >= 1 && n <= 9 {
+			return n
+		}
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+var (
+	pctRe    = regexp.MustCompile(`\d+(?:\.\d+)?%`)
+	dateRe   = regexp.MustCompile(`\d{1,2}月\d{1,2}日`)
+	bigNumRe = regexp.MustCompile(`\d{4,}`)
+	claimRe  = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:^|\n|\s)([一二三四五六七八九十]{1,2}、[^\s，。；|]{2,24})`)
+)
+
+// unverifiedFacts 抽取交付物里的百分比/日期/大数字，逐个回材料原文找出处。
+// 找不到的列为未核实事实（模型编造或来自模型自带的「常识」）。
+func unverifiedFacts(artifactText, materialText string) []string {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(artifactText) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(materialText) == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	var out []string
+	check := func(tok string) {
+		tok = strings.TrimSpace(tok)
+		if tok == "" || seen[tok] {
+			return
+		}
+		seen[tok] = true
+		if !strings.Contains(materialText, tok) {
+			out = append(out, tok)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, m := range pctRe.FindAllString(artifactText, -1) {
+		check(m)
+	}
+	for _, m := range dateRe.FindAllString(artifactText, -1) {
+		check(m)
+	}
+	for _, m := range bigNumRe.FindAllString(artifactText, -1) {
+		if len(m) >= 5 { // 4 位数大量是年份/编号，只报 5 位以上
+			check(m)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// unmarkedFacts 从未核实清单里剔除已按「目标/预计/假设」标注的（与后端
+// runtime.MarkedAsEstimate 同一口径，标注词邻域 ±32 字符）。
+func unmarkedFacts(tokens []string, artifactText string) []string {
+	var out []string
+	for _, tok := range tokens {
+		if !runtime.MarkedAsEstimate(artifactText, tok) {
+			out = append(out, tok)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// finalVsArtifact 终轮回复里声称的章节（「一、…」）必须能在工件里找到。
+func finalVsArtifact(turn *turnResult, artifactText string) []string {
+	if turn == nil || turn.FinalText == "" || strings.TrimSpace(artifactText) == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	final := turn.FinalText
+	var out []string
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, m := range claimRe.FindAllStringSubmatch(final, -1) {
+		claim := strings.TrimSpace(m[1])
+		if claim == "" || seen[claim] {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[claim] = true
+		if !strings.Contains(artifactText, claim) {
+			out = append(out, claim)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// ---- 报告 ----
+
+func writeReport(t *testing.T, rep *report) {
+	t.Helper()
+	outPath := os.Getenv("AGENT_EVAL_OUT")
+	if outPath == "" {
+		outPath = filepath.Join("eval-live", "report-"+time.Now().Format("0102-150405")+".json")
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(outPath), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mkdir report dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.MarshalIndent(rep, "", "  ")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(outPath, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write report: %v", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n[live-eval] report: %s\n%s\n", outPath, renderMarkdown(rep))
+}
+
+func renderMarkdown(rep *report) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "# Live eval — %s\n\n- target: %s\n- model: %s\n- generated: %s\n\n", rep.GeneratedAt, rep.Target, rep.Model, rep.GeneratedAt)
+	for _, tk := range rep.Tasks {
+		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "## %s\n\n| turn | status | tools | fails | regens | api探查 | 读原件 | 计划 | 检查 | 工件 | 时长s |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n", tk.ID)
+		for _, turn := range tk.Turns {
+			fmt.Fprintf(&b, "| %s | %s | %d | %d | %d | %d | %d | %d | %d | %d | %.0f |\n",
+				truncate(turn.User, 18), turn.Status, turn.Metrics.ToolCalls, turn.Metrics.ToolFailures,
+				turn.Metrics.FullRegens, turn.Metrics.APIDiscovery, turn.Metrics.ReadsOriginal,
+				turn.Metrics.PlanUpdates, turn.Metrics.VerifierChecks, len(turn.Artifacts),
+				float64(turn.DurationMs)/1000)
+		}
+		if len(tk.UnverifiedFacts) > 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n未核实事实（工件里出现、材料里找不到）：%s\n", strings.Join(tk.UnverifiedFacts, "、"))
+		if len(tk.UnverifiedUnmarkedFacts) > 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintf(&b, "其中未标注（无出处且无目标/预计/假设标注，E3 闸门口径）：%s\n", strings.Join(tk.UnverifiedUnmarkedFacts, "、"))
+		}
+		}
+		if len(tk.FinalVsArtifact) > 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n终轮声称但工件不存在的章节：%s\n", strings.Join(tk.FinalVsArtifact, "；"))
+		}
+		fmt.Fprint(&b, "\n")
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}

eval/live/live_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+//go:build live
+
+// Package live 是真实后端 + 真实模型的任务级评测（Phase 0 基线）。
+//
+// 用法（对准一个已配置好模型的运行实例）：
+//
+//	AGENT_EVAL_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:18799 \
+//	AGENT_EVAL_MATERIALS=~/.agent-system/eval/materials \
+//	AGENT_EVAL_OUT=/tmp/before.json \
+//	go test ./eval/live/ -tags live -run TestLiveSuite -v -timeout 90m
+//
+// 评测器只用公开 HTTP 面（上传→建会话→发消息→轮询），指标从消息 parts、
+// run usage 与工件内容计算；不触碰目标实例数据库。HITL 卡自动选第一个选项，
+// 保证无人值守跑完。产出 JSON + Markdown 报告；任务集见 tasks.json。
+// 真实材料不进仓：materials 目录按 eval/README 的口径放本机。
+package live
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type task struct {
+	ID       string   `json:"id"`
+	Material string   `json:"material,omitempty"`
+	Turns    []string `json:"turns"`
+}
+
+type part struct {
+	Type     string `json:"type"`
+	Text     string `json:"text"`
+	Process  bool   `json:"process"`
+	ToolCall *struct {
+		ID        string  `json:"id"`
+		Name      string  `json:"name"`
+		Arguments string  `json:"arguments"`
+		Duration  float64 `json:"durationMs"`
+	} `json:"toolCall"`
+	ToolResult *struct {
+		CallID  string `json:"callId"`
+		Status  string `json:"status"`
+		Summary string `json:"summary"`
+	} `json:"toolResult"`
+	Check *struct {
+		Passed bool   `json:"passed"`
+		Reason string `json:"reason"`
+	} `json:"check"`
+	Artifact *struct {
+		ArtifactID string `json:"artifactId"`
+		Name       string `json:"name"`
+		Kind       string `json:"kind"`
+	} `json:"artifact"`
+}
+
+type message struct {
+	ID       string `json:"id"`
+	RunID    string `json:"runId"`
+	Role     string `json:"role"`
+	Parts    []part `json:"parts"`
+	Excluded bool   `json:"excluded"`
+}
+
+type run struct {
+	ID        string `json:"id"`
+	Status    string `json:"status"`
+	CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`
+	EndedAt   string `json:"endedAt"`
+	Usage     *struct {
+		PromptTokens     int `json:"promptTokens"`
+		CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
+		TotalTokens      int `json:"totalTokens"`
+		DurationMs       int `json:"durationMs"`
+		ToolCalls        int `json:"toolCalls"`
+	} `json:"usage"`
+	Error any `json:"error"`
+}
+
+type artifactMeta struct {
+	ID        string `json:"id"`
+	Name      string `json:"name"`
+	Kind      string `json:"kind"`
+	MIME      string `json:"mime"`
+	SourceRun string `json:"sourceRun"`
+	CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`
+}
+
+type hitlCard struct {
+	ID       string `json:"id"`
+	Question string `json:"question"`
+	Choices  []struct {
+		ID    string `json:"id"`
+		Label string `json:"label"`
+	} `json:"choices"`
+	AllowFreeInput bool `json:"allowFreeInput"`
+}
+
+type client struct {
+	base  string
+	http  *http.Client
+	t     *testing.T
+	model string
+}
+
+func (c *client) do(method, path string, body any, out any) error {
+	var rd io.Reader
+	if body != nil {
+		b, err := json.Marshal(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		rd = bytes.NewReader(b)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(method, c.base+path, rd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if body != nil {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	}
+	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %s: %s", method, path, resp.Status, truncate(string(raw), 300))
+	}
+	if out != nil {
+		return json.Unmarshal(raw, out)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func truncate(s string, n int) string {
+	r := []rune(s)
+	if len(r) <= n {
+		return s
+	}
+	return string(r[:n]) + "…"
+}
+
+func TestLiveSuite(t *testing.T) {
+	base := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_EVAL_BASE"))
+	if base == "" {
+		t.Skip("AGENT_EVAL_BASE not set; live eval requires a configured backend instance")
+	}
+	materialsDir := os.Getenv("AGENT_EVAL_MATERIALS")
+	if materialsDir == "" {
+		home, _ := os.UserHomeDir()
+		materialsDir = filepath.Join(home, ".agent-system", "eval", "materials")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(materialsDir); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("materials dir not available: %v", err)
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile("tasks.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read tasks.json: %v", err)
+	}
+	var tasks []task
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tasks); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse tasks.json: %v", err)
+	}
+	if filter := os.Getenv("AGENT_EVAL_TASKS"); filter != "" {
+		want := map[string]bool{}
+		for _, id := range strings.Split(filter, ",") {
+			want[strings.TrimSpace(id)] = true
+		}
+		var kept []task
+		for _, tk := range tasks {
+			if want[tk.ID] {
+				kept = append(kept, tk)
+			}
+		}
+		tasks = kept
+	}
+	if len(tasks) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no tasks selected")
+	}
+	turnTimeout := 20 * time.Minute
+	if v := os.Getenv("AGENT_EVAL_TURN_TIMEOUT"); v != "" {
+		if d, err := time.ParseDuration(v); err == nil {
+			turnTimeout = d
+		}
+	}
+	c := &client{base: base, http: &http.Client{Timeout: 120 * time.Second}, t: t}
+	// /api/settings 的形状是 {defaults, project, schema, user}；模型播在 user 作用域。
+	var settings struct {
+		User struct {
+			Models struct {
+				Chat struct {
+					Model string `json:"model"`
+				} `json:"chat"`
+			} `json:"models"`
+		} `json:"user"`
+	}
+	_ = c.do("GET", "/api/settings", nil, &settings)
+	c.model = settings.User.Models.Chat.Model
+
+	proj := struct {
+		ID string `json:"id"`
+	}{}
+	if err := c.do("POST", "/api/projects", map[string]string{"name": "eval-" + time.Now().Format("0102-150405")}, &proj); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create project: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	rep := report{Target: base, Model: c.model, GeneratedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
+	for _, tk := range tasks {
+		rep.Tasks = append(rep.Tasks, runTask(t, c, proj.ID, tk, materialsDir, turnTimeout))
+	}
+	writeReport(t, &rep)
+}
+
+type turnResult struct {
+	User       string        `json:"user"`
+	RunID      string        `json:"runId"`
+	Status     string        `json:"status"`
+	FinalText  string        `json:"finalText,omitempty"`
+	Usage      *run          `json:"usage,omitempty"`
+	Metrics    turnMetrics   `json:"metrics"`
+	Checks     []checkRecord `json:"checks,omitempty"`
+	Artifacts  []string      `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
+	Issues     []string      `json:"issues,omitempty"`
+	DurationMs int64         `json:"durationMs"`
+}
+
+type turnMetrics struct {
+	ToolCalls      int `json:"toolCalls"`
+	ToolFailures   int `json:"toolFailures"`
+	FullRegens     int `json:"fullRegens"`
+	APIDiscovery   int `json:"apiDiscovery"`
+	ReadsOriginal  int `json:"readsOriginal"`
+	PlanUpdates    int `json:"planUpdates"`
+	VerifierChecks int `json:"verifierChecks"`
+}
+
+type checkRecord struct {
+	Passed bool   `json:"passed"`
+	Reason string `json:"reason"`
+}
+
+type taskResult struct {
+	ID              string       `json:"id"`
+	Turns           []turnResult `json:"turns"`
+	Total           turnMetrics  `json:"total"`
+	UnverifiedFacts []string     `json:"unverifiedFacts,omitempty"`
+	// UnverifiedUnmarkedFacts：无出处且未按「目标/预计/假设」标注的子集
+	// （E3 口径：严格口径 unverifiedFacts 保留原义以维持历史可比性）。
+	UnverifiedUnmarkedFacts []string `json:"unverifiedUnmarkedFacts,omitempty"`
+	FinalVsArtifact []string     `json:"finalVsArtifact,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type report struct {
+	Target      string       `json:"target"`
+	Model       string       `json:"model,omitempty"`
+	GeneratedAt string       `json:"generatedAt"`
+	Tasks       []taskResult `json:"tasks"`
+}
+
+func runTask(t *testing.T, c *client, projectID string, tk task, materialsDir string, turnTimeout time.Duration) taskResult {
+	t.Helper()
+	conv := struct {
+		ID string `json:"id"`
+	}{}
+	if err := c.do("POST", "/api/projects/"+projectID+"/conversations", map[string]string{"title": "eval-" + tk.ID}, &conv); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("[%s] create conversation: %v", tk.ID, err)
+	}
+	var attachmentIDs []string
+	materialText := ""
+	if tk.Material != "" {
+		path := filepath.Join(materialsDir, tk.Material)
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("[%s] open material: %v", tk.ID, err)
+		}
+		up := c.upload(t, projectID, tk.Material, raw)
+		attachmentIDs = append(attachmentIDs, up)
+		materialText = docxTextIfDocx(t, tk.Material, raw)
+	}
+	tr := taskResult{ID: tk.ID}
+	for i, turnText := range tk.Turns {
+		tr.Turns = append(tr.Turns, runTurn(t, c, projectID, conv.ID, turnText, attachmentIDs, turnTimeout))
+		attachmentIDs = nil // 材料只在第一轮附带；后续轮考验跨轮上下文
+		_ = i
+	}
+	// 汇总
+	for _, turn := range tr.Turns {
+		tr.Total.ToolCalls += turn.Metrics.ToolCalls
+		tr.Total.ToolFailures += turn.Metrics.ToolFailures
+		tr.Total.FullRegens += turn.Metrics.FullRegens
+		tr.Total.APIDiscovery += turn.Metrics.APIDiscovery
+		tr.Total.ReadsOriginal += turn.Metrics.ReadsOriginal
+		tr.Total.PlanUpdates += turn.Metrics.PlanUpdates
+		tr.Total.VerifierChecks += turn.Metrics.VerifierChecks
+	}
+	// 事实核查：最后一个带工件的回合 vs 材料
+	if materialText != "" {
+		last := lastArtifactTurn(tr)
+		if last != nil && len(last.Artifacts) > 0 {
+			artText := ""
+			for _, name := range last.Artifacts {
+				artText += downloadArtifactText(t, c, projectID, name)
+			}
+			tr.UnverifiedFacts = unverifiedFacts(artText, materialText)
+			tr.UnverifiedUnmarkedFacts = unmarkedFacts(tr.UnverifiedFacts, artText)
+			tr.FinalVsArtifact = finalVsArtifact(last, artText)
+		}
+	}
+	return tr
+}

eval/live/tasks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "minutes-basic",
+    "material": "meeting-rd-agent-asr.docx",
+    "turns": ["帮我总结一份会议纪要"]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "plan-followup",
+    "material": "meeting-rd-agent-asr.docx",
+    "turns": [
+      "帮我总结一份会议纪要",
+      "根据这个纪要，制定一个方案",
+      "方案太简要了，给我一个详细的方案和计划"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "qa-citation",
+    "material": "meeting-rd-agent-asr.docx",
+    "turns": ["这次会议最主要的事情是什么"]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "minutes-pm-tool",
+    "material": "meeting-pm-tool-asr.docx",
+    "turns": ["生成会议纪要"]
+  }
+]

go.mod

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ go 1.27
 
 require (
 	agent-command v0.0.0
+	agent-document-renderer v0.0.0
 	agent-intent v0.0.0
 	agent-native v0.0.0
 	agent-squad v0.0.0
@@ -26,12 +27,15 @@ require (
 	github.com/jackc/pgpassfile v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/jackc/pgservicefile v0.0.0-20240606120523-5a60cdf6a761 // indirect
 	github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2 // indirect
+	github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.24 // indirect
 	github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
+	github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.16.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 // indirect
+	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
 	modernc.org/libc v1.77.1 // indirect
 	modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
 	modernc.org/memory v1.12.1 // indirect
@@ -52,3 +56,5 @@ replace error-code-system => ./deps/error-code-system
 replace logging-system => ./deps/logging-system
 
 replace agent-command => ./deps/agent-command
+
+replace agent-document-renderer => ./deps/agent-document-renderer

go.sum

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ github.com/bsm/gomega v1.27.10 h1:yeMWxP2pV2fG3FgAODIY8EiRE3dy0aeFYt4l7wh6yKA=
 github.com/bsm/gomega v1.27.10/go.mod h1:JyEr/xRbxbtgWNi8tIEVPUYZ5Dzef52k01W3YH0H+O0=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
+github.com/creack/pty v1.1.9/go.mod h1:oKZEueFk5CKHvIhNR5MUki03XCEU+Q6VDXinZuGJ33E=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
@@ -25,6 +26,10 @@ github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.9.2 h1:3ZhOzMWnR4yJ+RW1XImIPsD1aNSz4T4fyP7zlQb56hw=
 github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.9.2/go.mod h1:mal1tBGAFfLHvZzaYh77YS/eC6IX9OWbRV1QIIM0Jn4=
 github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2 h1:PR8nw+E/1w0GLuRFSmiioY6UooMp6KJv0/61nB7icHo=
 github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:vriiEXHvEE654aYKXXjOvZM39qJ0q+azkZFrfEOc3H4=
+github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.0 h1:WgNl7dwNpEZ6jJ9k1snq4pZsg7DOEN8hP9Xw0Tsjwk0=
+github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.0/go.mod h1:640gp4NfQd8pI5XOwp5fnNeVWj67G7CFk/SaSQn7NBk=
+github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
+github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
 github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20260907135840-6c8c28e0e8a0 h1:7Q+xNAZFmnfYOMweHN3c/PDFUKKfY1pVJ26K++QvVfU=
 github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20260907135840-6c8c28e0e8a0/go.mod h1:1fEHWurg7pvf5SG6XNE5Q8UZmOwex51Mkx3SLhrW5B4=
 github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.24 h1:tGZZoVgT/KiqK1c8ocVLeDS8BSWMRd47J3Lbz7vsReI=
@@ -37,6 +42,8 @@ github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.14.0 h1:u4tNCjXOyzfgeLN+vAZaW1xUooqWDqVEsZN0U01j
 github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.14.0/go.mod h1:huWgSWd8mW6+m0VPhJjSSQ+d6Nh1VICQ6Q5lHuCH/Iw=
 github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec h1:W09IVJc94icq4NjY3clb7Lk8O1qJ8BdBEF8z0ibU0rE=
 github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec/go.mod h1:qqbHyh8v60DhA7CoWK5oRCqLrMHRGoxYCSS9EjAz6Eo=
+github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.16.0 h1:O9DK+vNMDVGLr2BeZqmpLeMjiMNkuXfcqntWbZV6S5g=
+github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.16.0/go.mod h1:DrUVZyrJU+txYW5/1kwtXQSMFio52ZOxX7yM1VHvnxs=
 github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
@@ -55,6 +62,8 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0 h1:c2ifzfcuY7L90lZ2aKd8S4K2NpASF08SZx9ZuJkHmSU=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0/go.mod h1:7ulVMw3831Mwi5EZD6RomGyffr4VFjuNYXf2BbCEAV0=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
+gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk=
+gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20200313102051-9f266ea9e77c/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=

internal/app/account_directory.go

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+type accountDirectorySlot struct {
+	mu         sync.RWMutex
+	pluginID   string
+	resolver   extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver
+	secret     [32]byte
+	keyVersion int
+}
+
+func newAccountDirectorySlot(st *store.Store) (*accountDirectorySlot, error) {
+	key, err := st.GetAccountCursorKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &accountDirectorySlot{secret: key.Secret, keyVersion: key.Version}, nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) register(pluginID string, fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	if fn == nil || pluginID != "rdm" {
+		return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.resolver != nil {
+		return errors.New("account directory resolver already registered")
+	}
+	s.pluginID, s.resolver = pluginID, fn
+	return nil
+}
+
+type directoryPolicy struct {
+	allowed    map[string]bool
+	match      []string
+	candidates map[string]bool
+	owners     map[string]bool
+	rows       []store.DirectoryAccountRow
+	all        bool
+	status     string
+	version    string
+}
+
+type directoryCursor struct {
+	KeyVersion int    `json:"k"`
+	Version    string `json:"v"`
+	Owner      string `json:"o"`
+	UserID     string `json:"u"`
+}
+
+type directoryVisibleRow struct {
+	UserID  string
+	Owner   string
+	Enabled bool
+	Name    string
+	StaffNo string
+}
+
+func knownDirectoryField(field string) bool {
+	return field == "owner" || field == "name" || field == "staffNo"
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) directoryPolicy(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, loadRows bool) (directoryPolicy, error) {
+	var p directoryPolicy
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return p, err
+	}
+	if h.actor == "" || h.caps.st == nil || h.caps.directory == nil || q.SchemaVersion != extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	actor, err := h.caps.st.GetUserAuthState(h.actor)
+	if err != nil || !actor.Enabled {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if q.Mode != extension.AccountDirectoryModeExact && q.Mode != extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	if !utf8.ValidString(q.Query) || utf8.RuneCountInString(q.Query) > 128 {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	for _, r := range q.Query {
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) {
+			return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+		}
+	}
+	p.status = q.Status
+	if p.status == "" {
+		p.status = "enabled"
+	}
+	if p.status != "enabled" && p.status != "disabled" && p.status != "all" {
+		return p, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	var scope extension.AccountDirectoryScope
+	switch q.Purpose {
+	case extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers:
+		if !actor.IsAdmin || q.ProjectID != "" || q.DocumentID != "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		scope = extension.AccountDirectoryScope{AllowedFields: []string{"owner", "name", "staffNo"},
+			MatchFields: []string{"owner", "name", "staffNo"}, AllCandidates: true, ScopeVersion: "system.users.v1"}
+	case extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers, extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties:
+		if h.pluginID != "rdm" || q.ProjectID == "" || (q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties && q.DocumentID == "") ||
+			(q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers && q.DocumentID != "") || p.status != "enabled" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		h.caps.directory.mu.RLock()
+		resolver, pluginID := h.caps.directory.resolver, h.caps.directory.pluginID
+		h.caps.directory.mu.RUnlock()
+		if resolver == nil || pluginID != h.pluginID {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		scope, err = resolver(ctx, extension.AccountDirectoryScopeRequest{
+			Actor: h.actor, PluginID: h.pluginID, Purpose: q.Purpose, ProjectID: q.ProjectID, DocumentID: q.DocumentID,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeDocumentDuties && scope.AllCandidates {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+	default:
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if scope.ScopeVersion == "" {
+		return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	p.allowed = map[string]bool{"owner": true}
+	for _, field := range scope.AllowedFields {
+		if !knownDirectoryField(field) {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.allowed[field] = true
+	}
+	matchAllowed := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, field := range scope.MatchFields {
+		if !knownDirectoryField(field) || !p.allowed[field] {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		matchAllowed[field] = true
+	}
+	requested := q.SearchFields
+	if len(requested) == 0 {
+		requested = []string{"owner", "name"}
+	}
+	for _, field := range requested {
+		if !matchAllowed[field] {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.match = append(p.match, field)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(p.match)
+	p.candidates = make(map[string]bool, len(scope.CandidateIDs))
+	p.owners = make(map[string]bool, len(scope.CandidateOwners))
+	for _, id := range scope.CandidateIDs {
+		if id == "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.candidates[id] = true
+	}
+	for _, owner := range scope.CandidateOwners {
+		if owner == "" {
+			return p, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p.owners[owner] = true
+	}
+	p.all = scope.AllCandidates
+	if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers {
+		p.all = true
+	}
+	visible := make([]directoryVisibleRow, 0)
+	if loadRows {
+		rows, err := h.caps.st.ListDirectoryAccountRows()
+		if err != nil {
+			return p, err
+		}
+		for _, row := range rows {
+			if !directoryRowAllowed(row, p) {
+				continue
+			}
+			p.rows = append(p.rows, row)
+			item := directoryVisibleRow{UserID: row.UserID, Owner: row.Owner, Enabled: row.Enabled}
+			if p.allowed["name"] {
+				item.Name = row.Name
+			}
+			if p.allowed["staffNo"] {
+				item.StaffNo = row.StaffNo
+			}
+			visible = append(visible, item)
+		}
+	}
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(p.candidates))
+	for id := range p.candidates {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(ids)
+	owners := make([]string, 0, len(p.owners))
+	for owner := range p.owners {
+		owners = append(owners, owner)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(owners)
+	allowed := make([]string, 0, len(p.allowed))
+	for field := range p.allowed {
+		allowed = append(allowed, field)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(allowed)
+	fingerprint := struct {
+		Actor, Plugin, Purpose, Project, Document, Mode, Query, Status, Scope string
+		Match, Allowed, IDs, Owners                                           []string
+		Visible                                                               []directoryVisibleRow
+		All                                                                   bool
+	}{Actor: h.actor, Plugin: h.pluginID, Purpose: q.Purpose, Project: q.ProjectID, Document: q.DocumentID,
+		Mode: q.Mode, Query: strings.TrimSpace(q.Query), Status: p.status,
+		Scope: scope.ScopeVersion, Match: p.match, Allowed: allowed, IDs: ids, Owners: owners, Visible: visible, All: p.all}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(fingerprint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return p, err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(encoded)
+	p.version = hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+	return p, nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) encodeCursor(c directoryCursor) (string, error) {
+	c.KeyVersion = s.keyVersion
+	data, err := json.Marshal(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-directory-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data) + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)), nil
+}
+
+func (s *accountDirectorySlot) decodeCursor(token, version string) (directoryCursor, error) {
+	var c directoryCursor
+	payload, signature, found := strings.Cut(token, ".")
+	if !found {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil || len(data) > 1024 {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	provided, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(signature)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("iam-directory-cursor-v1\x00"))
+	_, _ = mac.Write(data)
+	if !hmac.Equal(provided, mac.Sum(nil)) || json.Unmarshal(data, &c) != nil || c.KeyVersion != s.keyVersion || c.Version != version || c.Owner == "" || c.UserID == "" {
+		return directoryCursor{}, store.ErrConflict
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+func directoryEntry(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, p directoryPolicy) extension.AccountDirectoryEntry {
+	entry := extension.AccountDirectoryEntry{UserID: row.UserID, Owner: row.Owner, Valid: row.Enabled}
+	if p.allowed["name"] {
+		entry.Name = row.Name
+	}
+	if p.allowed["staffNo"] {
+		entry.StaffNo = row.StaffNo
+	}
+	return entry
+}
+
+func directoryMatches(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, fields []string, mode, query string) bool {
+	for _, field := range fields {
+		value := row.Owner
+		switch field {
+		case "name":
+			value = row.Name
+		case "staffNo":
+			value = row.StaffNo
+		}
+		if mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeExact && strings.EqualFold(value, query) {
+			return true
+		}
+		if mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(value), strings.ToLower(query)) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func directoryRowAllowed(row store.DirectoryAccountRow, p directoryPolicy) bool {
+	if !p.all && !p.candidates[row.UserID] && !p.owners[row.Owner] {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.status == "all" || (p.status == "enabled" && row.Enabled) || (p.status == "disabled" && !row.Enabled)
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) QueryAccountDirectory(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery) (extension.AccountDirectoryPage, error) {
+	query := strings.TrimSpace(q.Query)
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, query != "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+	}
+	maxLimit := 50
+	if q.Purpose == extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers {
+		maxLimit = 100
+	}
+	if q.Limit == 0 {
+		q.Limit = 20
+	}
+	if q.Limit < 1 || q.Limit > maxLimit {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	page := extension.AccountDirectoryPage{Entries: []extension.AccountDirectoryEntry{}, DirectoryVersion: p.version}
+	if query == "" {
+		if q.Cursor != "" {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrConflict
+		}
+		return page, nil
+	}
+	if q.Mode == extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy && utf8.RuneCountInString(query) < 2 {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	var after directoryCursor
+	if q.Cursor != "" {
+		after, err = h.caps.directory.decodeCursor(q.Cursor, p.version)
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	matched := make([]store.DirectoryAccountRow, 0, q.Limit+1)
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if !directoryMatches(row, p.match, q.Mode, query) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if after.Owner != "" && (row.Owner < after.Owner || (row.Owner == after.Owner && row.UserID <= after.UserID)) {
+			continue
+		}
+		matched = append(matched, row)
+		if len(matched) > q.Limit {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	more := len(matched) > q.Limit
+	if more {
+		matched = matched[:q.Limit]
+	}
+	for _, row := range matched {
+		page.Entries = append(page.Entries, directoryEntry(row, p))
+	}
+	if more {
+		last := matched[len(matched)-1]
+		page.NextCursor, err = h.caps.directory.encodeCursor(directoryCursor{Version: p.version, Owner: last.Owner, UserID: last.UserID})
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryPage{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	return page, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) LookupAccountDirectory(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, userID string) (extension.AccountDirectoryLookup, error) {
+	if userID == "" || q.Cursor != "" {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, err
+	}
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if row.UserID == userID {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{Entry: directoryEntry(row, p), DirectoryVersion: p.version}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrNotFound
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(ctx context.Context, q extension.AccountDirectoryQuery, owner string) (extension.AccountDirectoryLookup, error) {
+	if owner == "" || q.Cursor != "" {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrInvalidAccountProfile
+	}
+	p, err := h.directoryPolicy(ctx, q, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, err
+	}
+	for _, row := range p.rows {
+		if row.Owner == owner {
+			return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{Entry: directoryEntry(row, p), DirectoryVersion: p.version}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return extension.AccountDirectoryLookup{}, store.ErrNotFound
+}
+
+var _ extension.AccountDirectoryProvider = inprocHost{}

internal/app/account_directory_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func openDirectoryTestStore(t *testing.T) *store.Store {
+	t.Helper()
+	dsn := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "directory.db"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+		return st
+	}
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	schema := "t_" + strings.ToLower(store.NewID("dir"))
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE SCHEMA ` + schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_, _ = admin.Exec(`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ` + schema + ` CASCADE`)
+		_ = admin.Close()
+	})
+	separator := "?"
+	if strings.Contains(dsn, "?") {
+		separator = "&"
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(dsn+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	return st
+}
+
+func TestAccountDirectoryAppliesDomainScopeBeforeSearchAndCursor(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	t.Logf("directory provider dialect=%s", st.Dialect())
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	alice, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "alice", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-a"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "bob", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-b"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outsider, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", "outsider", store.AccountProfile{Name: "同名", StaffNo: "hidden-x"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, pluginID: "rdm", actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+	query := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+		Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeProjectMembers, ProjectID: "project-1",
+		Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy, Query: "同名", Limit: 1}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("domain directory ran without trusted resolver")
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: h.caps}).RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(func(context.Context, extension.AccountDirectoryScopeRequest) (extension.AccountDirectoryScope, error) {
+		return extension.AccountDirectoryScope{AllowedFields: []string{"owner", "name"}, MatchFields: []string{"owner", "name"},
+			CandidateIDs: []string{alice.ID, bob.ID}, ScopeVersion: "scope-1"}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].UserID != alice.ID || page.Entries[0].StaffNo != "" || page.NextCursor == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("first scoped page: %+v %v", page, err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = page.NextCursor
+	otherSlot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	otherSlot.pluginID, otherSlot.resolver = slot.pluginID, slot.resolver
+	otherHost := h
+	otherHost.caps.directory = otherSlot
+	second, err := otherHost.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil || len(second.Entries) != 1 || second.Entries[0].UserID != bob.ID || second.NextCursor != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("second scoped page on another host: %+v %v", second, err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = ""
+	query.Query = "hidden-x"
+	if found, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil || len(found.Entries) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("hidden staff number matched: %+v %v", found, err)
+	}
+	query.SearchFields = []string{"staffNo"}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("hidden staff number accepted as search field")
+	}
+	query.SearchFields = nil
+	query.Query = "同名"
+	if hit, err := h.LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(context.Background(), query, "alice"); err != nil || hit.Entry.UserID != alice.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit owner lookup failed to resolve stable ID: %+v %v", hit, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.LookupAccountDirectoryOwner(context.Background(), query, "outsider"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("owner lookup leaked outsider: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.LookupAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query, "not-in-scope"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("exact lookup leaked outsider: %v", err)
+	}
+	page, err = h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion, map[string]string{"phone": "private-edit"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	query.Cursor = page.NextCursor
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("private edit invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion+1, map[string]string{"staffNo": "still-hidden"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unavailable field invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", outsider.ID, outsider.ProfileVersion, map[string]string{"name": "out-of-scope-change"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("out-of-scope edit invalidated candidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.PatchAccountProfile("admin", alice.ID, alice.ProfileVersion+2, map[string]string{"name": "changed"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), query); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("visible edit did not invalidate cursor: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPGDirectoryCursorContinuesInAnotherProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if baseDSN == "" {
+		t.Skip("isolated PostgreSQL test DSN required")
+	}
+	if os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CHILD") == "1" {
+		schema := os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_SCHEMA")
+		separator := "?"
+		if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+			separator = "&"
+		}
+		st, err := store.OpenExistingPostgres(baseDSN+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer st.Close()
+		slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+		q := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+			Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers, Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy,
+			Query: "same", Limit: 1, Cursor: os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CURSOR")}
+		page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), q)
+		if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].Owner != "beta" {
+			t.Fatalf("cross-process page: %+v %v", page, err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-directory-cross-process", "pg"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "Admin", "hash", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alpha", "beta"} {
+		if _, err := st.CreatePendingAccount("admin", owner, store.AccountProfile{Name: "same"}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	slot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, directory: slot}, actor: "admin", owner: "admin"}
+	q := extension.AccountDirectoryQuery{SchemaVersion: extension.AccountDirectorySchemaVersion,
+		Purpose: extension.AccountDirectoryPurposeSystemUsers, Mode: extension.AccountDirectoryModeFuzzy,
+		Query: "same", Limit: 1}
+	page, err := h.QueryAccountDirectory(context.Background(), q)
+	if err != nil || len(page.Entries) != 1 || page.Entries[0].Owner != "alpha" || page.NextCursor == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("initial page: %+v %v", page, err)
+	}
+	var schema string
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestPGDirectoryCursorContinuesInAnotherProcess$")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CHILD=1", "IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_SCHEMA="+schema,
+		"IAM_U3_DIRECTORY_CURSOR="+page.NextCursor)
+	if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("cross-process cursor failed: %v: %s", err, strings.ReplaceAll(string(out), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_guard.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// accountEffectiveAuthorization is shared by runmgr and in-process Host
+// capabilities. The implicit local singleton is the only auth-off missing-row
+// exception; an existing disabled local account remains denied.
+func accountEffectiveAuthorization(st *store.Store, authOn bool) func(context.Context, string) (bool, error) {
+	return func(_ context.Context, owner string) (bool, error) {
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) && !authOn && owner == store.OwnerDefault {
+			return true, nil
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return false, err
+		}
+		return account.Enabled, nil
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestInprocHostRechecksEffectiveAccountOnEveryCapability(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/host.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	check := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, accountGuard: func(owner string) error {
+		valid, err := check(context.Background(), owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	if err := h.KVPut("before", "allowed"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner=?`, "alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := h.KVPut("after", "denied"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host wrote KV: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.KVGet("before"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host read KV: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.TaskCreate("test", "denied", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host created task: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.ProjectNameAvailable("denied", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host used project capability: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := h.Audit("action", "target", ""); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host wrote audit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.Complete(context.Background(), "denied"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host reached model completion: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "", "denied", 1); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled host read knowledge: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHostCompletionChecksAgainAfterModelSettingsRead(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/host-complete.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	requests := 0
+	model := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		requests++
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"late"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer model.Close()
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	set.SetSystemOverride(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"model": "test", "baseUrl": model.URL}}})
+	checks := 0
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, set: set, accountGuard: func(string) error {
+		checks++
+		if checks >= 3 {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	if _, err := h.Complete(context.Background(), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("completion after disable: %v", err)
+	}
+	if checks != 3 || requests != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("late completion reached model: checks=%d requests=%d", checks, requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestImplicitLocalAccountExceptionIsAuthOffOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/local.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	allowed, err := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, false)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || !allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("implicit local denied: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+	allowed, err = accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) || allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("auth-on missing account allowed: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureUser(store.OwnerDefault, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner=?`, store.OwnerDefault); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	allowed, err = accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, false)(context.Background(), store.OwnerDefault)
+	if err != nil || allowed {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled existing local account allowed: %v %v", allowed, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_lister_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-19 消费测试：inprocHost.ListAccounts——最小目录（owner/valid）、游标分页、
+// limit 钳制（1-200，缺省 50）。数据来自 users 表（真实 store，非桩）。
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestInprocHostListAccounts(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(dir + "/test.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	for _, o := range []string{"carol", "alice", "bob", "dave"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(o, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if _, err := st.CreateAPIKey(o, "e2e"); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET is_admin=TRUE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice"}
+	if _, _, err := (inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}}).ListAccounts("", 2); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("legacy directory allowed a host without a trusted dispatch actor")
+	}
+
+	// 首页（limit=2）：alice/bob，next=bob。
+	page, next, err := h.ListAccounts("", 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(page) != 2 || page[0].Owner != "alice" || page[1].Owner != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("首页不符: %+v", page)
+	}
+	for _, e := range page {
+		if !e.Valid {
+			t.Fatalf("现有账号应 valid: %+v", e)
+		}
+	}
+	if next != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("next 应为 bob, got %q", next)
+	}
+	// 次页：carol/dave，next=""（末页）。
+	page2, next2, _ := h.ListAccounts(next, 2)
+	if len(page2) != 2 || page2[0].Owner != "carol" || page2[1].Owner != "dave" || next2 != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("次页不符: %+v next=%q", page2, next2)
+	}
+	// limit 钳制：0 → 50 缺省；超 200 → 200（不炸）。
+	if p, _, _ := h.ListAccounts("", 0); len(p) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("limit=0 应取缺省（4 账号全量）, got %d", len(p))
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.ListAccounts("", 999); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("limit 超限应钳制不报错: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE users SET enabled=FALSE WHERE owner='alice'`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := h.ListAccounts("", 2); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("disabled administrator retained legacy directory access")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInprocHostSearchAccounts：EXT-19 扩展 SearchAccounts——账号/姓名子串
+// 检索、大小写不敏感、空 query 首页、limit 钳制（P3，2026-10-13）。
+func TestInprocHostSearchAccounts(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(dir + "/test.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("init-pass-01")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "王小明", hash, true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("bob", "李大明", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("carol", "", hash, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "alice", actor: "alice"}
+	if _, err := (inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}).SearchAccounts("alice", 50); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ordinary actor gained legacy system directory search")
+	}
+
+	// 姓名子串（同名区分场景）：两个"大明/小明"都以"明"命中。
+	got, err := h.SearchAccounts("明", 50)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0].Owner != "alice" || got[1].Owner != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("姓名子串命中不符: %+v", got)
+	}
+	if got[0].Name != "王小明" {
+		t.Fatalf("目录行应携带姓名: %+v", got[0])
+	}
+	// 账号子串、大小写不敏感。
+	got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("AL", 50)
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Owner != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("账号子串应命中 alice: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// 未命中。
+	if got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("不存在", 50); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("未命中应为空: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// 空 query＝首页候选（owner 升序）；姓名为空的账号 Name 为空串。
+	if got, _ = h.SearchAccounts("", 2); len(got) != 2 || got[0].Owner != "alice" || got[1].Name != "李大明" {
+		t.Fatalf("空 query 首页不符: %+v", got)
+	}
+	// ListAccounts 回归：分页行同样携带姓名。
+	page, _, _ := h.ListAccounts("", 2)
+	if page[0].Name != "王小明" {
+		t.Fatalf("ListAccounts 应携带姓名: %+v", page[0])
+	}
+}

internal/app/account_ops_existing_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestAccountMaintenanceDefaultsToNonCreatingOpen(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		run  func(string) error
+	}{
+		{"user", func(dir string) error {
+			_, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "ada", "Ada", "", false, false, false)
+			return err
+		}},
+		{"apikey", func(dir string) error {
+			_, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "ada", "test")
+			return err
+		}},
+		{"identity verify", func(dir string) error {
+			_, err := VerifySystemIdentity("", dir, "fixture", "sqlite")
+			return err
+		}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")
+			if err := tc.run(dir); err == nil {
+				t.Error("maintenance created a missing database")
+			}
+			if _, err := os.Stat(dir); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+				t.Error("failed maintenance created a directory")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+func TestAccountMaintenanceCannotImplicitlyMigrate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN", "")
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("test", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Roll back the newest additive migration in this private fixture only.
+	if err := st.MigrateDown(store.SchemaTarget() - 1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	if _, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "ada", "Ada", "", false, false, false); err == nil {
+		t.Error("account command implicitly migrated an older schema")
+	}
+}

internal/app/app.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package app
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
@@ -34,8 +35,10 @@ import (
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/cardsvc"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/config"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/genui"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/hostapi"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/intentgate"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/intentsem"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/pgbus"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/plugins"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/profiles"
@@ -49,22 +52,102 @@ import (
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/skills"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/squadadapter"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/tools"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/workflow"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
 	core "agent-system-core"
 )
 
 type Options struct {
-	Addr           string
-	DataDir        string
-	PluginsDir     string
-	ForceMock      bool
-	StorageDSN     string // 空 = 嵌入式 SQLite 档；非空 = PostgreSQL 档（多用户/多实例）
-	ArtifactsDir   string // PG 档工件对象目录（空 = <DataDir>/artifacts）
-	AuthMode       string // auto（默认：PG 档开、嵌入式关）| on | off
-	InstanceID     string // 空 = 主机名:监听地址；写入 runs.instance_id，启动对账只收口本实例
-	InsecureListen bool
-	AllowedHosts   []string
+	Addr                  string
+	DataDir               string
+	PluginsDir            string
+	ForceMock             bool
+	StorageDSN            string // 空 = 嵌入式 SQLite 档；非空 = PostgreSQL 档（多用户/多实例）
+	ArtifactsDir          string // PG 档工件对象目录（空 = <DataDir>/artifacts）
+	AuthMode              string // auto（默认：PG 档开、嵌入式关）| on | off
+	RequireProjectContext bool
+	InstanceID            string // 空 = 主机名:监听地址；写入 runs.instance_id，启动对账只收口本实例
+	InsecureListen        bool
+	AllowedHosts          []string
+	// DisableUploadIndexing EXT-9：true 时上传端点不自动写检索索引（发布决定
+	// 移交下游命令层）；零值=false=现状。由 link 层自 extension.Options 透传。
+	DisableUploadIndexing bool
+	// DisableConvCardMirror EXT-12：true 时会话卡不镜像进项目公共流（不发布
+	// 即不持久，重放不含会话卡）；零值=false=现状全量镜像。
+	DisableConvCardMirror bool
+	// DisableExecTools 启动级硬关闭执行原语（run_shell / run_python /
+	// register_artifact 与小队内核执行配置）：用户设置 runtime.exec 无法覆盖；
+	// 零值=false=现状。
+	DisableExecTools bool
+	// ExecBackend 执行后端（EXT-16）：空/direct=现状直启；sandbox=bwrap 隔离档。
+	// 硬关闭 DisableExecTools 优先级高于后端选择。
+	ExecBackend string
+	// ExecDepsDir sandbox 档只读依赖层（site-packages 等，空=不挂）：修复
+	// --tmpfs /home 遮蔽 ~/.local 导致交付物生成链路不可用（F3）。
+	ExecDepsDir string
+	// ExecEnvRoot 分层 Python 环境根（解释器、基础层、扩展层、白名单）。
+	// 设置后，未显式给出 ExecDepsDir 时使用其中的 current 基础层。
+	ExecEnvRoot string
+	// ExecWorkspace = "overlay" 时 sandbox 档启用 S0 工作区（冻结基底+私有
+	// upper+CAS 回收）；空 = EXT-16 现状直写会话目录。
+	ExecWorkspace string
+	// Tier 部署档（协作存储 KTD1）：空=auto（DSN→PG 否则 SQLite）；local=SQLite；
+	// team=PG fail-closed（缺 DSN/未认证拒绝启动；PG 故障拒绝就绪，不回落 SQLite）。
+	Tier string
+	// PGPool PG 连接预算（KTD12；零值走默认）。仅 PG 档生效。
+	PGPool store.PoolOptions
+	// AdoptInstanceGuard 在数据库被替换或锁文件被重建后，显式重写守卫记录。
+	AdoptInstanceGuard bool
+}
+
+// instanceTag 稳定执行身份：tier=team 时强制 host:addr（多实例互异），
+// 本地档退化为 local（单实例语义）。
+func instanceTag(opt Options) string {
+	if opt.Tier == "team" || opt.StorageDSN != "" {
+		return hostTag() + ":" + opt.Addr
+	}
+	return "local"
+}
+
+func hostTag() string {
+	h, err := os.Hostname()
+	if err != nil || h == "" {
+		return "host"
+	}
+	return h
+}
+
+// tierName 输出部署档名（诊断统一拼写：空 = auto）。
+func tierName(opt Options) string {
+	if opt.Tier == "" {
+		return "auto"
+	}
+	return opt.Tier
+}
+
+// TierRefusal 部署档门禁（KTD1）：返回阻止启动的问题（空 = 放行）。
+// team 档 fail-closed：缺 DSN、未开认证拒绝；PG 故障的拒绝发生在其后的
+// OpenPostgres（Run 对 team 档的错误显式声明不回落 SQLite）。
+func TierRefusal(opt Options) []string {
+	return config.Resolved{Config: config.Config{
+		Addr: opt.Addr, AuthMode: opt.AuthMode, StorageDSN: opt.StorageDSN, Tier: opt.Tier,
+		PGMaxOpen: opt.PGPool.MaxOpenConn, PGMaxIdle: opt.PGPool.MaxIdleConn,
+		PGConnMaxIdleSec: opt.PGPool.ConnMaxIdleTimeSec, PGConnMaxLifetimeSec: opt.PGPool.ConnMaxLifetimeSec,
+		PGQueryTimeoutSec: opt.PGPool.QueryTimeoutSec,
+	}}.TierProblems()
+}
+
+// latestVersion 返回已应用迁移的最高版本（0 = 空账本）。
+func latestVersion(versions []int) int {
+	max := 0
+	for _, v := range versions {
+		if v > max {
+			max = v
+		}
+	}
+	return max
 }
 
 // Run 装配并阻塞服务直至 SIGINT/SIGTERM（优雅停机：中断在途 run、冲净事件缓冲）。
@@ -73,33 +156,42 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		Service: "agent-system", Module: "app", Level: logsys.LevelInfo,
 		Sinks: []logsys.Sink{&sink.Console{Out: os.Stderr, Format: "json"}},
 	})
-	logger.Info("agent-system starting", "addr", opt.Addr, "data", opt.DataDir)
+	logger.Info("agent-system starting", "addr", opt.Addr, "data", opt.DataDir, "tier", tierName(opt))
 	resolved := config.Resolved{Config: config.Config{
 		Addr: opt.Addr, AuthMode: opt.AuthMode, StorageDSN: opt.StorageDSN, InsecureListen: opt.InsecureListen,
+		Tier: opt.Tier, PGMaxOpen: opt.PGPool.MaxOpenConn, PGMaxIdle: opt.PGPool.MaxIdleConn,
+		PGConnMaxIdleSec: opt.PGPool.ConnMaxIdleTimeSec, PGConnMaxLifetimeSec: opt.PGPool.ConnMaxLifetimeSec,
+		PGQueryTimeoutSec: opt.PGPool.QueryTimeoutSec,
 	}}
 	if msg := resolved.ListenRefusal(); msg != "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("listen guard: %s", msg)
 	}
+	// 部署档门禁（KTD1 fail-closed）：team 档缺 DSN/未开认证直接拒绝启动；
+	// local 档带 DSN 是配置错误。此处与 config.TierProblems 同规则（纵深防御，
+	// 服务入口不依赖 CLI 是否校验）。
+	if msgs := TierRefusal(opt); len(msgs) > 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tier guard: %s", strings.Join(msgs, "；"))
+	}
+	if opt.Tier == "team" && !opt.DisableExecTools && opt.ExecBackend == "" {
+		log.Printf("warning: team 档未配置执行隔离（disableExecTools 或 execBackend）；向真实多用户开放前必须补齐（方案 KTD1）")
+	}
 	if opt.InsecureListen && !config.IsLoopbackListen(opt.Addr) && !resolved.AuthEnabled() {
 		log.Printf("warning: listening on %s without authentication because insecureListen is set", opt.Addr)
 	}
-	traceFn := telemetry.StartFunc(logger)
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if opt.StorageDSN != "" {
-		artifacts := opt.ArtifactsDir
-		if artifacts == "" {
-			artifacts = filepath.Join(opt.DataDir, "artifacts")
-		}
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(opt.StorageDSN, artifacts)
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(opt.DataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
+	st, releaseStore, err := openServiceStore(opt)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("open store: %w", err)
+		return err
+	}
+	defer releaseStore()
+	pool := st.Pool()
+	if versions, verr := st.MigrationStatus(); verr == nil {
+		log.Printf("storage tier: %s (dialect=%s pool=%d/%d idleSec=%d lifetimeSec=%d schema=v%d)",
+			tierName(opt), st.Dialect(), pool.MaxOpenConn, pool.MaxIdleConn, pool.ConnMaxIdleTimeSec,
+			pool.ConnMaxLifetimeSec, latestVersion(versions))
+	} else {
+		log.Printf("storage tier: %s (dialect=%s pool=%d/%d schema=? migration status unavailable: %v)",
+			tierName(opt), st.Dialect(), pool.MaxOpenConn, pool.MaxIdleConn, verr)
 	}
-	defer st.Close()
-	log.Printf("storage tier: %s", st.Dialect())
 
 	b := bus.New()
 	reg := tools.NewRegistry()
@@ -112,7 +204,41 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	}
 	// 执行原语（agent-native 交付）：shell/python 在会话工作区执行 + 产物登记桥，
 	// runtime.exec=false 可整体禁用（fail-closed）。生成文档/表格/演示稿的方法
-	// 在提示词库 base.deliverables，不在系统工具里。
+	// 在提示词库 base.deliverables，不在系统工具里。启动参数 DisableExecTools
+	// 为不受用户设置影响的硬关闭（多用户部署的默认安全档）。
+	tools.SetExecDisabled(opt.DisableExecTools)
+	if opt.DisableExecTools {
+		log.Printf("exec tools: disabled by startup option (runtime.exec settings are ignored)")
+	}
+	// EXT-16：执行后端选择（direct|sandbox）；未知名字启动即失败（fail-closed）。
+	if err := tools.SetExecBackend(opt.ExecBackend); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("exec backend: %w", err)
+	}
+	if tools.ExecBackendName() == "sandbox" {
+		log.Printf("exec tools: backend=sandbox (bwrap: no network, ro root, session-only writes, proc limit)")
+	}
+	broker, err := wireExecEnv(st, &opt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("exec env: %w", err)
+	}
+	if opt.ExecDepsDir != "" {
+		tools.SetExecDepsDir(opt.ExecDepsDir)
+		log.Printf("exec tools: sandbox deps layer=%s", opt.ExecDepsDir)
+		if err := tools.ExecDoctor(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("exec doctor: %w", err)
+		}
+		log.Printf("exec tools: doctor ok (docx/openpyxl/pptx)")
+	}
+	if opt.ExecWorkspace == "overlay" {
+		tools.SetWorkspaceOverlay(true)
+		if tools.ExecBackendName() == "sandbox" {
+			log.Printf("exec tools: workspace=overlay (frozen base + private upper + CAS apply)")
+		} else {
+			log.Printf("exec tools: workspace=overlay ignored (backend is not sandbox)")
+		}
+	} else if opt.ExecWorkspace != "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("exec workspace: unknown mode %q (overlay)", opt.ExecWorkspace)
+	}
 	if err := tools.RegisterExecTools(reg); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("exec tools: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -123,6 +249,10 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("code orchestration tool: %w", err)
 	}
 	setSvc := settings.NewService(st)
+	effBoot := setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
+	traceFn := telemetry.StartFunc(logger,
+		telemetry.WithServiceName(effBoot.GetString("telemetry.serviceName", "agent-system-backend")),
+		telemetry.WithEndpoint(effBoot.GetString("telemetry.otlpEndpoint", "")))
 	setSvc.SetSystemOverride(map[string]any{"storage": map[string]any{"dataDir": opt.DataDir}})
 	// 点路径键展开必须在读 tools.tavily.apiKeys 之前，否则启动仍注册旧池。
 	norm, err := setSvc.NormalizeStored()
@@ -138,27 +268,39 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	if err := setSvc.SnapshotAndMigrateSecrets(); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("migrate secrets: %w", err)
 	}
-	runtime.SecretLookup = func(owner, service string) (string, bool) {
+	runtime.SecretLookup = func(owner, service string) (string, string, bool) {
 		if owner == "" {
 			owner = store.OwnerDefault
 		}
-		return st.ActiveSecret(owner, service)
+		if v, ok := st.ActiveSecret(owner, service); ok {
+			return v, "owner", true
+		}
+		// P2 受管：密钥统一迁入 secrets 表后，系统层受管密钥挂在系统行
+		//（owner=settings.OwnerSystemRow）；租户未单独配置时回退系统密钥。
+		if v, ok := st.ActiveSecret(settings.OwnerSystemRow, service); ok {
+			return v, "system", true
+		}
+		return "", "", false
 	}
 	rag.SecretLookup = func(service, fallback string) string {
 		return runtime.LookupSecret(store.OwnerDefault, service, fallback)
 	}
-	// 网络搜索（Tavily）：配置密钥池才注册（对齐 agent-native 语义：未配置不静默降级）。
-	eff := setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
-	tavilyRaw := eff.GetString("tools.tavily.apiKeys", "")
-	if active, ok := st.ActiveSecret(store.OwnerDefault, "tools.tavily"); ok {
-		tavilyRaw = active
-	}
-	if keys := splitKeyPool(tavilyRaw); len(keys) > 0 {
-		provider := agenttools.NewTavilyProvider(eff.GetString("tools.tavily.endpoint", ""), keys)
-		if err := tools.RegisterSearchTools(reg, provider); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("search tools: %w", err)
+	// 网络搜索（Tavily）：始终注册，密钥按调用时读取（设置页/svc 播种改了
+	// 即刻生效——此前启动时快照密钥，播种后必须重启工具才注册）。
+	// 未配置时调用返回明确的「未配置」提示，不静默降级为空结果。
+	if err := tools.RegisterLazySearchTools(reg, func() agenttools.SearchProvider {
+		effNow := setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
+		tavilyNow := effNow.GetString("tools.tavily.apiKeys", "")
+		if active, ok := st.ActiveSecret(store.OwnerDefault, "tools.tavily"); ok {
+			tavilyNow = active
 		}
-		log.Printf("tools: tavily_search/web_search registered (%d key(s))", len(keys))
+		keys := splitKeyPool(tavilyNow)
+		if len(keys) == 0 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return agenttools.NewTavilyProvider(effNow.GetString("tools.tavily.endpoint", ""), keys)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("search tools: %w", err)
 	}
 	promptLib, err := prompts.DefaultLibrary()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -217,6 +359,7 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 				return nil
 			},
 		}
+		cfg.Stream = runtime.GuardProjectStream(rc, "", cfg.Client.Stream)
 		tavilyNow := effNow.GetString("tools.tavily.apiKeys", "")
 		if active, ok := st.ActiveSecret(store.OwnerDefault, "tools.tavily"); ok {
 			tavilyNow = active
@@ -237,7 +380,17 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		if mgr := mcpManagerFor(rawMCP, strings.TrimSpace(effNow.GetString("tools.mcp.overrides", ""))); mgr != nil {
 			cfg.MCP = mgr
 		}
-		cfg.CodeOrchestration = effNow.GetBool("runtime.codeOrchestration", false)
+		// Native squad tools do not yet expose a fail-closed result hook to the
+		// project observation outbox. Project runs therefore use the audited
+		// runCtx retrieval/tool path only; enabling these direct providers would
+		// let their results reach the next model turn without source analysis.
+		if rc.Run().ProjectID != "" {
+			cfg.Search = nil
+			cfg.Exec = nil
+			cfg.Fetch = nil
+			cfg.MCP = nil
+		}
+		cfg.CodeOrchestration = rc.Run().ProjectID == "" && effNow.GetBool("runtime.codeOrchestration", false)
 		if ask, ok := rc.(interface {
 			AskUser(card core.HITLCard) (core.HITLResponse, error)
 		}); ok {
@@ -255,6 +408,9 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 			}
 		}
 		cfg.Trace = traceFn
+		// N1 WP4：小队成员的内核 ask 决策经 GateOptions.PermissionAsk 到达
+		// runCtx 的 HITL 确认卡（宿主无实现则 nil，内核保持 ask=拒绝旧行为）。
+		cfg.PermissionAsk = runtime.PermissionAskOf(rc)
 		if host, ok := rc.(interface {
 			OpenCheckpoints() (*checkpoint.Log, error)
 			CheckpointAnchor() string
@@ -272,7 +428,10 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("default profile: %w", err)
 	}
 	if opt.ForceMock {
-		if err := setSvc.MergeUser(store.OwnerDefault, map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}}); err != nil {
+		// runtime.* 自 #188 起为系统受管项：启动选项属受信操作员输入，
+		// 播种走系统层（对所有租户生效）；用户层写入会被受管拦截拒绝，
+		// 导致 serve --mock 直接启动失败（multi-instance 集成回归）。
+		if err := setSvc.MergeSystem(map[string]any{"runtime": map[string]any{"mock": true}}); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
@@ -281,6 +440,18 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	subRunner := &runtime.SubLLMRunner{Prompts: promptSvc, Trace: traceFn}
 	mockRunner := &runtime.MockRunner{}
 	mgr := runmgr.New(st, b, reg, profSvc, setSvc, convRunner, subRunner, mockRunner, &runtime.MockSubagent{})
+	if broker != nil {
+		mgr.SetExecEnvDecider(func(actor, id string, allow, isolate bool) (string, error) {
+			out, err := broker.Decide(context.Background(), id, actor, false, allow, isolate)
+			if err != nil {
+				return "", err
+			}
+			return out.Detail, nil
+		})
+	}
+	authOn := resolved.AuthEnabled()
+	effectiveAccount := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, authOn)
+	mgr.SetAccountEffectiveAuthorization(effectiveAccount, !authOn)
 	instanceID := opt.InstanceID
 	if instanceID == "" {
 		host, err := os.Hostname()
@@ -294,6 +465,8 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	if err := mgr.ReconcileInterrupted(); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("reconcile interrupted runs: %w", err)
 	}
+	// 后台子代理通知重启重投（N2 WP5）：未投递结果装回队列并按空闲语义投递。
+	mgr.LoadPendingNotices()
 	mgr.SetSquadRunner(&runtime.SquadRunner{})
 
 	// 意图闸门：插件意图 overlay → agent-intent 注册表（未装载意图 = 行为回退）。
@@ -324,29 +497,191 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 			logger.Error("plugin load failed", perr, "plugin", id, "code", string(errcode.SysUnavailable))
 		}
 	}
+	// P2 受管：插件声明里带 scope=system 的设置项同样纳入受管路径
+	//（user/project 写入拒绝、生效链剥除）。
+	setSvc.SetExtraSchema(pluginHost.SettingsSchema())
 
 	// 检索管线（4.12）：分块+全文+（配置时）向量混合与 rerank；未配置自动退化为全文。
 	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, setSvc, nil, nil)
-	pipe.SetEmbedder(rag.SwitchingEmbedder{HTTP: rag.NewHTTPEmbedder(pipe.EmbeddingRoute), Provider: func() string {
+	embedder := rag.SwitchingEmbedder{HTTP: rag.NewHTTPEmbedder(pipe.EmbeddingRoute), Provider: func() string {
 		return setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetString("models.embedding.provider", "")
-	}})
+	}}
+	pipe.SetEmbedder(embedder)
 	pipe.SetReranker(rag.NewHTTPReranker(pipe.RerankRoute))
 	mgr.SetRetriever(pipe)
 	mgr.SetIndexer(pipe)
+
+	// 意图慢通道（I2）：语义向量裁决 + 轻量模型命令生成。
+	// 两个开关都默认关——此时识别行为与 I1 完全一致（fail-closed 分层）；
+	// 开启语义需已配置 embedding 端点，开启生成需可用的轻量/主模型档。
+	if setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetBool("runtime.intentSemantic", false) {
+		gate.SetSemantic(intentsem.EmbeddingScorer{Provider: embedder}, 0)
+	}
+	if setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetBool("runtime.intentGenerator", false) {
+		effNow := setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
+		light := runtime.ResolveLightweightModel(core.AgentProfile{}, effNow)
+		client := &agentllm.Client{BaseURL: light.Base, APIKey: light.Key, HTTPClient: &http.Client{}}
+		gate.SetGenerator(intentsem.LightGenerator{Stream: client.Stream, Model: light.Model})
+	}
 	// fs 预留能力沙箱根：<DataDir>/workspaces/<owner>/<conversationID>/。
 	mgr.SetWorkspaceRoot(filepath.Join(opt.DataDir, "workspaces"))
+	// 中断子代理续跑（N2 WP5）：依赖转录目录（workspaceRoot）与派生请求。
+	mgr.ResumeInterruptedChildrenChecked(context.Background(), func(ctx context.Context, owner string) error {
+		valid, err := effectiveAccount(ctx, owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
 
 	// 收件箱任务卡：事件走会话事件管道（持久化/seq/重放）；关闭即 T0 基线。
 	cardSvc := cardsvc.New(st, mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	cardSvc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	cardSvc.SetProjectSharedEmitter(mgr.EmitProjectSharedCardEvent)
+	surfaceSvc := surfacesvc.New(st, mgr.EmitCardEvent)
+	surfaceSvc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(mgr.EmitCardEventAccountChecked)
+	go func() { // 启动恢复：重发「快照已落盘、事件未发出」的待恢复投影（KTD）。
+		if n, err := surfaceSvc.RecoverPendingEventsAccountChecked(context.Background(), !authOn); err == nil && n > 0 {
+			log.Printf("surface: recovered %d pending events", n)
+		}
+	}()
 	mgr.SetCards(cardSvc)
+	// 执行身份与命令消费（协作存储 U5）：PG 档启动跨实例命令轮询；
+	// SQLite 本地档无跨实例命令（StartCommandConsumer 自行短路）。
+	mgr.SetInstanceTag(instanceTag(opt), opt.Addr)
+	stopCommands := mgr.StartCommandConsumer(context.Background())
+	defer stopCommands()
+	// 执行预算（协作存储 U3，R8）：runtime.execBudgetGlobal / runtime.execBudgetPerUser
+	// 全零=不限（本地档默认，行为不变）；开启后执行许可共享账本生效，
+	// 待执行队列上限 runtime.execQueueMax（默认 200，容量合同数值待 U7 实测调整）。
+	mgr.SetExecutionBudgetFn(func() store.ExecutionBudget {
+		eff := setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "")
+		return store.ExecutionBudget{
+			Global:  int(eff.GetNumber("runtime.execBudgetGlobal", 0)),
+			PerUser: int(eff.GetNumber("runtime.execBudgetPerUser", 0)),
+		}
+	}, int(setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetNumber("runtime.execQueueMax", 200)))
 
 	// 命令总线（提案 T3/D27/D30）：四入口同源分发 + 审计 + 危险内联确认卡。
 	bus := cmdbus.New(st, cardSvc, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+	bus.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(ctx context.Context, actor string) error {
+		valid, err := effectiveAccount(ctx, actor)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	bus.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(!authOn)
+	// U5：页面动作分发口——surfacesvc.SubmitAction 经命令总线四入口同源分发
+	//（审计信封、参数校验、DangerHigh 内联确认卡全复用；Confirmed 不透传）。
+	surfaceSvc.SetDispatcher(func(ctx context.Context, d surfacesvc.ActionDispatch) (surfacesvc.ActionOutcome, error) {
+		return dispatchSurfaceAction(ctx, bus, d)
+	})
+	// U3：generative-ui 工具注入闸——activation 台账关闭时命令不投影给该 owner
+	// 的模型（禁用即不注入能力；执行端守卫仍在 surfacesvc）。
+	bus.SetToolGate(func(owner, commandID string) bool {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(commandID, genui.PluginID+".") {
+			return true
+		}
+		row, err := surfaceSvc.Activation(context.Background(), owner, genui.PluginID)
+		return err == nil && row.Enabled
+	})
+	// 自动建议页面 opt-in：settings ∧ activation；预算/冷却在 genui.Auto。
+	mgr.SetGenUIAuto(genui.NewAuto(
+		func(owner string) bool {
+			row, err := surfaceSvc.Activation(context.Background(), owner, genui.PluginID)
+			return err == nil && row.Enabled
+		},
+		func(owner string) bool {
+			return setSvc.Effective(owner, "").GetBool(genui.SettingAutoPresent, false)
+		},
+		func(owner, kind, detail string) {
+			_ = st.AppendAuditEvent(store.AuditEvent{Owner: owner, Action: kind, Evidence: detail})
+		},
+	))
+
 	bus.SetPendingStore(st)
 	pluginHost.OnCommands = bus.RegisterPluginCommands
 	// hostcaps：hostapi 闭包与进程内插件句柄共用的 owner 作用域能力（EXT-1 批注 1）。
-	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: setSvc}
-	applyCompiled(skillsRoot, bus, caps)
+	authzSlot := &projectAuthz{}
+	projectSlot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	workObserverSlot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{}
+	directorySlot, err := newAccountDirectorySlot(st)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	contextSlot := &projectContextSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{projects: projectSlot, workObserver: workObserverSlot, contexts: contextSlot, projectAudit: &projectAuditSlot{}, directory: directorySlot, regulations: &regulationsSlot{}, st: st, pipe: pipe, set: setSvc, authz: authzSlot, surfaces: surfaceSvc, allowImplicitLocal: !authOn,
+		accountGuard: func(owner string) error {
+			valid, err := effectiveAccount(context.Background(), owner)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if !valid {
+				return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+			}
+			return nil
+		}}
+	bus.SetProjectWorkPreflight(func(ctx context.Context, req cmdbus.Request) error {
+		if req.Actor == "" || req.Actor != req.Owner || req.ConversationID == "" || req.AnchorMessageID == "" || req.HostProjectID == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("formal project command requires an authenticated conversation source")
+		}
+		conv, err := st.GetConversation(req.Owner, req.ConversationID)
+		if err != nil || string(conv.ProjectID) != req.HostProjectID {
+			return fmt.Errorf("formal project command conversation binding changed")
+		}
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(req.Params)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		digest := sha256.Sum256(raw)
+		decision, err := preflightProjectMessage(ctx, st, workObserverSlot, projectSlot.work(), req.AnchorMessageID,
+			"project-command:"+req.ID, req.Owner, req.ConversationID, req.HostProjectID, req.ID, hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkProceed || decision.DecisionID == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("source analysis did not commit a proceed decision")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	// EXT-13：回合内检索（knowledge_search / @knowledge 注入）与 HTTP/Host 检索面
+	// 同一适配器授权；槽为共享指针，扩展在 applyCompiled 期间注册后即生效。
+	mgr.SetSharedKnowledgeAllow(func(owner string, projectID core.ID) bool {
+		ok, err := authzSlot.Authorize(owner, projectID)
+		return err == nil && ok
+	})
+	// EXT-14：命令即工具——带 exposeAsTool 的命令投影进回合工具清单，模型调用
+	// 经命令总分发（Entrance=agent，同审计信封与高危内联确认卡）。
+	mgr.SetCommandSource(busAdapter{bus: bus})
+	// EXT-11：公开受限 Host 工厂（下游恢复路径经 extension.NewScopedHost 重建句柄）。
+	wireScopedHostFactory(caps)
+	compiledSummary := applyCompiled(skillsRoot, bus, caps)
+	if err := requireProjectContextProvider(opt.RequireProjectContext, contextSlot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	mgr.SetProjectWorkAuthorization(projectSlot.work())
+	wireProjectWorkGate(mgr, st, caps, workObserverSlot, projectSlot.work())
+	if contextSlot.active() {
+		mgr.SetProjectContextResolver(contextSlot.resolve)
+		mgr.SetProjectEvidenceReader(contextSlot.readEvidence)
+		mgr.SetProjectContextSourceRechecker(contextSlot.recheck)
+	}
+	mgr.SetKnowledgeProjectScope(func(ctx context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+		return projectSlot.resolve(ctx, caps, actor, id)
+	})
+	if authzSlot.hasV2() {
+		mgr.SetKnowledgeResourceAllow(func(actor string, d core.KnowledgeDoc) bool {
+			ok, err := authzSlot.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: actor, Action: "model-context", ResourceType: "knowledge", ResourceID: d.ID, Owner: d.Owner, ProjectID: d.ProjectID, Source: d.Source})
+			return err == nil && ok
+		})
+	}
 	mgr.OnUsage = func(owner string, tokens int) {
 		budget := int(setSvc.Effective(owner, "").GetNumber("llm.dailyTokenBudget", 0))
 		status, aerr := st.AccountTokens(owner, tokens, budget)
@@ -360,6 +695,9 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		}
 	}
 	hostSrv.Dispatch = func(ctx context.Context, pluginID, owner, commandID string, params map[string]any) error {
+		if err := caps.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 		resp := bus.Dispatch(ctx, cmdbus.Request{ID: commandID, Params: params, Entrance: "api", Actor: pluginID, Owner: owner})
 		if resp.Receipt.State == "rejected" || resp.Receipt.State == "unknown" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("%s", resp.Receipt.Reason)
@@ -369,14 +707,35 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	hostSrv.Search = func(ctx context.Context, owner, text string) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
 		return caps.searchDefault(ctx, owner, text)
 	}
+	// EXT-8 余项：hostapi 检索面同样吃适配器共享（本人 + 放行的他人项目知识）。
+	hostSrv.SharedSearch = func(ctx context.Context, owner, text string) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+		return caps.searchDefault(ctx, owner, text)
+	}
+
 	hostSrv.Complete = func(ctx context.Context, owner, prompt string) (string, error) {
 		return caps.complete(ctx, owner, prompt)
 	}
 
 	srv := server.New(st, mgr, reg, profSvc, setSvc, pluginHost)
+	srv.ExecEnv = broker
+	projectSlot.wire(srv, caps)
+	// EXT-8：装载期注册的资源授权适配器注入读取入口（未注册=默认拒绝，行为不变）。
+	srv.SetProjectAuthorizer(authzSlot.Authorize)
+	// EXT-8b：资源级适配器注入读面（未注册=server 回落 V1，行为不变）。
+	if authzSlot.hasV2() {
+		srv.SetResourceAuthorizerV2(authzSlot.AuthorizeResource)
+	}
+	// EXT-9：宿主可关闭上传自动索引（发布决定移交下游命令层）。
+	srv.DisableUploadIndexing = opt.DisableUploadIndexing
+	// EXT-12 最小开关：会话卡不镜像进项目公共流（cardSvc 在上方已建）。
+	cardSvc.MirrorConvCards = !opt.DisableConvCardMirror
+
 	srv.Workflows = wfReg
 	mgr.SetWorkflows(wfReg)
 	srv.Cards = cardSvc
+	srv.Surfaces = surfaceSvc
+	// WP3-I4：编译插件摘要进 /api/plugins 管理清单（注册面即清单面）。
+	srv.CompiledPlugins = compiledSummary
 	srv.Bus = bus
 	srv.Gate = gate
 	srv.Prompts = promptSvc
@@ -400,7 +759,6 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 		return int(setSvc.Effective(store.OwnerDefault, "").GetNumber("runtime.rateLimitPerMin", 0))
 	})
 	// 认证策略（auto）：PG 档默认开启（多用户面不能裸奔）；嵌入式档默认关闭（本地单用户）。
-	authOn := resolved.AuthEnabled()
 	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, authOn)
 	if authOn {
 		log.Printf("auth: API key required (create with: agent-system apikey create --owner <name>)")
@@ -445,48 +803,105 @@ func Run(opt Options) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// CreateUserAccount CLI 建号（管理员发放制）：未给密码则生成随机 12 位并返回明文（仅此一次输出）。
-func CreateUserAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name, password string, isAdmin bool) (string, error) {
-	if password == "" {
-		password = server.RandomPassword()
+func assertLocalAccountOwner(st *store.Store, storageDSN, dataDir string) error {
+	if storageDSN == "" {
+		storageDSN = os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN")
 	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(password)
+	if storageDSN != "" {
+		var isOwner bool
+		err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_user = pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner) FROM pg_class c WHERE c.oid='users'::regclass`).Scan(&isOwner)
+		if err != nil || !isOwner {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
+		return err
 	}
-	if err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
-		return st.CreateAccount(owner, name, hash, isAdmin)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return "", err
+	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
+	if !ok || (os.Geteuid() != 0 && stat.Uid != uint32(os.Geteuid())) {
+		return store.ErrAccountForbidden
 	}
-	return password, nil
+	return nil
 }
 
-// ResetUserPassword CLI 重置密码：must_change=1（首登强制改密），吊销全部会话。
-func ResetUserPassword(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, password string) (string, error) {
-	if password == "" {
-		password = server.RandomPassword()
+// CreateUserAccount is the local owner-only, audited pending-account path.
+// Password-bearing creation is rejected before storage is opened.
+func CreateUserAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name, password string, isAdmin, openExisting, generatePassword bool) (string, string, error) {
+	if password != "" || generatePassword {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: local creation uses trusted activation only")
 	}
-	hash, err := store.HashPassword(password)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
-		if err := st.SetUserPassword(owner, hash); err != nil {
+	var out store.AccountOutcome
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		st.DeleteUserSessions(owner, "")
-		return nil
-	}); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return password, nil
+		_, next, err := st.CreateLocalPendingAccountWithAudit(owner, name, isAdmin, accountInstanceID())
+		out = next
+		return err
+	})
+	return out.Plain, out.OperationID, err
+}
+
+// IssueUserLoginKey is retained only as a rejecting compatibility entry.
+func IssueUserLoginKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, purpose string, openExisting, revokeAllCreds bool, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: use owner initialization or owner-confirmed recovery")
+}
+
+// InitializeAccount resumes a specific pending account. The operator identity
+// comes from the local OS UID; the target is fixed by stable user ID and CAS.
+func InitializeAccount(storageDSN, dataDir, userID string, expectedStateVersion, expectedGeneration int64) (string, string, error) {
+	var plain, owner string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		account, err := st.GetAccount(userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		out, err := st.InitializePendingAccountWithAudit(userID, expectedStateVersion, expectedGeneration, accountInstanceID())
+		plain, owner = out.Plain, account.Owner
+		return err
+	})
+	return plain, owner, err
+}
+
+// RevokeUserLoginKey CLI 撤销未使用登录 Key。
+func RevokeUserLoginKey(storageDSN, dataDir, id string, openExisting bool) error {
+	return withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		return st.RevokeLoginKey(id)
+	})
+}
+
+// BootstrapAdmin 首位管理员引导：单事务串行（KTD12——PG 咨询锁/SQLite 插入后复查），
+// 建号、激活 Key 与审计共同提交；库内已有用户即拒绝接管。
+func BootstrapAdmin(storageDSN, dataDir, owner string, openExisting bool) (string, error) {
+	var plain string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		outc, err := st.BootstrapFirstAdminWrite(store.AccountWrite{
+			Owner: owner, Name: owner, Actor: cliActor(), InstanceID: accountInstanceID(),
+		})
+		plain = outc.Plain
+		return err
+	})
+	return plain, err
+}
+
+// ResetUserPassword CLI 重置密码：单事务写 must_change=1、bump 认证版本、
+// 作废未用登录 Key、吊销全部会话并审计。
+func ResetUserPassword(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, password string, openExisting bool) (string, error) {
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("RECOVERY_CONTRACT_REPLACED: administrators cannot set another user's password")
 }
 
 // ListUserAccounts CLI 用户列表。
-func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
+func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string, openExisting bool) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
 	var out []store.AdminUser
-	err := withStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, openExisting, func(st *store.Store) error {
 		var e error
 		out, e = st.ListUsersAdmin()
 		return e
@@ -495,13 +910,12 @@ func ListUserAccounts(storageDSN, dataDir string) ([]store.AdminUser, error) {
 }
 
 func withStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
+	return withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, false, fn)
+}
+
+// withIdentityStore 只打开既有库：不建文件、不建目录、不迁移。
+func withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
+	st, err := store.OpenIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -509,55 +923,119 @@ func withStore(storageDSN, dataDir string, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
 	return fn(st)
 }
 
-// CreateAPIKey 是 apikey 子命令的实现：在指定存储档上为 owner 创建密钥（明文仅打印一次）。
-func CreateAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (string, error) {
+func withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir string, _ bool, fn func(*store.Store) error) error {
 	var st *store.Store
 	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
+	// DSN 等价安全输入（KTD14）：argv 缺省时回落环境变量——凭据不落 shell history。
+	if storageDSN == "" {
+		storageDSN = os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN")
 	}
+	// Account maintenance never initializes or migrates storage; the retained
+	// CLI compatibility flag cannot opt this operation into service initialization.
+	if storageDSN != "" {
+		st, err = store.OpenExistingPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
+	} else {
+		st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
+	}
+
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
+		return err
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
-	return st.CreateAPIKey(owner, name)
+	if id := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID")); id != "" {
+		dbref := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DBREF"))
+		if dbref == "" {
+			if storageDSN != "" {
+				dbref = "pg"
+			} else {
+				dbref = "sqlite"
+			}
+		}
+		if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(id, dbref); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return fn(st)
+}
+
+// CreateAPIKey 是 apikey 子命令的实现：在指定存储档上为 owner 创建密钥（明文仅打印一次）。
+func CreateAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (string, error) {
+	var plain string
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := assertLocalAccountOwner(st, storageDSN, dataDir); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !account.Enabled || account.InitializationState == store.InitializationPending {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		p, e := st.CreateAPIKey(owner, name)
+		plain = p
+		return e
+	})
+	return plain, err
 }
 
 // ListAPIKeys 列出租户密钥（摘要视图）。
 func ListAPIKeys(storageDSN, dataDir, owner string) ([]store.APIKeyInfo, error) {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	defer st.Close()
-	if _, err := st.GetUser(owner); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("owner %q 不存在（先 apikey create 创建）", owner)
-	}
-	return st.ListAPIKeys(owner)
+	var out []store.APIKeyInfo
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if _, err := st.GetUser(owner); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("owner %q 不存在（先建立账号）", owner)
+		}
+		var e error
+		out, e = st.ListAPIKeys(owner)
+		return e
+	})
+	return out, err
 }
 
 // RevokeAPIKey 撤销指定名称密钥。
 func RevokeAPIKey(storageDSN, dataDir, owner, name string) (bool, error) {
-	var st *store.Store
-	var err error
-	if storageDSN != "" {
-		st, err = store.OpenPostgres(storageDSN, filepath.Join(dataDir, "artifacts"))
-	} else {
-		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dataDir, "agent-system.db"))
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	defer st.Close()
-	return st.RevokeAPIKeyByName(owner, name)
+	var ok bool
+	err := withStoreMode(storageDSN, dataDir, true, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		var e error
+		ok, e = st.RevokeAPIKeyByName(owner, name)
+		return e
+	})
+	return ok, err
+}
+
+// EnsureSystemIdentity CLI：显式建立库内服务身份（svc init / I2→I3 引导）。
+// 只打开既有库，不建库、不迁移。
+func EnsureSystemIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir, instanceID, dbref string) error {
+	return withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		return st.EnsureSystemIdentity(instanceID, dbref)
+	})
+}
+
+// VerifySystemIdentity CLI：校验库内服务身份（svc start 前；失败不插入）。
+// 只打开既有库，不建库、不迁移。schemaVersion 取身份行上的值。
+func VerifySystemIdentity(storageDSN, dataDir, instanceID, dbref string) (int, error) {
+	var schemaVersion int
+	err := withIdentityStore(storageDSN, dataDir, func(st *store.Store) error {
+		if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(instanceID, dbref); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		row, err := st.GetSystemIdentity()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		schemaVersion = row.SchemaVersion
+		return nil
+	})
+	return schemaVersion, err
+}
+
+func cliActor() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
+}
+
+func accountInstanceID() string {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID"))
 }
 
 // cachedInt 带短 TTL 的整型缓存读（限流值热读取免打库）。
@@ -632,3 +1110,31 @@ func splitKeyPool(s string) []string {
 	}
 	return out
 }
+
+// busAdapter EXT-14：cmdbus.Bus 适配 runmgr.CommandSource。视图类型转换在此收口
+// （runmgr 不依赖 cmdbus，边不进架构基线）；Entrance 由 runmgr 固定为 agent。
+type busAdapter struct{ bus *cmdbus.Bus }
+
+func (a busAdapter) CommandTools() []runmgr.CommandTool {
+	return a.CommandToolsFor("")
+}
+
+func (a busAdapter) CommandToolsFor(owner string) []runmgr.CommandTool {
+	src := a.bus.CommandToolsFor(owner)
+	out := make([]runmgr.CommandTool, len(src))
+	for i, ct := range src {
+		out[i] = runmgr.CommandTool{ID: ct.ID, Description: ct.Description, Params: ct.Params, Risk: ct.Risk}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (a busAdapter) DispatchCommand(ctx context.Context, req runmgr.CommandRequest) runmgr.CommandResponse {
+	resp := a.bus.Dispatch(ctx, cmdbus.Request{
+		ID: req.ID, Params: req.Params, Entrance: req.Entrance,
+		Actor: req.Actor, Owner: req.Owner, ConversationID: req.ConversationID,
+	})
+	return runmgr.CommandResponse{
+		State: string(resp.Receipt.State), Reason: resp.Receipt.Reason,
+		Payload: resp.Payload, Card: resp.Card != nil,
+	}
+}

internal/app/compiled.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package app
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
 	"os"
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 
 	agentcommand "agent-command"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
 	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
 	core "agent-system-core"
 )
@@ -25,6 +27,29 @@ type pluginRegistry struct {
 	compiledRegistry
 	pluginID string
 	caps     hostcaps
+	// summary 是本插件的注册面摘要（WP3-I4）：AddAdminZone 声明记录于此，
+	// server 经 CompiledPlugins 供给分区清单端点（WP3-I3）。
+	summary *server.CompiledPlugin
+}
+
+// AddAdminZone 记录管理区分区声明（WP3-I3）：声明即展示元数据，权威记录
+// 就是注册期摘要；规格非法（非对象、id/title 缺失）fail-closed 拒绝，
+// 使 register() 整体中止（与命令注册同一失败语义）。
+func (r pluginRegistry) AddAdminZone(spec json.RawMessage) error {
+	if r.summary == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: " + r.pluginID + ": admin zone outside applyCompiled")
+	}
+	var s extension.AdminZoneSpec
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(spec, &s); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("extension: admin zone spec: %w", err)
+	}
+	if s.ID == "" || s.Title == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("extension: %s: admin zone requires id and title", r.pluginID)
+	}
+	r.summary.AdminZones = append(r.summary.AdminZones, server.AdminZoneSection{
+		ID: s.ID, Title: s.Title, Icon: s.Icon, Desc: s.Desc, Order: s.Order,
+	})
+	return nil
 }
 
 func (r pluginRegistry) AddCommandHandler(spec json.RawMessage, h extension.Handler) error {
@@ -39,14 +64,32 @@ func (r pluginRegistry) AddCommandHandler(spec json.RawMessage, h extension.Hand
 		return fmt.Errorf("extension: command spec: %w", err)
 	}
 	return r.bus.RegisterPluginCommand(s, func(ctx context.Context, req cmdbus.Request) (any, error) {
-		host := inprocHost{caps: r.caps, pluginID: r.pluginID, owner: req.Owner}
+		host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: r.caps, pluginID: r.pluginID, owner: req.Owner, actor: req.Actor,
+			conversationID: core.ID(req.ConversationID), hostProjectID: core.ID(req.HostProjectID),
+			entrance: req.Entrance, humanGrant: req.HumanGrant}}
 		return h(ctx, host, extension.Request{
 			ID: req.ID, Params: req.Params, Entrance: req.Entrance,
-			Actor: req.Actor, Owner: req.Owner, ConversationID: req.ConversationID,
+			Actor: req.Actor, Owner: req.Owner, ConversationID: req.ConversationID, OperationID: req.OperationID,
+			HostProjectID: req.HostProjectID,
 		})
 	})
 }
 
+// AddIntent 意图声明（G2-2）：汇入总线意图表；插件身份随声明归因。
+func (r pluginRegistry) AddIntent(spec json.RawMessage) error {
+	if r.bus == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var is extension.IntentSpec
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(spec, &is); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("extension: intent spec: %w", err)
+	}
+	return r.bus.Intents().Declare(cmdbus.Intent{
+		ID: is.ID, Phrases: is.Phrases, Command: is.Command,
+		Params: is.Params, Description: is.Description, Plugin: r.pluginID,
+	})
+}
+
 func (r compiledRegistry) AddSkill(name, markdown string) error {
 	if r.skillsRoot == "" || name == "" {
 		return nil
@@ -65,22 +108,155 @@ func (r compiledRegistry) AddCommand(spec json.RawMessage) error {
 	return r.bus.RegisterPluginCommands([]json.RawMessage{spec})
 }
 
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizer 声明式扩展无宿主进程内代码，不能提供回调（fail-closed）。
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2 声明式扩展同样不能提供资源级回调（fail-closed）。
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register resource authorizers")
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizer(extension.ResourceAuthorizer) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register resource authorizers")
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register account directory authorization")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	if r.pluginID != "rdm" || r.caps.directory == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: account directory resolver requires trusted RDM registration")
+	}
+	return r.caps.directory.register(r.pluginID, fn)
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterRegulationsProvider(extension.RegulationsProvider) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register a regulations provider")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterRegulationsProvider(p extension.RegulationsProvider) error {
+	if r.caps.regulations == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: regulations provider registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return r.caps.regulations.register(r.pluginID, p)
+}
+
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizer 进程内扩展（EXT-1）：填充 EXT-8 适配器槽
+// （hostcaps.authz 共享指针；首个注册者生效，组合根已装配进 Server/runmgr）。
+// 此前 pluginRegistry 未覆盖该方法——进程内插件注册适配器会命中声明式分支的
+// 拒绝，register() 整体中止，插件命令全部未注册（RDM 二进制 rdm.* 全部
+// 「unknown command」；MS1 重验收烟测实测发现）。
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizer(fn extension.ResourceAuthorizer) error {
+	if fn == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: " + r.pluginID + ": nil resource authorizer")
+	}
+	r.caps.authz.set(r.pluginID, fn)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2 进程内扩展：填充 EXT-8b 资源级适配器槽（首注册生效）。
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(fn extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) error {
+	if fn == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: " + r.pluginID + ": nil resource authorizer v2")
+	}
+	r.caps.authz.setV2(r.pluginID, fn)
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (r compiledRegistry) Note(kind, name string, payload json.RawMessage) error {
 	log.Printf("extension: note %s %s (%d bytes)", kind, name, len(payload))
 	return nil
 }
 
-func applyCompiled(skillsRoot string, bus *cmdbus.Bus, caps hostcaps) {
+// recordRegistry 包装 per-plugin 注册表，把成功注册的声明资产名记入摘要
+// （WP3-I4：注册面即清单面——编译插件的管理条目不另设声明口）。
+type recordRegistry struct {
+	extension.Registry
+	sum *server.CompiledPlugin
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn extension.AccountDirectoryScopeResolver) error {
+	registrar, ok := r.Registry.(extension.AccountDirectoryRegistrar)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: account directory registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return registrar.RegisterAccountDirectoryScopeResolver(fn)
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterRegulationsProvider(p extension.RegulationsProvider) error {
+	registrar, ok := r.Registry.(extension.RegulationsRegistrar)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: regulations provider registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return registrar.RegisterRegulationsProvider(p)
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) AddCommand(spec json.RawMessage) error {
+	if err := r.Registry.AddCommand(spec); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if id := specID(spec); id != "" {
+		r.sum.Commands = append(r.sum.Commands, id)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) AddCommandHandler(spec json.RawMessage, h extension.Handler) error {
+	if err := r.Registry.AddCommandHandler(spec, h); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if id := specID(spec); id != "" {
+		r.sum.Commands = append(r.sum.Commands, id)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) AddIntent(spec json.RawMessage) error {
+	if err := r.Registry.AddIntent(spec); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if id := specID(spec); id != "" {
+		r.sum.Intents = append(r.sum.Intents, id)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) AddSkill(name, markdown string) error {
+	if err := r.Registry.AddSkill(name, markdown); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	r.sum.Skills = append(r.sum.Skills, name)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// specID 宽松提取 spec 顶层 id：仅服务清单摘要展示，解析失败返回空串
+// 不记录，不影响注册结果本身。
+func specID(spec json.RawMessage) string {
+	var s struct {
+		ID string `json:"id"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(spec, &s); err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return s.ID
+}
+
+func applyCompiled(skillsRoot string, bus *cmdbus.Bus, caps hostcaps) []server.CompiledPlugin {
 	base := compiledRegistry{skillsRoot: skillsRoot, bus: bus}
+	var out []server.CompiledPlugin
 	for _, e := range extension.Compiled() {
 		if e.Register == nil {
 			continue
 		}
-		reg := pluginRegistry{compiledRegistry: base, pluginID: e.ID, caps: caps}
-		if err := e.Register(reg); err != nil {
+		sum := server.CompiledPlugin{ID: e.ID}
+		reg := pluginRegistry{compiledRegistry: base, pluginID: e.ID, caps: caps, summary: &sum}
+		// Register 失败的插件保留已成功注册部分（与命令总线一致：部分注册
+		// 生效），摘要如实反映实际注册面。
+		if err := e.Register(recordRegistry{Registry: reg, sum: &sum}); err != nil {
 			log.Printf("extension: %s: %v", e.ID, err)
 		}
+		out = append(out, sum)
 	}
+	return out
 }
 
 func mergeMCPServers(raw string, extra []core.PluginMCPServer) string {

internal/app/compiled_authz_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// fakeExtAuthz 进程内扩展：注册 EXT-8 适配器＋一条命令——修复前适配器注册被
+// 声明式分支拒绝，register() 中止导致命令全部丢失。
+type fakeExtAuthz struct{}
+
+func (f *fakeExtAuthz) Register(reg extension.Registry) error {
+	if err := reg.RegisterResourceAuthorizer(func(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return owner == "alice", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return reg.AddCommandHandler([]byte(`{"id":"t.authz.ping","title":"t"}`),
+		func(ctx context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+			return map[string]any{"ok": true}, nil
+		})
+}
+
+func TestInprocPluginRegistersAuthorizerAndCommands(t *testing.T) {
+	extension.ResetCompiled()
+	extension.RegisterCompiled(extension.InProc{ID: "t", Register: (&fakeExtAuthz{}).Register})
+	defer extension.ResetCompiled()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0).UTC() })
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, authz: &projectAuthz{}}
+	applyCompiled("", bus, caps)
+	// ① 命令已注册且可分发（修复前：适配器注册被拒 → register() 中止 →
+	//    命令全部丢失，rdm.* 全部 unknown command）。
+	if resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
+		ID: "t.authz.ping", Entrance: "button", Owner: "alice"}); resp.Receipt.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("命令分发 = %+v（注册整体中止）", resp.Receipt)
+	}
+	// ② 适配器经共享槽生效：alice 放行、bob 拒绝。
+	if ok, _ := caps.authz.Authorize("alice", "p1"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("alice 应放行")
+	}
+	if ok, _ := caps.authz.Authorize("bob", "p1"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("bob 应被拒绝")
+	}
+}

internal/app/compiled_list_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+// WP3-I4：applyCompiled 的注册面摘要——成功注册的命令/意图/技能记入
+// CompiledPlugin，失败注册不记录，Register 整体失败保留已成功部分。
+func TestApplyCompiledRecordsSummary(t *testing.T) {
+	extension.ResetCompiled()
+	t.Cleanup(extension.ResetCompiled)
+	extension.RegisterCompiled(extension.InProc{ID: "demo", Register: func(reg extension.Registry) error {
+		if err := reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"demo.one","title":"一"}`), func(ctx context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+			return "ok", nil
+		}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		// 重复 id 注册失败：总线拒绝，摘要不记录。
+		if err := reg.AddCommand(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"demo.one","title":"重复"}`)); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("duplicate command should fail")
+		}
+		if err := reg.AddIntent(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"demo.go","phrases":["演示"],"command":"demo.one"}`)); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		_ = reg.AddSkill("demo-skill", "# 演示\n技能正文")
+		// WP3-I3：管理区分区声明记入摘要；缺 id/title 的非法规格 fail-closed。
+		if err := reg.AddAdminZone(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"demo.audit","title":"演示审计","icon":"search","order":20}`)); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := reg.AddAdminZone(json.RawMessage(`{"title":"缺 id"}`)); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("admin zone without id should fail")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}})
+	extension.RegisterCompiled(extension.InProc{ID: "broken", Register: func(reg extension.Registry) error {
+		if err := reg.AddCommand(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"broken.cmd","title":"先成功"}`)); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`not-json`), nil)
+	}})
+	// 无 Register 的登记不产生条目。
+	extension.RegisterCompiled(extension.InProc{ID: "empty"})
+
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0).UTC() })
+	sums := applyCompiled(t.TempDir(), bus, hostcaps{st: st, set: settings.NewService(st)})
+	if len(sums) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 summaries, got %d: %+v", len(sums), sums)
+	}
+	if sums[0].ID != "demo" {
+		t.Fatalf("sums[0] = %+v", sums[0])
+	}
+	if len(sums[0].Commands) != 1 || sums[0].Commands[0] != "demo.one" {
+		t.Fatalf("demo commands = %v", sums[0].Commands)
+	}
+	if len(sums[0].Intents) != 1 || sums[0].Intents[0] != "demo.go" {
+		t.Fatalf("demo intents = %v", sums[0].Intents)
+	}
+	if len(sums[0].Skills) != 1 || sums[0].Skills[0] != "demo-skill" {
+		t.Fatalf("demo skills = %v", sums[0].Skills)
+	}
+	// WP3-I3：合法声明记入，非法规格（缺 id）被拒后摘要不受污染。
+	if len(sums[0].AdminZones) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("demo admin zones = %+v", sums[0].AdminZones)
+	}
+	if z := sums[0].AdminZones[0]; z.ID != "demo.audit" || z.Title != "演示审计" || z.Icon != "search" || z.Order != 20 {
+		t.Fatalf("demo admin zone = %+v", z)
+	}
+	// broken：Register 报错但先成功的命令仍在总线，摘要如实保留。
+	if sums[1].ID != "broken" || len(sums[1].Commands) != 1 || sums[1].Commands[0] != "broken.cmd" {
+		t.Fatalf("broken summary = %+v", sums[1])
+	}
+	// 摘要与总线一致：记录的命令真实可分发（不是空头衔）。
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "demo.one", Owner: "alice", Entrance: "test"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("demo.one dispatch = %s (%s)", resp.Receipt.State, resp.Receipt.Reason)
+	}
+}

internal/app/delegated_project_projection.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// requestBoundHost is created only for a current lifecycle or command request.
+// A reconstructed global ScopedHost is a plain inprocHost and cannot expose
+// the delegated projection method by type assertion.
+type requestBoundHost struct{ inprocHost }
+
+// ProjectProjectionForCreator only derives from a live request Host of the
+// registered RDM provider. The operator is inherited from that Host, never
+// accepted as a caller-supplied field. RDM's project.settings decision remains
+// its own domain authority; this capability fences the Backend projection.
+func (bound requestBoundHost) ProjectProjectionForCreator(creator, projectID string) (extension.ProjectHost, error) {
+	h := bound.inprocHost
+	if h.actor == "" || h.actor != h.owner || h.pluginID != "rdm" ||
+		h.caps.projects == nil || h.caps.st == nil || creator == "" || projectID == "" {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	slot := h.caps.projects
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	registered := slot.provider != nil && slot.holder == h.pluginID
+	slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if !registered {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := h.caps.accountGuard(creator); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := h.caps.st.ProjectMetadata(projectID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if string(project.Owner) != creator || string(project.ID) != projectID {
+		return nil, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return delegatedProjectProjection{caps: h.caps, pluginID: h.pluginID,
+		actor: h.actor, creator: creator, projectID: projectID}, nil
+}
+
+// delegatedProjectProjection exposes only ProjectHost, and every method is
+// confined to the bound project. It cannot be cast to the broader Host.
+type delegatedProjectProjection struct {
+	caps      hostcaps
+	pluginID  string
+	actor     string
+	creator   string
+	projectID string
+}
+
+var _ extension.ProjectHost = delegatedProjectProjection{}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) Owner() string { return p.creator }
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) check() error {
+	if p.caps.accountGuard == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := p.caps.accountGuard(p.actor); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return p.caps.accountGuard(p.creator)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) target(id string) error {
+	if id == "" || id != p.projectID {
+		return store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) OwnedProjects() ([]core.Project, error) {
+	return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) OwnedProject(string) (core.Project, error) {
+	return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) EnsureProject(string, string) (core.Project, error) {
+	return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) ProjectMetadata(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := p.target(id); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	view := inprocHost{caps: p.caps, pluginID: p.pluginID, owner: p.creator, actor: p.actor}
+	return view.ProjectMetadata(id)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID string) (bool, error) {
+	if err := p.target(exceptID); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return p.caps.st.ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID)
+}
+
+func (p delegatedProjectProjection) RenameOwnedProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := p.target(id); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if err := p.check(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	return p.caps.st.RenameOwnedProjectAccountChecked(p.actor, p.creator, p.projectID, name, p.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}

internal/app/delegated_project_projection_entry_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestDelegatedProjectionIsBoundAtHTTPAndCommandEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/entries.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	httpProject, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "HTTP original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	commandProject, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Command original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !state.Enabled {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	projectFromRequest := func(h extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+		bound, ok := h.(extension.DelegatedProjectProjectionHost)
+		if !ok {
+			return core.Project{}, errors.New("request Host lost operator-bound projection")
+		}
+		projection, err := bound.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", id)
+		if err != nil {
+			return core.Project{}, err
+		}
+		return projection.RenameOwnedProject(id, name)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, set: settings.NewService(st), projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.Rename = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host, id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+		return projectFromRequest(h, id, name)
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	srv := server.New(st, nil, nil, nil, caps.set, nil)
+	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, true)
+	slot.wire(srv, caps)
+	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "delegate-entry")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/api/projects/"+string(httpProject.ID), strings.NewReader(`{"name":"via HTTP"}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("HTTP lifecycle rename: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, nil)
+	bus.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, owner string) error { return check(owner) })
+	bus.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(false)
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps, compiledRegistry: compiledRegistry{bus: bus}}
+	err = reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"rdm.fixture.rename","title":"Rename"}`),
+		func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+			id, _ := req.Params["id"].(string)
+			name, _ := req.Params["name"].(string)
+			return projectFromRequest(h, id, name)
+		})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	result := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "rdm.fixture.rename", Owner: "bob", Actor: "bob",
+		Params: map[string]any{"id": string(commandProject.ID), "name": "via command"}})
+	if result.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("command rename: %+v", result.Receipt)
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ id, want string }{{string(httpProject.ID), "via HTTP"}, {string(commandProject.ID), "via command"}} {
+		project, err := st.ProjectMetadata(tc.id)
+		if err != nil || project.Name != tc.want {
+			t.Fatalf("entry %s did not reach bound projection: %+v %v", tc.id, project, err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/app/delegated_project_projection_pg_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// Two processes share one isolated PostgreSQL schema. The child has already
+// accepted a stale early account read when the parent commits disable; only
+// the final Backend transaction can stop the physical rename.
+func TestPGDelegatedProjectionDisableAcrossProcesses(t *testing.T) {
+	baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if baseDSN == "" {
+		t.Skip("isolated PostgreSQL DSN required")
+	}
+	separator := "?"
+	if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+		separator = "&"
+	}
+	if os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_CHILD") == "1" {
+		dsn := baseDSN + separator + "search_path=" + os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_SCHEMA") + ",public"
+		st, err := store.OpenExistingPostgres(dsn, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer st.Close()
+		var bobChecks atomic.Int32
+		check := func(owner string) error {
+			state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if !state.Enabled {
+				return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+			}
+			if owner == "bob" && bobChecks.Add(1) == 2 {
+				if err := os.WriteFile(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_READY"), []byte("ready"), 0o600); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+				for {
+					if _, err := os.Stat(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_RELEASE")); err == nil {
+						break
+					}
+					if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+						return errors.New("parent did not release paused child")
+					}
+					time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+				}
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+		caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+		if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+		projection, err := host.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT"))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(os.Getenv("IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT"), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("late physical rename was not fenced: %v", err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	st := openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-delegate-two-process", "pg"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "before")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var schema string
+	if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	barrier := t.TempDir()
+	ready, release := filepath.Join(barrier, "ready"), filepath.Join(barrier, "release")
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestPGDelegatedProjectionDisableAcrossProcesses$")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_CHILD=1", "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_SCHEMA="+schema,
+		"IAM_U3_DELEGATE_PROJECT="+string(project.ID), "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_READY="+ready, "IAM_U3_DELEGATE_RELEASE="+release)
+	var output bytes.Buffer
+	cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &output, &output
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(ready); err == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+			t.Fatalf("child did not reach stale early check: %s", strings.ReplaceAll(output.String(), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(release, []byte("release"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("child failed: %v: %s", err, strings.ReplaceAll(output.String(), baseDSN, "[REDACTED]"))
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "before" {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled operator's project rename persisted: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/execenv_wire.go

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/execenv"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/tools"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// envStore 把 store 的行类型适配成 execenv.Store。
+type envStore struct{ *store.Store }
+
+func (s envStore) InsertExecEnvRequest(r execenv.Request) error {
+	return s.Store.InsertExecEnvRequest(store.ExecEnvRequest{
+		ID: r.ID, ConversationID: r.ConversationID, Owner: r.Owner, Spec: r.Spec,
+		Reason: r.Reason, Status: r.Status, LayerID: r.LayerID, Detail: r.Detail,
+		Approver: r.Approver, CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt, UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt,
+	})
+}
+
+func (s envStore) GetExecEnvRequest(id string) (execenv.Request, error) {
+	r, err := s.Store.GetExecEnvRequest(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return execenv.Request{}, err
+	}
+	return execenv.Request{
+		ID: r.ID, ConversationID: r.ConversationID, Owner: r.Owner, Spec: r.Spec,
+		Reason: r.Reason, Status: r.Status, LayerID: r.LayerID, Detail: r.Detail,
+		Approver: r.Approver, CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt, UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (s envStore) ListExecEnvRequests(conversationID string, limit int) ([]execenv.Request, error) {
+	rows, err := s.Store.ListExecEnvRequests(conversationID, limit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]execenv.Request, 0, len(rows))
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		out = append(out, execenv.Request{
+			ID: r.ID, ConversationID: r.ConversationID, Owner: r.Owner, Spec: r.Spec,
+			Reason: r.Reason, Status: r.Status, LayerID: r.LayerID, Detail: r.Detail,
+			Approver: r.Approver, CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt, UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt,
+		})
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (s envStore) UpdateExecEnvRequest(id, status, layerID, detail, approver string) error {
+	return s.Store.UpdateExecEnvRequest(id, status, layerID, detail, approver)
+}
+
+func (s envStore) GetExecEnvBinding(conversationID string) (execenv.Binding, error) {
+	b, err := s.Store.GetExecEnvBinding(conversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return execenv.Binding{}, err
+	}
+	return execenv.Binding{
+		ConversationID: b.ConversationID, BaseID: b.BaseID, Extensions: b.Layers,
+		Isolated: b.Isolated, UpdatedAt: b.UpdatedAt,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (s envStore) PutExecEnvBinding(b execenv.Binding) error {
+	return s.Store.PutExecEnvBinding(store.ExecEnvBinding{
+		ConversationID: b.ConversationID, BaseID: b.BaseID, Layers: b.Extensions,
+		Isolated: b.Isolated, UpdatedAt: b.UpdatedAt,
+	})
+}
+
+func (s envStore) ListExecEnvBindings() ([]execenv.Binding, error) {
+	rows, err := s.Store.ListExecEnvBindings()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]execenv.Binding, 0, len(rows))
+	for _, b := range rows {
+		out = append(out, execenv.Binding{
+			ConversationID: b.ConversationID, BaseID: b.BaseID, Extensions: b.Layers,
+			Isolated: b.Isolated, UpdatedAt: b.UpdatedAt,
+		})
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (s envStore) InsertExecEnvAudit(owner, action, actor, target, outcome, entry string) error {
+	return s.Store.InsertExecEnvAudit(owner, action, actor, target, outcome, entry)
+}
+
+// wireExecEnv 打开环境根，把基础层交给执行器，并接上申请代理。
+// 两者都空时不改变现状（解释器仍固定为 /usr/bin/python3，避免 linuxbrew 路径）。
+func wireExecEnv(st *store.Store, opt *Options) (*execenv.Broker, error) {
+	if opt.ExecEnvRoot == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	root, err := execenv.Open(opt.ExecEnvRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if bin, ok := root.PythonBin(); ok {
+		tools.SetExecPython(bin, root.PythonPrefix())
+	}
+	tools.SetExecShimDir(root.BinDir())
+	if opt.ExecDepsDir == "" {
+		if id, err := root.CurrentBase(); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		} else if id != "" {
+			opt.ExecDepsDir = root.LayerDir(id)
+		}
+	}
+	py, _ := root.PythonBin()
+	if py == "" {
+		py = "/usr/bin/python3"
+	}
+	broker := execenv.NewBroker(root, envStore{st}, execenv.Pip{Python: py})
+	tools.SetEnvBroker(broker)
+	tools.SetExecLayers(broker.LayersFor)
+	tools.SetEnvApproval(func(owner, conv, requestID, detail string) error {
+		card := &core.HITLCard{
+			ID: core.ID("hitl_" + requestID), RunID: "execenv", ConversationID: core.ID(conv),
+			Question: "批准为这个会话安装额外的 Python 包？", Kind: core.HITLKindChoice,
+			Detail: "exec-env:" + requestID + "\n" + detail,
+			Choices: []core.HITLChoice{
+				{ID: "approve", Label: "批准", Description: detail, Impact: "只挂到这个会话，不改变基础层", Recommended: true},
+				{ID: "isolate", Label: "批准并使用隔离层", Description: "与基础层版本冲突时用这份独立闭包", Impact: "这个会话不再叠基础层"},
+				{ID: "reject", Label: "拒绝", Description: "不安装", Impact: "会话保持现状"},
+			},
+		}
+		return st.SaveHITLCard(owner, card)
+	})
+	return broker, nil
+}

internal/app/ext13_shared_search_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-13 红测（提案 2026-10-09-ext-g1-b1-b3 §1）：进程内 Host.KnowledgeSearch
+// 的检索面在适配器放行后吃到他人项目的共享知识；未放行保持本人两路、零泄露。
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// newExt13Host EXT-13 装配：真实 store + rag 管线 + authz 槽 + inprocHost（bob 视角）。
+func newExt13Host(t *testing.T) (interface {
+	KnowledgeSearch(ctx context.Context, projectID core.ID, text string, topK int) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error)
+}, *projectAuthz) {
+	t.Helper()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, set, nil, nil)
+	authz := &projectAuthz{}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: set, authz: authz}, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob"}
+	// alice 已发布的项目知识（带 ProjectID；模拟发布状态机产物）。
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "p-1",
+		Source: "plugin:rdm", Ref: "ext13-1", Chunk: "EXT13共享独占令牌陈述"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return h, authz
+}
+
+func TestInprocHostKnowledgeSearchShared(t *testing.T) {
+	h, authz := newExt13Host(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	q := core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "EXT13共享独占令牌", TopK: 5}
+
+	if hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(ctx, "", q.Text, q.TopK); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("before grant: hits=%d err=%v, want 0（未放行零泄露）", len(hits), err)
+	}
+	// 适配器放行 bob × p-1 → Host 检索面吃到 alice 的共享命中。
+	// （槽为首个注册者生效——切换授权改闭包内变量，不重注册。）
+	allowBob := true
+	authz.set("rdm", func(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return allowBob && owner == "bob" && string(projectID) == "p-1", nil
+	})
+	hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(ctx, "", q.Text, q.TopK)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(hits) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("after grant: host search got 0 shared hits, want ≥1（EXT-13）")
+	}
+	// 指定他人 ProjectID 时同样经适配器（发布边界在下游状态机）。
+	if hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(ctx, "p-1", q.Text, q.TopK); err != nil || len(hits) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("scoped to shared project: hits=%d err=%v, want ≥1", len(hits), err)
+	}
+	// 撤销（同一注册内翻转授权）→ 共享命中即停、零泄露。
+	allowBob = false
+	if hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(ctx, "", q.Text, q.TopK); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("after revoke: hits=%d err=%v, want 0", len(hits), err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/ext18_admin_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-18 AdminProvider 正负例：admin 主体 → true；非 admin / 空 actor（scoped
+// host）→ false；store 查询失败 → false（fail-closed）。
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestExt18AdminProviderPositive(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("boss", "Boss", "pw", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, pluginID: "tst", owner: "boss", actor: "boss"}
+	if !h.IsAdmin() {
+		t.Fatal("admin 主体应返回 true")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExt18AdminProviderNegative(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("user", "User", "pw", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, pluginID: "tst", owner: "user", actor: "user"}
+	if h.IsAdmin() {
+		t.Fatal("非 admin 主体应返回 false")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExt18AdminProviderEmptyActor(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("boss", "Boss", "pw", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, pluginID: "tst", owner: "boss", actor: ""} // scoped host（无 dispatch）
+	if h.IsAdmin() {
+		t.Fatal("空 actor（非 dispatch 上下文）恒 false")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExt18RequestHostProjectIDField(t *testing.T) {
+	// 编译期断言：Request 有 HostProjectID 字段。
+	_ = ""
+	var r struct{ HostProjectID string }
+	r.HostProjectID = "proj-1"
+	if r.HostProjectID != "proj-1" {
+		t.Fatal("字段赋值失败")
+	}
+}

internal/app/ext9_publish_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// newExt9Host EXT-9 测试装配：真实 store + rag 管线 + inprocHost（无 embedder，
+// embed=false 走全文档路径）。
+func newExt9Host(t *testing.T) (interface {
+	KnowledgePublish(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, embed bool) error
+	KnowledgeDelete(ctx context.Context, sourcePrefix string) error
+}, *store.Store, *rag.Pipeline) {
+	t.Helper()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, set, nil, nil)
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: set}, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice"}
+	return h, st, pipe
+}
+
+func searchAll(t *testing.T, pipe *rag.Pipeline, owner, text string) []core.RetrievalHit {
+	t.Helper()
+	hits, err := pipe.Retrieve(context.Background(), core.ID(owner), core.RetrievalQuery{Text: text, TopK: 50})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("retrieve: %v", err)
+	}
+	return hits
+}
+
+// EXT-9 验收：publish 按 ref 幂等（重试不重复）；delete 后检索即停且幂等；
+// manual 来源不经 host 可删（前缀强制 plugin:<自身>）。
+func TestKnowledgePublishIdempotentAndRevoke(t *testing.T) {
+	h, st, pipe := newExt9Host(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	docs := []core.KnowledgeDoc{
+		{Ref: "batch-001", Chunk: "EXT9甲 独占令牌之一陈述"},
+		{Ref: "batch-001", Chunk: "EXT9乙 独占令牌之二陈述"},
+	}
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(ctx, docs, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("publish#1: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(ctx, docs, false); err != nil { // 重试幂等
+		t.Fatalf("publish#2: %v", err)
+	}
+	hits := searchAll(t, pipe, "alice", "独占令牌")
+	if len(hits) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("after double publish: hits=%d, want 2（幂等不重复；got %+v）", len(hits), hits)
+	}
+
+	if err := h.KnowledgeDelete(ctx, "plugin:rdm"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hits = searchAll(t, pipe, "alice", "独占令牌"); len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("after delete: hits=%d, want 0（撤销即停）", len(hits))
+	}
+	if err := h.KnowledgeDelete(ctx, "plugin:rdm"); err != nil { // 幂等
+		t.Fatalf("delete#2: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// manual 来源：host 前缀强制拒绝，且内容不受插件删除影响。
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{Owner: "alice", Source: "manual", Ref: "m-1", Chunk: "manual 手册独占词"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := h.KnowledgeDelete(ctx, "manual"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("delete(manual) must be rejected: plugins may only revoke their own prefix")
+	}
+	if hits = searchAll(t, pipe, "alice", "手册独占词"); len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("manual row must survive: hits=%d", len(hits))
+	}
+}

internal/app/guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+//go:build unix
+
+package app
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/instanceguard"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestSecondProcessRejectedBeforeOpen(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("U8_APP_ROLE") == "hold" {
+		holdService(t)
+		return
+	}
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	ready := filepath.Join(dir, "ready")
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=TestSecondProcessRejectedBeforeOpen")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "U8_APP_ROLE=hold", "U8_APP_DIR="+dir, "U8_APP_READY="+ready)
+	cmd.Dir = t.TempDir()
+	cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout
+	cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if cmd.Process != nil {
+			_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+			_, _ = cmd.Process.Wait()
+		}
+	})
+	waitReady(t, ready)
+	_, _, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir, Addr: ":1"})
+	if !errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrBusy) {
+		t.Fatalf("second open: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := Migrate(Options{DataDir: dir}); !errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrBusy) {
+		t.Fatalf("migrate while held: %v", err)
+	}
+	cli, err := store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run, err := cli.GetRunByID("run_u8_hold")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if run.Status != core.RunWaitingHITL {
+		t.Fatalf("run changed while second process was refused: %s", run.Status)
+	}
+	if _, err := cli.CreateProject("owner", "short"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("account-style write while service holds the guard: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := cli.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cmd.Process.Kill(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, _ = cmd.Process.Wait()
+	st, release, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir, Addr: ":2"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer release()
+	run, err = st.GetRunByID("run_u8_hold")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if run.Status != core.RunWaitingHITL {
+		t.Fatalf("restart reconciled a run the second process never opened: %s", run.Status)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCopiedBinaryStillSharesGuard(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("U8_APP_ROLE") == "copy-hold" {
+		holdService(t)
+		return
+	}
+	bin, err := os.Executable()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	copyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "agent-system-test-copy")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(bin)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(copyPath, raw, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	ready := filepath.Join(dir, "ready")
+	cmd := exec.Command(copyPath, "-test.run=TestCopiedBinaryStillSharesGuard")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "U8_APP_ROLE=copy-hold", "U8_APP_DIR="+dir, "U8_APP_READY="+ready)
+	cmd.Dir = t.TempDir()
+	cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout
+	cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if cmd.Process != nil {
+			_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+			_, _ = cmd.Process.Wait()
+		}
+	})
+	waitReady(t, ready)
+	if _, _, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir}); !errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrBusy) {
+		t.Fatalf("copied binary: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func holdService(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := os.Getenv("U8_APP_DIR")
+	st, _, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run := &core.Run{
+		ID: "run_u8_hold", ConversationID: "c", ProjectID: "p", Owner: "o",
+		Kind: core.RunConversation, Status: core.RunWaitingHITL,
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(os.Getenv("U8_APP_READY"), []byte("ready"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	time.Sleep(30 * time.Second)
+}
+
+func waitReady(t *testing.T, ready string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(20 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(ready); err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatal("child did not become ready")
+}
+
+func TestAdoptDoesNotCreateMissingDatabase(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	_, release, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	release()
+	db := filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db")
+	if err := os.Remove(db); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, _, err = openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir, AdoptInstanceGuard: true})
+	if !errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrDBMissing) {
+		t.Fatalf("adopt missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(db); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("adopt created a database: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIdentityFailureDoesNotStick(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID", "wrong")
+	if _, _, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("missing identity row was accepted")
+	}
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID", "")
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	marker, ok, err := st.LoadInstanceGuard()
+	if err != nil || ok || marker.InstanceID != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("failed start wrote a guard id: ok=%v id=%q err=%v", ok, marker.InstanceID, err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("right", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID", "right")
+	opened, release, err := openServiceStore(Options{DataDir: dir})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	release()
+	_ = opened
+}

internal/app/hostcaps.go

@@ -1,13 +1,21 @@
 package app
 
 import (
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
 
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/ingest"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/runtime"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
 	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
 	core "agent-system-core"
 )
 
@@ -15,14 +23,132 @@ import (
 // 同一实现同时服务 hostapi.Server 的 Search/Complete 闭包与进程内
 // inprocHost（EXT-1 批注 1：复用现有 owner 作用域函数，不新造句柄）。
 type hostcaps struct {
-	st   *store.Store
-	pipe *rag.Pipeline
-	set  *settings.Service
+	projects           *projectLifecycleSlot
+	workObserver       *projectWorkObserverSlot
+	directory          *accountDirectorySlot
+	contexts           *projectContextSlot
+	projectAudit       *projectAuditSlot
+	regulations        *regulationsSlot // EXT-20 法规提供方槽（共享指针；nil/未注册＝不可用）
+	accountGuard       func(string) error
+	allowImplicitLocal bool
+	st                 *store.Store
+	pipe               *rag.Pipeline
+	set                *settings.Service
+	authz              *projectAuthz       // EXT-8 适配器槽（共享指针；首个注册者生效）
+	surfaces           *surfacesvc.Service // EXT-17 Surface 能力槽（nil = 未装配，明确拒绝）
+	now                func() time.Time
+}
+
+// projectAuthz EXT-8 资源授权适配器槽：进程内扩展注册，组合根装配进 Server。
+type projectAuthz struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	holder  string // 持有者 pluginID（首个注册者生效）
+	fn      extension.ResourceAuthorizer
+	holder2 string // EXT-8b 资源级持有者（首个注册者生效）
+	fn2     extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2
+}
+
+func (a *projectAuthz) set(pluginID string, fn extension.ResourceAuthorizer) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	if a.fn != nil {
+		return // 首个注册者生效；后来者忽略（调用方经日志可查）
+	}
+	a.holder, a.fn = pluginID, fn
+}
+
+func (a *projectAuthz) setV2(pluginID string, fn extension.ResourceAuthorizerV2) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	if a.fn2 != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	a.holder2, a.fn2 = pluginID, fn
+}
+
+// AuthorizeResource EXT-8b 资源级判定（U9）：V2 注册时按查询六要素咨询（含
+// owner 自有命中与共享读取，fail-closed）；未注册回落 V1 的 owner×project
+// 布尔（兼容现行行为）。查询字段由执行端受信构造。
+func (a *projectAuthz) AuthorizeResource(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	fn2, fn1 := a.fn2, a.fn
+	a.mu.Unlock()
+	if fn2 != nil {
+		if q.Actor == "" || q.Action == "" || q.ResourceType == "" || q.ResourceID == "" {
+			return false, nil // 受信上下文字段缺失＝不可判定＝拒绝
+		}
+		return fn2(q)
+	}
+	if fn1 == nil || q.Owner == "" || q.ProjectID == "" {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return fn1(q.Actor, q.ProjectID)
+}
+
+// Authorize owner×project 共享读取判定；未注册一律 false（默认拒绝）。
+func (a *projectAuthz) hasV2() bool {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	return a.fn2 != nil
+}
+
+func (a *projectAuthz) Authorize(owner string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	fn := a.fn
+	a.mu.Unlock()
+	if fn == nil || owner == "" || projectID == "" {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return fn(owner, projectID)
+}
+
+// wireScopedHostFactory EXT-11：把「按 owner+pluginID 构造受限 Host」注入公开面
+// （extension.SetScopedHostFactory）。组合根在 hostcaps 就绪后调用；重建句柄与
+// 分发期同构（owner 作用域、来源前缀强制、KV/任务台账隔离）。
+func wireScopedHostFactory(caps hostcaps) {
+	extension.SetScopedHostFactory(func(owner, pluginID string) extension.Host {
+		return inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: pluginID, owner: owner}
+	})
 }
 
 // search owner 作用域混合检索；projectID/topK 为空/0 时用管线默认值。
+// sharedRetriever EXT-13：rag.Pipeline.RetrieveShared 形状（避免 app 直接 import rag
+// 的具体类型断言散落）。
+type sharedRetriever interface {
+	RetrieveShared(ctx context.Context, owner core.ID, q core.RetrievalQuery, allow func(docOwner, projectID core.ID) bool) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error)
+}
+
 func (c hostcaps) search(ctx context.Context, owner string, projectID core.ID, text string, topK int) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
-	return c.pipe.Retrieve(ctx, core.ID(owner), core.RetrievalQuery{ProjectID: projectID, Text: text, TopK: topK})
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	q := core.RetrievalQuery{ProjectID: projectID, Text: text, TopK: topK}
+	if c.projects != nil && projectID != "" {
+		id, err := c.projects.resolve(ctx, c, owner, projectID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		q.ProjectID = id
+	}
+	if c.authz != nil && c.authz.hasV2() {
+		return c.pipe.RetrieveAuthorized(ctx, core.ID(owner), q, func(d core.KnowledgeDoc) bool {
+			ok, err := c.authz.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: owner, Action: "search", ResourceType: "knowledge", ResourceID: d.ID, Owner: d.Owner, ProjectID: d.ProjectID, Source: d.Source})
+			return err == nil && ok
+		})
+	}
+	// EXT-13：进程内 Host 检索面与回合内检索同一授权口径——适配器已注册时走
+	// 共享通道（本人两路如常 + 放行的他人项目知识，与 HTTP 检索面一致）。
+	if c.authz != nil {
+		if rs, ok := interface{}(c.pipe).(sharedRetriever); ok {
+			return rs.RetrieveShared(ctx, core.ID(owner), q, func(docOwner, pid core.ID) bool {
+				ok, err := c.authz.Authorize(owner, pid)
+				return err == nil && ok
+			})
+		}
+	}
+	return c.pipe.Retrieve(ctx, core.ID(owner), q)
 }
 
 // searchDefault 与 hostapi /host/v1 检索端点同口径（不带 projectID/topK）。
@@ -32,51 +158,226 @@ func (c hostcaps) searchDefault(ctx context.Context, owner, text string) ([]core
 
 // complete 经基座 LLM 路由补全（owner 的模型配置生效；未配置报错）。
 func (c hostcaps) complete(ctx context.Context, owner, prompt string) (string, error) {
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
 	route := runtime.ResolveChatModel(core.AgentProfile{}, c.set.Effective(owner, ""))
 	if route.Model == "" || route.Base == "" {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("llm route not configured")
 	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if c.accountGuard != nil {
+		if err := c.accountGuard(owner); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
 	return completeChat(ctx, route.Base, route.Key, route.Model, prompt)
 }
 
+// maxParseInput 与上传端点的读取上限同口径（server.upload 的 100<<20）。
+const maxParseInput = 100 << 20
+
+// parse 走基座内置解析器（EXT-5）：纯计算、不落 owner 数据；不可解析由
+// Warnings 显式表达，只有取消与超限是 error。
+func (c hostcaps) parse(ctx context.Context, filename, mime string, content []byte) (core.ParsedDocument, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return core.ParsedDocument{}, err
+	}
+	if len(content) > maxParseInput {
+		return core.ParsedDocument{}, fmt.Errorf("parse input %d bytes exceeds %d limit", len(content), maxParseInput)
+	}
+	return ingest.Parse(filename, mime, content), nil
+}
+
 // inprocHost 是进程内插件命令的 owner 作用域宿主句柄（extension.Host 实现）。
 // 每次分发按请求 Owner 新建；所有能力调用都以该 owner 为第一参数，插件无法越权。
+// actor 是本次分发主体（通常等于 owner）；AdminProvider 能力经 actor 查询
+// （EXT-18）。非 dispatch 上下文（EXT-11 scoped host）actor 为空——IsAdmin 恒 false。
 type inprocHost struct {
-	caps     hostcaps
-	pluginID string
-	owner    string
+	caps           hostcaps
+	pluginID       string
+	owner          string
+	actor          string  // EXT-18：分发主体（空＝非 dispatch 上下文）
+	conversationID core.ID // dispatch-bound, never taken from completion arguments
+	hostProjectID  core.ID // dispatch project; rechecked against stored conversation
+	entrance       string  // dispatch entrance; model tools are "agent"
+	humanGrant     *cmdbus.HumanGrant
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) requireEffective() error {
+	if h.caps.accountGuard != nil {
+		return h.caps.accountGuard(h.owner)
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) PluginID() string { return h.pluginID }
 func (h inprocHost) Owner() string    { return h.owner }
 
+// IsAdmin 实现 EXT-18 AdminProvider：查询本次分发主体的基座平台管理角色。
+// actor 为空（非 dispatch 上下文）恒 false；store 查询失败按非管理员处理
+// （fail-closed——不因存储故障放行超管面）。
+func (h inprocHost) IsAdmin() bool {
+	if h.actor == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	state, err := h.caps.st.GetUserAuthState(h.actor)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return state.Enabled && state.IsAdmin
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() bool {
+	if h.requireEffective() != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if h.actor == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	state, err := h.caps.st.GetUserAuthState(h.actor)
+	return err == nil && state.Enabled && state.IsAdmin
+}
+
+// ListAccounts 保留 EXT-19 旧签名，仅供有受信分发主体的系统管理上下文；
+// 项目和文档候选必须走带 locator 的 AccountDirectoryProvider。
+func (h inprocHost) ListAccounts(cursor string, limit int) ([]extension.AccountEntry, string, error) {
+	if !h.legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() {
+		return nil, "", store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	users, err := h.caps.st.ListUsersAdmin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	entries := make([]extension.AccountEntry, 0, len(users))
+	for _, u := range users {
+		entries = append(entries, extension.AccountEntry{Owner: u.Owner, Name: u.Name, Valid: u.Enabled})
+	}
+	// 排序+游标（owner 升序；cursor 为上一页末 owner，空＝首页）。
+	for i := 0; i < len(entries); i++ {
+		for j := i + 1; j < len(entries); j++ {
+			if entries[j].Owner < entries[i].Owner {
+				entries[i], entries[j] = entries[j], entries[i]
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	start := 0
+	if cursor != "" {
+		for start < len(entries) && entries[start].Owner <= cursor {
+			start++
+		}
+	}
+	end := start + limit
+	if end > len(entries) {
+		end = len(entries)
+	}
+	next := ""
+	if end < len(entries) {
+		next = entries[end-1].Owner
+	}
+	return entries[start:end], next, nil
+}
+
+// SearchAccounts 实现 EXT-19 扩展 AccountSearcher（P3，2026-10-13）：账号或
+// 姓名子串检索（大小写不敏感；空 query ＝ 首页候选）。结果按 owner 升序，
+// 有效态口径与 ListAccounts 一致。
+func (h inprocHost) SearchAccounts(query string, limit int) ([]extension.AccountEntry, error) {
+	if !h.legacySystemDirectoryAuthorized() {
+		return nil, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	users, err := h.caps.st.ListUsersAdmin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	q := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(query))
+	entries := make([]extension.AccountEntry, 0, len(users))
+	for _, u := range users {
+		if q != "" &&
+			!strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(u.Owner), q) &&
+			!strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(u.Name), q) {
+			continue
+		}
+		entries = append(entries, extension.AccountEntry{Owner: u.Owner, Name: u.Name, Valid: u.Enabled})
+	}
+	sort.Slice(entries, func(i, j int) bool { return entries[i].Owner < entries[j].Owner })
+	if len(entries) > limit {
+		entries = entries[:limit]
+	}
+	return entries, nil
+}
+
 func (h inprocHost) KVPut(key, value string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.PutPluginKV(h.pluginID, h.owner, key, value)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.PutPluginKVAccountChecked(h.owner, h.pluginID, key, value, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) KVGet(key string) (string, bool, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", false, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.GetPluginKV(h.pluginID, h.owner, key)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) Audit(action, target, evidence string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.AppendAuditEvent(store.AuditEvent{
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if strings.HasPrefix(action, "model.context_manifest") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("extension: model context manifest is a reserved host receipt")
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.AppendAuditEventAccountChecked(h.owner, store.AuditEvent{
 		Owner: h.owner, Actor: "plugin:" + h.pluginID,
 		Action: action, Target: target, Evidence: evidence,
-	})
+	}, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) Complete(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (string, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
 	return h.caps.complete(ctx, h.owner, prompt)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeSearch(ctx context.Context, projectID core.ID, text string, topK int) ([]core.RetrievalHit, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.search(ctx, h.owner, projectID, text, topK)
 }
 
+// knowledgeSource preserves ordinary host Source semantics. A lifecycle provider
+// introduces shared publication provenance, so plugins may only assert their own
+// namespace; another plugin cannot impersonate an RDM published row.
+func (h inprocHost) knowledgeSource(source string) error {
+	if h.caps.projects == nil || !h.caps.projects.active() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	prefix := "plugin:" + h.pluginID
+	if source == prefix || strings.HasPrefix(source, prefix+":") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("extension: knowledge source must belong to plugin %q", h.pluginID)
+}
+
 // KnowledgeWrite 强制 owner 归属：Owner 改写为本次分发 owner，Source 为空补
 // "plugin:<id>"；embed=false 只写全文行，embed=true 走 IndexChunks 建向量
-//（embedding 失败降级纯全文，不阻断写入）。
+// （embedding 失败降级纯全文，不阻断写入）。
 func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeWrite(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, embed bool) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if len(docs) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -86,16 +387,61 @@ func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeWrite(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc
 		if docs[i].Source == "" {
 			docs[i].Source = src
 		}
+		if err := h.knowledgeSource(docs[i].Source); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 	}
 	if !embed {
-		return h.caps.st.AddKnowledge(docs...)
+		return h.caps.st.AddKnowledgeAccountChecked(h.owner, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal, docs...)
 	}
-	return h.caps.pipe.IndexChunks(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), docs)
+	return h.caps.pipe.IndexChunksAccountChecked(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), docs, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+// KnowledgePublish replaces refs and their vectors within the publication scope.
+// A registered lifecycle scopes replacement to the exact owner/project/plugin;
+// ordinary unregistered Hosts retain the legacy cross-source ref semantics.
+func (h inprocHost) KnowledgePublish(ctx context.Context, docs []core.KnowledgeDoc, embed bool) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if len(docs) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	for i := range docs {
+		docs[i].Owner = core.ID(h.owner)
+		if docs[i].Source == "" {
+			docs[i].Source = "plugin:" + h.pluginID
+		}
+		if err := h.knowledgeSource(docs[i].Source); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	scoped := h.caps.projects != nil && h.caps.projects.active()
+	if embed {
+		return h.caps.pipe.PublishChunksAccountChecked(ctx, core.ID(h.owner), h.pluginID, scoped, docs, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.ReplaceKnowledgeAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID, scoped, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal, docs...)
+}
+
+// KnowledgeDelete 撤销本插件来源（EXT-9）：前缀强制 plugin:<自身ID>——manual
+// 或他人来源拒绝（fail-closed）；删行+向量，幂等。
+func (h inprocHost) KnowledgeDelete(ctx context.Context, sourcePrefix string) error {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if sourcePrefix != "plugin:"+h.pluginID {
+		return fmt.Errorf("ext-9: plugins may only delete their own source prefix, want %q", "plugin:"+h.pluginID)
+	}
+	_, err := h.caps.st.DeleteKnowledgeBySourceAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, sourcePrefix, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+	return err
 }
 
 // TaskCreate/TaskUpdate 后台任务台账：基座只记进度/状态，执行体由下游自跑（H5）。
 func (h inprocHost) TaskCreate(kind, title, conversationID string) (string, error) {
-	t, err := h.caps.st.CreateBackgroundTask(h.owner, kind, title, conversationID)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	t, err := h.caps.st.CreateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(h.owner, kind, title, conversationID, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
@@ -103,14 +449,81 @@ func (h inprocHost) TaskCreate(kind, title, conversationID string) (string, erro
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) TaskUpdate(taskID, status string, progress int, errText string) error {
-	return h.caps.st.UpdateBackgroundTask(h.owner, taskID, status, progress, errText)
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.UpdateBackgroundTaskAccountChecked(h.owner, taskID, status, progress, errText, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
 }
 
 // ArtifactGet/ArtifactContent 工件只读（R1-3 ingest 读原件；写入属完整集）。
 func (h inprocHost) ArtifactGet(artifactID string) (core.Artifact, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Artifact{}, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.GetArtifact(h.owner, artifactID)
 }
 
 func (h inprocHost) ArtifactContent(artifactID string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return h.caps.st.ArtifactContent(h.owner, artifactID)
 }
+
+// ParseDocument 内置文档解析（EXT-5）：委托 hostcaps.parse；纯计算不经存储，
+// owner 作用域由调用方经 ArtifactContent 取字节时保证。
+func (h inprocHost) ParseDocument(ctx context.Context, filename, mime string, content []byte) (core.ParsedDocument, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.ParsedDocument{}, err
+	}
+	return h.caps.parse(ctx, filename, mime, content)
+}
+
+// ---- EXT-17 Surface 能力（可选）：nil 槽=能力缺失，明确拒绝不降级 ----
+
+func (h inprocHost) surface() (*surfacesvc.Service, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.surfaces == nil {
+		return nil, surfacesvc.ErrUnavailable
+	}
+	return h.caps.surfaces, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SurfaceSave(ctx context.Context, req extension.SurfaceSaveRequest) (core.SurfaceSnapshot, error) {
+	svc, err := h.surface()
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.SurfaceSnapshot{}, err
+	}
+	return svc.SubmitAccountChecked(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID, surfacesvc.SubmitRequest{
+		SurfaceID: req.SurfaceID, ConversationID: req.ConversationID, SourceRunID: req.SourceRunID,
+		BaseRevision: req.BaseRevision, ObservedEpoch: req.ObservedEpoch,
+		ContextVersion: req.ContextVersion, SemanticText: req.SemanticText, Spec: req.Spec,
+	}, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SurfaceGet(ctx context.Context, surfaceID core.ID) (core.SurfaceSnapshot, error) {
+	svc, err := h.surface()
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.SurfaceSnapshot{}, err
+	}
+	return svc.Get(ctx, h.owner, surfaceID)
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SurfaceList(ctx context.Context, conversationID core.ID) ([]core.SurfaceMeta, error) {
+	svc, err := h.surface()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return svc.List(ctx, h.owner, conversationID)
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SurfaceActivation(ctx context.Context) (bool, int64, error) {
+	svc, err := h.surface()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, 0, err
+	}
+	row, err := svc.Activation(ctx, h.owner, h.pluginID)
+	return row.Enabled, row.Epoch, err
+}

internal/app/human_decision.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func (h inprocHost) clock() time.Time {
+	if h.caps.now != nil {
+		return h.caps.now()
+	}
+	return time.Now()
+}
+
+func humanCommand(audience string) (string, error) {
+	if audience == extension.HumanDecisionAudienceStructure {
+		return "rdm.structure.decide", nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision audience is not issued for this host")
+}
+
+func humanEntranceAllowed(entrance string) bool {
+	switch entrance {
+	case "button", "card", "api":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// IssueHumanDecision opens a pending card for the authenticated person.
+// Model-tool, chat, and slash entrances cannot open one.
+func (h inprocHost) IssueHumanDecision(binding extension.HumanDecisionBinding, question string) (extension.HumanDecisionCard, error) {
+	if h.caps.st == nil || h.actor == "" || h.actor != binding.Actor || !humanEntranceAllowed(h.entrance) {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionCard{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision cannot be issued on this dispatch")
+	}
+	commandID, err := humanCommand(binding.Audience)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionCard{}, err
+	}
+	if binding.ProjectID == "" || binding.ProposalID == "" || binding.ProposalRevision < 1 || binding.PayloadHash == "" {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionCard{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision binding is incomplete")
+	}
+	rec, err := h.caps.st.IssueHumanDecision(store.HumanDecision{
+		PluginID: h.pluginID, Audience: binding.Audience, CommandID: commandID,
+		HumanActor: binding.Actor, Owner: h.owner, ProjectID: binding.ProjectID,
+		ProposalID: binding.ProposalID, ProposalRevision: binding.ProposalRevision,
+		PayloadHash: binding.PayloadHash, Question: question, ConversationID: string(h.conversationID),
+	}, h.clock())
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionCard{}, err
+	}
+	return extension.HumanDecisionCard{CardID: rec.ID, Question: rec.Question, ExpiresAt: rec.ExpiresAt}, nil
+}
+
+// VerifyHumanDecision reports the persisted human response for this dispatch.
+// A model tool, a forged entrance, a mismatched binding, an expired card, or
+// a revoked card fails closed. The record stays answered; it is not consumed.
+func (h inprocHost) VerifyHumanDecision(expected extension.HumanDecisionBinding) (extension.HumanDecisionProof, error) {
+	if h.caps.st == nil || h.humanGrant == nil || h.entrance == "agent" || h.actor == "" || h.actor != h.humanGrant.Actor {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionProof{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: this dispatch has no authenticated human decision")
+	}
+	rec, err := h.caps.st.HumanDecision(h.humanGrant.CardID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionProof{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision card is not pending for this dispatch")
+	}
+	now := h.clock()
+	if rec.Status != "responded" || rec.PluginID != h.pluginID || rec.ProofID == "" || rec.ProofID != h.humanGrant.ProofID ||
+		rec.HumanActor != expected.Actor || rec.HumanActor != h.actor || rec.Decision != expected.Decision ||
+		rec.Audience != expected.Audience || rec.ProjectID != expected.ProjectID || rec.ProposalID != expected.ProposalID ||
+		rec.ProposalRevision != expected.ProposalRevision || rec.PayloadHash != expected.PayloadHash ||
+		!now.Before(rec.ExpiresAt) {
+		return extension.HumanDecisionProof{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision does not match this dispatch")
+	}
+	return extension.HumanDecisionProof{
+		ProofID: rec.ProofID, Issuer: "agent-system-backend", HumanActor: rec.HumanActor,
+		Audience: rec.Audience, ProjectID: rec.ProjectID, ProposalID: rec.ProposalID,
+		Revision: rec.ProposalRevision, PayloadHash: rec.PayloadHash, Decision: rec.Decision,
+		IssuedAt: rec.IssuedAt, ExpiresAt: rec.ExpiresAt, ConversationID: rec.ConversationID,
+		HITLResponseRef: rec.ID,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// RevokeHumanDecision invalidates a still-pending card. Answered proofs stay
+// available until they expire; consumption is not a host concern.
+func (h inprocHost) RevokeHumanDecision(cardID string) error {
+	if h.caps.st == nil || h.actor == "" || !humanEntranceAllowed(h.entrance) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("extension: human decision cannot be revoked on this dispatch")
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.RevokeHumanDecision(h.pluginID, h.actor, cardID)
+}
+
+// HumanGrantFromRecord copies the persisted response onto a dispatch.
+// Callers must set it only after an authenticated response or session retry.
+func HumanGrantFromRecord(rec store.HumanDecision) *cmdbus.HumanGrant {
+	if rec.ProofID == "" || rec.Status != "responded" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &cmdbus.HumanGrant{CardID: rec.ID, ProofID: rec.ProofID, Actor: rec.HumanActor, Decision: rec.Decision}
+}

internal/app/human_decision_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func openDecisionStore(t *testing.T) *store.Store {
+	t.Helper()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/decision.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	return st
+}
+
+func decisionHost(st *store.Store, plugin, actor, entrance string, now time.Time, grant *cmdbus.HumanGrant) inprocHost {
+	return inprocHost{
+		caps:     hostcaps{st: st, now: func() time.Time { return now }},
+		pluginID: plugin, owner: actor, actor: actor, entrance: entrance, humanGrant: grant,
+	}
+}
+
+func binding(decision, hash string, revision int) extension.HumanDecisionBinding {
+	return extension.HumanDecisionBinding{
+		Audience: extension.HumanDecisionAudienceStructure, Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1",
+		ProposalID: "prop-1", ProposalRevision: revision, PayloadHash: hash, Decision: decision,
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHumanDecisionAuthenticatedResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openDecisionStore(t)
+	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 15, 1, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	host := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "button", now, nil)
+	card, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-1", 1), "确认结构变更")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	answered, err := st.RespondHumanDecision("alice", card.CardID, "accept", now)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	host.humanGrant = &cmdbus.HumanGrant{CardID: answered.ID, ProofID: answered.ProofID, Actor: "alice", Decision: "accept"}
+	host.entrance = "card"
+	proof, err := host.VerifyHumanDecision(binding("accept", "hash-1", 1))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if proof.ProofID == "" || proof.Issuer != "agent-system-backend" || proof.HumanActor != "alice" ||
+		proof.HITLResponseRef != card.CardID || proof.PayloadHash != "hash-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("proof = %+v", proof)
+	}
+	again, err := host.VerifyHumanDecision(binding("accept", "hash-1", 1))
+	if err != nil || again.ProofID != proof.ProofID {
+		t.Fatalf("second verify consumed or changed the proof: %v %+v", err, again)
+	}
+	stored, err := st.HumanDecision(card.CardID)
+	if err != nil || stored.Status != "responded" {
+		t.Fatalf("host consumed the proof, status=%s err=%v", stored.Status, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHumanDecisionRejectsUntrustedDispatch(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openDecisionStore(t)
+	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 15, 1, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	host := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "button", now, nil)
+	card, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-1", 1), "确认")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	answered, err := st.RespondHumanDecision("alice", card.CardID, "accept", now)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	grant := &cmdbus.HumanGrant{CardID: answered.ID, ProofID: answered.ProofID, Actor: "alice", Decision: "accept"}
+	expect := binding("accept", "hash-1", 1)
+
+	agent := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "agent", now, grant)
+	if _, err := agent.VerifyHumanDecision(expect); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("model tool dispatch verified a human decision")
+	}
+	forged := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "card", now, nil)
+	if _, err := forged.VerifyHumanDecision(expect); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("forged entrance verified without a host grant")
+	}
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "agent", now, nil).IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-2", 1), "x"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("model tool issued a human decision card")
+	}
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "other", "alice", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(expect); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("another plugin reused the proof")
+	}
+	other := expect
+	other.ProposalID = "prop-2"
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(other); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("proof authorized a second proposal")
+	}
+	wrongActor := expect
+	wrongActor.Actor = "bob"
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "bob", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(wrongActor); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong actor verified")
+	}
+	wrongProject := expect
+	wrongProject.ProjectID = "p2"
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(wrongProject); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong project verified")
+	}
+	wrongRev := expect
+	wrongRev.ProposalRevision = 2
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(wrongRev); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong revision verified")
+	}
+	wrongHash := expect
+	wrongHash.PayloadHash = "hash-changed"
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "card", now, grant).VerifyHumanDecision(wrongHash); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong payload hash verified")
+	}
+	if _, err := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "button", now, nil).IssueHumanDecision(
+		extension.HumanDecisionBinding{Audience: "other.plugin", Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1", ProposalID: "prop-1", ProposalRevision: 1, PayloadHash: "h"},
+		"x"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("foreign audience was issued")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHumanDecisionCardChangeExpiryAndRevoke(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openDecisionStore(t)
+	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 15, 1, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	host := decisionHost(st, "rdm", "alice", "api", now, nil)
+	first, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-1", 1), "旧卡")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-2", 2), "新卡"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.RespondHumanDecision("alice", first.CardID, "accept", now); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("changed card still accepted the old confirmation")
+	}
+	current, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-3", 3), "待撤销")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := host.RevokeHumanDecision(current.CardID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.RespondHumanDecision("alice", current.CardID, "accept", now); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("revoked card was answered")
+	}
+	live, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-4", 4), "会过期")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.RespondHumanDecision("alice", live.CardID, "accept", now.Add(16*time.Minute)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expired card was answered")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingHumanDecisionStoreFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	host := decisionHost(nil, "rdm", "alice", "button", time.Now(), nil)
+	if _, err := host.IssueHumanDecision(binding("", "hash-1", 1), "x"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("missing store issued a card")
+	}
+	if _, err := host.VerifyHumanDecision(binding("accept", "hash-1", 1)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("missing store verified a decision")
+	}
+}

internal/app/inproc_host_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package app
 
 import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -76,6 +78,9 @@ func TestInprocHostOwnerScope(t *testing.T) {
 	bus, st := newInprocTestApp(t, nil) // embedder nil：embed=true 仍只落全文（IndexChunks 降级路径）
 
 	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
 		resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
 			ID: "tst.record", Params: map[string]any{"ref": owner + "-ref"}, Owner: owner, Actor: "ui", Entrance: "chat",
 		})
@@ -155,6 +160,9 @@ func TestInprocHostKnowledgeWriteEmbedHash(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	})
 	bus, st := newInprocTestApp(t, func() string { return "hash" })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 
 	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
 		ID: "tst.embed", Params: map[string]any{"text": "Hash 向量内容"}, Owner: "alice", Entrance: "api",
@@ -193,3 +201,112 @@ func TestInprocHostKnowledgeWriteEmbedHash(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("vector owner leak: %+v", bhits)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestInprocHostParseDocumentOwnerScope：EXT-5 解析方法的 owner 作用域——
+// alice 经句柄读自己的工件并解析；bob 用同一工件 ID 在 ArtifactContent 处
+// 即被拒（解析是纯计算，作用域边界在取原件一环）。
+func TestInprocHostParseDocumentOwnerScope(t *testing.T) {
+	extension.ResetCompiled()
+	t.Cleanup(extension.ResetCompiled)
+	extension.RegisterCompiled(extension.InProc{
+		ID: "tst",
+		Register: func(reg extension.Registry) error {
+			return reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"tst.parse","title":"解析"}`),
+				func(ctx context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+					id, _ := req.Params["artifactId"].(string)
+					content, err := h.ArtifactContent(id)
+					if err != nil {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					doc, err := h.ParseDocument(ctx, "报价.xlsx", "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet", content)
+					if err != nil {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					return map[string]any{
+						"parser":   doc.Meta.Parser,
+						"warnings": len(doc.Warnings),
+						"blocks":   len(doc.Blocks),
+					}, nil
+				})
+		},
+	})
+	bus, st := newInprocTestApp(t, nil)
+
+	art := core.Artifact{ProjectID: "p1", Owner: "alice", Name: "报价.xlsx", Kind: "document"}
+	if err := st.CreateArtifact(&art, testXLSXBytes(t)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	artID := art.ID
+
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
+		ID: "tst.parse", Params: map[string]any{"artifactId": artID}, Owner: "alice", Entrance: "chat",
+	})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("alice dispatch: %+v %s", resp.Receipt, resp.Receipt.Reason)
+	}
+	m, _ := resp.Payload.(map[string]any)
+	if m["parser"] != "builtin:xlsx" || m["warnings"] != 0 || m["blocks"] == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("alice payload: %+v", m)
+	}
+
+	// bob 同一工件 ID：取原件即被拒（跨 owner 不可见）。
+	resp = bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{
+		ID: "tst.parse", Params: map[string]any{"artifactId": artID}, Owner: "bob", Entrance: "chat",
+	})
+	if resp.Receipt.State == agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("bob must not read alice's artifact: %+v", resp.Payload)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInprocHostParseDocumentLimits：仅有的两条 error 路径——ctx 取消与输入
+// 超过 100MiB 上限；不可解析格式仍是带 Warnings 的显式失败。
+func TestInprocHostParseDocumentLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "t.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, pluginID: "tst", owner: "alice"}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	if _, err := h.ParseDocument(ctx, "a.xlsx", "", []byte("x")); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("canceled ctx must error")
+	}
+	if _, err := h.ParseDocument(context.Background(), "a.xlsx", "", make([]byte, maxParseInput+1)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("oversized input must error")
+	}
+	doc, err := h.ParseDocument(context.Background(), "旧.xls", "", []byte{0xD0, 0xCF})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy format is a visible failure, not an error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if doc.Meta.Parser != "builtin:legacy-office" || len(doc.Warnings) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy doc: %+v %v", doc.Meta, doc.Warnings)
+	}
+}
+
+// testXLSXBytes 构造最小可用 xlsx（单表两行），供句柄测试解析。
+func testXLSXBytes(t *testing.T) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	zw := zip.NewWriter(&buf)
+	files := map[string]string{
+		"xl/workbook.xml":            `<workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"><sheets><sheet name="报价" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets></workbook>`,
+		"xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels": `<Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet" Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/></Relationships>`,
+		"xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml": `<worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"><sheetData>
+<row r="1"><c r="A1" t="inlineStr"><is><t>物料</t></is></c><c r="B1" t="inlineStr"><is><t>单价</t></is></c></row>
+<row r="2"><c r="A2" t="inlineStr"><is><t>支架</t></is></c><c r="B2"><v>12.5</v></c></row>
+</sheetData></worksheet>`,
+	}
+	for _, name := range []string{"xl/workbook.xml", "xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels", "xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml"} {
+		w, err := zw.Create(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		w.Write([]byte(files[name]))
+	}
+	if err := zw.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}

internal/app/intent_flags_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// 慢通道开关默认关（行为与 I1 一致的机器证明）：
+// 两条 runtime.intentSemantic / runtime.intentGenerator 必须注册且默认 false。
+func TestIntentSlowLaneFlagsDefaultOff(t *testing.T) {
+	seen := map[string]core.SettingDesc{}
+	for _, d := range settings.Schema() {
+		seen[d.Key] = d
+	}
+	for _, key := range []string{"runtime.intentSemantic", "runtime.intentGenerator"} {
+		d, ok := seen[key]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("设置未注册：%s", key)
+		}
+		if d.Type != core.SettingBool {
+			t.Fatalf("%s 类型应为 bool，得到 %v", key, d.Type)
+		}
+		if def, isBool := d.Default.(bool); !isBool || def {
+			t.Fatalf("%s 必须默认 false，得到 %v", key, d.Default)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// 遥测开关默认安全（N3 WP4）：otlpEndpoint 默认空（不导出，保持现状），
+// serviceName 有非空默认。两处都注册进 Schema。
+func TestTelemetryFlagsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	seen := map[string]core.SettingDesc{}
+	for _, d := range settings.Schema() {
+		seen[d.Key] = d
+	}
+	if d, ok := seen["telemetry.otlpEndpoint"]; !ok || d.Default != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("otlpEndpoint 必须注册且默认空：%+v", d)
+	}
+	if d, ok := seen["telemetry.serviceName"]; !ok || d.Default != "agent-system-backend" {
+		t.Fatalf("serviceName 必须注册且默认 agent-system-backend：%+v", d)
+	}
+}

internal/app/knowledge_authorization_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestHostKnowledgeV2AndProjectReplacement(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, settings.NewService(st), nil, nil)
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	alice := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, authz: auth}}
+	first := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "slice-1", ProjectID: "domain-1", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "sharedneedle one"}}
+	second := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "slice-2", ProjectID: "domain-2", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "sharedneedle two"}}
+	for _, ds := range [][]core.KnowledgeDoc{first, second, second} {
+		if err := alice.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), ds, false); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	own, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "sharedneedle"})
+	if err != nil || len(own) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("cross project publish replaced first: %+v %v", own, err)
+	}
+	auth.set("rdm", func(string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.ResourceType == "project" || (q.ResourceType == "knowledge" && q.ResourceID == "slice-1" && q.ProjectID == "domain-1" && q.Actor == "bob" && q.Owner == "alice"), nil
+	})
+	bob := inprocHost{owner: "bob", pluginID: "rdm", caps: alice.caps}
+	hits, err := bob.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "", "sharedneedle", 5)
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("host V2=%+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHostKnowledgeResolvesTrustedProjectScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-current", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-current", Chunk: "scopeneedle current"}, core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "slice-other", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain-other", Chunk: "scopeneedle other"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.List = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		if h.Owner() != "bob" {
+			t.Fatalf("wrong scope actor %q", h.Owner())
+		}
+		return []core.Project{{ID: "host-current", Settings: map[string]any{"rdm.projectId": "domain-current", "rdm.state": "ready"}}}, nil
+	}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: rag.NewPipeline(st, settings.NewService(st), nil, nil), authz: &projectAuthz{}, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	caps.authz.setV2("rdm", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "bob", pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	hits, err := h.KnowledgeSearch(context.Background(), "host-current", "scopeneedle", 5)
+	if err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != "slice-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("host scope: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegisteredProjectHostRejectsForeignKnowledgeSource(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: caps}
+	for _, publish := range []bool{false, true} {
+		docs := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "claimed-published", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:rdm:published", Ref: "ref", Chunk: "spoofneedle"}}
+		var err error
+		if publish {
+			err = h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), docs, false)
+		} else {
+			err = h.KnowledgeWrite(context.Background(), docs, false)
+		}
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("foreign namespace accepted publish=%v", publish)
+		}
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "spoofneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign source wrote data: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	// Existing ordinary Hosts preserve their documented caller-provided Source.
+	h.caps.projects = nil
+	if err := h.KnowledgeWrite(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{Source: "manual", Chunk: "ordinaryneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ordinary source semantics changed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectPublishPreservesForeignPluginAndScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	original := core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "rdm-published", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:rdm:published", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "originalneedle"}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(original); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.UpsertKnowledgeVector(context.Background(), "alice", original.ID, original.Ref, []float32{1, 0}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: caps}
+	replacement := []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "other", ProjectID: "domain", Source: "plugin:other", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "replacementneedle"}}
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), replacement, false); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "originalneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign plugin deleted RDM publication: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledgeVectors(context.Background(), "alice", []float32{1, 0}, 5, core.RetrievalQuery{ProjectID: "domain"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 || hits[0].Doc.ID != original.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign plugin deleted RDM vector: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	h.pluginID = "rdm"
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "unscoped", Source: "plugin:rdm", Ref: "notes.md", Chunk: "privateneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "originalneedle", ProjectID: "domain"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unscoped publication deleted scoped RDM data: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnregisteredPublishRetainsLegacyRefScope(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "legacy", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: "old-project", Source: "manual", Ref: "same", Chunk: "legacyneedle"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{owner: "alice", pluginID: "other", caps: hostcaps{st: st}}
+	if err := h.KnowledgePublish(context.Background(), []core.KnowledgeDoc{{ID: "replacement", Source: "manual", Ref: "same", Chunk: "replacementneedle"}}, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "legacyneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered legacy scope changed: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+	if hits, err := st.SearchKnowledge("alice", core.RetrievalQuery{Text: "replacementneedle"}); err != nil || len(hits) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unregistered replacement missing: %+v %v", hits, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/local_account_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestLocalOwnerAccountCreationAndReissuePreserveIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	seed, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := seed.EnsureSystemIdentity("test-local-owner", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	seed.Close()
+	bootstrap, err := BootstrapAdmin("", dir, "root", false)
+	if err != nil || bootstrap == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %v", err)
+	}
+	first, _, err := CreateUserAccount("", dir, "alice", "", "", false, true, false)
+	if err != nil || first == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("local pending create: %v", err)
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	second, owner, err := InitializeAccount("", dir, account.ID, account.StateVersion, account.InitializationGeneration)
+	if err != nil || owner != "alice" || second == first {
+		t.Fatalf("owner reissue: owner=%s err=%v", owner, err)
+	}
+	st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	current, err := st.GetAccount(account.ID)
+	if err != nil || current.Owner != account.Owner || current.ID != account.ID || current.InitializationGeneration != account.InitializationGeneration+1 {
+		t.Fatalf("reissue changed account identity: %+v %v", current, err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(first); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("old activation grant survived reissue")
+	}
+	if _, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(second); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new activation grant failed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPIKeyCLIRequiresExistingInitializedAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("test-api-key-admission", "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.Close()
+	if _, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("missing account was implicitly created: %v", err)
+	}
+	grant, err := BootstrapAdmin("", dir, "alice", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("pending account received a full API key: %v", err)
+	}
+	st, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(filepath.Join(dir, "agent-system.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	token, _, err := st.RedeemLoginKey(grant)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hash, err := store.HashPassword("trusted-owner-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.CompleteSetPasswordChecked(token, hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if key, err := CreateAPIKey("", dir, "alice", "integration"); err != nil || key == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("initialized account could not receive its API key: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_audit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// projectAuditSlot binds the audit.read policy to its registering domain plugin.
+// A different plugin cannot borrow that policy through its own Host handle.
+type projectAuditSlot struct {
+	mu             sync.RWMutex
+	holder         string
+	check          extension.ProjectAuditAuthorizer
+	verifier       extension.ProjectAuditLinkVerifier
+	disclose       extension.ProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer
+	publisherToken *auditPublisherToken
+}
+
+// This identity is available only to the publisher factory returned at
+// registration. A caller-provided pluginID cannot manufacture the pointer.
+type auditPublisherToken struct{ marker byte }
+
+type projectAuditPublisherFactory struct {
+	caps     hostcaps
+	pluginID string
+	token    *auditPublisherToken
+}
+
+func (f projectAuditPublisherFactory) ForOwner(owner string) (extension.ProjectAuditPublisher, error) {
+	if owner == "" || f.token == nil {
+		return nil, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	return projectAuditPublisher{caps: f.caps, owner: owner, pluginID: f.pluginID, token: f.token}, nil
+}
+
+type projectAuditPublisher struct {
+	caps     hostcaps
+	owner    string
+	pluginID string
+	token    *auditPublisherToken
+}
+
+func (p projectAuditPublisher) PublishProjectAuditLink(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectAuditLinkRequest) (extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt, error) {
+	h := inprocHost{caps: p.caps, owner: p.owner, pluginID: p.pluginID}
+	return h.publishProjectAuditLink(ctx, req, p.token)
+}
+
+func (s *projectAuditSlot) register(pluginID string, check extension.ProjectAuditAuthorizer) error {
+	if pluginID == "" || check == nil {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.check != nil || (s.holder != "" && s.holder != pluginID) {
+		return errors.New("extension: project audit authorizer already registered")
+	}
+	s.holder, s.check = pluginID, check
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *projectAuditSlot) registerVerifier(pluginID string, verify extension.ProjectAuditLinkVerifier) (*auditPublisherToken, error) {
+	if pluginID == "" || verify == nil {
+		return nil, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.verifier != nil || (s.holder != "" && s.holder != pluginID) {
+		return nil, errors.New("extension: project audit verifier already registered")
+	}
+	s.holder, s.verifier = pluginID, verify
+	s.publisherToken = &auditPublisherToken{marker: 1}
+	return s.publisherToken, nil
+}
+
+func (s *projectAuditSlot) registerDisclosure(pluginID string, disclose extension.ProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer) error {
+	if pluginID == "" || disclose == nil {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.disclose != nil || (s.holder != "" && s.holder != pluginID) {
+		return errors.New("extension: project audit disclosure authorizer already registered")
+	}
+	s.holder, s.disclose = pluginID, disclose
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(extension.ProjectAuditAuthorizer) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project audit authorizers")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(check extension.ProjectAuditAuthorizer) error {
+	if r.caps.projectAudit == nil {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	return r.caps.projectAudit.register(r.pluginID, check)
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(check extension.ProjectAuditAuthorizer) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectAuditRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(check)
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(extension.ProjectAuditLinkVerifier) (extension.ProjectAuditPublisherFactory, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project audit link verifiers")
+}
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(extension.ProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project audit disclosure authorizers")
+}
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(verify extension.ProjectAuditLinkVerifier) (extension.ProjectAuditPublisherFactory, error) {
+	if r.caps.projectAudit == nil {
+		return nil, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	token, err := r.caps.projectAudit.registerVerifier(r.pluginID, verify)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return projectAuditPublisherFactory{caps: r.caps, pluginID: r.pluginID, token: token}, nil
+}
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(disclose extension.ProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer) error {
+	if r.caps.projectAudit == nil {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	return r.caps.projectAudit.registerDisclosure(r.pluginID, disclose)
+}
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(verify extension.ProjectAuditLinkVerifier) (extension.ProjectAuditPublisherFactory, error) {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectAuditLinkRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(verify)
+}
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(disclose extension.ProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectAuditLinkRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(disclose)
+}
+
+var _ extension.ProjectAuditHost = inprocHost{}
+var _ extension.ProjectAuditPublisher = projectAuditPublisher{}
+var _ extension.ProjectAuditPublisherFactory = projectAuditPublisherFactory{}
+
+func (h inprocHost) publishProjectAuditLink(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectAuditLinkRequest, capability *auditPublisherToken) (extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.projectAudit == nil || h.caps.st == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	slot := h.caps.projectAudit
+	slot.mu.RLock()
+	holder, verify, registeredToken := slot.holder, slot.verifier, slot.publisherToken
+	slot.mu.RUnlock()
+	if holder != h.pluginID || verify == nil || registeredToken == nil || capability != registeredToken {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	if h.owner == "" || (h.actor != "" && h.actor != h.owner) || req.HostAuditOffset < 0 || req.ProjectID == "" || req.SourceKind != "domain-commit" || req.SourceID == "" || req.OperationID == "" || req.ResourceKind == "" || req.ResourceID == "" || req.DisclosureClass != "metadata" || req.IdempotencyKey == "" {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	// An explicit offset is only a locator. A historical collision or a forged
+	// offset must not turn a private command with the same operation ID into a
+	// published project receipt.
+	resolved, err := h.caps.st.CommittedAuditOffset(h.owner, string(req.ProjectID), req.OperationID)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		if req.HostAuditOffset == 0 {
+			return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditPending
+		}
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	if req.HostAuditOffset != 0 && req.HostAuditOffset != resolved {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict
+	}
+	req.HostAuditOffset = resolved
+	row, projectID, err := h.caps.st.CommandAuditForLink(h.owner, req.HostAuditOffset)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	if projectID != string(req.ProjectID) || row.Envelope.Actor != h.owner || row.Envelope.OperationID != req.OperationID || string(row.Envelope.State) != "committed" || row.Envelope.RunID != req.RunID {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if req.RunID != "" {
+		bound, err := h.caps.st.RunBoundToAudit(h.owner, projectID, row.Envelope.ConversationID, req.RunID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+		}
+		if !bound {
+			return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+		}
+	}
+	previous, lookupErr := h.caps.st.ProjectAuditLinkByKey(h.owner, req.IdempotencyKey)
+	if lookupErr == nil {
+		if previous.HostAuditOffset != req.HostAuditOffset || previous.ProjectID != string(req.ProjectID) || previous.SourceKind != req.SourceKind || previous.SourceID != req.SourceID || previous.OperationID != req.OperationID || previous.ResourceKind != req.ResourceKind || previous.ResourceID != req.ResourceID || previous.RunID != req.RunID || previous.DisclosureClass != req.DisclosureClass {
+			return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict
+		}
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{LinkID: previous.ID, HostAuditOffset: previous.HostAuditOffset}, nil
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(lookupErr, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, lookupErr
+	}
+	proof := extension.ProjectAuditLinkProof{ProjectAuditLinkRequest: req, Owner: h.owner}
+	ok, err := verify(ctx, proof)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	link := store.ProjectAuditLink{HostAuditOffset: req.HostAuditOffset, ProjectID: projectID, Owner: h.owner,
+		SourceKind: req.SourceKind, SourceID: req.SourceID, OperationID: req.OperationID, ResourceKind: req.ResourceKind,
+		ResourceID: req.ResourceID, RunID: req.RunID, DisclosureClass: req.DisclosureClass, IdempotencyKey: req.IdempotencyKey}
+	saved, err := h.caps.st.SaveProjectAuditLink(link)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{}, err
+	}
+	return extension.ProjectAuditLinkReceipt{LinkID: saved.ID, HostAuditOffset: saved.HostAuditOffset}, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) QueryProjectAudit(ctx context.Context, q extension.ProjectAuditQuery) (extension.ProjectAuditPage, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	if h.actor == "" || h.actor != h.owner || q.ProjectID == "" {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if h.caps.projectAudit == nil || h.caps.st == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	slot := h.caps.projectAudit
+	slot.mu.RLock()
+	holder, check := slot.holder, slot.check
+	slot.mu.RUnlock()
+	if holder != h.pluginID || check == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	ok, err := check(h.actor, core.ID(q.ProjectID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	if q.LinkedSourceKind != "" || q.LinkedSourceID != "" || q.LinkedHostOffset != 0 {
+		return h.queryLinkedProjectAudit(ctx, q, slot)
+	}
+	rows, cutoff, next, err := h.caps.st.ListProjectCommandAudits(h.owner, string(q.ProjectID), q.BeforeOffset, q.CutoffOffset, q.Limit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	page := extension.ProjectAuditPage{
+		Receipts:   make([]extension.HostAuditReceipt, 0, len(rows)),
+		NextOffset: next, CutoffOffset: cutoff,
+		Coverage: extension.ProjectAuditCoverage{
+			CommandAudit: "actor-owned-project-bound-only", CutoffConsistency: "committed-prefix", CrossMember: "unsupported", LegacyProjectBinding: "not-recorded", RunRelations: "unsupported", ModelReceipts: "unsupported",
+			BackgroundReceipts: "unsupported", ResourceBodies: "unsupported",
+		},
+	}
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		nameStatus := "not-recorded"
+		if row.ActorName != "" {
+			nameStatus = "recorded"
+		}
+		page.Receipts = append(page.Receipts, extension.HostAuditReceipt{
+			SourceOffset: row.Offset, Time: row.Envelope.Time, ActorID: row.Envelope.Actor,
+			ActorName: row.ActorName, ActorNameStatus: nameStatus,
+			CommandID: row.Envelope.CommandID, State: string(row.Envelope.State),
+			OperationID: row.Envelope.OperationID, ConversationID: row.Envelope.ConversationID,
+		})
+	}
+	return page, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) queryLinkedProjectAudit(ctx context.Context, q extension.ProjectAuditQuery, slot *projectAuditSlot) (extension.ProjectAuditPage, error) {
+	if q.LinkedSourceKind != "domain-commit" || q.LinkedSourceID == "" || q.LinkedHostOffset <= 0 || q.BeforeOffset != 0 || q.CutoffOffset != 0 {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	slot.mu.RLock()
+	disclose := slot.disclose
+	slot.mu.RUnlock()
+	if disclose == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported
+	}
+	link, row, err := h.caps.st.ProjectAuditLinkedReceipt(string(q.ProjectID), q.LinkedSourceKind, q.LinkedSourceID, q.LinkedHostOffset)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	resource := extension.ProjectAuditLinkedResource{ProjectID: q.ProjectID, Owner: link.Owner, SourceKind: link.SourceKind, SourceID: link.SourceID,
+		OperationID: link.OperationID, ResourceKind: link.ResourceKind, ResourceID: link.ResourceID, RunID: link.RunID, DisclosureClass: link.DisclosureClass}
+	allowed, err := disclose(ctx, h.actor, resource)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, err
+	}
+	if !allowed.Metadata {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditPage{}, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied
+	}
+	nameStatus := "not-recorded"
+	if row.ActorName != "" {
+		nameStatus = "recorded"
+	}
+	return extension.ProjectAuditPage{Receipts: []extension.HostAuditReceipt{{SourceOffset: row.Offset, Time: row.Envelope.Time,
+		ActorID: row.Envelope.Actor, ActorName: row.ActorName, ActorNameStatus: nameStatus, CommandID: row.Envelope.CommandID,
+		State: string(row.Envelope.State), OperationID: row.Envelope.OperationID}},
+		Coverage: extension.ProjectAuditCoverage{CommandAudit: "verified-exact-link-only", CrossMember: "verified-exact-link-only",
+			CutoffConsistency: "exact-link", LegacyProjectBinding: "not-recorded", RunRelations: "unsupported",
+			ModelReceipts: "unsupported", BackgroundReceipts: "unsupported", ResourceBodies: "unsupported"}}, nil
+}

internal/app/project_audit_link_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestProjectAuditLinkSharesOnlyVerifiedCommittedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice at action"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("bob", "Bob"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "A")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	otherProject, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "B")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(p.ID), "private", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.AppendAudit("alice", agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: "alice", CommandID: "rdm.confirm", OperationID: "op-1", ConversationID: string(c.ID), State: agentcommand.StateCommitted, ParamsDigest: "secret-digest"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	private, _, _, err := st.ListProjectCommandAudits("alice", string(p.ID), 0, 0, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	offset := private[0].Offset
+	slot := &projectAuditSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projectAudit: slot}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	auditAllowed := true
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(func(actor string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return auditAllowed && actor == "bob" && projectID == p.ID, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publisherFactory, err := (recordRegistry{Registry: reg}).RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(func(_ context.Context, proof extension.ProjectAuditLinkProof) (bool, error) {
+		return proof.Owner == "alice" && proof.ProjectID == p.ID && proof.SourceKind == "domain-commit" && proof.SourceID == "commit-1" && proof.OperationID == "op-1" && proof.ResourceKind == "document" && proof.ResourceID == "doc-1", nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	metadataAllowed := true
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(func(_ context.Context, actor string, resource extension.ProjectAuditLinkedResource) (extension.ProjectAuditDisclosure, error) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditDisclosure{Metadata: metadataAllowed && actor == "bob" && resource.ResourceID == "doc-1"}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bob := inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}
+	q := extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: p.ID, LinkedSourceKind: "domain-commit", LinkedSourceID: "commit-1", LinkedHostOffset: offset}
+	if _, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), q); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("unlinked private audit: %v", err)
+	}
+	alicePublisher, err := publisherFactory.ForOwner("alice") // capability retained by trusted RDM outbox
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := alicePublisher.(extension.Host); ok {
+		t.Fatal("publisher factory exposed a full owner-scoped Host")
+	}
+	linkReq := extension.ProjectAuditLinkRequest{ProjectID: p.ID, SourceKind: "domain-commit", SourceID: "commit-1", OperationID: "op-1", ResourceKind: "document", ResourceID: "doc-1", DisclosureClass: "metadata", IdempotencyKey: "outbox-1"}
+	// A different compiled plugin can call the public scoped-host factory with
+	// "rdm" as text. That must not mint RDM's audit publication authority.
+	wireScopedHostFactory(caps)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { extension.SetScopedHostFactory(nil) })
+	forged, err := extension.NewScopedHost("alice", "rdm")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if publisher, ok := forged.(extension.ProjectAuditPublisher); ok {
+		if _, err := publisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), linkReq); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported) {
+			t.Fatalf("self-reported plugin ID minted audit publisher: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if rows, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: p.ID}); err != nil || len(rows.Receipts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("private owner row visible without exact link: %+v %v", rows, err)
+	}
+	wrongProject := linkReq
+	wrongProject.ProjectID = otherProject.ID
+	wrongProject.HostAuditOffset = offset
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), wrongProject); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong host project: %v", err)
+	}
+	uncommitted := linkReq
+	uncommitted.SourceID, uncommitted.IdempotencyKey = "uncommitted", "outbox-uncommitted"
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), uncommitted); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("uncommitted source: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "other", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(func(context.Context, extension.ProjectAuditLinkProof) (bool, error) { return true, nil }); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("other plugin replaced the registered verifier")
+	}
+	pending := linkReq
+	pending.OperationID, pending.IdempotencyKey = "op-not-yet-recorded", "outbox-pending"
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), pending); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditPending) {
+		t.Fatalf("host receipt race must be retryable: %v", err)
+	}
+	first, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), linkReq)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if first.HostAuditOffset != offset {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted resolved offset: got %d want %d", first.HostAuditOffset, offset)
+	}
+	retry, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), linkReq)
+	if err != nil || retry.LinkID != first.LinkID {
+		t.Fatalf("idempotent retry: first=%+v retry=%+v err=%v", first, retry, err)
+	}
+	page, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), q)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(page.Receipts) != 1 || page.Receipts[0].CommandID != "rdm.confirm" || page.Receipts[0].ActorName != "Alice at action" || page.Receipts[0].ConversationID != "" || page.Coverage.CrossMember != "verified-exact-link-only" {
+		t.Fatalf("linked page: %+v", page)
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(page)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(raw), "secret-digest") || strings.Contains(string(raw), string(c.ID)) {
+		t.Fatalf("private receipt fields leaked: %s", raw)
+	}
+	if err := st.AppendAudit("alice", agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: "alice", CommandID: "private.note", OperationID: "op-1", ConversationID: string(c.ID), State: agentcommand.StateCommitted}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	duplicates, _, _, err := st.ListProjectCommandAudits("alice", string(p.ID), 0, 0, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	privateOffset := duplicates[0].Offset
+	mislink := linkReq
+	mislink.HostAuditOffset, mislink.IdempotencyKey = privateOffset, "outbox-private"
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), mislink); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("ambiguous operation linked a private command: %v", err)
+	}
+	privateQuery := q
+	privateQuery.LinkedHostOffset = privateOffset
+	if _, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), privateQuery); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("private command disclosed through ambiguous operation: %v", err)
+	}
+	metadataAllowed = false
+	if _, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), q); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked object metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+	metadataAllowed, auditAllowed = true, false
+	if _, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), q); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked audit.read: %v", err)
+	}
+	linkReq.ResourceID = "doc-2"
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), linkReq); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditLinkConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("same key different link: %v", err)
+	}
+	metadataAllowed, auditAllowed = true, true
+	if err := st.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := alicePublisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), linkReq); err == nil || errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("storage outage during publish must remain retryable: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), q); err == nil || errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("storage outage during linked read must be explicit: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_audit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestProjectAuditHostChecksDomainReadAndProjectsStoredReceipts(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, strings.ToUpper(owner)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	a, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "A")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "B")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ac, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(a.ID), "A", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bc, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(b.ID), "B", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	shared, err := st.CreateConversationInProject("bob", string(a.ID), "A shared", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, item := range []struct{ owner, conversation, command string }{
+		{"alice", string(ac.ID), "a.command"},
+		{"alice", string(bc.ID), "b.command"},
+		{"bob", string(shared.ID), "shared.command"},
+	} {
+		if err := st.AppendAudit(item.owner, agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: item.owner, CommandID: item.command, ConversationID: item.conversation, State: agentcommand.StateCommitted, ParamsDigest: "sensitive-digest"}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	slot := &projectAuditSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projectAudit: slot}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	allowed := true
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(func(actor string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return allowed && actor == "bob" && projectID == a.ID, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: "bob", actor: "bob", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	page, err := h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: a.ID, Limit: 10})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(page.Receipts) != 1 || page.Receipts[0].CommandID != "shared.command" {
+		t.Fatalf("A page: %+v", page)
+	}
+	if page.Coverage.CommandAudit != "actor-owned-project-bound-only" || page.Coverage.CrossMember != "unsupported" || page.Coverage.LegacyProjectBinding != "not-recorded" || page.Coverage.RunRelations != "unsupported" || page.Coverage.ModelReceipts != "unsupported" || page.Coverage.CutoffConsistency != "committed-prefix" {
+		t.Fatalf("coverage: %+v", page.Coverage)
+	}
+	if page.Receipts[0].ActorName != "BOB" {
+		t.Fatalf("actor names: %+v", page.Receipts)
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(page)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(raw), "sensitive-digest") || strings.Contains(string(raw), "paramsDigest") || strings.Contains(string(raw), "payload") {
+		t.Fatalf("raw audit payload leaked: %s", raw)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: b.ID}); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("project B: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := (inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: "bob", actor: "bob", pluginID: "other"}).QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: a.ID}); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditUnsupported) {
+		t.Fatalf("other plugin: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := (inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: "bob", pluginID: "rdm"}).QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: a.ID}); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("unbound actor: %v", err)
+	}
+	allowed = false
+	if _, err := h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: a.ID, BeforeOffset: page.NextOffset, CutoffOffset: page.CutoffOffset}); !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrProjectAuditDenied) {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked audit.read: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A direct explicit ID bypasses the v39 default allocator. This must never
+// yield a committed-prefix page that permanently skips the late lower row.
+func TestProjectAuditPostgresExplicitLowIDCannotHideAcrossPages(t *testing.T) {
+	dsn := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Skip("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN unset: isolated PostgreSQL check NOT_RUN")
+	}
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { admin.Close() })
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	schema := "w9_" + strings.ToLower(string(store.NewID("audit")))
+	if _, err := admin.Exec(`CREATE SCHEMA ` + schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { admin.Exec(`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ` + schema + ` CASCADE`) })
+	st, err := store.OpenPostgres(store.AppendPGRuntimeParam(dsn, "search_path", schema+",public"), filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "artifacts"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "A")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, command := range []string{"first", "second"} {
+		if err := st.AppendAudit("alice", agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: "alice", CommandID: command, ConversationID: string(conversation.ID), State: agentcommand.StateCommitted}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	insert := `INSERT INTO command_audit(time,command_id,source,entrance,state,operation_id,conversation_id,owner,payload,actor_name,project_id)
+		VALUES ($1,$2,'','','committed','',$3,'alice',$4,'Alice',$5) RETURNING id`
+	gap, err := st.DB().Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer gap.Rollback()
+	var gapID int64
+	if err := gap.QueryRow(insert, time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), "rolled-back-gap", string(conversation.ID), `{}`, string(project.ID)).Scan(&gapID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if gapID != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("rollback gap ID=%d want=3", gapID)
+	}
+	if err := gap.Rollback(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	a, err := st.DB().Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer a.Rollback()
+	env := agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: "alice", CommandID: "explicit-late", ConversationID: string(conversation.ID), State: agentcommand.StateCommitted}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(env)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, err = a.Exec(`INSERT INTO command_audit(id,time,command_id,source,entrance,state,operation_id,conversation_id,owner,payload,actor_name,project_id)
+		VALUES (3,$1,$2,'','','committed','',$3,'alice',$4,'Alice',$5)`, env.Time.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), env.CommandID, string(conversation.ID), string(raw), string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		// Rejecting the online explicit ID is also a safe outcome.
+		t.Logf("online explicit low ID rejected: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	slot := &projectAuditSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projectAudit: slot}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(func(actor string, projectID core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return actor == "alice" && projectID == project.ID, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: "alice", actor: "alice", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	committed := make(chan error, 1)
+	started := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		close(started)
+		committed <- st.AppendAudit("alice", agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{Time: time.Now(), Actor: "alice", CommandID: "implicit-high", ConversationID: string(conversation.ID), State: agentcommand.StateCommitted})
+	}()
+	<-started
+	var first extension.ProjectAuditPage
+	highCommittedEarly := false
+	select {
+	case err := <-committed:
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		highCommittedEarly = true
+	case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+	}
+	if highCommittedEarly {
+		first, err = h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: project.ID, Limit: 2})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if len(first.Receipts) != 2 || first.Receipts[0].SourceOffset != 4 || first.Receipts[1].SourceOffset != 2 || first.CutoffOffset != 4 || first.NextOffset != 2 || first.Coverage.CutoffConsistency != "committed-prefix" {
+			t.Fatalf("counterexample first page changed: %+v", first)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := a.Commit(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !highCommittedEarly {
+		if err := <-committed; err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		first, err = h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: project.ID, Limit: 2})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	second, err := h.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: project.ID, BeforeOffset: first.NextOffset, CutoffOffset: first.CutoffOffset, Limit: 2})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	seen := map[int64]bool{}
+	for _, receipt := range append(first.Receipts, second.Receipts...) {
+		seen[receipt.SourceOffset] = true
+	}
+	if !seen[3] || len(seen) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("committed-prefix omitted explicit low ID 3: early=%v first=%+v second=%+v", highCommittedEarly, first, second)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_context.go

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/projectcontext"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/runtime"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type projectContextSlot struct {
+	mu       sync.RWMutex
+	holder   string
+	provider extension.ProjectContextProvider
+}
+
+func (s *projectContextSlot) active() bool {
+	if s == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	return s.provider != nil
+}
+
+func requireProjectContextProvider(required bool, slot *projectContextSlot) error {
+	if required && !slot.active() {
+		return errors.New("extension: required project context provider not assembled")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectContextProvider(extension.ProjectContextProvider) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project context providers")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectContextProvider(p extension.ProjectContextProvider) error {
+	if r.caps.contexts == nil || r.pluginID == "" || p == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project context provider unavailable")
+	}
+	slot := r.caps.contexts
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider != nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project context provider already registered")
+	}
+	slot.holder, slot.provider = r.pluginID, p
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectContextProvider(p extension.ProjectContextProvider) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectContextRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: project context registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectContextProvider(p)
+}
+
+func (s *projectContextSlot) resolve(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+	if s == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, errors.New("extension: project context provider missing")
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	p, holder := s.provider, s.holder
+	s.mu.RUnlock()
+	if p == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, errors.New("extension: project context provider missing")
+	}
+	if req.Actor == "" || req.ProjectID == "" {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, errors.New("extension: trusted project scope missing")
+	}
+	req.PluginID = holder
+	bounded, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	b, err := p.Resolve(bounded, req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, err
+	}
+	if err := bounded.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, err
+	}
+	if b.ProjectID != req.ProjectID || b.Status != extension.ProjectContextReady {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, fmt.Errorf("extension: project context unavailable: %s", b.Status)
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}
+
+func (s *projectContextSlot) readEvidence(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest) (extension.ProjectEvidence, error) {
+	if s == nil || req.Scope.Actor == "" || req.Scope.ProjectID == "" || req.Reference.ID == "" {
+		return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, errors.New("extension: trusted evidence scope missing")
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	p, holder := s.provider, s.holder
+	s.mu.RUnlock()
+	if p == nil {
+		return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, errors.New("extension: project context provider missing")
+	}
+	req.Scope.PluginID = holder
+	bounded, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	evidence, err := p.ReadEvidence(bounded, req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, err
+	}
+	if err := bounded.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, err
+	}
+	if evidence.Reference != req.Reference || len([]rune(evidence.Text)) > req.Scope.BudgetChars {
+		return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, errors.New("extension: project evidence response mismatches reference or budget")
+	}
+	return evidence, nil
+}
+
+func (s *projectContextSlot) recheck(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest) (extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult, error) {
+	if s == nil || req.Scope.Actor == "" || req.Scope.ProjectID == "" || req.Scope.Goal != "" {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, errors.New("extension: trusted source recheck scope missing")
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	p, holder := s.provider, s.holder
+	s.mu.RUnlock()
+	rechecker, ok := p.(extension.ProjectContextSourceRechecker)
+	if !ok {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, errors.New("extension: project source rechecker unavailable")
+	}
+	req.Scope.PluginID = holder
+	bounded, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	result, err := rechecker.Recheck(bounded, req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, err
+	}
+	if err := bounded.Err(); err != nil {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, err
+	}
+	if result.Bundle.ProjectID != req.Scope.ProjectID || result.Bundle.Status != extension.ProjectContextReady {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, errors.New("extension: project sources no longer authorized")
+	}
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+const workContextBudgetChars = 12000
+
+// TaskCreateForWork fixes the project binding while the authenticated command
+// dispatch still owns its conversation. Legacy TaskCreate has no such binding.
+func (h inprocHost) TaskCreateForWork(kind, title string) (string, error) {
+	if h.actor == "" || h.actor != h.owner || h.pluginID == "" || h.conversationID == "" || h.caps.st == nil || !h.caps.contexts.active() {
+		return "", errors.New("extension: trusted project work dispatch required")
+	}
+	conv, err := h.caps.st.GetConversation(h.owner, string(h.conversationID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if conv.ProjectID == "" || (h.hostProjectID != "" && h.hostProjectID != conv.ProjectID) || h.caps.projects == nil || h.caps.projects.work() == nil {
+		return "", errors.New("extension: trusted project work scope missing")
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	allowed, err := h.caps.projects.work()(ctx, h.actor, conv.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || !allowed {
+		return "", errors.New("extension: project work denied")
+	}
+	task, err := h.caps.st.CreateWorkTask(h.owner, h.pluginID, string(conv.ProjectID), string(conv.ID), kind, title)
+	return task.ID, err
+}
+
+// completeForWork is the dispatch-scoped completion path. The conversation is
+// reloaded so a plugin's goal/target and a stale dispatch project cannot select
+// another project's context. Work authorization is checked on every call.
+func (h inprocHost) CompleteForWork(ctx context.Context, req extension.WorkCompletionRequest) (extension.WorkCompletionResult, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(req.Goal) == "" {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: work goal required")
+	}
+	if h.caps.st == nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: trusted work store missing")
+	}
+	actor, convID, targetID := h.actor, h.conversationID, string(h.conversationID)
+	var boundProjectID core.ID
+	if actor == "" {
+		if req.TaskID == "" || convID != "" {
+			return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: persisted work task required for scoped host")
+		}
+		binding, err := h.caps.st.WorkTaskScope(h.owner, h.pluginID, req.TaskID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+		}
+		if binding.Status == "done" || binding.Status == "completed" || binding.Status == "failed" || binding.Status == "cancelled" {
+			return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: work task already terminal")
+		}
+		actor, convID, boundProjectID, targetID = binding.Owner, core.ID(binding.ConversationID), core.ID(binding.ProjectID), binding.TaskID
+	} else if actor != h.owner || convID == "" || req.TaskID != "" {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: trusted work dispatch required")
+	}
+	conv, err := h.caps.st.GetConversation(h.owner, string(convID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	if conv.ProjectID == "" || (h.hostProjectID != "" && h.hostProjectID != conv.ProjectID) || (boundProjectID != "" && boundProjectID != conv.ProjectID) {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: trusted project scope mismatch")
+	}
+	if h.caps.projects == nil || h.caps.projects.work() == nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: project work authorization missing")
+	}
+	allowed, err := h.caps.projects.work()(ctx, actor, conv.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	if !allowed {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: project work denied")
+	}
+	requested := extension.ProjectContextRequest{
+		Actor: actor, ProjectID: conv.ProjectID, ConversationID: conv.ID, TaskID: core.ID(req.TaskID),
+		Goal: req.Goal, TargetID: req.TargetID, BudgetChars: workContextBudgetChars,
+	}
+	bundle, err := h.caps.contexts.resolve(ctx, requested)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	evidenceText, usedEvidence, err := h.readWorkEvidence(ctx, requested, bundle, req.EvidenceRefs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	prompt, manifest, err := assembleWorkCompletionWithEvidence(req.Goal, bundle, workContextBudgetChars, evidenceText, usedEvidence)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	manifest.ProjectID = conv.ProjectID
+	manifest.TaskID = req.TaskID
+	route := runtime.ResolveChatModel(core.AgentProfile{}, h.caps.set.Effective(h.owner, ""))
+	manifest.Model = route.Model
+	if route.Model == "" || route.Base == "" {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("llm route not configured")
+	}
+	// Resolve can be slow. A member may be revoked while the provider is
+	// assembling summaries, so check the live work policy again at send time.
+	allowed, err = h.caps.projects.work()(ctx, actor, conv.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	if !allowed {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: project work denied")
+	}
+	current, err := h.caps.contexts.resolve(ctx, requested)
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	if err := projectcontext.ValidateCurrent(manifest, current); err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	for _, used := range manifest.ReadEvidence {
+		found := false
+		for _, ref := range current.Evidence {
+			if ref.ID != used.ReferenceID || ref.SourceID != used.SourceID || ref.Revision != used.Revision || ref.Hash != used.SourceHash {
+				continue
+			}
+			scope := requested
+			scope.BudgetChars = 8000
+			now, err := h.caps.contexts.readEvidence(ctx, extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest{Scope: scope, Reference: ref})
+			if err != nil {
+				return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+			}
+			if fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(now.Text))) == used.InputSHA256 {
+				found = true
+			}
+			break
+		}
+		if !found {
+			return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, errors.New("extension: requested work evidence changed before model send")
+		}
+	}
+	attemptID, err := projectcontext.NewAttemptID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	manifest.AttemptID, manifest.Delivery = attemptID, "attempted"
+	if err := h.caps.st.AppendContextManifest(h.owner, targetID, manifest); err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	text, err := completeChat(ctx, route.Base, route.Key, route.Model, prompt)
+	if err != nil {
+		manifest.Delivery = "unknown"
+		_ = h.caps.st.AppendContextManifest(h.owner, targetID, manifest)
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	manifest.Delivery = "responded"
+	if err := h.caps.st.AppendContextManifest(h.owner, targetID, manifest); err != nil {
+		return extension.WorkCompletionResult{}, err
+	}
+	return extension.WorkCompletionResult{Text: text, Manifest: manifest}, nil
+}
+
+func assembleWorkCompletion(goal string, bundle extension.ProjectContextBundle, budget int) (string, extension.ProjectContextManifest, error) {
+	return assembleWorkCompletionWithEvidence(goal, bundle, budget, "", nil)
+}
+
+func assembleWorkCompletionWithEvidence(goal string, bundle extension.ProjectContextBundle, budget int, evidenceText string, used []extension.ProjectContextManifestEntry) (string, extension.ProjectContextManifest, error) {
+	prefix := "Work goal:\n" + goal + "\n\n"
+	ref, m, err := projectcontext.Assemble(bundle, budget-len([]rune(prefix))-len([]rune(evidenceText)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", m, err
+	}
+	prompt := prefix + ref + evidenceText
+	m.BudgetChars = budget
+	m.ReadEvidence = used
+	m.InputSHA256 = fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(prompt)))
+	return prompt, m, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) readWorkEvidence(ctx context.Context, scope extension.ProjectContextRequest, bundle extension.ProjectContextBundle, ids []string) (string, []extension.ProjectContextManifestEntry, error) {
+	if len(ids) > 4 {
+		return "", nil, errors.New("extension: too many work evidence references")
+	}
+	var b strings.Builder
+	var used []extension.ProjectContextManifestEntry
+	seen := make(map[string]bool, len(ids))
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		if id == "" || seen[id] {
+			return "", nil, errors.New("extension: invalid or duplicate work evidence reference")
+		}
+		seen[id] = true
+		var selected extension.ProjectEvidenceRef
+		for _, ref := range bundle.Evidence {
+			if ref.ID == id {
+				selected = ref
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if selected.ID == "" {
+			return "", nil, errors.New("extension: work evidence reference not in current bundle")
+		}
+		readScope := scope
+		readScope.BudgetChars = 8000
+		evidence, err := h.caps.contexts.readEvidence(ctx, extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest{Scope: readScope, Reference: selected})
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", nil, err
+		}
+		b.WriteString("\n[Evidence ")
+		b.WriteString(selected.ID)
+		b.WriteString(" source ")
+		b.WriteString(selected.SourceID)
+		b.WriteString(" revision ")
+		b.WriteString(selected.Revision)
+		b.WriteString("]\n")
+		b.WriteString(evidence.Text)
+		used = append(used, extension.ProjectContextManifestEntry{ReferenceID: selected.ID, SourceID: selected.SourceID, Revision: selected.Revision, SourceHash: selected.Hash,
+			InputSHA256: fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(evidence.Text)))})
+	}
+	return b.String(), used, nil
+}

internal/app/project_context_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type testProjectContextProvider struct {
+	resolve func(extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error)
+	read    func(extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest) (extension.ProjectEvidence, error)
+}
+
+type testSourceRecheckProvider struct {
+	testProjectContextProvider
+	called *bool
+}
+
+func (p testSourceRecheckProvider) Recheck(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest) (extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult, error) {
+	if _, ok := ctx.Deadline(); !ok || req.Scope.PluginID != "rdm" || req.Scope.Actor != "alice" || req.Scope.ProjectID != "p1" || req.Scope.Goal != "" {
+		return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{}, fmt.Errorf("untrusted or unbounded recheck scope")
+	}
+	*p.called = true
+	return extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckResult{Bundle: extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady, ProjectID: req.Scope.ProjectID}}, nil
+}
+
+func TestProjectSourceRecheckUsesSameRegisteredProviderAndDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+	called := false
+	slot := &projectContextSlot{}
+	provider := testSourceRecheckProvider{called: &called}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: slot}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := slot.recheck(context.Background(), extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest{Scope: extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1"}}); err != nil || !called {
+		t.Fatalf("registered source rechecker unavailable: called=%v err=%v", called, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := slot.recheck(context.Background(), extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest{Scope: extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1", Goal: "OLD_RESTRICTED_BODY"}}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("raw Goal entered source recheck provider")
+	}
+	cancelled, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	if _, err := slot.recheck(cancelled, extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest{Scope: extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1"}}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("cancelled source recheck returned authorized context")
+	}
+	legacy := &projectContextSlot{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: legacy}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(testProjectContextProvider{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := legacy.recheck(context.Background(), extension.ProjectContextSourceRecheckRequest{Scope: extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1"}}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("provider without optional rechecker silently accepted old sources")
+	}
+}
+
+type deadlineContextProvider struct{ sawDeadline *bool }
+
+func (p deadlineContextProvider) Resolve(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+	_, *p.sawDeadline = ctx.Deadline()
+	return extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady, ProjectID: req.ProjectID}, nil
+}
+func (p deadlineContextProvider) ReadEvidence(ctx context.Context, req extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest) (extension.ProjectEvidence, error) {
+	_, *p.sawDeadline = ctx.Deadline()
+	return extension.ProjectEvidence{Reference: req.Reference, Text: "detail"}, nil
+}
+
+func TestProjectContextProviderCallsHaveBoundedDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+	seen := false
+	slot := &projectContextSlot{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: slot}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(deadlineContextProvider{sawDeadline: &seen}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := slot.resolve(context.Background(), extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1"}); err != nil || !seen {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve missing bounded context: seen=%v err=%v", seen, err)
+	}
+	seen = false
+	if _, err := slot.readEvidence(context.Background(), extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest{Scope: extension.ProjectContextRequest{Actor: "alice", ProjectID: "p1", BudgetChars: 100}, Reference: extension.ProjectEvidenceRef{ID: "r1"}}); err != nil || !seen {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadEvidence missing bounded context: seen=%v err=%v", seen, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func (p testProjectContextProvider) Resolve(_ context.Context, req extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+	return p.resolve(req)
+}
+
+func (p testProjectContextProvider) ReadEvidence(_ context.Context, req extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest) (extension.ProjectEvidence, error) {
+	if p.read != nil {
+		return p.read(req)
+	}
+	return extension.ProjectEvidence{}, nil
+}
+
+func TestProjectContextRegistryOptionalAndSingleOwner(t *testing.T) {
+	slot := &projectContextSlot{}
+	reg := recordRegistry{Registry: pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: slot}}}
+	optional, ok := any(reg).(extension.ProjectContextRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("record registry hides optional project context registration")
+	}
+	provider := testProjectContextProvider{resolve: func(extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady}, nil
+	}}
+	if err := optional.RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := optional.RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("duplicate provider replaced the first provider")
+	}
+	if err := (compiledRegistry{}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("declarative provider accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequiredProjectContextFailsWhenProviderNotAssembled(t *testing.T) {
+	slot := &projectContextSlot{}
+	if err := requireProjectContextProvider(true, slot); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("required project context silently degraded")
+	}
+	if err := requireProjectContextProvider(false, slot); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("optional legacy path blocked: %v", err)
+	}
+	provider := testProjectContextProvider{resolve: func(extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{}, nil
+	}}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: slot}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := requireProjectContextProvider(true, slot); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("registered provider rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCompleteForWorkUsesStoredScopeAndActualInputManifest(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Project")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	other, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Other")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var sent string
+	modelCalls := 0
+	model := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		modelCalls++
+		var payload struct {
+			Messages []struct {
+				Content string `json:"content"`
+			} `json:"messages"`
+		}
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+		}
+		for _, m := range payload.Messages {
+			sent += m.Content
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"done"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer model.Close()
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	set.SetSystemOverride(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"baseUrl": model.URL, "model": "test-model"}}})
+	projects := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{projects: projects}}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	contexts := &projectContextSlot{}
+	called := 0
+	oversized := false
+	revokeDuringResolve := false
+	revokeDocDuringResolve := false
+	authEpoch := "duty-1"
+	provider := testProjectContextProvider{resolve: func(req extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+		called++
+		if req.Actor != "alice" || req.ProjectID != core.ID(p.ID) || req.ConversationID != core.ID(conv.ID) || req.PluginID != "rdm" {
+			t.Errorf("untrusted scope: %+v", req)
+		}
+		item := extension.ProjectContextItem{SourceID: "decision-1", Revision: "r3", Hash: "source-hash", Text: "Authorized summary", Required: true}
+		if oversized {
+			item.Text = strings.Repeat("x", workContextBudgetChars+1)
+		}
+		if revokeDuringResolve {
+			projects.mu.Lock()
+			projects.provider.Work = func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
+			projects.mu.Unlock()
+		}
+		epoch := authEpoch
+		if revokeDocDuringResolve {
+			authEpoch = "duty-2"
+			revokeDocDuringResolve = false
+		}
+		return extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady, ProjectID: core.ID(p.ID), Version: "v7", AuthorizationEpoch: epoch, Items: []extension.ProjectContextItem{item}}, nil
+	}}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: contexts}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, set: set, projects: projects, contexts: contexts}, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice", actor: "alice", conversationID: conv.ID, hostProjectID: p.ID}
+	work := any(h).(extension.WorkCompletionHost)
+	result, err := work.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if result.Text != "done" || !strings.Contains(sent, "Authorized summary") || !strings.Contains(sent, "Draft report") || result.Manifest.InputSHA256 == "" || len(result.Manifest.Included) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("input or manifest mismatch: result=%+v sent=%q", result, sent)
+	}
+	if want := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(sent))); result.Manifest.InputSHA256 != want {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest input hash %q differs from actual request content hash %q", result.Manifest.InputSHA256, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := result.Manifest.Included[0].InputSHA256, fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte("Authorized summary"))); got != want || result.Manifest.Included[0].SourceHash != "source-hash" {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest does not distinguish source hash and actual text hash: %+v", result.Manifest.Included[0])
+	}
+	if called != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider called %d times, want initial and pre-send reads", called)
+	}
+	stored, err := st.ListContextManifests("alice", string(conv.ID))
+	if err != nil || len(stored) != 2 || stored[0].Delivery != "attempted" || stored[1].Delivery != "responded" || stored[0].AttemptID != stored[1].AttemptID || stored[1].InputSHA256 != result.Manifest.InputSHA256 {
+		t.Fatalf("work completion manifest not persisted: got=%+v err=%v", stored, err)
+	}
+	h.hostProjectID = other.ID
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || called != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("forged project scope reached provider")
+	}
+	h.hostProjectID = p.ID
+	h.conversationID = ""
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || called != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("scoped host without dispatch scope reached provider")
+	}
+	h.conversationID = conv.ID
+	projects.mu.Lock()
+	projects.provider.Work = func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
+	projects.mu.Unlock()
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || called != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("revoked project work reached provider")
+	}
+	projects.mu.Lock()
+	projects.provider.Work = func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
+	projects.mu.Unlock()
+	oversized = true
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || modelCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("required context was dropped and model still called")
+	}
+	oversized = false
+	revokeDuringResolve = true
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || modelCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("revocation during context resolution reached model")
+	}
+	projects.mu.Lock()
+	projects.provider.Work = func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
+	projects.mu.Unlock()
+	revokeDuringResolve = false
+	revokeDocDuringResolve = true
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Draft report"}); err == nil || modelCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("document duty revoked while project membership remains reached model")
+	}
+	taskHost := any(h).(extension.WorkTaskHost)
+	taskID, err := taskHost.TaskCreateForWork("compose", "Draft report")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	scoped := inprocHost{caps: h.caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice"}
+	if _, err := scoped.TaskCreateForWork("compose", "Forged"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("scoped host created a work task without dispatch scope")
+	}
+	if _, err := scoped.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Resume report", TaskID: taskID}); err != nil || modelCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted plugin task did not restore trusted work scope: err=%v calls=%d", err, modelCalls)
+	}
+	otherPlugin := inprocHost{caps: h.caps, pluginID: "other", owner: "alice"}
+	if _, err := otherPlugin.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Steal task", TaskID: taskID}); err == nil || modelCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("other plugin reused task binding")
+	}
+	otherOwner := inprocHost{caps: h.caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob"}
+	if _, err := otherOwner.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Steal task", TaskID: taskID}); err == nil || modelCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("other owner reused task binding")
+	}
+	legacyTaskID, err := h.TaskCreate("legacy", "Unbound", string(conv.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := scoped.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Old task", TaskID: legacyTaskID}); err == nil || modelCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("old unbound task was treated as trusted work scope")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE conversations SET project_id=? WHERE id=?`, other.ID, conv.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := scoped.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Moved project", TaskID: taskID}); err == nil || modelCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("task silently followed a conversation to another project")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWorkContextBudgetKeepsRequiredEvidenceFirst(t *testing.T) {
+	bundle := extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady, ProjectID: "project-1", Items: []extension.ProjectContextItem{
+		{SourceID: "optional", Revision: "r1", Hash: "h1", Text: "12345678"},
+		{SourceID: "required", Revision: "r1", Hash: "h2", Text: "must keep", Required: true},
+	}}
+	prompt, manifest, err := assembleWorkCompletion("goal", bundle, 140)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(prompt, "must keep") || strings.Contains(prompt, "12345678") {
+		t.Fatalf("required evidence lost to optional evidence: %q", prompt)
+	}
+	if len([]rune(prompt)) > 140 {
+		t.Fatalf("final prompt exceeded the budget: %d", len([]rune(prompt)))
+	}
+	if len(manifest.Included) != 1 || manifest.Included[0].SourceID != "required" || len(manifest.Dropped) != 1 || manifest.Dropped[0].SourceID != "optional" {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest does not match selected input: %+v", manifest)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCompleteForWorkReadsOnlyCurrentBundleEvidence(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "evidence.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", p.ID, "C", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var sent []string
+	model := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var body struct {
+			Messages []struct {
+				Content string `json:"content"`
+			} `json:"messages"`
+		}
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		var input string
+		for _, m := range body.Messages {
+			input += m.Content
+		}
+		sent = append(sent, input)
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"done"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer model.Close()
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	set.SetSystemOverride(map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"baseUrl": model.URL, "model": "test-model"}}})
+	projects := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{projects: projects}}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	contexts := &projectContextSlot{}
+	ref := extension.ProjectEvidenceRef{ID: "ref-1", SourceID: "doc-1", Revision: "r2", Hash: "source-hash"}
+	readCalls := 0
+	readText, authEpoch := "current restricted detail", "duty-1"
+	provider := testProjectContextProvider{
+		resolve: func(req extension.ProjectContextRequest) (extension.ProjectContextBundle, error) {
+			return extension.ProjectContextBundle{Status: extension.ProjectContextReady, ProjectID: req.ProjectID, AuthorizationEpoch: authEpoch, PublicationEpoch: "pub-1", Evidence: []extension.ProjectEvidenceRef{ref}}, nil
+		},
+		read: func(req extension.ProjectEvidenceRequest) (extension.ProjectEvidence, error) {
+			readCalls++
+			if req.Reference != ref || req.Scope.ProjectID != core.ID(p.ID) {
+				t.Errorf("untrusted evidence scope: %+v", req)
+			}
+			return extension.ProjectEvidence{Reference: req.Reference, Text: readText}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{contexts: contexts}}).RegisterProjectContextProvider(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st, set: set, projects: projects, contexts: contexts}, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice", actor: "alice", conversationID: conv.ID, hostProjectID: p.ID}
+	result, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Write", EvidenceRefs: []string{"ref-1"}})
+	if err != nil || len(sent) != 1 || !strings.Contains(sent[0], "current restricted detail") || len(result.Manifest.ReadEvidence) != 1 || readCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("requested evidence did not reach model under reauthorization: err=%v sent=%q manifest=%+v reads=%d", err, sent, result.Manifest, readCalls)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Write", EvidenceRefs: []string{"arbitrary-path"}}); err == nil || readCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatal("arbitrary evidence reference reached provider")
+	}
+	readText, authEpoch = "new public detail", "duty-2"
+	if _, err := h.CompleteForWork(context.Background(), extension.WorkCompletionRequest{Goal: "Write", EvidenceRefs: []string{"ref-1"}}); err != nil || len(sent) != 2 || strings.Contains(sent[1], "current restricted detail") || !strings.Contains(sent[1], "new public detail") {
+		t.Fatalf("same Host reused old evidence after duty change: err=%v sent=%q", err, sent)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPluginAuditCannotForgeOrCorruptContextManifest(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "manifest.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	good := extension.ProjectContextManifest{ProjectID: "p1", AttemptID: "attempt-1", Delivery: "attempted", InputSHA256: "sha-good"}
+	if err := st.AppendContextManifest("alice", "run-1", good); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	h := inprocHost{caps: hostcaps{st: st}, pluginID: "malicious", owner: "alice"}
+	if err := h.Audit("model.context_manifest", "run-1", `{"Delivery":"responded","InputSHA256":"forged"}`); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("plugin forged a trusted model manifest action")
+	}
+	if err := st.AppendAuditEvent(store.AuditEvent{Owner: "alice", Action: "model.context_manifest", Target: "run-1", Evidence: "not-json"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := st.ListContextManifests("alice", "run-1")
+	if err != nil || len(got) != 1 || got[0].InputSHA256 != "sha-good" {
+		t.Fatalf("untrusted audit row corrupted manifest reader: got=%+v err=%v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_lifecycle.go

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/projectscope"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type projectLifecycleSlot struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	holder   string
+	provider *extension.ProjectLifecycle
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project lifecycle")
+}
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(p extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	if r.caps.projects == nil || r.pluginID == "" {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle slot unavailable")
+	}
+	if p.List == nil || p.Create == nil || p.Rename == nil || p.Archive == nil || p.Work == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle requires all callbacks")
+	}
+	slot := r.caps.projects
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider != nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle already registered")
+	}
+	slot.holder, slot.provider = r.pluginID, &p
+	return nil
+}
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectLifecycle(p extension.ProjectLifecycle) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectLifecycleRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: project lifecycle registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(p)
+}
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) wire(srv *server.Server, caps hostcaps) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	holder := slot.holder
+	srv.SetProjectLifecycle(*slot.provider, func(owner string) extension.Host {
+		return requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: owner, actor: owner, pluginID: holder}}
+	})
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) active() bool {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	return slot.provider != nil
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) work() func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	defer slot.mu.Unlock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return slot.provider.Work
+}
+
+func (slot *projectLifecycleSlot) resolve(ctx context.Context, caps hostcaps, owner string, id core.ID) (core.ID, error) {
+	slot.mu.Lock()
+	if slot.provider == nil {
+		slot.mu.Unlock()
+		return id, nil
+	}
+	p, holder := *slot.provider, slot.holder
+	slot.mu.Unlock()
+	return projectscope.Resolve(ctx, inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: owner, actor: owner, pluginID: holder}, p, id)
+}
+
+var _ extension.ProjectHost = inprocHost{}
+
+func (h inprocHost) OwnedProjects() ([]core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	ps, err := h.caps.st.ListProjects(h.owner)
+	for i := range ps {
+		ps[i].Owner = h.owner
+	}
+	return ps, err
+}
+func (h inprocHost) OwnedProject(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.GetProject(h.owner, id)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) ProjectMetadata(id string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	p, err := h.caps.st.ProjectMetadata(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.caps.projects != nil && h.caps.projects.active() {
+		p.Settings = h.caps.set.MaskedProjectMetadata(p.Settings)
+	}
+	if p.Owner == h.owner {
+		return p, nil
+	}
+	if h.caps.authz == nil {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	ok, err := h.caps.authz.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{Actor: h.owner, Action: "read", ResourceType: "project", ResourceID: core.ID(id), Owner: p.Owner, ProjectID: core.ID(id)})
+	if err != nil || !ok {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return p, nil
+}
+func (h inprocHost) EnsureProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.actor != "" && h.actor != h.owner {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	// A creator-scoped Host is the approved I1 projection capability. RDM
+	// authorizes a delegated operator before invoking it; cross-database
+	// commit fencing remains outside U3's guarantee.
+	return h.caps.st.EnsureProjectAccountChecked(h.owner, h.owner, id, name, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) RenameOwnedProject(id, name string) (core.Project, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return core.Project{}, err
+	}
+	if h.actor != "" && h.actor != h.owner {
+		return core.Project{}, store.ErrAccountForbidden
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.RenameOwnedProjectAccountChecked(h.owner, h.owner, id, name, h.caps.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+func (h inprocHost) ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID string) (bool, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return h.caps.st.ProjectNameAvailable(name, exceptID)
+}

internal/app/project_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/server"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func completeLifecycle() extension.ProjectLifecycle {
+	return extension.ProjectLifecycle{
+		List:   func(context.Context, extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) { return nil, nil },
+		Create: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) (core.Project, error) { return core.Project{}, nil },
+		Rename: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string, string) (core.Project, error) {
+			return core.Project{}, nil
+		},
+		Archive: func(context.Context, extension.Host, string) error { return nil },
+		Work:    func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil },
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectLifecycleOptionalRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{projects: slot}}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(extension.ProjectLifecycle{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("incomplete registration accepted")
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("duplicate registration accepted")
+	}
+	if err := (compiledRegistry{}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("declarative callback accepted")
+	}
+	rr := recordRegistry{Registry: pluginRegistry{pluginID: "other", caps: hostcaps{projects: &projectLifecycleSlot{}}}}
+	optional, ok := any(rr).(extension.ProjectLifecycleRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("record registry hides optional registration")
+	}
+	if err := optional.RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+func TestProjectHostMetadataDoesNotGrantMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, owner := range []string{"alice", "bob"} {
+		if err := st.EnsureUser(owner, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	alice := inprocHost{owner: "alice", caps: hostcaps{st: st}}
+	p, err := alice.EnsureProject("stable", "Shared")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	auth.set("rdm", func(owner string, id core.ID) (bool, error) { return owner == "bob" && id == core.ID(p.ID), nil })
+	bob := inprocHost{owner: "bob", caps: hostcaps{st: st, authz: auth}}
+	if _, err := bob.ProjectMetadata(p.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.OwnedProject(p.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("owned lookup=%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.RenameOwnedProject(p.ID, "Other"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("shared rename=%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := bob.EnsureProject(p.ID, p.Name); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("shared ensure=%v", err)
+	}
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	if _, err := bob.ProjectMetadata(p.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("V2 denial ignored=%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectHostMetadataMasksSharedSecretsWithoutMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/t.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "Shared")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	raw := map[string]any{"models": map[string]any{"chat": map[string]any{"apiKey": "fixture-nested-secret"}}, "models.embedding.apiKey": "fixture-flat-secret", "legacy.token": "fixture-legacy-secret", "plugins.private": map[string]any{"credential": "fixture-schema-secret"}, "display": map[string]any{"caption": "Shared configuration"}, "rdm.projectId": "canonical", "rdm.state": "ready"}
+	if err := st.UpdateProjectSettings("alice", p.ID, raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	svc := settings.NewService(st)
+	svc.SetExtraSchema([]core.SettingDesc{{Key: "plugins.private.credential", Secret: true}})
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	auth := &projectAuthz{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, set: svc, projects: slot, authz: auth}
+	provider := completeLifecycle()
+	provider.List = func(_ context.Context, h extension.Host) ([]core.Project, error) {
+		project, err := h.(extension.ProjectHost).ProjectMetadata(p.ID)
+		return []core.Project{project}, err
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(provider); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	auth.setV2("rdm", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.Actor == "bob" && q.ResourceType == "project" && q.ResourceID == p.ID, nil
+	})
+	for _, actor := range []string{"bob", "alice"} {
+		h := inprocHost{owner: actor, caps: caps}
+		view, err := h.ProjectMetadata(p.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		encoded, _ := json.Marshal(view.Settings)
+		for _, value := range []string{"fixture-nested-secret", "fixture-flat-secret", "fixture-legacy-secret", "fixture-schema-secret"} {
+			if bytes.Contains(encoded, []byte(value)) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s metadata exposed a fixture credential", actor)
+			}
+		}
+		if view.Settings["rdm.projectId"] != "canonical" || view.Settings["rdm.state"] != "ready" || view.Settings["display"].(map[string]any)["caption"] != "Shared configuration" {
+			t.Fatal("allowed service/configuration metadata changed")
+		}
+	}
+	// Exercise the real registry -> actor-scoped Host -> public HTTP list chain.
+	srv := server.New(st, nil, nil, nil, svc, nil)
+	srv.Auth = server.NewAuthenticator(st, true)
+	slot.wire(srv, caps)
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("bob", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key, err := st.CreateAPIKey("bob", "test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	request := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/projects", nil)
+	request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(response, request)
+	if response.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("member list=%d", response.Code)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"fixture-nested-secret", "fixture-flat-secret", "fixture-legacy-secret", "fixture-schema-secret"} {
+		if bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte(value)) {
+			t.Fatal("actor-scoped lifecycle list exposed a fixture credential")
+		}
+	}
+	if !bytes.Contains(response.Body.Bytes(), []byte(`"rdm.projectId":"canonical"`)) {
+		t.Fatal("actor-scoped list lost canonical metadata")
+	}
+
+	owned, err := (inprocHost{owner: "alice", caps: caps}).OwnedProject(p.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	before, _ := json.Marshal(raw)
+	after, _ := json.Marshal(owned.Settings)
+	if !bytes.Equal(before, after) {
+		t.Fatal("metadata read mutated persisted owner settings")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestBoundDelegatedProjectionFencesRealOperator(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/delegated-project.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "original")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	guard := accountEffectiveAuthorization(st, true)
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		valid, err := guard(context.Background(), owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	request := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+	delegator, ok := any(request).(interface {
+		ProjectProjectionForCreator(creator, projectID string) (extension.ProjectHost, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("request-bound delegated projection capability missing")
+	}
+	projection, err := delegator.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if projection.Owner() != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted projection owner=%s", projection.Owner())
+	}
+	if _, ok := projection.(extension.Host); ok {
+		t.Fatal("single-project projection exposed broad creator Host capabilities")
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "delegated"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("active delegated rename: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject("another-project", "hijack"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("projection escaped bound project: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.EnsureProject("another-project", "hijack"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("projection created another project: %v", err)
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "late"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled real operator renamed creator project: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "delegated" {
+		t.Fatalf("late rename changed project: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDelegatedProjectionRejectsDisableBetweenEarlyCheckAndWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	var st, other *store.Store
+	var err error
+	if baseDSN := os.Getenv("AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN"); baseDSN != "" {
+		st = openDirectoryTestStore(t)
+		if err := st.EnsureSystemIdentity("u3-delegated-projection", "pg"); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		var schema string
+		if err := st.DB().QueryRow(`SELECT current_schema()`).Scan(&schema); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		separator := "?"
+		if strings.Contains(baseDSN, "?") {
+			separator = "&"
+		}
+		other, err = store.OpenExistingPostgres(baseDSN+separator+"search_path="+schema+",public", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "other-artifacts"))
+	} else {
+		db := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "shared.db")
+		st, err = store.OpenSQLite(db)
+		if err == nil {
+			other, err = store.OpenExistingSQLite(db)
+		}
+		if st != nil {
+			defer st.Close()
+		}
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer other.Close()
+	for _, account := range []struct {
+		owner string
+		admin bool
+	}{{"admin", true}, {"alice", false}, {"bob", false}} {
+		if err := st.CreateAccount(account.owner, "", "", account.admin); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "before")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	entered, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
+	var bobChecks atomic.Int32
+	check := func(owner string) error {
+		state, err := st.GetUserAuthState(owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !state.Enabled {
+			return store.ErrAccountForbidden
+		}
+		if owner == "bob" && bobChecks.Add(1) == 2 {
+			close(entered)
+			<-release
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectLifecycleSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projects: slot, accountGuard: check}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}).RegisterProjectLifecycle(completeLifecycle()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	host := requestBoundHost{inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "bob", actor: "bob"}}
+	projection, err := host.ProjectProjectionForCreator("alice", string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	written := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, err := projection.RenameOwnedProject(string(project.ID), "late")
+		written <- err
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-entered:
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("rename did not reach paused early account check")
+	}
+	bob, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("bob")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := other.SetAccountEnabled("admin", bob.ID, bob.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	close(release)
+	select {
+	case err := <-written:
+		if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("late delegated rename committed: %v", err)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("late rename did not return")
+	}
+	got, err := st.ProjectMetadata(string(project.ID))
+	if err != nil || got.Name != "before" {
+		t.Fatalf("project changed after disable: %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_work_observation.go

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/runmgr"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+type projectWorkObserverSlot struct {
+	mu       sync.RWMutex
+	provider *extension.ProjectWorkObserver
+}
+
+func (s *projectWorkObserverSlot) get() *extension.ProjectWorkObserver {
+	if s == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	if s.provider == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	copy := *s.provider
+	return &copy
+}
+
+func (s *projectWorkObserverSlot) active() bool { return s.get() != nil }
+
+func wireProjectWorkGate(mgr *runmgr.Manager, st *store.Store, caps hostcaps, slot *projectWorkObserverSlot,
+	work func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error),
+) {
+	provider := slot.get()
+	if provider == nil || work == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	verify := func(ctx context.Context, row store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error {
+		switch row.SourceKind {
+		case "retrieval-hit":
+			return verifyProjectKnowledgeObservation(ctx, caps, row)
+		case "tool-result", "visible-analysis":
+			return verifyProjectTransientObservation(ctx, st, row)
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: unsupported run source kind %q", row.EventID, row.SourceKind)
+		}
+	}
+	mgr.SetProjectWorkGate(
+		func(ctx context.Context, runID, action string) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+			return preflightProjectRun(ctx, st, slot, work, verify, runID, action)
+		},
+		provider.Respond,
+	)
+}
+
+func (r compiledRegistry) RegisterProjectWorkObserver(extension.ProjectWorkObserver) error {
+	return errors.New("extension: declarative plugins cannot register project work observers")
+}
+
+func (r pluginRegistry) RegisterProjectWorkObserver(p extension.ProjectWorkObserver) error {
+	if r.pluginID != "rdm" || r.caps.workObserver == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project work observer requires trusted RDM registration")
+	}
+	if p.Observe == nil || p.Preflight == nil || p.Respond == nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project work observer requires all callbacks")
+	}
+	s := r.caps.workObserver
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.provider != nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: project work observer already registered")
+	}
+	copy := p
+	s.provider = &copy
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r recordRegistry) RegisterProjectWorkObserver(p extension.ProjectWorkObserver) error {
+	reg, ok := r.Registry.(extension.ProjectWorkObservationRegistry)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("extension: project work observation registration unavailable")
+	}
+	return reg.RegisterProjectWorkObserver(p)
+}
+
+// deliverProjectWorkObservations replays only committed source parts, rechecking
+// their owner and current project work authority before disclosing text to RDM.
+// An Observe ACK is an intake receipt, not a preflight or publication decision.
+// Failures leave the row pending for a later idempotent retry.
+func deliverProjectWorkObservations(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, slot *projectWorkObserverSlot,
+	work func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error), limit int, verify ...func(context.Context, store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error,
+) (int, error) {
+	provider := slot.get()
+	if provider == nil || work == nil {
+		return 0, errors.New("extension: trusted project work observer unavailable")
+	}
+	rows, err := st.PendingProjectWorkObservations(limit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return deliverProjectWorkRows(ctx, st, provider, work, rows, verify...)
+}
+
+func deliverProjectWorkRows(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, provider *extension.ProjectWorkObserver,
+	work func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error), rows []store.ProjectWorkObservationRow,
+	verify ...func(context.Context, store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error,
+) (int, error) {
+	completed := 0
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		if row.State != "pending" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if row.SourceKind != "user-message" && row.SourceKind != "assistant-message" {
+			if len(verify) != 1 || verify[0] == nil {
+				return completed, fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: current resource status verifier unavailable", row.EventID)
+			}
+			if err := verify[0](ctx, row); err != nil {
+				return completed, err
+			}
+		}
+		if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+			return completed, err
+		}
+		conv, err := st.GetConversation(row.Owner, row.ConversationID)
+		if err != nil || string(conv.ProjectID) != row.ProjectID {
+			return completed, fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: current conversation binding unavailable", row.EventID)
+		}
+		allowed, err := work(ctx, row.Owner, core.ID(row.ProjectID))
+		if err != nil || !allowed {
+			return completed, fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: current project authorization denied", row.EventID)
+		}
+		account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner(row.Owner)
+		authorizationEpoch := ""
+		if err == nil && account.Enabled {
+			authorizationEpoch = fmt.Sprintf("account:%d:project:%s", account.AuthVersion, row.ProjectID)
+		} else if row.Owner == store.OwnerDefault {
+			// Auth-off local mode has no enabled account model. The project-work
+			// callback above is still authoritative for this process.
+			authorizationEpoch = "auth-off-local:project:" + row.ProjectID
+		} else {
+			return completed, fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: current account authorization unavailable", row.EventID)
+		}
+		observation := extension.WorkObservation{
+			EventID: row.EventID, Phase: "source-committed", Actor: row.Owner, Owner: row.Owner,
+			ProjectID: core.ID(row.ProjectID), ConversationID: core.ID(row.ConversationID), RunID: core.ID(row.RunID),
+			SourceKind: row.SourceKind, SourceID: row.SourceID, SourceVersion: row.SourceVersion,
+			SourceSHA256: row.SourceSHA256, PartIndex: row.PartIndex, SpanStart: row.SpanStart, SpanEnd: row.SpanEnd,
+			Text: row.Text, Scope: row.Scope, Delivery: row.Delivery, DeliveryReason: row.Reason, Metadata: row.Metadata,
+			AuthorizationEpoch: authorizationEpoch, ObservedAt: row.ObservedAt,
+		}
+		result, err := provider.Observe(ctx, observation)
+		if err != nil {
+			return completed, err
+		}
+		switch result.State {
+		case extension.WorkObservationPending:
+			continue
+		case extension.WorkObservationAccepted, extension.WorkObservationPartial, extension.WorkObservationDenied:
+			if err := st.FinishProjectWorkObservation(row.EventID, result.ReceiptID, string(result.State)); err != nil {
+				return completed, err
+			}
+			completed++
+		default:
+			return completed, fmt.Errorf("project work source %s: invalid observer result %q", row.EventID, result.State)
+		}
+	}
+	return completed, nil
+}
+
+func verifyProjectKnowledgeObservation(_ context.Context, caps hostcaps, row store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error {
+	if row.SourceKind != "retrieval-hit" || caps.st == nil {
+		return errors.New("project work source: unsupported resource verification")
+	}
+	doc, err := caps.st.ProjectWorkKnowledgeSource(row.SourceID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("project work source: current knowledge source unavailable")
+	}
+	hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(doc.Chunk))
+	actualHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", hash)
+	if actualHash != row.SourceVersion || actualHash != row.SourceSHA256 || doc.Chunk != row.Text ||
+		(row.Metadata["ref"] != "" && row.Metadata["ref"] != doc.Ref) ||
+		(row.Metadata["source"] != "" && row.Metadata["source"] != doc.Source) ||
+		(doc.ProjectID != "" && string(doc.ProjectID) != row.ProjectID) {
+		return errors.New("project work source: knowledge version or scope changed")
+	}
+	if caps.authz != nil && caps.authz.hasV2() {
+		allowed, err := caps.authz.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+			Actor: row.Owner, Action: "model-context", ResourceType: "knowledge", ResourceID: doc.ID,
+			Owner: string(doc.Owner), ProjectID: doc.ProjectID, Source: doc.Source,
+		})
+		if err != nil || !allowed {
+			return errors.New("project work source: current knowledge authorization denied")
+		}
+	} else if string(doc.Owner) != row.Owner {
+		return errors.New("project work source: shared knowledge authorization unavailable")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A transient tool result has no external source authority to recheck. Its
+// committed private outbox bytes and stored run are the only reliable source;
+// RDM must keep it a candidate until a separately verifiable evidence source
+// or human confirmation supports a formal project claim.
+func verifyProjectTransientObservation(_ context.Context, st *store.Store, row store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error {
+	toolSource := row.SourceKind == "tool-result" && row.Metadata["sourceStatus"] == "transient" && row.Metadata["toolName"] != ""
+	visibleAnalysis := row.SourceKind == "visible-analysis" && row.Metadata["stage"] == "assistant-final" && row.Metadata["partType"] != ""
+	if (!toolSource && !visibleAnalysis) || row.RunID == "" {
+		return errors.New("project work source: transient result lacks trusted provenance")
+	}
+	run, err := st.GetRunByID(core.ID(row.RunID))
+	if err != nil || string(run.Owner) != row.Owner || string(run.ProjectID) != row.ProjectID || string(run.ConversationID) != row.ConversationID {
+		return errors.New("project work source: transient run binding unavailable")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// preflightProjectMessage delivers this committed message's pending parts
+// inline, then asks RDM to prove that every exact source part was analyzed for
+// the pending action. A durable intake ACK alone never permits the action.
+func preflightProjectMessage(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, slot *projectWorkObserverSlot,
+	work func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error), messageID, action, expectedOwner, expectedConversation, expectedProject, targetID, targetVersion string,
+) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+	pending := extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending, Reason: "project source awaiting analysis"}
+	provider := slot.get()
+	if provider == nil || work == nil {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: trusted project work observer unavailable")
+	}
+	rows, err := st.ProjectMessageObservations(messageID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	if len(rows) == 0 {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: committed project message has no source manifest")
+	}
+	if _, err := deliverProjectWorkRows(ctx, st, provider, work, rows); err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	rows, err = st.ProjectMessageObservations(messageID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	manifest := make([]extension.ProjectWorkSource, 0, len(rows))
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		if row.State != "accepted" || row.Delivery != "complete" {
+			return pending, nil
+		}
+		manifest = append(manifest, extension.ProjectWorkSource{
+			EventID: row.EventID, SourceKind: row.SourceKind, SourceID: row.SourceID,
+			SourceVersion: row.SourceVersion, SourceSHA256: row.SourceSHA256, PartIndex: row.PartIndex,
+		})
+	}
+	first := rows[0]
+	if first.Owner != expectedOwner || first.ConversationID != expectedConversation || first.ProjectID != expectedProject {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: source message is not bound to this actor, conversation, and project")
+	}
+	for _, row := range rows[1:] {
+		if row.Owner != first.Owner || row.ProjectID != first.ProjectID || row.ConversationID != first.ConversationID {
+			return pending, errors.New("extension: mixed project source manifest")
+		}
+	}
+	conv, err := st.GetConversation(first.Owner, first.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil || string(conv.ProjectID) != first.ProjectID {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: project binding changed before preflight")
+	}
+	allowed, err := work(ctx, first.Owner, conv.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || !allowed {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: current project work denied before preflight")
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(manifest)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	watermark := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256(raw))
+	decision, err := provider.Preflight(ctx, extension.ProjectWorkAction{
+		Actor: first.Owner, Owner: first.Owner, ProjectID: conv.ProjectID,
+		ConversationID: conv.ID, RunID: core.ID(first.RunID), Action: action, TargetID: targetID, TargetVersion: targetVersion,
+		Manifest: manifest, SourceWatermark: watermark,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	switch decision.State {
+	case extension.ProjectWorkProceed:
+		if decision.DecisionID == "" || decision.SourceWatermark != watermark {
+			return pending, errors.New("extension: project preflight decision did not bind current sources")
+		}
+	case extension.ProjectWorkClarify, extension.ProjectWorkPending, extension.ProjectWorkDenied:
+		// A non-proceed decision is a real result, never an implied approval.
+	default:
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: invalid project preflight decision")
+	}
+	return decision, nil
+}
+
+// preflightProjectRun binds all committed user, retrieval, tool, and visible
+// analysis parts of one run before a later model or business action consumes
+// them. Missing/partial parts keep the action pending. The domain provider
+// decides whether the complete source set contains a blocking risk.
+func preflightProjectRun(ctx context.Context, st *store.Store, slot *projectWorkObserverSlot,
+	work func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error), verify func(context.Context, store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error,
+	runID, action string,
+) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+	pending := extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending, Reason: "run sources awaiting analysis"}
+	provider := slot.get()
+	if provider == nil || work == nil || verify == nil {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: trusted project run observer unavailable")
+	}
+	run, err := st.GetRunByID(core.ID(runID))
+	if err != nil || run.ProjectID == "" {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: trusted project run unavailable")
+	}
+	rows, err := st.ProjectRunObservations(runID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	if len(rows) == 0 {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: project run has no trusted source manifest")
+	}
+	if _, err := deliverProjectWorkRows(ctx, st, provider, work, rows, verify); err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	rows, err = st.ProjectRunObservations(runID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	manifest := make([]extension.ProjectWorkSource, 0, len(rows))
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		if row.State != "accepted" || row.Delivery != "complete" {
+			return pending, nil
+		}
+		if row.RunID != runID || row.Owner != string(run.Owner) || row.ProjectID != string(run.ProjectID) || row.ConversationID != string(run.ConversationID) {
+			return pending, errors.New("extension: mixed run source manifest")
+		}
+		if row.SourceKind != "user-message" && row.SourceKind != "assistant-message" {
+			if err := verify(ctx, row); err != nil {
+				return pending, err
+			}
+		}
+		manifest = append(manifest, extension.ProjectWorkSource{
+			EventID: row.EventID, SourceKind: row.SourceKind, SourceID: row.SourceID,
+			SourceVersion: row.SourceVersion, SourceSHA256: row.SourceSHA256, PartIndex: row.PartIndex,
+		})
+	}
+	conv, err := st.GetConversation(string(run.Owner), string(run.ConversationID))
+	if err != nil || conv.ProjectID != run.ProjectID {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: run project binding changed before preflight")
+	}
+	allowed, err := work(ctx, string(run.Owner), run.ProjectID)
+	if err != nil || !allowed {
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: current run project work denied")
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(manifest)
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	watermark := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256(raw))
+	decision, err := provider.Preflight(ctx, extension.ProjectWorkAction{
+		Actor: string(run.Owner), Owner: string(run.Owner), ProjectID: run.ProjectID,
+		ConversationID: run.ConversationID, RunID: run.ID, Action: action,
+		Manifest: manifest, SourceWatermark: watermark,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return pending, err
+	}
+	switch decision.State {
+	case extension.ProjectWorkProceed:
+		if decision.DecisionID == "" || decision.SourceWatermark != watermark {
+			return pending, errors.New("extension: run preflight decision did not bind current sources")
+		}
+	case extension.ProjectWorkClarify, extension.ProjectWorkPending, extension.ProjectWorkDenied:
+	default:
+		return pending, errors.New("extension: invalid project run preflight decision")
+	}
+	return decision, nil
+}

internal/app/project_work_observation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func workObserverForTest() extension.ProjectWorkObserver {
+	return extension.ProjectWorkObserver{
+		Observe: func(context.Context, extension.WorkObservation) (extension.WorkObservationResult, error) {
+			return extension.WorkObservationResult{State: extension.WorkObservationPending}, nil
+		},
+		Preflight: func(context.Context, extension.ProjectWorkAction) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+			return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending}, nil
+		},
+		Respond: func(context.Context, extension.ProjectRiskAnswer) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+			return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending}, nil
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkDeliveryRechecksCurrentAuthorityAndACKsOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "work.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	msg := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleUser, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "要求效率和成本都低于人工"}}}
+	if err := st.AppendMessageWithRequestAccountChecked("alice", false, &msg, "req-1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	called := 0
+	slot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{}
+	observer := workObserverForTest()
+	observer.Observe = func(_ context.Context, source extension.WorkObservation) (extension.WorkObservationResult, error) {
+		called++
+		if source.Owner != "alice" || source.Actor != "alice" || source.ProjectID != project.ID || source.SourceID != string(msg.ID) || source.Text != msg.Parts[0].Text || source.Scope != "private" {
+			t.Fatalf("provider received forged or wrong source: %+v", source)
+		}
+		return extension.WorkObservationResult{State: extension.WorkObservationAccepted, ReceiptID: "rdm-receipt-1"}, nil
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{workObserver: slot}}).RegisterProjectWorkObserver(observer); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	denied := func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
+	if _, err := deliverProjectWorkObservations(context.Background(), st, slot, denied, 10); err == nil || called != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("revoked source was disclosed: calls=%d err=%v", called, err)
+	}
+	allowed := func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return actor == "alice" && id == project.ID, nil
+	}
+	if delivered, err := deliverProjectWorkObservations(context.Background(), st, slot, allowed, 10); err != nil || delivered != 1 || called != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("authorized source delivery failed: delivered=%d calls=%d err=%v", delivered, called, err)
+	}
+	if delivered, err := deliverProjectWorkObservations(context.Background(), st, slot, allowed, 10); err != nil || delivered != 0 || called != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("delivered source was replayed without need: delivered=%d calls=%d err=%v", delivered, called, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectMessagePreflightRequiresAnalysisAndExactManifest(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "preflight.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	msg := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleUser, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "要求效率和成本都低于人工"}}}
+	if err := st.AppendMessageWithRequestAccountChecked("alice", false, &msg, "req-1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ready, observations, decisions := false, 0, 0
+	observer := workObserverForTest()
+	observer.Observe = func(context.Context, extension.WorkObservation) (extension.WorkObservationResult, error) {
+		observations++
+		return extension.WorkObservationResult{State: extension.WorkObservationAccepted, ReceiptID: "intake-1"}, nil
+	}
+	observer.Preflight = func(_ context.Context, action extension.ProjectWorkAction) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+		decisions++
+		if action.Actor != "alice" || action.ProjectID != project.ID || action.ConversationID != conv.ID || action.RunID != "" || action.Action != "conversation.run" || len(action.Manifest) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("preflight did not receive exact trusted source manifest: %+v", action)
+		}
+		if !ready {
+			return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending}, nil
+		}
+		return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkProceed, DecisionID: "decision-1", SourceWatermark: action.SourceWatermark}, nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{provider: &observer}
+	work := func(_ context.Context, actor string, id core.ID) (bool, error) {
+		return actor == "alice" && id == project.ID, nil
+	}
+	decision, err := preflightProjectMessage(context.Background(), st, slot, work, string(msg.ID), "conversation.run", "alice", string(conv.ID), string(project.ID), "conversation.run", "v1")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkPending || observations != 1 || decisions != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("durable intake was confused with completed analysis: %+v observations=%d decisions=%d err=%v", decision, observations, decisions, err)
+	}
+	ready = true
+	decision, err = preflightProjectMessage(context.Background(), st, slot, work, string(msg.ID), "conversation.run", "alice", string(conv.ID), string(project.ID), "conversation.run", "v1")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkProceed || observations != 1 || decisions != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("same source did not proceed after domain analysis: %+v observations=%d decisions=%d err=%v", decision, observations, decisions, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`UPDATE messages SET parts=? WHERE id=?`, `[{"type":"text","text":"changed"}]`, msg.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	decision, err = preflightProjectMessage(context.Background(), st, slot, work, string(msg.ID), "conversation.run", "alice", string(conv.ID), string(project.ID), "conversation.run", "v1")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkPending || decisions != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("source changed after ACK but stale decision still passed: %+v decisions=%d err=%v", decision, decisions, err)
+	}
+	partial := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleUser, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartArtifactRef, Artifact: &core.ArtifactRef{ArtifactID: "file-1"}}}}
+	if err := st.AppendMessageWithRequestAccountChecked("alice", false, &partial, "req-2"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	decision, err = preflightProjectMessage(context.Background(), st, slot, work, string(partial.ID), "conversation.run", "alice", string(conv.ID), string(project.ID), "conversation.run", "v1")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkPending || decisions != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("partial attachment reached project action preflight: %+v decisions=%d err=%v", decision, decisions, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRetrievalObservationRechecksCurrentSourceBeforeDisclosure(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "source.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run := core.Run{ConversationID: conv.ID, ProjectID: project.ID, Owner: "alice", Kind: core.RunConversation, Status: core.RunRunning, Phase: core.PhaseThinking}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	doc := core.KnowledgeDoc{ID: "knowledge-1", Owner: "alice", ProjectID: project.ID, Source: "upload", Ref: "https://example.test/a", Chunk: "actual source"}
+	if err := st.AddKnowledge(doc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	observation := store.RunWorkObservationInput{RunID: string(run.ID), SourceKind: "retrieval-hit", SourceID: string(doc.ID),
+		SourceVersion: fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(doc.Chunk))), Text: doc.Chunk, Delivery: "complete",
+		Metadata: map[string]string{"ref": doc.Ref, "source": doc.Source}}
+	if _, err := st.AppendRunWorkObservation(observation); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	called := 0
+	provider := workObserverForTest()
+	provider.Observe = func(context.Context, extension.WorkObservation) (extension.WorkObservationResult, error) {
+		called++
+		return extension.WorkObservationResult{State: extension.WorkObservationAccepted, ReceiptID: "rdm-1"}, nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{provider: &provider}
+	work := func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
+	verify := func(ctx context.Context, row store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error {
+		return verifyProjectKnowledgeObservation(ctx, hostcaps{st: st}, row)
+	}
+	if n, err := deliverProjectWorkObservations(context.Background(), st, slot, work, 10, verify); err != nil || n != 1 || called != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("current owned source was not delivered: n=%d calls=%d err=%v", n, called, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.AppendRunWorkObservation(observation); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`DELETE FROM knowledge WHERE id=?`, doc.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n, err := deliverProjectWorkObservations(context.Background(), st, slot, work, 10, verify); err == nil || n != 0 || called != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted source text crossed into observer: n=%d calls=%d err=%v", n, called, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransientToolSourceKeepsCurrentRunAndCandidateStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tool.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run := core.Run{ConversationID: conv.ID, ProjectID: project.ID, Owner: "alice", Kind: core.RunConversation, Status: core.RunRunning, Phase: core.PhaseThinking}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, err = st.AppendRunWorkObservation(store.RunWorkObservationInput{RunID: string(run.ID), SourceKind: "tool-result", SourceID: "call-1", SourceVersion: "v1",
+		Text: "实际工具返回", Delivery: "complete", Metadata: map[string]string{"sourceStatus": "transient", "toolName": "lookup"}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rows, err := st.PendingProjectWorkObservations(10)
+	if err != nil || len(rows) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("tool source missing: %+v %v", rows, err)
+	}
+	if err := verifyProjectTransientObservation(context.Background(), st, rows[0]); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("committed private tool source rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DB().Exec(`DELETE FROM runs WHERE id=?`, run.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := verifyProjectTransientObservation(context.Background(), st, rows[0]); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("deleted run still authorized its transient source")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunPreflightWaitsForAllCommittedSourceParts(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "run-preflight.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "P")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(project.ID), "Work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	run := core.Run{ConversationID: conv.ID, ProjectID: project.ID, Owner: "alice", Kind: core.RunConversation, Status: core.RunRunning, Phase: core.PhaseThinking}
+	if err := st.CreateRun(&run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	msg := core.Message{ConversationID: conv.ID, Role: core.RoleUser, Parts: []core.Part{{Type: core.PartText, Text: "检查成本和效率"}}}
+	if err := st.AppendMessageWithRequestAccountChecked("alice", false, &msg, "req"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.SetMessageRunIDAccountChecked("alice", string(msg.ID), string(run.ID), false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.AppendRunWorkObservation(store.RunWorkObservationInput{RunID: string(run.ID), SourceKind: "tool-result", SourceID: "call-1",
+		SourceVersion: "v1", Text: "工具中的测量结果", Delivery: "complete", Metadata: map[string]string{"sourceStatus": "transient", "toolName": "measure"}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ready, preflights, observed, verified := false, 0, 0, 0
+	provider := workObserverForTest()
+	provider.Observe = func(_ context.Context, observation extension.WorkObservation) (extension.WorkObservationResult, error) {
+		observed++
+		if observation.AuthorizationEpoch == "" {
+			t.Fatal("observation omitted the current authorization epoch")
+		}
+		return extension.WorkObservationResult{State: extension.WorkObservationAccepted, ReceiptID: fmt.Sprintf("receipt-%d", observed)}, nil
+	}
+	provider.Preflight = func(_ context.Context, action extension.ProjectWorkAction) (extension.ProjectWorkDecision, error) {
+		preflights++
+		if action.RunID != run.ID || action.ProjectID != project.ID || len(action.Manifest) != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("run manifest omitted a committed source: %+v", action)
+		}
+		if !ready {
+			return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkPending}, nil
+		}
+		return extension.ProjectWorkDecision{State: extension.ProjectWorkProceed, DecisionID: "approved-risk-check", SourceWatermark: action.SourceWatermark}, nil
+	}
+	slot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{provider: &provider}
+	work := func(context.Context, string, core.ID) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
+	verify := func(ctx context.Context, row store.ProjectWorkObservationRow) error {
+		verified++
+		return verifyProjectTransientObservation(ctx, st, row)
+	}
+	decision, err := preflightProjectRun(context.Background(), st, slot, work, verify, string(run.ID), "model.consume.tool")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkPending || observed != 2 || preflights != 1 || verified != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("intake ACK was mistaken for finished risk analysis: %+v observed=%d preflights=%d err=%v", decision, observed, preflights, err)
+	}
+	ready = true
+	decision, err = preflightProjectRun(context.Background(), st, slot, work, verify, string(run.ID), "model.consume.tool")
+	if err != nil || decision.State != extension.ProjectWorkProceed || observed != 2 || preflights != 2 || verified != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("fully analyzed run was not released once: %+v observed=%d verified=%d preflights=%d err=%v", decision, observed, verified, preflights, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectWorkObservationRegistrationIsTrustedAndUnique(t *testing.T) {
+	slot := &projectWorkObserverSlot{}
+	trusted := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: hostcaps{workObserver: slot}}
+	other := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "other", caps: hostcaps{workObserver: slot}}
+	if err := other.RegisterProjectWorkObserver(workObserverForTest()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("untrusted plugin registered project observer")
+	}
+	if err := (compiledRegistry{}).RegisterProjectWorkObserver(workObserverForTest()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("declarative plugin registered live observer callback")
+	}
+	if err := trusted.RegisterProjectWorkObserver(extension.ProjectWorkObserver{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("partial observer registered")
+	}
+	if err := trusted.RegisterProjectWorkObserver(workObserverForTest()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := trusted.RegisterProjectWorkObserver(workObserverForTest()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("second observer replaced the trusted provider")
+	}
+	if got := slot.get(); got == nil || got.Observe == nil || got.Preflight == nil || got.Respond == nil {
+		t.Fatal("registered observer not available to host")
+	}
+}

internal/app/regulations.go

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+// EXT-20：共享法规检索与网络证据。提供方由受信插件 kbreg 进程内注册；基座只
+// 填写调用方身份、做查询最小化校验并审计，不改写提供方返回的状态。
+
+const (
+	regulationsPluginID = "kbreg"
+	maxWebQueryRunes    = 256
+
+	auditRegulationsSearch   = "regulations.search"
+	auditRegulationsEvidence = "regulations.evidence"
+	auditWebSearch           = "web.search"
+	auditWebCapture          = "web.capture"
+
+	regulationsAuditInvalid = "invalid"
+	regulationsAuditError   = "error"
+	regulationsAuditOK      = "ok"
+)
+
+var (
+	errRegulationsSchema = errors.New("extension: unsupported regulations schema version")
+	errWebQueryInvalid   = errors.New("extension: web search query must be 1-256 characters")
+)
+
+type regulationsSlot struct {
+	mu       sync.RWMutex
+	provider extension.RegulationsProvider
+}
+
+func (s *regulationsSlot) register(pluginID string, p extension.RegulationsProvider) error {
+	if p == nil || pluginID != regulationsPluginID {
+		return errors.New("extension: regulations provider requires trusted kbreg registration")
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.provider != nil {
+		return errors.New("extension: regulations provider already registered")
+	}
+	s.provider = p
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *regulationsSlot) get() extension.RegulationsProvider {
+	if s == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	return s.provider
+}
+
+// regulationsAudit is the only content written to the audit trail: never the
+// query text, excerpts or captured page text.
+type regulationsAudit struct {
+	Revision    string `json:"revision,omitempty"`
+	Count       int    `json:"count"`
+	State       string `json:"state"`
+	QuerySHA256 string `json:"querySha256,omitempty"`
+}
+
+func regulationsQueryDigest(query string) string {
+	if query == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(query))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+// regulations resolves the provider and the trusted caller. Without an audit
+// store the capability is unavailable: calls must never run unaudited.
+func (h inprocHost) regulations() (extension.RegulationsProvider, extension.RegulationsCaller, error) {
+	if err := h.requireEffective(); err != nil {
+		return nil, extension.RegulationsCaller{}, err
+	}
+	p := h.caps.regulations.get()
+	if p == nil || h.caps.st == nil {
+		return nil, extension.RegulationsCaller{}, extension.ErrRegulationsUnavailable
+	}
+	return p, extension.RegulationsCaller{PluginID: h.pluginID, Actor: h.actor, Owner: h.owner}, nil
+}
+
+// auditRegulations appends one event per call. A call error takes precedence;
+// otherwise an audit failure withholds the result.
+func (h inprocHost) auditRegulations(action string, rec regulationsAudit, callErr error) error {
+	if callErr != nil && rec.State == "" {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditError
+	}
+	evidence, err := json.Marshal(rec)
+	if err == nil {
+		err = h.Audit(action, regulationsPluginID, string(evidence))
+	}
+	if callErr != nil {
+		return callErr
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SearchRegulations(ctx context.Context, req extension.RegulationsSearchRequest) (extension.RegulationsSearchResult, error) {
+	p, caller, err := h.regulations()
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.RegulationsSearchResult{}, err
+	}
+	rec := regulationsAudit{Revision: req.CorpusRevision, QuerySHA256: regulationsQueryDigest(req.Query)}
+	if req.SchemaVersion != extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditInvalid
+		return extension.RegulationsSearchResult{}, h.auditRegulations(auditRegulationsSearch, rec, errRegulationsSchema)
+	}
+	res, err := p.SearchRegulations(ctx, caller, req)
+	if err == nil {
+		rec.Revision, rec.Count, rec.State = res.CorpusRevision, len(res.Hits), res.State
+	}
+	if err := h.auditRegulations(auditRegulationsSearch, rec, err); err != nil {
+		return extension.RegulationsSearchResult{}, err
+	}
+	return res, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) ResolveRegulationEvidence(ctx context.Context, req extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest) (extension.RegulationEvidence, error) {
+	p, caller, err := h.regulations()
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.RegulationEvidence{}, err
+	}
+	rec := regulationsAudit{Revision: req.CorpusRevision}
+	if req.SchemaVersion != extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditInvalid
+		return extension.RegulationEvidence{}, h.auditRegulations(auditRegulationsEvidence, rec, errRegulationsSchema)
+	}
+	ev, err := p.ResolveRegulationEvidence(ctx, caller, req)
+	if err == nil {
+		rec.Count, rec.State = 1, regulationsAuditOK
+		if ev.CorpusRevision != "" {
+			rec.Revision = ev.CorpusRevision
+		}
+	}
+	if err := h.auditRegulations(auditRegulationsEvidence, rec, err); err != nil {
+		return extension.RegulationEvidence{}, err
+	}
+	return ev, nil
+}
+
+// webQueryExcluded reports whether query contains any non-empty exclusion
+// term, case-insensitively.
+func webQueryExcluded(query string, exclusions []string) bool {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(query)
+	for _, term := range exclusions {
+		term = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(term))
+		if term != "" && strings.Contains(lower, term) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) SearchWeb(ctx context.Context, req extension.WebSearchRequest) (extension.WebSearchResult, error) {
+	p, caller, err := h.regulations()
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WebSearchResult{}, err
+	}
+	req.Query = strings.TrimSpace(req.Query)
+	rec := regulationsAudit{QuerySHA256: regulationsQueryDigest(req.Query)}
+	if req.SchemaVersion != extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditInvalid
+		return extension.WebSearchResult{}, h.auditRegulations(auditWebSearch, rec, errRegulationsSchema)
+	}
+	if req.Query == "" || !utf8.ValidString(req.Query) || utf8.RuneCountInString(req.Query) > maxWebQueryRunes {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditInvalid
+		return extension.WebSearchResult{}, h.auditRegulations(auditWebSearch, rec, errWebQueryInvalid)
+	}
+	if webQueryExcluded(req.Query, req.Exclusions) {
+		res := extension.WebSearchResult{State: extension.WebSearchStateRejected, Reason: "query contains an excluded term"}
+		rec.State = res.State
+		if err := h.auditRegulations(auditWebSearch, rec, nil); err != nil {
+			return extension.WebSearchResult{}, err
+		}
+		return res, nil
+	}
+	res, err := p.SearchWeb(ctx, caller, req)
+	if err == nil {
+		rec.Count, rec.State = len(res.Results), res.State
+	}
+	if err := h.auditRegulations(auditWebSearch, rec, err); err != nil {
+		return extension.WebSearchResult{}, err
+	}
+	return res, nil
+}
+
+func (h inprocHost) CaptureWeb(ctx context.Context, req extension.WebCaptureRequest) (extension.WebCapture, error) {
+	p, caller, err := h.regulations()
+	if err != nil {
+		return extension.WebCapture{}, err
+	}
+	rec := regulationsAudit{QuerySHA256: regulationsQueryDigest(strings.TrimSpace(req.SearchQuery))}
+	if req.SchemaVersion != extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion {
+		rec.State = regulationsAuditInvalid
+		return extension.WebCapture{}, h.auditRegulations(auditWebCapture, rec, errRegulationsSchema)
+	}
+	capture, err := p.CaptureWeb(ctx, caller, req)
+	if err == nil {
+		rec.Count, rec.State = len(capture.Candidates), capture.State
+	}
+	if err := h.auditRegulations(auditWebCapture, rec, err); err != nil {
+		return extension.WebCapture{}, err
+	}
+	return capture, nil
+}
+
+var _ extension.RegulationsHost = inprocHost{}

internal/app/regulations_compat_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+// compatRegulationsPlugin stands in for the external kbreg repository: it uses
+// only pkg/extension types and registers through the optional Registrar.
+type compatRegulationsPlugin struct{ seen []extension.RegulationsCaller }
+
+func (p *compatRegulationsPlugin) Register(reg extension.Registry) error {
+	registrar, ok := reg.(extension.RegulationsRegistrar)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("regulations registrar unavailable")
+	}
+	return registrar.RegisterRegulationsProvider(p)
+}
+
+func (p *compatRegulationsPlugin) SearchRegulations(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, req extension.RegulationsSearchRequest) (extension.RegulationsSearchResult, error) {
+	p.seen = append(p.seen, c)
+	return extension.RegulationsSearchResult{CorpusRevision: "rev-compat", State: extension.RegulationsStateOK,
+		Hits: []extension.RegulationHit{{RegulationID: "r", EditionID: "e", NodeID: "n", Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureExcerpt}}}, nil
+}
+
+func (p *compatRegulationsPlugin) ResolveRegulationEvidence(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, req extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest) (extension.RegulationEvidence, error) {
+	p.seen = append(p.seen, c)
+	return extension.RegulationEvidence{CorpusRevision: req.CorpusRevision, NodeID: req.NodeID, Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureFull, HashVerified: true}, nil
+}
+
+func (p *compatRegulationsPlugin) SearchWeb(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, req extension.WebSearchRequest) (extension.WebSearchResult, error) {
+	p.seen = append(p.seen, c)
+	return extension.WebSearchResult{Provider: "compat", SentQuery: req.Query, State: extension.WebSearchStateEmpty}, nil
+}
+
+func (p *compatRegulationsPlugin) CaptureWeb(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, req extension.WebCaptureRequest) (extension.WebCapture, error) {
+	p.seen = append(p.seen, c)
+	return extension.WebCapture{FinalURL: req.URL, State: extension.WebCaptureStateFailed, Reason: "offline"}, nil
+}
+
+// compatRegulationsConsumer is a second compiled plugin that reaches the
+// provider only through the dispatch Host type assertion.
+func compatRegulationsConsumer(reg extension.Registry) error {
+	return reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"consumer.regs","title":"regs"}`),
+		func(ctx context.Context, h extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+			regs, ok := h.(extension.RegulationsHost)
+			if !ok {
+				return nil, errors.New("regulations host capability missing")
+			}
+			search, err := regs.SearchRegulations(ctx, extension.RegulationsSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion, Query: "注册检验"})
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			web, err := regs.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion, Query: "注册检验 指导原则"})
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return map[string]any{"revision": search.CorpusRevision, "webState": web.State}, nil
+		})
+}
+
+func newRegulationsCompatApp(t *testing.T, plugins ...extension.InProc) (*cmdbus.Bus, *store.Store, hostcaps) {
+	t.Helper()
+	extension.ResetCompiled()
+	t.Cleanup(extension.ResetCompiled)
+	for _, p := range plugins {
+		extension.RegisterCompiled(p)
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "compat.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0).UTC() })
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, regulations: &regulationsSlot{}}
+	applyCompiled("", bus, caps)
+	return bus, st, caps
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsCompiledPluginCompatibility(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &compatRegulationsPlugin{}
+	impostor := &compatRegulationsPlugin{}
+	bus, st, caps := newRegulationsCompatApp(t,
+		extension.InProc{ID: "impostor", Register: impostor.Register},
+		extension.InProc{ID: "kbreg", Register: provider.Register},
+		extension.InProc{ID: "consumer", Register: compatRegulationsConsumer},
+	)
+	if caps.regulations.get() != extension.RegulationsProvider(provider) {
+		t.Fatal("compiled kbreg provider was not the registered provider")
+	}
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "consumer.regs", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", Entrance: "button"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("dispatch = %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	}
+	payload, _ := resp.Payload.(map[string]any)
+	if payload["revision"] != "rev-compat" || payload["webState"] != extension.WebSearchStateEmpty {
+		t.Fatalf("payload = %+v", resp.Payload)
+	}
+	want := extension.RegulationsCaller{PluginID: "consumer", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice"}
+	if len(provider.seen) != 2 || provider.seen[0] != want || provider.seen[1] != want || len(impostor.seen) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider callers = %+v impostor = %+v", provider.seen, impostor.seen)
+	}
+	evs, err := st.ListAuditEvents("alice", 20)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	actions := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, ev := range evs {
+		actions[ev.Action] = true
+	}
+	if !actions[auditRegulationsSearch] || !actions[auditWebSearch] {
+		t.Fatalf("host audit missing: %+v", evs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsCompiledConsumerWithoutProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	bus, _, _ := newRegulationsCompatApp(t, extension.InProc{ID: "consumer", Register: compatRegulationsConsumer})
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "consumer.regs", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", Entrance: "button"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State == agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("consumer succeeded without a regulations provider: %+v", resp.Payload)
+	}
+}

internal/app/regulations_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+type fakeRegulationsProvider struct {
+	callers    []extension.RegulationsCaller
+	webQueries []string
+	search     extension.RegulationsSearchResult
+	evidence   extension.RegulationEvidence
+	web        extension.WebSearchResult
+	capture    extension.WebCapture
+	err        error
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRegulationsProvider) SearchRegulations(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, _ extension.RegulationsSearchRequest) (extension.RegulationsSearchResult, error) {
+	f.callers = append(f.callers, c)
+	return f.search, f.err
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRegulationsProvider) ResolveRegulationEvidence(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, _ extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest) (extension.RegulationEvidence, error) {
+	f.callers = append(f.callers, c)
+	return f.evidence, f.err
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRegulationsProvider) SearchWeb(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, req extension.WebSearchRequest) (extension.WebSearchResult, error) {
+	f.callers = append(f.callers, c)
+	f.webQueries = append(f.webQueries, req.Query)
+	return f.web, f.err
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRegulationsProvider) CaptureWeb(_ context.Context, c extension.RegulationsCaller, _ extension.WebCaptureRequest) (extension.WebCapture, error) {
+	f.callers = append(f.callers, c)
+	return f.capture, f.err
+}
+
+func newRegulationsTestHost(t *testing.T) (inprocHost, *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "regulations.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, regulations: &regulationsSlot{}}
+	return inprocHost{caps: caps, pluginID: "rdm", owner: "alice", actor: "alice"}, st
+}
+
+func registerFakeRegulations(t *testing.T, h inprocHost) *fakeRegulationsProvider {
+	t.Helper()
+	p := &fakeRegulationsProvider{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "kbreg", caps: h.caps}).RegisterRegulationsProvider(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+const regV = extension.RegulationsSchemaVersion
+
+func callAllRegulations(h inprocHost, version int) []error {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	_, e1 := h.SearchRegulations(ctx, extension.RegulationsSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: version, Query: "医疗器械 临床评价"})
+	_, e2 := h.ResolveRegulationEvidence(ctx, extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest{SchemaVersion: version, CorpusRevision: "rev-1", NodeID: "n1"})
+	_, e3 := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: version, Query: "临床评价 指导原则"})
+	_, e4 := h.CaptureWeb(ctx, extension.WebCaptureRequest{SchemaVersion: version, URL: "https://www.nmpa.gov.cn/x", SearchQuery: "临床评价 指导原则"})
+	return []error{e1, e2, e3, e4}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsUnavailableWithoutProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	h, st := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	for i, err := range callAllRegulations(h, regV) {
+		if !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrRegulationsUnavailable) {
+			t.Fatalf("method %d without provider: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	h.caps.regulations = nil
+	for i, err := range callAllRegulations(h, regV) {
+		if !errors.Is(err, extension.ErrRegulationsUnavailable) {
+			t.Fatalf("method %d without slot: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if evs, err := st.ListAuditEvents("alice", 10); err != nil || len(evs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unavailable calls audited: %+v %v", evs, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsRegistrationOnlyTrustedKbregOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	first, second := &fakeRegulationsProvider{}, &fakeRegulationsProvider{}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "rdm", caps: h.caps}).RegisterRegulationsProvider(first); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("non-kbreg plugin registered a regulations provider")
+	}
+	kbreg := pluginRegistry{pluginID: "kbreg", caps: h.caps}
+	if err := kbreg.RegisterRegulationsProvider(nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("nil provider registered")
+	}
+	if err := kbreg.RegisterRegulationsProvider(first); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := kbreg.RegisterRegulationsProvider(second); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("duplicate registration accepted")
+	}
+	if h.caps.regulations.get() != first {
+		t.Fatal("duplicate registration replaced the first provider")
+	}
+	if err := (pluginRegistry{pluginID: "kbreg"}).RegisterRegulationsProvider(first); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("registration without a host slot accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsDeclarativeRegistrationRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := &fakeRegulationsProvider{}
+	if err := (compiledRegistry{}).RegisterRegulationsProvider(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("declarative registry accepted a regulations provider")
+	}
+	if err := (recordRegistry{Registry: pluginRegistry{pluginID: "kbreg", caps: h.caps}}).RegisterRegulationsProvider(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record registry did not forward kbreg registration: %v", err)
+	}
+	if h.caps.regulations.get() != p {
+		t.Fatal("forwarded registration did not fill the slot")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsCallerFilledFromDispatchContext(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	h.actor = "alice-session"
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	p.web.State = extension.WebSearchStateOK
+	for i, err := range callAllRegulations(h, regV) {
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("method %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	want := extension.RegulationsCaller{PluginID: "rdm", Actor: "alice-session", Owner: "alice"}
+	if len(p.callers) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d", len(p.callers))
+	}
+	for i, got := range p.callers {
+		if got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("call %d caller = %+v, want %+v", i, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsRejectsOtherSchemaVersions(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	for _, version := range []int{0, regV + 1} {
+		for i, err := range callAllRegulations(h, version) {
+			if !errors.Is(err, errRegulationsSchema) {
+				t.Fatalf("schema %d method %d: %v", version, i, err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if len(p.callers) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider reached with unsupported schema: %d calls", len(p.callers))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsWebQueryBounds(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	for _, q := range []string{"", "   \t\n", strings.Repeat("法", maxWebQueryRunes+1)} {
+		if _, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: q}); !errors.Is(err, errWebQueryInvalid) {
+			t.Fatalf("query of %d runes accepted: %v", len([]rune(q)), err)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(p.callers) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("provider reached with an invalid query")
+	}
+	maxQuery := strings.Repeat("法", maxWebQueryRunes)
+	if _, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: "  " + maxQuery + " "}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("256-rune query rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(p.webQueries) != 1 || p.webQueries[0] != maxQuery {
+		t.Fatalf("provider query was not trimmed: %q", p.webQueries)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsExclusionRejectedBeforeProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	h, st := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	query := "Project-Falcon 临床评价 指导原则"
+	res, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: query,
+		Exclusions: []string{"", "  ", "project-falcon"}})
+	if err != nil || res.State != extension.WebSearchStateRejected || res.SentQuery != "" || len(res.Results) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("excluded query result = %+v %v", res, err)
+	}
+	if len(p.callers) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("provider received a query containing an excluded term")
+	}
+	evs, err := st.ListAuditEvents("alice", 10)
+	if err != nil || len(evs) != 1 || evs[0].Action != auditWebSearch {
+		t.Fatalf("rejection audit: %+v %v", evs, err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(evs[0].Evidence), "falcon") || !strings.Contains(evs[0].Evidence, `"state":"rejected"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("rejection audit evidence = %s", evs[0].Evidence)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: query, Exclusions: []string{"", " "}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(p.callers) != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("blank exclusions blocked an allowed query")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsProviderStatesPassThroughUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	at := time.Date(2026, 10, 18, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	p.search = extension.RegulationsSearchResult{CorpusRevision: "rev-7", State: extension.RegulationsStateDegraded,
+		DegradedReasons: []string{"vector_index_unavailable"},
+		Hits: []extension.RegulationHit{{RegulationID: "r1", EditionID: "e1", NodeID: "n1",
+			Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureWithheld, WithheldReason: "rights"},
+			{RegulationID: "r2", EditionID: "e2", NodeID: "n2", Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureMetadataOnly}}}
+	p.evidence = extension.RegulationEvidence{CorpusRevision: "rev-7", NodeID: "n1",
+		Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureWithheld, WithheldReason: "rights", HashVerified: false}
+	p.web = extension.WebSearchResult{Provider: "fake", SentQuery: "q", SearchedAt: at,
+		State: extension.WebSearchStateRateLimited, Reason: "quota"}
+	p.capture = extension.WebCapture{CaptureID: "c1", FetchedAt: at, Retention: extension.WebRetentionMetadataOnly,
+		State: extension.WebCaptureStateRejected, Reason: "robots"}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	search, err := h.SearchRegulations(ctx, extension.RegulationsSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: "q"})
+	if err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(search, p.search) {
+		t.Fatalf("search = %+v %v", search, err)
+	}
+	evidence, err := h.ResolveRegulationEvidence(ctx, extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, CorpusRevision: "rev-7", NodeID: "n1"})
+	if err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(evidence, p.evidence) {
+		t.Fatalf("evidence = %+v %v", evidence, err)
+	}
+	web, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: "q"})
+	if err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(web, p.web) {
+		t.Fatalf("web = %+v %v", web, err)
+	}
+	p.web.State = extension.WebSearchStateRejected
+	web, err = h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: "q"})
+	if err != nil || web.State != extension.WebSearchStateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("provider rejection rewritten: %+v %v", web, err)
+	}
+	capture, err := h.CaptureWeb(ctx, extension.WebCaptureRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, URL: "https://example.org"})
+	if err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(capture, p.capture) {
+		t.Fatalf("capture = %+v %v", capture, err)
+	}
+	p.err = errors.New("provider failure")
+	if _, err := h.SearchRegulations(ctx, extension.RegulationsSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: "q"}); !errors.Is(err, p.err) {
+		t.Fatalf("provider failure wrapped as success: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsAuditEvidenceOmitsQueryAndText(t *testing.T) {
+	h, st := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	const (
+		secretQuery   = "第十七条 secret-query-text"
+		secretExcerpt = "SECRET-EXCERPT 原文片段"
+		secretPage    = "SECRET-PAGE 网页全文"
+	)
+	p.search = extension.RegulationsSearchResult{CorpusRevision: "rev-9", State: extension.RegulationsStateOK,
+		Hits: []extension.RegulationHit{{NodeID: "n1", Excerpt: secretExcerpt, Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureExcerpt}}}
+	p.evidence = extension.RegulationEvidence{CorpusRevision: "rev-9", NodeID: "n1", Excerpt: secretExcerpt,
+		Disclosure: extension.RegulationDisclosureFull, HashVerified: true}
+	p.web = extension.WebSearchResult{SentQuery: secretQuery, State: extension.WebSearchStateOK,
+		Results: []extension.WebSearchHit{{Rank: 1, URL: "https://example.org", Snippet: secretExcerpt}}}
+	p.capture = extension.WebCapture{State: extension.WebCaptureStateCaptured, Retention: extension.WebRetentionFull,
+		Text: secretPage, Candidates: []extension.WebClauseCandidate{{Excerpt: secretExcerpt}}}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := h.SearchRegulations(ctx, extension.RegulationsSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: secretQuery}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.ResolveRegulationEvidence(ctx, extension.RegulationEvidenceRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, CorpusRevision: "rev-9", NodeID: "n1"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.SearchWeb(ctx, extension.WebSearchRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, Query: " " + secretQuery + " "}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := h.CaptureWeb(ctx, extension.WebCaptureRequest{SchemaVersion: regV, URL: "https://example.org", SearchQuery: secretQuery}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	evs, err := st.ListAuditEvents("alice", 10)
+	if err != nil || len(evs) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("audit events = %+v %v", evs, err)
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(secretQuery))
+	digest := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+	want := map[string]regulationsAudit{
+		auditRegulationsSearch:   {Revision: "rev-9", Count: 1, State: "ok", QuerySHA256: digest},
+		auditRegulationsEvidence: {Revision: "rev-9", Count: 1, State: "ok"},
+		auditWebSearch:           {Count: 1, State: "ok", QuerySHA256: digest},
+		auditWebCapture:          {Count: 1, State: "captured", QuerySHA256: digest},
+	}
+	for _, ev := range evs {
+		for _, secret := range []string{"secret-query-text", "第十七条", "SECRET-EXCERPT", "原文片段", "SECRET-PAGE", "网页全文"} {
+			if strings.Contains(ev.Evidence, secret) || strings.Contains(ev.Target, secret) {
+				t.Fatalf("%s audit leaks %q: %s", ev.Action, secret, ev.Evidence)
+			}
+		}
+		var fields map[string]any
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(ev.Evidence), &fields); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for k := range fields {
+			if k != "revision" && k != "count" && k != "state" && k != "querySha256" {
+				t.Fatalf("%s audit has unexpected field %q", ev.Action, k)
+			}
+		}
+		var got regulationsAudit
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(ev.Evidence), &got); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if w, ok := want[ev.Action]; !ok || got != w || ev.Owner != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("%s audit = %+v owner=%s, want %+v", ev.Action, got, ev.Owner, w)
+		}
+		delete(want, ev.Action)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegulationsRequireEffectiveAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := newRegulationsTestHost(t)
+	p := registerFakeRegulations(t, h)
+	h.caps.accountGuard = func(string) error { return store.ErrAccountForbidden }
+	for i, err := range callAllRegulations(h, regV) {
+		if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("method %d ignored the account guard: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(p.callers) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("provider reached for an ineffective account")
+	}
+}

internal/app/resource_authz_v2_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package app
+
+// EXT-8b 资源级授权槽位测试（U9 首切片）：
+//  1. V2 未注册 → AuthorizeResource 回落 V1（owner×project 兼容现行）；
+//  2. V2 注册 → 按查询六要素咨询；受信字段缺失（actor/action/type/id 空）＝拒绝；
+//  3. V2 返回 error ＝ 拒绝（fail-closed）；
+//  4. 首注册者生效（后来者忽略）；
+//  5. compiledRegistry 的 V2 注册被拒（声明式无宿主回调）。
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+func TestAuthorizeResourceV2FallbackAndQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	var a projectAuthz
+	// 未注册任何适配器 → 拒绝。
+	if ok, err := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); ok || err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("未注册应拒绝, got %v %v", ok, err)
+	}
+	// 仅 V1：回落 owner×project 布尔。
+	a.set("p1", func(owner string, projectID string) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("V1 允许时回落应放行")
+	}
+	// V1 路径要求 owner/project 非空。
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1"}); ok {
+		t.Fatal("V1 回落在无项目私域应拒绝")
+	}
+	// 注册 V2 → 按六要素咨询。
+	a.setV2("p1", func(q extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) {
+		return q.Actor == "u1" && q.Action == "download" && q.ResourceType == "artifact" &&
+			q.ResourceID == "a1" && q.Owner == "u2" && q.ProjectID == "p1", nil
+	})
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", Action: "download", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1",
+		Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("V2 六要素齐备应放行")
+	}
+	// 六要素缺一（action 空）＝拒绝（不可判定）。
+	if ok, _ := a.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u1", ResourceType: "artifact", ResourceID: "a1", Owner: "u2", ProjectID: "p1"}); ok {
+		t.Fatal("受信字段缺失应拒绝")
+	}
+	// V2 出错＝拒绝（fail-closed）。
+	a2 := projectAuthz{}
+	a2.setV2("p1", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, errors.New("boom") })
+	if ok, err := a2.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u", Action: "read", ResourceType: "x", ResourceID: "1"}); ok || err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("V2 error 应拒绝")
+	}
+	// 首注册者生效。
+	a3 := projectAuthz{}
+	a3.setV2("first", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil })
+	a3.setV2("second", func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return false, nil })
+	if ok, _ := a3.AuthorizeResource(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery{
+		Actor: "u", Action: "read", ResourceType: "x", ResourceID: "1"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("首个 V2 注册者应生效")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCompiledRegistryRejectsV2(t *testing.T) {
+	r := compiledRegistry{}
+	if err := r.RegisterResourceAuthorizerV2(func(extension.ResourceAuthzQuery) (bool, error) { return true, nil }); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("声明式扩展不得注册资源级授权回调（fail-closed）")
+	}
+}

internal/app/scoped_host_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/rag"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/settings"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+)
+
+// EXT-11 红测：注入前 NewScopedHost fail-closed；注入后重建句柄与分发期同构
+// （owner 作用域、PluginID、KV 隔离、知识删除前缀强制）。
+func TestScopedHostFactory(t *testing.T) {
+	// 注入前：fail-closed。
+	if _, err := extension.NewScopedHost("alice", "rdm"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("before wiring, NewScopedHost must fail closed（工厂未注入）")
+	}
+
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "t.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	set := settings.NewService(st)
+	pipe := rag.NewPipeline(st, set, nil, nil)
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, pipe: pipe, set: set}
+
+	// 组合根同款注入（app.Run 内以 wireScopedHostFactory 接线；此处直接调内部函数）。
+	wireScopedHostFactory(caps)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { extension.SetScopedHostFactory(nil) })
+
+	h, err := extension.NewScopedHost("alice", "rdm")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewScopedHost: %v", err)
+	}
+	if h.Owner() != "alice" || h.PluginID() != "rdm" {
+		t.Fatalf("Owner/PluginID = %s/%s, want alice/rdm", h.Owner(), h.PluginID())
+	}
+	if _, ok := h.(extension.DelegatedProjectProjectionHost); ok {
+		t.Fatal("globally reconstructed Host exposed request-bound projection authority")
+	}
+	// KV 往返落 owner 作用域。
+	if err := h.KVPut("k1", "v1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if v, ok, err := h.KVGet("k1"); err != nil || !ok || v != "v1" {
+		t.Fatalf("KVGet = %q ok=%v err=%v", v, ok, err)
+	}
+	// 同构性：知识删除前缀强制（manual 不可及）。
+	if err := h.KnowledgeDelete(context.Background(), "manual"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("scoped host must keep the plugin:<id> prefix enforcement")
+	}
+	// 空 owner/pluginID：拒绝。
+	if _, err := extension.NewScopedHost("", "rdm"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("empty owner must be rejected")
+	}
+}

internal/app/service_store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/blobstore"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/instanceguard"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+)
+
+// openServiceStore 打开活动服务使用的存储。
+// SQLite 档先取活动服务锁，再打开（打开即迁移），然后核对守卫标记。
+// 返回的函数先关存储再放锁。
+func openServiceStore(opt Options) (*store.Store, func(), error) {
+	nop := func() {}
+	if opt.StorageDSN != "" {
+		artifacts := opt.ArtifactsDir
+		if artifacts == "" {
+			artifacts = filepath.Join(opt.DataDir, "artifacts")
+		}
+		// 共享工件（U5/KTD9）：配置了 S3 兼容对象存储时注入（多实例共享）；
+		// 未配置回落本地目录（单实例/共享卷）。凭据只经环境（不入库不入报告）。
+		blobs, berr := blobstore.NewS3FromEnv()
+		if berr != nil {
+			return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("blobstore s3: %w", berr)
+		}
+		if blobs != nil {
+			log.Printf("artifacts: shared via S3-compatible object storage (prefix %q)", blobs.Prefix)
+		}
+		st, err := store.OpenPostgresWithOptions(opt.StorageDSN, artifacts, opt.PGPool, blobs)
+		if err != nil && opt.Tier == "team" {
+			// team 档拒绝就绪（R2）：PG 故障不回落 SQLite，错误必须明说。
+			return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("team 档打开 PostgreSQL 失败，拒绝就绪（不回落 SQLite）: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("open store: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err := verifyConfiguredIdentity(st, "pg"); err != nil {
+			_ = st.Close()
+			return nil, nop, err
+		}
+		return st, func() { _ = st.Close() }, nil
+	}
+
+	lease, err := instanceguard.Acquire(opt.DataDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("instance guard: %w", err)
+	}
+	releaseLease := func() { lease.Release() }
+	if err := lease.AutomaticRefusal(); err != nil {
+		adoptable := opt.AdoptInstanceGuard && (errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrDBReplaced) || errors.Is(err, instanceguard.ErrLockCorrupt))
+		if !adoptable {
+			releaseLease()
+			return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("instance guard: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(lease.DBPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		releaseLease()
+		return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("open store: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := verifyConfiguredIdentity(st, "sqlite"); err != nil {
+		_ = st.Close()
+		releaseLease()
+		return nil, nop, err
+	}
+	if err := instanceguard.Bind(st, lease, instanceguard.BindOptions{
+		Adopt:      opt.AdoptInstanceGuard,
+		InstanceID: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID")),
+	}); err != nil {
+		_ = st.Close()
+		releaseLease()
+		return nil, nop, fmt.Errorf("instance guard: %w", err)
+	}
+	return st, func() {
+		_ = st.Close()
+		lease.Release()
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// verifyConfiguredIdentity U1 I3：svc 注入的服务实例身份（manifest.instance_id）与库内 marker 对齐；
+// 未设置则跳过（兼容未接线旧调用方）。与 --instance（runs 进程标识）无关。
+func verifyConfiguredIdentity(st *store.Store, defaultRef string) error {
+	sysID := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE_ID"))
+	if sysID == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	dbref := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENT_SYSTEM_DBREF"))
+	if dbref == "" {
+		dbref = defaultRef
+	}
+	if err := st.VerifySystemIdentity(sysID, dbref); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("system identity: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Migrate 执行显式迁移。SQLite 必须先取得活动服务锁，有服务占用则拒绝。
+func Migrate(opt Options) error {
+	_, release, err := openServiceStore(opt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	release()
+	return nil
+}

internal/app/surface_audit_actor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
+	"agent-system-backend/pkg/extension"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestSurfaceButtonDispatchUsesAuthenticatedActor(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := st.EnsureUser("alice", "Alice at action"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "A")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(p.ID), "work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+	if err := bus.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.submit", Title: "Submit"}, "", func(context.Context, cmdbus.Request) (any, error) { return "ok", nil }); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	result, err := dispatchSurfaceAction(context.Background(), bus, surfacesvc.ActionDispatch{CommandID: "demo.submit", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: string(c.ID)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if result.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("state: %s", result.State)
+	}
+	rows, _, _, err := st.ListProjectCommandAudits("alice", string(p.ID), 0, 0, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].Envelope.Actor != "alice" || rows[0].ActorName != "Alice at action" {
+		t.Fatalf("button audit actor: %+v", rows)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCompiledHandlerReceivesHostOperationID(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	p, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "A")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", string(p.ID), "work", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bus := cmdbus.New(st, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+	slot := &projectAuditSlot{}
+	caps := hostcaps{st: st, projectAudit: slot}
+	reg := pluginRegistry{compiledRegistry: compiledRegistry{bus: bus}, pluginID: "rdm", caps: caps}
+	var seen string
+	if err := reg.AddCommandHandler(json.RawMessage(`{"id":"rdm.confirm","title":"Confirm"}`), func(_ context.Context, _ extension.Host, req extension.Request) (any, error) {
+		seen = req.OperationID
+		return "domain-committed", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), cmdbus.Request{ID: "rdm.confirm", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: string(c.ID)})
+	rows, _, _, err := st.ListProjectCommandAudits("alice", string(p.ID), 0, 0, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if seen == "" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != seen || len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].Envelope.OperationID != seen {
+		t.Fatalf("handler/domain correlation: seen=%q receipt=%+v rows=%+v", seen, resp.Receipt, rows)
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditAuthorizer(func(actor string, project core.ID) (bool, error) { return actor == "bob" && project == p.ID, nil }); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publisherFactory, err := (recordRegistry{Registry: reg}).RegisterProjectAuditLinkVerifier(func(_ context.Context, proof extension.ProjectAuditLinkProof) (bool, error) {
+		return proof.Owner == "alice" && proof.ProjectID == p.ID && proof.OperationID == seen && proof.SourceID == "domain-commit-1" && proof.ResourceID == "doc-1", nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := reg.RegisterProjectAuditDisclosureAuthorizer(func(_ context.Context, actor string, r extension.ProjectAuditLinkedResource) (extension.ProjectAuditDisclosure, error) {
+		return extension.ProjectAuditDisclosure{Metadata: actor == "bob" && r.ResourceID == "doc-1"}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publisher, err := publisherFactory.ForOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	linked, err := publisher.PublishProjectAuditLink(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditLinkRequest{ProjectID: p.ID, OperationID: seen, SourceKind: "domain-commit", SourceID: "domain-commit-1", ResourceKind: "document", ResourceID: "doc-1", DisclosureClass: "metadata", IdempotencyKey: "outbox-1"})
+	if err != nil || linked.HostAuditOffset != rows[0].Offset {
+		t.Fatalf("publish by trusted operation: %+v %v", linked, err)
+	}
+	bob := inprocHost{caps: caps, owner: "bob", actor: "bob", pluginID: "rdm"}
+	page, err := bob.QueryProjectAudit(context.Background(), extension.ProjectAuditQuery{ProjectID: p.ID, LinkedSourceKind: "domain-commit", LinkedSourceID: "domain-commit-1", LinkedHostOffset: linked.HostAuditOffset})
+	if err != nil || len(page.Receipts) != 1 || page.Receipts[0].OperationID != seen {
+		t.Fatalf("linked read: %+v %v", page, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/surface_dispatch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/cmdbus"
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/surfacesvc"
+)
+
+// dispatchSurfaceAction receives Owner from SurfaceService's authenticated
+// caller. The button is acting for that user, so both Actor and Owner must be
+// populated before the command bus writes its audit envelope.
+func dispatchSurfaceAction(ctx context.Context, bus *cmdbus.Bus, d surfacesvc.ActionDispatch) (surfacesvc.ActionOutcome, error) {
+	if cmdbus.RequiresProjectWorkDecision(d.CommandID) {
+		return surfacesvc.ActionOutcome{}, fmt.Errorf("project formal action requires a committed conversation source preflight")
+	}
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(ctx, cmdbus.Request{ID: d.CommandID, Params: d.Params,
+		Entrance: "button", Actor: d.Owner, Owner: d.Owner, ConversationID: d.ConversationID})
+	state := "committed"
+	if resp.Receipt.State != "" {
+		state = string(resp.Receipt.State)
+	}
+	cardID := ""
+	if resp.Card != nil {
+		cardID = string(resp.Card.ID)
+	}
+	return surfacesvc.ActionOutcome{State: state, CardID: cardID, Receipt: resp.Receipt, Payload: resp.Payload}, nil
+}

internal/app/tier_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// 协作存储方案 U2（KTD1/R2）：服务入口的部署档门禁。
+// team 档缺 DSN / 未开认证必须拒绝启动——不创建 SQLite、不进入装配。
+func TestTierRefusalTeam(t *testing.T) {
+	msgs := TierRefusal(Options{Tier: "team", Addr: "127.0.0.1:8788"})
+	if len(msgs) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("team without dsn/auth: %v", msgs)
+	}
+	joined := strings.Join(msgs, "；")
+	if !strings.Contains(joined, "PostgreSQL DSN") || !strings.Contains(joined, "认证") {
+		t.Fatalf("refusal wording: %v", msgs)
+	}
+	msgs = TierRefusal(Options{Tier: "team", Addr: "127.0.0.1:8788", StorageDSN: "postgres://u:p@h/db", AuthMode: "on"})
+	if len(msgs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("team with dsn+auth should pass: %v", msgs)
+	}
+	msgs = TierRefusal(Options{Tier: "local", Addr: "127.0.0.1:8788", StorageDSN: "postgres://u:p@h/db"})
+	if len(msgs) != 1 || !strings.Contains(msgs[0], "local 档不使用") {
+		t.Fatalf("local with dsn: %v", msgs)
+	}
+	msgs = TierRefusal(Options{Addr: "127.0.0.1:8788"})
+	if len(msgs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("auto default: %v", msgs)
+	}
+}

internal/blobstore/blobstore.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 )
@@ -19,6 +20,21 @@ type Store interface {
 	Delete(ref string) error
 }
 
+// IsNil 判断对象存储是否未配置。nil 接口，以及放进接口后的带类型空指针
+// （例如未设置端点时的 (*S3)(nil)），都算未配置。已构造的实现返回 false。
+func IsNil(s Store) bool {
+	if s == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	v := reflect.ValueOf(s)
+	switch v.Kind() {
+	case reflect.Chan, reflect.Func, reflect.Interface, reflect.Map, reflect.Pointer, reflect.Slice:
+		return v.IsNil()
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
 // Local 是本地目录实现（data/artifacts；多实例时把目录指向共享卷即可）。
 type Local struct {
 	dir string
@@ -32,6 +48,12 @@ func NewLocal(dir string) (*Local, error) {
 	return &Local{dir: dir}, nil
 }
 
+// OpenLocalExisting 绑定既有目录，不 MkdirAll。目录缺失时仍返回可用句柄
+// （账户运维只碰 DB；Put 时若目录不存在会失败）。
+func OpenLocalExisting(dir string) (*Local, error) {
+	return &Local{dir: dir}, nil
+}
+
 // validID 只接受纯文件名形态的对象 id：非空、不含路径分隔符、非 . / ..。
 // Put 的 id 可能是上层透传的用户输入（如工件路径参数），先在此挡住路径穿越。
 func validID(id string) bool {

internal/blobstore/nil_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+package blobstore
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestIsNil(t *testing.T) {
+	var unset Store
+	if !IsNil(unset) {
+		t.Fatal("nil interface must count as unset")
+	}
+	var typed *S3
+	var asStore Store = typed
+	if !IsNil(asStore) {
+		t.Fatal("typed nil *S3 must count as unset")
+	}
+	local, err := NewLocal(t.TempDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if IsNil(local) {
+		t.Fatal("local store must count as configured")
+	}
+	s3, err := NewS3("http://127.0.0.1:9/bucket", "us-east-1", "access", "secret", "art/")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if IsNil(s3) {
+		t.Fatal("configured S3 must count as configured")
+	}
+}

internal/blobstore/object_store_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+package blobstore
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// U5/KTD9：S3 兼容对象存储实现——针对嵌入式测试服务器验证
+// 签名请求、Put/Get/Delete 语义与预签名 URL 生成。
+// （真实 S3 兼容服务的端到端验收随 U7 压测环境执行；此处锁定协议正确性。）
+
+func newTestS3(t *testing.T, base string) *S3 {
+	t.Helper()
+	s, err := NewS3(base, "us-east-1", "AKIDEXAMPLE", "secret", "art/")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func TestS3PutGetDeleteRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotPath, gotMethod, gotAuth string
+	var gotBody []byte
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		gotPath, gotMethod, gotAuth = r.URL.Path, r.Method, r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+		buf := make([]byte, 4096)
+		n, _ := r.Body.Read(buf)
+		gotBody = buf[:n]
+		switch r.Method {
+		case http.MethodPut:
+			w.WriteHeader(200)
+		case http.MethodGet:
+			if strings.Contains(gotPath, "obj404") {
+				w.WriteHeader(404)
+				return
+			}
+			w.Write([]byte("payload"))
+		case http.MethodDelete:
+			w.WriteHeader(204)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+	s := newTestS3(t, srv.URL+"/bucket")
+
+	ref, err := s.Put("doc1", []byte("payload"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if ref != "art/doc1" {
+		t.Fatalf("ref=%s（对象键应带前缀）", ref)
+	}
+	if gotPath != "/bucket/art/doc1" || gotMethod != http.MethodPut || string(gotBody) != "payload" {
+		t.Fatalf("put 请求：%s %s body=%q", gotMethod, gotPath, gotBody)
+	}
+	if len(gotAuth) == 0 || gotAuth[:17] != "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 " {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization 头：%q", gotAuth)
+	}
+	got, err := s.Get(ref)
+	if err != nil || string(got) != "payload" {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %q err=%v", got, err)
+	}
+	if err := s.Delete(ref); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	// 404 → 哨兵错误（服务端对 art/obj404 的 GET 返回 404）。
+	if _, err := s.Get("art/obj404"); err == nil || err.Error() != ErrObjectNotFound.Error() {
+		t.Fatalf("404 应 ErrObjectNotFound：%v", err)
+	}
+	// Delete 幂等（404 视为成功）。
+	srv2 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(404)
+	}))
+	defer srv2.Close()
+	s2 := newTestS3(t, srv2.URL+"/b")
+	if err := s2.Delete("art/none"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete 404 应幂等：%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestS3PresignGet(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTestS3(t, "https://s3.example.com/bucket")
+	u, err := s.PresignGet("art/doc1", 15*time.Minute)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, want := range []string{"X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256", "X-Amz-Signature=", "X-Amz-Expires=900", "/bucket/art/doc1"} {
+		if !contains(u, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("预签名 URL 缺 %s：%s", want, u)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func contains(s, sub string) bool {
+	return len(s) >= len(sub) && (func() bool {
+		for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
+			if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	})()
+}
+
+func TestNewS3FromEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	os.Unsetenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ENDPOINT")
+	s, err := NewS3FromEnv()
+	if s != nil || err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("未配置端点应回落 (nil,nil)：s=%v err=%v", s, err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ENDPOINT", "http://x/b")
+	t.Setenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ACCESS_KEY", "a")
+	t.Setenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_SECRET_KEY", "b")
+	s, err = NewS3FromEnv()
+	if err != nil || s == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("已配置应构造：s=%v err=%v", s, err)
+	}
+}

internal/blobstore/s3.go

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+package blobstore
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// S3 是 S3 兼容对象存储实现（协作存储 U5/KTD9：多实例共享工件）。
+// 认证：AWS Signature V4（静态 AccessKey/SecretKey；凭据只经环境或受保护
+// 配置注入，引用形态为对象键，不含凭据）。
+//
+// 语义（KTD9）：
+//   - Put：先完整写对象再由上层提交引用（失败孤儿可清理）；
+//   - Get：按对象键读取；
+//   - Delete：立即删除（标记/延迟 GC 由桶生命周期策略承担）。
+type S3 struct {
+	Base    string // 端点（含 bucket 路径，如 https://s3.example.com/bucket）
+	Region  string
+	Access  string
+	Secret  string
+	Prefix  string // 对象键前缀（租户/应用隔离）
+	client  *http.Client
+	nowFunc func() time.Time
+}
+
+// NewS3 从显式参数构造；nil client 用默认。
+func NewS3(base, region, access, secret, prefix string) (*S3, error) {
+	if base == "" || access == "" || secret == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("blobstore: s3 requires base/access/secret")
+	}
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(base, "/") {
+		base += "/"
+	}
+	return &S3{Base: base, Region: region, Access: access, Secret: secret, Prefix: prefix,
+		client: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}, nowFunc: time.Now}, nil
+}
+
+// NewS3FromEnv 按环境构造：BLOBSTORE_S3_ENDPOINT/REGION/ACCESS_KEY/SECRET_KEY/PREFIX。
+// 未配置端点返回 (nil, nil)（调用方回落本地档）。
+func NewS3FromEnv() (*S3, error) {
+	if os.Getenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ENDPOINT") == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return NewS3(os.Getenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ENDPOINT"),
+		envOr("BLOBSTORE_S3_REGION", "us-east-1"),
+		os.Getenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_ACCESS_KEY"),
+		os.Getenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_SECRET_KEY"),
+		os.Getenv("BLOBSTORE_S3_PREFIX"))
+}
+
+func envOr(k, d string) string {
+	if v := os.Getenv(k); v != "" {
+		return v
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
+func (s *S3) key(id string) (string, error) {
+	if !validID(id) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("blobstore: invalid object id %q", id)
+	}
+	return s.Prefix + id, nil
+}
+
+// Put 上传对象；ref=对象键。
+func (s *S3) Put(id string, content []byte) (string, error) {
+	key, err := s.key(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.do(http.MethodPut, key, content, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
+		body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 256))
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("blobstore: s3 put %s: %s %s", key, resp.Status, body)
+	}
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+// Get 下载对象。
+func (s *S3) Get(ref string) ([]byte, error) {
+	resp, err := s.do(http.MethodGet, ref, nil, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
+		return nil, ErrObjectNotFound
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("blobstore: s3 get %s: %s", ref, resp.Status)
+	}
+	return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+}
+
+// ErrObjectNotFound 对象不存在（与本地档 ErrNotExist 对齐的哨兵）。
+var ErrObjectNotFound = errors.New("blobstore: object not found")
+
+// Delete 删除对象（幂等：404 视为成功）。
+func (s *S3) Delete(ref string) error {
+	resp, err := s.do(http.MethodDelete, ref, nil, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode/100 == 2 || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("blobstore: s3 delete %s: %s", ref, resp.Status)
+}
+
+// do 签名并执行请求（AWS SigV4，service=s3）。
+func (s *S3) do(method, key string, body []byte, contentType string) (*http.Response, error) {
+	u, err := url.Parse(s.Base + key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	now := s.nowFunc().UTC()
+	amzDate := now.Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	dateStamp := now.Format("20060102")
+	payloadHash := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	payloadHex := hex.EncodeToString(payloadHash[:])
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(method, u.String(), bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("x-amz-date", amzDate)
+	req.Header.Set("x-amz-content-sha256", payloadHex)
+	if contentType != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
+	}
+	// 规范请求与签名（SigV4 单 chunk）。
+	canonicalURI := "/" + strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/")
+	canonicalQuery := u.RawQuery
+	var ch bytes.Buffer
+	ch.WriteString(method + "\n" + canonicalURI + "\n" + canonicalQuery + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("host:" + u.Host + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("x-amz-content-sha256:" + payloadHex + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("x-amz-date:" + amzDate + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("\nhost;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date\n" + payloadHex)
+	cr := ch.Bytes()
+
+	scope := dateStamp + "/" + s.Region + "/s3/aws4_request"
+	stringToSign := "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n" + amzDate + "\n" + scope + "\n" + hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum(cr))
+	kDate := hmacSHA256([]byte("AWS4"+s.Secret), dateStamp)
+	kRegion := hmacSHA256(kDate, s.Region)
+	kService := hmacSHA256(kRegion, "s3")
+	kSigning := hmacSHA256(kService, "aws4_request")
+	sig := hex.EncodeToString(hmacSHA256(kSigning, stringToSign))
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential="+s.Access+"/"+scope+
+		", SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="+sig)
+	return s.client.Do(req)
+}
+
+func sha256sum(b []byte) []byte {
+	h := sha256.Sum256(b)
+	return h[:]
+}
+
+func hmacSHA256(key []byte, data string) []byte {
+	m := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+	m.Write([]byte(data))
+	return m.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// PresignGet 生成限时 GET 预签名 URL（下载入口；有效期由调用方指定）。
+// 用于把大对象下载直接指向对象存储，应用实例不做数据中继。
+func (s *S3) PresignGet(ref string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
+	u, err := url.Parse(s.Base + ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	now := s.nowFunc().UTC()
+	amzDate := now.Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	dateStamp := now.Format("20060102")
+	expiry := int64(ttl / time.Second)
+	payloadHex := hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum(nil))
+	q := u.Query()
+	q.Set("X-Amz-Algorithm", "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256")
+	q.Set("X-Amz-Credential", s.Access+"/"+dateStamp+"/"+s.Region+"/s3/aws4_request")
+	q.Set("X-Amz-Date", amzDate)
+	q.Set("X-Amz-Expires", fmt.Sprint(expiry))
+	q.Set("X-Amz-SignedHeaders", "host")
+	u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
+
+	canonicalQuery := canonicalQueryEncode(u)
+	var ch bytes.Buffer
+	ch.WriteString("GET\n/" + strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/") + "\n" + canonicalQuery + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("host:" + u.Host + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("x-amz-content-sha256:" + payloadHex + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("x-amz-date:" + amzDate + "\n")
+	ch.WriteString("\nhost;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date\n" + payloadHex)
+	scope := dateStamp + "/" + s.Region + "/s3/aws4_request"
+	stringToSign := "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n" + amzDate + "\n" + scope + "\n" + hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum(ch.Bytes()))
+	kDate := hmacSHA256([]byte("AWS4"+s.Secret), dateStamp)
+	kRegion := hmacSHA256(kDate, s.Region)
+	kService := hmacSHA256(kRegion, "s3")
+	kSigning := hmacSHA256(kService, "aws4_request")
+	sig := hex.EncodeToString(hmacSHA256(kSigning, stringToSign))
+	return u.String() + "&X-Amz-Signature=" + sig, nil
+}
+
+// canonicalQueryEncode 按 AWS 规则重排查询串（键排序 + URL 编码）。
+func canonicalQueryEncode(u *url.URL) string {
+	q := u.Query()
+	var keys []string
+	for k := range q {
+		keys = append(keys, k)
+	}
+	// 排序（简单实现足够：键集固定且互不冲突）
+	for i := 0; i < len(keys); i++ {
+		for j := i + 1; j < len(keys); j++ {
+			if keys[j] < keys[i] {
+				keys[i], keys[j] = keys[j], keys[i]
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	var sb strings.Builder
+	for i, k := range keys {
+		if i > 0 {
+			sb.WriteString("&")
+		}
+		sb.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(k) + "=" + url.QueryEscape(q[k][0]))
+	}
+	return sb.String()
+}
+
+var _ Store = (*S3)(nil)

internal/cardsvc/account_checked.go

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+func (s *Service) requireAccountCheckedEmitter() error {
+	if s.emit != nil && s.accountCheckedEmit == nil {
+		return ErrGuardedEmitterRequired
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *Service) ResolveByRefAccountChecked(actor, ref, actionID, answer string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	id, err := s.st.CardIDByRef(actor, ref)
+	if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if card.Status.Terminal() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	card.Status = core.CardResolved
+	recordAnswer(&card, actionID, answer)
+	if err := s.UpdateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault); errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+		return nil
+	} else if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardResolved,
+		core.CardResolvedPayload{CardID: card.ID, ActionID: actionID, Answer: answer})
+}
+
+// AppendAccountChecked preserves stream-card throttling while fencing its
+// durable body update against account disable.
+func (s *Service) AppendAccountChecked(actor, id, text string, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if text != "" {
+		if n := len(card.Body); n > 0 && card.Body[n-1].Type == core.UIMarkdown {
+			card.Body[n-1].Markdown += text
+		} else {
+			card.Body = append(card.Body, core.UINode{Type: core.UIMarkdown, Markdown: text})
+		}
+	}
+	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardVersionedAccountChecked(actor, &card, "", version, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if card.ConversationID == "" && card.ProjectID == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.emitMu.Lock()
+	last, seen := s.lastEmit[id]
+	emit := !seen || s.now().Sub(last) >= cardAppendWindow
+	if emit {
+		s.lastEmit[id] = s.now()
+	}
+	s.emitMu.Unlock()
+	if !emit {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) emitCardAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+	if s.accountCheckedEmit == nil || (card.ConversationID == "" && card.ProjectID == "") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if card.ConversationID != "" {
+		if err := s.accountCheckedEmit(actor, card.ConversationID, card.SourceRunID, typ, payload); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !s.MirrorConvCards {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	if card.ProjectID != "" {
+		return s.accountCheckedEmit(actor, string(core.ProjectChannelKey(card.ProjectID)), card.SourceRunID, typ, payload)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CreateAccountChecked creates a card under the actor's final Store fence.
+func (s *Service) CreateAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	if card.ID == "" {
+		card.ID = store.NewID("card")
+	}
+	now := s.now().UTC()
+	card.CreatedAt, card.UpdatedAt = now, now
+	if card.Status == "" {
+		card.Status = core.CardActive
+	}
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardAccountChecked(actor, &card, ref, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, expectedVersion int, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardVersionedAccountChecked(actor, &card, "", expectedVersion, allowImplicitDefault); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) UpdateVersionedAccountChecked(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, expectedVersion int, allowImplicitDefault bool) error {
+	_, err := s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, expectedVersion, allowImplicitDefault)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (s *Service) SetPinnedAccountChecked(actor, id string, pinned, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.Pinned = pinned
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Service) SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	card.Status = status
+	if tone != "" {
+		card.Tone = tone
+	}
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	return card, s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardStatus,
+		core.CardStatusPayload{CardID: card.ID, Status: status, Tone: card.Tone, Note: note})
+}
+
+func (s *Service) DismissAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	return s.SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id, core.CardDismissed, "", "dismissed by user", allowImplicitDefault)
+}
+
+func (s *Service) ActionAccountChecked(actor, id, actionID, freeText string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, string, error) {
+	card, version, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(actor, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, "", err
+	}
+	if card.Status != core.CardActionRequired {
+		return card, "", ErrNotAwaiting
+	}
+	label, found := actionID, false
+	for _, action := range card.Actions {
+		if action.ID == actionID {
+			label, found = action.Label, true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		if actionID == "" && freeText != "" {
+			label = freeText
+		} else {
+			return card, "", ErrNoAction
+		}
+	}
+	card.Status = core.CardResolved
+	recordAnswer(&card, actionID, freeText)
+	card, err = s.updateVersionedAccountChecked(actor, card, version, allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil {
+		return card, "", err
+	}
+	err = s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, card, core.EvCardResolved,
+		core.CardResolvedPayload{CardID: card.ID, ActionID: actionID, Answer: freeText})
+	return card, label, err
+}
+
+// ToProjectAccountChecked performs the copy and dismissal in one transaction.
+// Events are published after commit through the actor-aware event sink.
+func (s *Service) ToProjectAccountChecked(actor, id string, allowImplicitDefault bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if err := s.requireAccountCheckedEmitter(); err != nil {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, err
+	}
+	archived, origin, created, err := s.st.ArchiveCardToProjectAccountChecked(actor, id, s.now().UTC(), allowImplicitDefault)
+	if err != nil || !created {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	if err := s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, archived, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: archived}); err != nil {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	if err := s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, origin, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: origin}); err != nil {
+		return archived, err
+	}
+	err = s.emitCardAccountChecked(actor, origin, core.EvCardStatus,
+		core.CardStatusPayload{CardID: origin.ID, Status: core.CardDismissed, Tone: origin.Tone, Note: "已留档到项目"})
+	return archived, err
+}

internal/cardsvc/account_checked_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+func TestAccountCheckedCardActionsUseActorEventSinkAndRespectDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/cards.db")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("admin", "", "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.CreateAccount("alice", "", "", false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := st.CreateProject("alice", "cards")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conv, err := st.CreateConversation("alice", project.ID, "cards", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	legacyCalls := 0
+	svc := New(st, func(string, string, core.StreamEventType, any) error {
+		legacyCalls++
+		return nil
+	})
+	type emitted struct {
+		actor, channel string
+		typ            core.StreamEventType
+	}
+	var guarded []emitted
+	svc.SetAccountCheckedEmitter(func(actor, channel, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+		guarded = append(guarded, emitted{actor, channel, typ})
+		return nil
+	})
+	base := core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Action",
+		Status: core.CardActionRequired, Actions: []core.UIAction{{ID: "yes", Label: "Approve"}}}
+	action, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, label, err := svc.ActionAccountChecked("alice", action.ID, "yes", "", false); err != nil || label != "Approve" {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded action: label=%q err=%v", label, err)
+	}
+	pending, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pin, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Pin"}, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := svc.SetPinnedAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, true, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := svc.DismissAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	archive, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: project.ID, ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "Archive"}, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	archived, err := svc.ToProjectAccountChecked("alice", archive.ID, false)
+	if err != nil || archived.ConversationID != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded archive: %+v %v", archived, err)
+	}
+	if legacyCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("guarded card operations used unguarded emitter %d times", legacyCalls)
+	}
+	if len(guarded) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("guarded operations published no events")
+	}
+	for _, event := range guarded {
+		if event.actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("event actor lost: %+v", event)
+		}
+	}
+	before := len(guarded)
+	account, err := st.GetAccountByOwner("alice")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.SetAccountEnabled("admin", account.ID, account.StateVersion, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, mutate := range []func() error{
+		func() error { _, err := svc.CreateAccountChecked("alice", base, "", false); return err },
+		func() error { _, _, err := svc.ActionAccountChecked("alice", pending.ID, "yes", "", false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.SetPinnedAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false, false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.DismissAccountChecked("alice", pin.ID, false); return err },
+		func() error { _, err := svc.ToProjectAccountChecked("alice", archive.ID, false); return err },
+	} {
+		if err := mutate(); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrAccountForbidden) {
+			t.Fatalf("disabled actor mutated card: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(guarded) != before {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled actor published %d events", len(guarded)-before)
+	}
+}

internal/cardsvc/cardsvc.go

@@ -17,25 +17,76 @@ import (
 // 获得持久化、seq 排序、断线重放与终态对账（Stream 契约）。
 type Emitter func(conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
 
+// AccountCheckedEmitter persists an actor-attributed event through its own
+// final account-checked Store transaction. The card write and event emission
+// are separate commits; the application wires this to its guarded event sink.
+type AccountCheckedEmitter func(actor, conversationID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
+
 var (
-	ErrNotFound    = store.ErrNotFound // 语义对齐存储层：跨租户/不存在一律 NotFound
-	ErrNoAction    = errors.New("card: action not found")
-	ErrNotAwaiting = errors.New("card: not awaiting action")
+	ErrNotFound               = store.ErrNotFound // 语义对齐存储层：跨租户/不存在一律 NotFound
+	ErrNoAction               = errors.New("card: action not found")
+	ErrNotAwaiting            = errors.New("card: not awaiting action")
+	ErrGuardedEmitterRequired = errors.New("card: account-checked emitter required")
 )
 
 // cardAppendWindow 是流式追加（Append）的 card.updated 发布节流窗口（D45）。
 const cardAppendWindow = 250 * time.Millisecond
 
 type Service struct {
-	st      *store.Store
-	emit    Emitter
-	now     func() time.Time
-	emitMu  sync.Mutex
-	lastEmit map[string]time.Time // 流式追加的最近发布时刻（按卡）
+	st                 *store.Store
+	emit               Emitter
+	accountCheckedEmit AccountCheckedEmitter
+	projectSharedEmit  ProjectSharedEmitter
+	// MirrorConvCards EXT-12：会话卡是否镜像进项目公共流（缺省 true=现状全量
+	// 镜像；false 时会话卡只进本人会话流，项目级卡不受影响）。
+	MirrorConvCards bool
+	now             func() time.Time
+	emitMu          sync.Mutex
+	lastEmit        map[string]time.Time // 流式追加的最近发布时刻（按卡）
 }
 
 func New(st *store.Store, emit Emitter) *Service {
-	return &Service{st: st, emit: emit, now: time.Now, lastEmit: map[string]time.Time{}}
+	return &Service{st: st, emit: emit, now: time.Now, lastEmit: map[string]time.Time{}, MirrorConvCards: true}
+}
+
+func (s *Service) SetAccountCheckedEmitter(emit AccountCheckedEmitter) {
+	s.accountCheckedEmit = emit
+}
+
+// ProjectSharedEmitter is an internal trusted publication adapter. It is never
+// bound to model arguments or exposed as a mandatory extension capability.
+type ProjectSharedEmitter func(owner, producer, channel, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error
+
+func (s *Service) SetProjectSharedEmitter(emit ProjectSharedEmitter) { s.projectSharedEmit = emit }
+
+// PublishProjectCard explicitly publishes a project-level structural snapshot.
+// Ordinary Create/Update remain private unless this entry issues a new proof.
+func (s *Service) PublishProjectCard(owner, producer string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if s.projectSharedEmit == nil || owner == "" || producer == "" || card.ProjectID == "" || card.ConversationID != "" {
+		return card, errors.New("card: trusted project publisher required")
+	}
+	if card.ID != "" {
+		current, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, card.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return card, err
+		}
+		if current.ProjectID != card.ProjectID || current.ConversationID != "" {
+			return card, store.ErrNotFound
+		}
+	} else {
+		card.ID = store.NewID("card")
+	}
+	now := s.now().UTC()
+	card.CreatedAt = now
+	card.UpdatedAt = now
+	if card.Status == "" {
+		card.Status = core.CardActive
+	}
+	if err := s.st.SaveCard(owner, &card, ref); err != nil {
+		return card, err
+	}
+	err := s.projectSharedEmit(owner, producer, string(core.ProjectChannelKey(card.ProjectID)), card.SourceRunID, core.EvCardCreated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+	return card, err
 }
 
 // emitCard 按卡归属发布卡片事件（D50）：
@@ -52,6 +103,11 @@ func (s *Service) emitCard(c core.ActivityCard, typ core.StreamEventType, payloa
 		if err := s.emit(c.ConversationID, c.SourceRunID, typ, payload); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		// EXT-12 最小开关：会话卡不镜像进项目公共流（不发布即不持久，
+		// 重放天然不含会话卡）；项目级卡（无会话归属）不受影响。
+		if !s.MirrorConvCards {
+			return nil
+		}
 	}
 	if c.ProjectID != "" {
 		return s.emit(string(core.ProjectChannelKey(c.ProjectID)), c.SourceRunID, typ, payload)
@@ -79,14 +135,24 @@ func (s *Service) Create(owner string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string) (core
 }
 
 // Get 读取单卡。
-func (s *Service) Get(owner, id string) (core.ActivityCard, error) { return s.st.GetCard(owner, id) }
+func (s *Service) Get(owner, id string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	c, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, id)
+	return s.presentResolved(owner, c), err
+}
 
 // List 按会话列出（updated_at 降序；置顶与待办排序是前端关注点）。
 func (s *Service) List(owner, conversationID string) ([]core.ActivityCard, error) {
-	return s.st.ListCards(owner, conversationID)
+	cards, err := s.st.ListCards(owner, conversationID)
+	if err == nil {
+		for i := range cards {
+			cards[i] = s.presentResolved(owner, cards[i])
+		}
+	}
+	return cards, err
 }
 
 // Update 保存整卡变更（流式 Body 增量等）并发布 card.updated；ref 保持原值。
+// 系统镜像路径（同会话 run 的顺序行为）沿用盲写；用户态裁决走 UpdateVersioned。
 func (s *Service) Update(owner string, card core.ActivityCard) error {
 	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
 	if err := s.st.SaveCard(owner, &card, ""); err != nil {
@@ -95,6 +161,16 @@ func (s *Service) Update(owner string, card core.ActivityCard) error {
 	return s.emitCard(card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
 }
 
+// UpdateVersioned 乐观并发保存（U3，KTD7）：版本不匹配透传 store.ErrConflict，
+// HTTP 层映射 409；客户端重读卡后重试。
+func (s *Service) UpdateVersioned(owner string, card core.ActivityCard, expectedVersion int) error {
+	card.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	if err := s.st.SaveCardVersioned(owner, &card, "", expectedVersion); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return s.emitCard(card, core.EvCardUpdated, core.CardPayload{Card: card})
+}
+
 // Append 流式追加正文（card_append 工具；D45）：文本并入 body 尾部 markdown
 // 节点（尾节点非 markdown 则新增），逐次持久化；card.updated 按 cardAppendWindow
 // 节流——窗口内的追加只落库不发布（投影语义：事件携带整卡，后续事件自然覆盖
@@ -133,7 +209,7 @@ func (s *Service) Append(owner, id, text string) error {
 
 // SetStatus 状态迁移：更新并发布 card.status。
 func (s *Service) SetStatus(owner, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
-	c, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, id)
+	c, ver, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(owner, id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return c, err
 	}
@@ -141,7 +217,7 @@ func (s *Service) SetStatus(owner, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note
 	if tone != "" {
 		c.Tone = tone
 	}
-	if err := s.Update(owner, c); err != nil {
+	if err := s.UpdateVersioned(owner, c, ver); err != nil {
 		return c, err
 	}
 	return c, s.emitCard(c, core.EvCardStatus, core.CardStatusPayload{CardID: c.ID, Status: status, Tone: c.Tone, Note: note})
@@ -149,12 +225,12 @@ func (s *Service) SetStatus(owner, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note
 
 // SetPinned 置顶/取消（收件箱"不沉没"语义）。
 func (s *Service) SetPinned(owner, id string, pinned bool) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
-	c, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, id)
+	c, ver, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(owner, id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return c, err
 	}
 	c.Pinned = pinned
-	return c, s.Update(owner, c)
+	return c, s.UpdateVersioned(owner, c, ver)
 }
 
 // Dismiss 关闭卡（非确认语义，留痕）。
@@ -165,7 +241,7 @@ func (s *Service) Dismiss(owner, id string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
 // Action 处理卡上按钮点击：仅 action_required 卡可裁决；结果 resolved 并发布
 // card.resolved（ActionID 即按钮语义）。
 func (s *Service) Action(owner, id, actionID, freeText string) (core.ActivityCard, string, error) {
-	c, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, id)
+	c, ver, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(owner, id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return c, "", err
 	}
@@ -189,7 +265,8 @@ func (s *Service) Action(owner, id, actionID, freeText string) (core.ActivityCar
 		return c, "", ErrNoAction
 	}
 	c.Status = core.CardResolved
-	if err := s.Update(owner, c); err != nil {
+	recordAnswer(&c, actionID, freeText)
+	if err := s.UpdateVersioned(owner, c, ver); err != nil {
 		return c, "", err
 	}
 	return c, label, s.emitCard(c, core.EvCardResolved, core.CardResolvedPayload{CardID: c.ID, ActionID: actionID, Answer: freeText})
@@ -242,7 +319,7 @@ func (s *Service) ResolveByRef(owner, ref, actionID, answer string) error {
 		}
 		return err
 	}
-	c, err := s.st.GetCard(owner, id)
+	c, ver, err := s.st.GetCardVersion(owner, id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -250,7 +327,11 @@ func (s *Service) ResolveByRef(owner, ref, actionID, answer string) error {
 		return nil // 已决（双现任一侧先到）
 	}
 	c.Status = core.CardResolved
-	if err := s.Update(owner, c); err != nil {
+	recordAnswer(&c, actionID, answer)
+	if err := s.UpdateVersioned(owner, c, ver); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrConflict) {
+			return nil // 双现任一侧先到（版本竞争败者）：不重试，卡以先到侧为准
+		}
 		return err
 	}
 	if c.ConversationID != "" && s.emit != nil {

internal/cardsvc/mirror_switch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+)
+
+// EXT-12 最小开关（红测）：MirrorConvCards=false 时会话卡不镜像进项目公共流
+// （不发布即不持久，重放天然不含会话卡）；项目级卡不受影响；缺省 true 保持现状。
+func TestConvCardMirrorSwitch(t *testing.T) {
+	newSvc := func(mirror bool) (*Service, *[]string) {
+		chans := []string{}
+		emit := func(convID, runID string, typ core.StreamEventType, payload any) error {
+			chans = append(chans, convID)
+			return nil
+		}
+		st, err := store.OpenSQLite(t.TempDir() + "/cards.db")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
+		svc := New(st, emit)
+		svc.MirrorConvCards = mirror
+		return svc, &chans
+	}
+	card := core.ActivityCard{ConversationID: "c-priv", ProjectID: "p-1", Kind: core.CardKindProgress, Title: "私有过程卡"}
+
+	// 开（缺省现状）：会话流 + 项目流双发。
+	svc, chans := newSvc(true)
+	if _, err := svc.Create("alice", card, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(*chans) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("mirror on: emitted %v, want 会话流+项目流", *chans)
+	}
+
+	// 关：只进本人会话流，项目公共流零事件。
+	svc2, chans2 := newSvc(false)
+	if _, err := svc2.Create("alice", card, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(*chans2) != 1 || (*chans2)[0] != "c-priv" {
+		t.Fatalf("mirror off: emitted %v, want 仅会话流 c-priv（项目流不得发布）", *chans2)
+	}
+
+	// 项目级卡（无会话归属）不受开关影响。
+	pc := core.ActivityCard{ProjectID: "p-1", Kind: core.CardKindProgress, Title: "项目级卡"}
+	if _, err := svc2.Create("alice", pc, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(*chans2) != 2 || (*chans2)[1] != string(core.ProjectChannelKey("p-1")) {
+		t.Fatalf("project-level card must still publish: %v", *chans2)
+	}
+}

internal/cardsvc/resolution.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+func recordAnswer(card *core.ActivityCard, actionID, answer string) {
+	label := actionID
+	for _, action := range card.Actions {
+		if action.ID == actionID {
+			label = action.Label
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	body := []core.UINode{}
+	for _, node := range card.Body {
+		if node.Type == core.UIMarkdown && (strings.Contains(node.Markdown, "可在输入框自由输入") || strings.Contains(node.Markdown, "自由输入回应")) {
+			continue
+		}
+		body = append(body, node)
+	}
+	pairs := [][2]string{}
+	if label != "" {
+		pairs = append(pairs, [2]string{"你的选择", label})
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" && answer != label {
+		pairs = append(pairs, [2]string{"补充说明", answer})
+	}
+	if len(pairs) > 0 {
+		body = append(body, core.UINode{Type: core.UIKV, KV: pairs})
+	}
+	card.Body = body
+}
+
+func (s *Service) presentResolved(owner string, card core.ActivityCard) core.ActivityCard {
+	if card.Status != core.CardResolved {
+		return card
+	}
+	// Already-recorded answers survive unchanged; old projections are repaired
+	// from their owner-scoped persisted HITL resolution without changing history.
+	for _, node := range card.Body {
+		for _, pair := range node.KV {
+			if pair[0] == "你的选择" || pair[0] == "补充说明" {
+				return card
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	ref, err := s.st.CardRef(owner, card.ID)
+	if err != nil || !strings.HasPrefix(ref, "hitl:") {
+		return card
+	}
+	resolution, err := s.st.HITLResolution(owner, strings.TrimPrefix(ref, "hitl:"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return card
+	}
+	recordAnswer(&card, "", resolution.Answer)
+	return card
+}

internal/cardsvc/resolution_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package cardsvc
+
+import (
+	"agent-system-backend/internal/store"
+	core "agent-system-core"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestHistoricalResolvedChoiceDisplaysPersistedAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	st, svc, _ := openTest(t)
+	hitl := core.HITLCard{ID: "old-choice", ConversationID: "cnv_1"}
+	if err := st.SaveHITLCard(store.OwnerDefault, &hitl); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.ResolveHITLCard(store.OwnerDefault, hitl.ID, core.HITLResolvedPayload{CardID: hitl.ID, Answer: "生成摘要", Kind: "choice"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	card, err := svc.Create(store.OwnerDefault, core.ActivityCard{Kind: core.CardKindConfirm, Status: core.CardResolved, Body: []core.UINode{{Type: core.UIMarkdown, Markdown: "_可在输入框自由输入回应。_"}}}, "hitl:"+hitl.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := svc.Get(store.OwnerDefault, card.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	found := false
+	for _, node := range got.Body {
+		if strings.Contains(node.Markdown, "输入框") {
+			t.Fatal("stale input hint retained")
+		}
+		for _, pair := range node.KV {
+			if pair[1] == "生成摘要" {
+				found = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatal("stored choice answer missing")
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/account_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardRejectsBeforeDispatchEffects(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		req  Request
+		err  error
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"disabled handler", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+		{"failed lookup", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("database unavailable"), "alice"},
+		{"plugin actor uses account owner", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Owner: "alice", Actor: "plugin:rdm"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+		{"actor fallback", Request{ID: "demo.ping", Actor: "alice"}, errors.New("disabled"), "alice"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+			b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+			called := 0
+			b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+				called++
+				if actor != tc.want {
+					t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q, want %q", actor, tc.want)
+				}
+				return tc.err
+			})
+			resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), tc.req)
+			if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || !strings.Contains(resp.Receipt.Reason, "effective account") {
+				t.Fatalf("guard rejection: %+v", resp.Receipt)
+			}
+			if called != 1 || len(audit.logs) != 0 || len(cards.created) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("guard calls=%d audits=%d cards=%d", called, len(audit.logs), len(cards.created))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardRejectsBeforePendingConfirmAndRechecks(t *testing.T) {
+	audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+	b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+	allowed := false
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if !allowed {
+			return errors.New("disabled")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	req := Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}}
+	if r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if len(cards.created) != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 || len(audit.logs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("disabled dispatch created confirmation effects")
+	}
+	allowed = true
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req)
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted || len(cards.created) != 1 || len(b.pending) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("enabled dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	allowed = false
+	before := len(audit.logs)
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled confirm: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if len(b.pending) != 1 || len(audit.logs) != before {
+		t.Fatal("disabled confirm consumed pending request or wrote audit")
+	}
+	allowed = true
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
+		t.Fatalf("re-enabled confirm: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardStopsConfirmedHandlerAfterStateChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	b := New(&memAudit{}, &memCards{}, nil)
+	executed := 0
+	if err := b.RegisterPluginCommand(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.effect", Title: "Effect"}, func(context.Context, Request) (any, error) {
+		executed++
+		return "done", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	checks := 0
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		checks++
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if checks == 4 {
+			return errors.New("disabled after confirmation started")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	// Confirm passes its own check, then Dispatch must check once more before
+	// invoking the handler. A direct confirmed request takes the same path.
+	if err := b.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "demo.high", Title: "High", Danger: agentcommand.DangerHigh}, "", func(context.Context, Request) (any, error) {
+		executed++
+		return "done", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.high", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1"})
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("initial dispatch: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	// Dispatch checks again before creating the confirmation card. Confirm's
+	// check passes; its nested Dispatch catches the fourth-state change.
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm after disable: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	if executed != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("executed=%d pending=%d", executed, len(b.pending))
+	}
+	// Direct confirmed execution also passes through the same guard.
+	checks = 3
+	if r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.effect", Owner: "alice", Confirmed: true}); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || executed != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("direct confirmed dispatch: %+v executed=%d", r.Receipt, executed)
+	}
+}
+
+type trackingPendingStore struct {
+	owner, payload string
+	takes          int
+}
+
+func (p *trackingPendingStore) SavePendingConfirm(_ string, owner, payload string) error {
+	p.owner, p.payload = owner, payload
+	return nil
+}
+func (p *trackingPendingStore) TakePendingConfirm(string) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	p.takes++
+	return p.owner, p.payload, p.payload != "", nil
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAccountGuardDoesNotConsumeStoredPendingOnDeniedConfirm(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newTestBus(&memAudit{}, &memCards{})
+	pendingStorage := &trackingPendingStore{}
+	b.SetPendingStore(pendingStorage)
+	allowed := true
+	b.SetEffectiveAccountGuard(func(_ context.Context, actor string) error {
+		if actor != "alice" {
+			t.Fatalf("guard actor = %q", actor)
+		}
+		if !allowed {
+			return errors.New("database unavailable")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	r := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}})
+	if r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateAccepted || pendingStorage.payload == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("pending setup: %+v", r.Receipt)
+	}
+	b.pending = map[string]pending{} // force the restored path
+	allowed = false
+	if r := b.Confirm("alice", "card_x1", "confirm"); r.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || pendingStorage.takes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("denied confirm: %+v takes=%d", r.Receipt, pendingStorage.takes)
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/account_write_fence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+func TestStrictAccountWritesRejectLegacyBusPorts(t *testing.T) {
+	audit, cards := &memAudit{}, &memCards{}
+	b := newTestBus(audit, cards)
+	b.RequireAccountCheckedWrites(false)
+	resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.risky", Owner: "alice", Actor: "alice", ConversationID: "cnv_1", Params: map[string]any{"target": "prod"}})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateUnknown || len(cards.created) != 0 || len(audit.logs) != 0 || len(b.pending) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy port wrote under strict mode: %+v, cards=%d audit=%d pending=%d", resp.Receipt, len(cards.created), len(audit.logs), len(b.pending))
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/cmdbus.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package cmdbus
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -15,12 +16,14 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	agentcommand "agent-command"
-	"agent-system-core"
+	core "agent-system-core"
 )
 
-// AuditStore 审计落盘端口（store 实现；v7 command_audit）。
+// AuditStore 审计落盘端口（store 实现；v7 建表、v18 加 owner 列）。
+// owner 是请求租户（req.Owner）：审计行按租户归属，查询按 owner 过滤，
+// 跨租户审计不可见（信封 Actor 是发起主体，不作归属依据）。
 type AuditStore interface {
-	AppendAudit(env agentcommand.AuditEnvelope) error
+	AppendAudit(owner string, env agentcommand.AuditEnvelope) error
 }
 
 // CardPort 确认卡所需卡片能力（cardsvc.Service 实现）。
@@ -32,6 +35,60 @@ type CardPort interface {
 // Handler 宿主执行适配器：同步内置用例返回 payload；异步执行自行返回 accepted 回执。
 type Handler func(ctx context.Context, req Request) (any, error)
 
+// CommandTool EXT-14：带 exposeAsTool 声明的命令的工具投影视图（runmgr 消费）。
+// Risk 取 low|medium|high（工具权限声明口径）；ID 即工具名（命令 id）。
+type CommandTool struct {
+	ID          string
+	Title       string
+	Description string
+	Params      json.RawMessage
+	Risk        string
+}
+
+// CommandTools 全部带 ExposeAsTool 的已启用命令（EXT-14 工具投影源）。
+// ToolGate 是 owner 级工具注入闸（U3：禁用即不注入能力）：返回 false 时该命令
+// 不投影给该 owner 的模型。组合根按需装配（如 generative-ui 按 activation 台账）。
+type ToolGate func(owner, commandID string) bool
+
+// EffectiveAccountGuard checks the current account state before a command can
+// create a confirmation or invoke a handler. The composition root supplies the
+// check; nil keeps standalone and auth-off fixtures unchanged. The actor is
+// derived only from trusted Request identity fields, never Params. This is an
+// early check, not an atomic fence across handler databases or external calls.
+type EffectiveAccountGuard func(ctx context.Context, actor string) error
+
+// SetToolGate 装配 owner 级注入闸（组合根；启动期一次）。
+func (b *Bus) SetToolGate(g ToolGate) { b.toolGate = g }
+
+func (b *Bus) CommandTools() []CommandTool {
+	return b.CommandToolsFor("")
+}
+
+// CommandToolsFor 按 owner 过滤工具投影（gate 为 nil 时不过滤；owner 为空时
+// gated 命令一律不投影——fail-closed）。
+func (b *Bus) CommandToolsFor(owner string) []CommandTool {
+	out := []CommandTool{}
+	for _, r := range b.reg.List() {
+		if !r.Enabled || r.Spec.ExposeAsTool == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if b.toolGate != nil && !b.toolGate(owner, r.Spec.ID) {
+			continue
+		}
+		risk := r.Spec.ExposeAsTool.Risk
+		if risk == "" {
+			risk = "low"
+		}
+		desc := r.Spec.Description
+		if desc == "" {
+			desc = r.Spec.Title
+		}
+		out = append(out, CommandTool{ID: r.Spec.ID, Title: r.Spec.Title,
+			Description: desc, Params: r.Spec.ParamsSchema, Risk: risk})
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // Request 一次分发请求（入口归一后的统一形态）。
 type Request struct {
 	ID              string
@@ -40,8 +97,49 @@ type Request struct {
 	Actor           string
 	Owner           string
 	ConversationID  string
+	OperationID     string // overwritten by the trusted bus before handler execution
 	AnchorMessageID string // 确认卡锚定的发起消息（内联渲染）
 	Confirmed       bool   // 危险命令经确认卡放行后的执行
+	HostProjectID   string // EXT-18：分发所属基座项目（空＝无项目上下文）
+	// HumanGrant is set only by the authenticated session path or the human
+	// decision resolver. Client JSON and agent tool dispatch leave it nil.
+	HumanGrant *HumanGrant
+}
+
+// RequiresProjectWorkDecision identifies formal RDM writes that must be bound
+// to an analyzed committed-message manifest before dispatch. Read views and
+// the separate exact-card structure issue/decision path are excluded.
+func RequiresProjectWorkDecision(id string) bool {
+	for _, prefix := range []string{
+		"rdm.reqs.", "rdm.review.", "rdm.draft.", "rdm.cnode.", "rdm.cedge.",
+		"rdm.conclusion.", "rdm.section.", "rdm.stage.", "rdm.change.",
+	} {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(id, prefix) {
+			for _, read := range []string{"rdm.reqs.list", "rdm.reqs.exports", "rdm.reqs.underived", "rdm.review.status", "rdm.review.doc.status", "rdm.draft.proposals", "rdm.conclusion.list", "rdm.change.list"} {
+				if id == read {
+					return false
+				}
+			}
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	switch id {
+	case "rdm.structure.propose", "rdm.structure.revise", "rdm.docs.instantiate", "rdm.docs.delivery.approve",
+		"rdm.doc.snapshot", "rdm.ingest", "rdm.upload.confirm", "rdm.knowledge.publish", "rdm.trace.confirm",
+		"rdm.conflicts.resolve":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// HumanGrant ties this dispatch to one persisted human response.
+// It is not a secret token and is not read from command params.
+type HumanGrant struct {
+	CardID   string
+	ProofID  string
+	Actor    string
+	Decision string
 }
 
 // Response 分发结果：回执 + 处理负载 + 可能的确认卡。
@@ -58,15 +156,25 @@ type pending struct {
 }
 
 type Bus struct {
-	reg          *agentcommand.Registry
-	audit        AuditStore
-	cards        CardPort
-	now          func() time.Time
-	handlers     map[string]Handler
-	slash        map[string]string // "/x" → command id
-	pendMu       sync.Mutex
-	pending      map[string]pending
-	pendingStore PendingStore
+	reg                  *agentcommand.Registry
+	audit                AuditStore
+	cards                CardPort
+	now                  func() time.Time
+	handlers             map[string]Handler
+	slash                map[string]string // "/x" → command id
+	pendMu               sync.Mutex
+	pending              map[string]pending
+	pendingStore         PendingStore
+	intents              *IntentStore          // G2-2：意图声明表（自然语言路由）
+	toolGate             ToolGate              // U3：owner 级工具注入闸（nil = 不过滤）
+	accountGuard         EffectiveAccountGuard // A1: optional command execution precheck
+	strictAccountWrites  bool
+	allowImplicitLocal   bool
+	projectWorkPreflight func(context.Context, Request) error
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) SetProjectWorkPreflight(fn func(context.Context, Request) error) {
+	b.projectWorkPreflight = fn
 }
 
 // PendingStore 把危险命令的确认挂起态落盘。进程内 map 仍是热路径；重启后从存储取回。
@@ -82,6 +190,7 @@ func New(audit AuditStore, cards CardPort, now func() time.Time) *Bus {
 	return &Bus{
 		reg: agentcommand.NewRegistry(), audit: audit, cards: cards, now: now,
 		handlers: map[string]Handler{}, slash: map[string]string{}, pending: map[string]pending{},
+		intents: NewIntentStore(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -91,6 +200,70 @@ func (b *Bus) Registry() *agentcommand.Registry { return b.reg }
 // SetPendingStore 注入确认挂起态的持久化实现（nil = 仅进程内）。
 func (b *Bus) SetPendingStore(st PendingStore) { b.pendingStore = st }
 
+// SetEffectiveAccountGuard installs the composition-root check at startup.
+// Handler Store writes still need their own final transaction fence.
+func (b *Bus) SetEffectiveAccountGuard(g EffectiveAccountGuard) { b.accountGuard = g }
+
+// RequireAccountCheckedWrites makes every Bus-owned durable sink use a final
+// account transaction. The composition root enables this after wiring Store
+// and Cards; standalone in-memory fixtures retain their legacy ports.
+func (b *Bus) RequireAccountCheckedWrites(allowImplicitLocal bool) {
+	b.strictAccountWrites = true
+	b.allowImplicitLocal = allowImplicitLocal
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) createConfirmCard(actor string, card core.ActivityCard, ref string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.cards.Create(actor, card, ref)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.cards.(interface {
+		CreateAccountChecked(string, core.ActivityCard, string, bool) (core.ActivityCard, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked card port required")
+	}
+	return checked.CreateAccountChecked(actor, card, ref, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) setConfirmCardStatus(actor, id string, status core.CardStatus, tone, note string) (core.ActivityCard, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.cards.SetStatus(actor, id, status, tone, note)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.cards.(interface {
+		SetStatusAccountChecked(string, string, core.CardStatus, string, string, bool) (core.ActivityCard, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return core.ActivityCard{}, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked card port required")
+	}
+	return checked.SetStatusAccountChecked(actor, id, status, tone, note, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) savePending(cardID, owner, payload string) error {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.pendingStore.SavePendingConfirm(cardID, owner, payload)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.pendingStore.(interface {
+		SavePendingConfirmAccountChecked(string, string, string, bool) error
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked pending store required")
+	}
+	return checked.SavePendingConfirmAccountChecked(cardID, owner, payload, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) takePending(cardID, owner string) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	if !b.strictAccountWrites {
+		return b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
+	}
+	checked, ok := b.pendingStore.(interface {
+		TakePendingConfirmAccountChecked(string, string, bool) (string, string, bool, error)
+	})
+	if !ok {
+		return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked pending store required")
+	}
+	return checked.TakePendingConfirmAccountChecked(cardID, owner, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+}
+
 // RegisterBuiltin 登记内置命令并绑定宿主处理器与 `/` 别名。
 func (b *Bus) RegisterBuiltin(spec agentcommand.CommandSpec, slash string, h Handler) error {
 	spec.Binding = agentcommand.Binding{Kind: agentcommand.BindBuiltin}
@@ -136,10 +309,19 @@ func (b *Bus) RegisterPluginCommands(overlay []json.RawMessage) error {
 		if err := b.reg.Register(spec, agentcommand.SourcePlugin); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: register %s: %w", spec.ID, err)
 		}
+		b.bindPluginSlash(spec)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
+// bindPluginSlash EXT-10②：插件命令规格自带的 slash 别名绑定（与内置命令同一张
+// 别名表——四入口同源：slash 命中即同一命令 id、同一审计信封）。
+func (b *Bus) bindPluginSlash(spec agentcommand.CommandSpec) {
+	if spec.Slash != "" {
+		b.slash[strings.ToLower(spec.Slash)] = spec.ID
+	}
+}
+
 // RegisterPluginCommand 注册进程内插件命令（EXT-1）：登记规格并绑定宿主处理器。
 // 仅登记规格的声明式路径仍走 RegisterPluginCommands（无 handler，分发即 rejected）。
 func (b *Bus) RegisterPluginCommand(spec agentcommand.CommandSpec, h Handler) error {
@@ -149,9 +331,13 @@ func (b *Bus) RegisterPluginCommand(spec agentcommand.CommandSpec, h Handler) er
 	if h != nil {
 		b.handlers[spec.ID] = h
 	}
+	b.bindPluginSlash(spec)
 	return nil
 }
 
+// Intents 意图声明表（G2-2：注册面与路由查询共用）。
+func (b *Bus) Intents() *IntentStore { return b.intents }
+
 // ResolveSlash `/` 入口解析：返回命令 id 与原始字段（参数由宿主处理器按命令语义解析）。
 func (b *Bus) ResolveSlash(cmd string) (string, bool) {
 	id, ok := b.slash[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(cmd))]
@@ -176,10 +362,16 @@ func (b *Bus) HasCommand(id string) bool {
 // List 四入口共享的命令清单（`/` 菜单、按钮、卡片 action 提示用）。
 func (b *Bus) List() []agentcommand.Registered { return b.reg.List() }
 
-// Dispatch 统一分发：校验→危险收口→执行→审计。任何路径都产出回执与审计（入口对称）。
+// Dispatch 统一分发：账号预检→校验→危险收口→执行→审计。账号预检拒绝只返回回执，
+// 避免停用账号或检查故障时继续写入审计；其余路径维持四入口审计对称。
 func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 	start := b.now()
 	req.Entrance = agentcommand.CanonicalEntrance(req.Entrance)
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+		// A rejected account cannot create a card, pending row, audit row, or
+		// invoke a handler. A failed read is also a denial.
+		return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+	}
 	receipt := func(state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reason string) Response {
 		return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, state, op, reason, start)}
 	}
@@ -190,22 +382,37 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 	if err := validateParams(spec.ParamsSchema, req.Params); err != nil {
 		return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "params: "+err.Error())
 	}
+	if RequiresProjectWorkDecision(req.ID) {
+		if b.projectWorkPreflight == nil {
+			return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "project source preflight unavailable")
+		}
+		if err := b.projectWorkPreflight(ctx, req); err != nil {
+			return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "project source preflight: "+err.Error())
+		}
+	}
 	// 高危收口：非确认入口先落内联确认卡（committed 语义 = 卡已创建；确认后二次分发执行）。
 	if spec.Danger == agentcommand.DangerHigh && !req.Confirmed {
 		if b.cards == nil || req.ConversationID == "" {
 			return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "high-danger command requires conversation context for inline confirm")
 		}
-		card, err := b.cards.Create(req.Owner, confirmCard(spec, req), "cmd:"+spec.ID)
+		if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+			return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+		}
+		card, err := b.createConfirmCard(accountActor(req), confirmCard(spec, req), "cmd:"+spec.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm card: "+err.Error())
 		}
+		if b.pendingStore != nil {
+			raw, _ := json.Marshal(req)
+			if err := b.savePending(card.ID, accountActor(req), string(raw)); err != nil {
+				return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm pending: "+err.Error())
+			}
+		} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+			return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "confirm pending: account-checked store required")
+		}
 		b.pendMu.Lock()
 		b.pending[card.ID] = pending{req: req, cardID: card.ID}
 		b.pendMu.Unlock()
-		if b.pendingStore != nil {
-			raw, _ := json.Marshal(req)
-			_ = b.pendingStore.SavePendingConfirm(card.ID, req.Owner, string(raw))
-		}
 		r := b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateAccepted, card.ID, "awaiting explicit confirm", start)
 		return Response{Receipt: r, Card: &card}
 	}
@@ -213,59 +420,118 @@ func (b *Bus) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, req Request) Response {
 	if !ok {
 		return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "no host handler bound for "+req.ID)
 	}
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, accountActor(req)); err != nil {
+		return b.accountRejected(req.ID, start)
+	}
+	// The domain handler can persist this trusted ID with its transaction/outbox.
+	// Entropy, not the clock or caller Params, distinguishes concurrent operations.
+	// A handler failure still writes only a rejected audit receipt without an ID.
+	var opBytes [24]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(opBytes[:]); err != nil {
+		return receipt(agentcommand.StateUnknown, "", "operation ID unavailable")
+	}
+	req.OperationID = "op_" + hex.EncodeToString(opBytes[:])
 	payload, err := h(ctx, req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return receipt(agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "rejected: "+err.Error())
 	}
-	op := fmt.Sprintf("op_%s_%d", strings.ReplaceAll(strings.TrimPrefix(req.ID, ""), ".", "_"), b.now().UnixNano())
-	return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateCommitted, op, "", start), Payload: payload}
+	return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateCommitted, req.OperationID, "", start), Payload: payload}
 }
 
 // Confirm 确认卡回道：actionID=confirm 执行挂起请求（entrance 归一 card），其余视为取消。
 func (b *Bus) Confirm(owner, cardID, actionID string) Response {
+	return b.ConfirmContext(context.Background(), owner, cardID, actionID)
+}
+
+// ConfirmContext carries the request cancellation through the confirmed
+// handler and repeats the account check before consuming durable state.
+func (b *Bus) ConfirmContext(ctx context.Context, owner, cardID, actionID string) Response {
+	// The caller supplies the authenticated card owner. Check before even
+	// consuming a persisted pending request; Dispatch checks the stored
+	// request again immediately before executing its handler.
+	if err := b.checkEffectiveAccount(ctx, owner); err != nil {
+		return b.accountRejected("unknown", b.now())
+	}
 	b.pendMu.Lock()
 	p, ok := b.pending[cardID]
-	if ok && actionID == "confirm" {
-		delete(b.pending, cardID)
-	}
 	b.pendMu.Unlock()
-	if ok && actionID == "confirm" && b.pendingStore != nil {
-		_, _, _, _ = b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
+	if ok && p.req.Owner != "" && p.req.Owner != owner {
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: p.req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
-	if !ok && b.pendingStore != nil {
-		_, payload, found, err := b.pendingStore.TakePendingConfirm(cardID)
-		if err == nil && found {
-			var req Request
-			if json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &req) == nil {
-				p = pending{req: req, cardID: cardID}
-				ok = true
-			}
+	if b.pendingStore != nil {
+		storedOwner, payload, found, err := b.takePending(cardID, owner)
+		if err != nil {
+			return b.accountRejected("unknown", b.now())
 		}
+		if found {
+			var req Request
+			if storedOwner != owner || json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &req) != nil {
+				return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "invalid pending confirm", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+			}
+			p = pending{req: req, cardID: cardID}
+			ok = true
+		} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+			ok = false
+		}
+	} else if b.strictAccountWrites {
+		ok = false
 	}
 	if !ok {
 		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: "unknown", State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "no pending confirm (expired or already resolved)", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
 	}
 	req := p.req
+	if req.Owner != "" && req.Owner != owner {
+		return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected, Reason: "confirm owner mismatch", Time: b.now().UTC()}}
+	}
+	b.pendMu.Lock()
+	delete(b.pending, cardID)
+	b.pendMu.Unlock()
 	req.Confirmed = true
 	req.Entrance = "card"
 	if actionID != "confirm" {
 		if b.cards != nil {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "muted", "cancelled")
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "muted", "cancelled")
 		}
 		start := b.now()
 		return Response{Receipt: b.auditReceipt(req, agentcommand.StateRejected, "", "cancelled at confirm card", start)}
 	}
-	resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), req)
+	resp := b.Dispatch(ctx, req)
 	if b.cards != nil {
 		if resp.Receipt.State == agentcommand.StateCommitted {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "ok", "confirmed")
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardResolved, "ok", "confirmed")
 		} else {
-			_, _ = b.cards.SetStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardFailed, "danger", resp.Receipt.Reason)
+			_, _ = b.setConfirmCardStatus(owner, cardID, core.CardFailed, "danger", resp.Receipt.Reason)
 		}
 	}
 	return resp
 }
 
+func accountActor(req Request) string {
+	// Plugin and delegated commands use Actor for an audit label such as a
+	// plugin ID; Owner is the effective account whose state controls effects.
+	if req.Owner != "" {
+		return req.Owner
+	}
+	return req.Actor
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) checkEffectiveAccount(ctx context.Context, actor string) error {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if b.accountGuard == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return b.accountGuard(ctx, actor)
+}
+
+func (b *Bus) accountRejected(commandID string, start time.Time) Response {
+	return Response{Receipt: agentcommand.ExecReceipt{
+		CommandID: commandID, State: agentcommand.StateRejected,
+		Reason: "effective account unavailable", Time: start.UTC(),
+	}}
+}
+
 func (b *Bus) auditReceipt(req Request, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reason string, start time.Time) agentcommand.ExecReceipt {
 	env := agentcommand.AuditEnvelope{
 		Time: start.UTC(), Actor: req.Actor, CommandID: req.ID, Entrance: agentcommand.CanonicalEntrance(req.Entrance),
@@ -275,7 +541,20 @@ func (b *Bus) auditReceipt(req Request, state agentcommand.ResultState, op, reas
 	if _, src, err := b.reg.Resolve(req.ID); err == nil {
 		env.Source = src
 	}
-	if err := b.audit.AppendAudit(env); err != nil {
+	var err error
+	if b.strictAccountWrites {
+		checked, ok := b.audit.(interface {
+			AppendAuditAccountChecked(string, agentcommand.AuditEnvelope, bool) error
+		})
+		if !ok {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: account-checked audit store required")
+		} else {
+			err = checked.AppendAuditAccountChecked(accountActor(req), env, b.allowImplicitLocal)
+		}
+	} else {
+		err = b.audit.AppendAudit(req.Owner, env)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
 		// 审计不可用：结果标记未知，不臆断成功（四态语义）。
 		return agentcommand.ExecReceipt{CommandID: req.ID, State: agentcommand.StateUnknown, Reason: "audit unavailable: " + err.Error(), Time: b.now().UTC()}
 	}

internal/cmdbus/cmdbus_test.go

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ type memAudit struct {
 	fail bool
 }
 
-func (m *memAudit) AppendAudit(env agentcommand.AuditEnvelope) error {
+func (m *memAudit) AppendAudit(owner string, env agentcommand.AuditEnvelope) error {
 	if m.fail {
 		return errors.New("audit down")
 	}
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ func newTestBus(a AuditStore, c CardPort) *Bus {
 func TestDispatchFourEntrancesSameAudit(t *testing.T) {
 	a := &memAudit{}
 	b := newTestBus(a, &memCards{})
+	b.SetProjectWorkPreflight(func(context.Context, Request) error { return nil })
 	for _, ent := range []string{"button", "slash", "chat", "card", "api", "weird-unknown"} {
 		resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "demo.ping", Entrance: ent})
 		if resp.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateCommitted {
@@ -87,6 +88,66 @@ func TestDispatchFourEntrancesSameAudit(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestHandlerReceivesCommittedOperationIDBeforeDomainWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	audit := &memAudit{}
+	bus := New(audit, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 123).UTC() })
+	var seen string
+	if err := bus.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "rdm.confirm", Title: "Confirm"}, "", func(_ context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		seen = req.OperationID
+		return "committed-domain-event", nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "rdm.confirm", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice", Params: map[string]any{"operationId": "forged-client-id"}})
+	if seen == "" || seen == "forged-client-id" || resp.Receipt.OperationID != seen || len(audit.logs) != 1 || audit.logs[0].OperationID != seen {
+		t.Fatalf("operation correlation missing: handler=%q receipt=%+v audit=%+v", seen, resp.Receipt, audit.logs)
+	}
+	if err := bus.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "rdm.fail", Title: "Fail"}, "", func(_ context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		if req.OperationID == "" {
+			t.Fatal("handler must receive a tentative host operation ID")
+		}
+		return nil, errors.New("domain transaction rejected")
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	failed := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "rdm.fail", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice"})
+	if failed.Receipt.State != agentcommand.StateRejected || failed.Receipt.OperationID != "" || len(audit.logs) != 2 || audit.logs[1].OperationID != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("failed handler was marked committed: %+v audits=%+v", failed.Receipt, audit.logs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOperationIDsRemainUniqueWithFixedClockAndConcurrentDispatch(t *testing.T) {
+	audit := &memAudit{}
+	bus := New(audit, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 123).UTC() })
+	if err := bus.RegisterBuiltin(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "rdm.confirm", Title: "Confirm"}, "", func(_ context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		return req.OperationID, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	const count = 64
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	ids := make([]string, count)
+	for i := range ids {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "rdm.confirm", Actor: "alice", Owner: "alice"})
+			ids[i] = resp.Receipt.OperationID
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		if id == "" || seen[id] {
+			t.Fatalf("fixed clock produced a missing or duplicate trusted operation ID: %q", id)
+		}
+		seen[id] = true
+	}
+	if len(audit.logs) != count {
+		t.Fatalf("audit rows=%d want=%d", len(audit.logs), count)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDispatchUnknownAndBadParams(t *testing.T) {
 	a := &memAudit{}
 	b := newTestBus(a, &memCards{})
@@ -217,6 +278,7 @@ func TestValidateParamsScalars(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRegisterPluginCommandDispatch(t *testing.T) {
 	a := &memAudit{}
 	b := newTestBus(a, &memCards{})
+	b.SetProjectWorkPreflight(func(context.Context, Request) error { return nil })
 	err := b.RegisterPluginCommand(agentcommand.CommandSpec{ID: "rdm.ingest", Title: "入库"}, func(ctx context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
 		return map[string]any{"echo": req.Params["ref"], "owner": req.Owner}, nil
 	})

internal/cmdbus/command_tools_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+// EXT-14：Bus.CommandTools 只投影带 ExposeAsTool 的已启用命令；risk 缺省 low、
+// description 缺省取 title；未暴露/未启用的命令不出现。
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+func newToolBus(t *testing.T) *Bus {
+	t.Helper()
+	return New(nopAudit{}, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+}
+
+func TestCommandToolsFiltering(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newToolBus(t)
+	specs := []json.RawMessage{
+		[]byte(`{"id":"rdm.trace","title":"追溯查询","description":"查网","paramsSchema":{"type":"object"},"exposeAsTool":{"risk":"medium"}}`),
+		[]byte(`{"id":"rdm.baseline","title":"基线视图","exposeAsTool":{}}`),
+		[]byte(`{"id":"rdm.hidden","title":"未暴露","description":"不出现"}`),
+	}
+	if err := b.RegisterPluginCommands(specs); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	tools := b.CommandTools()
+	byID := map[string]CommandTool{}
+	for _, ct := range tools {
+		byID[ct.ID] = ct
+	}
+	if len(byID) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("projected = %+v, want 2（rdm.trace + rdm.baseline）", tools)
+	}
+	if ct := byID["rdm.trace"]; ct.Risk != "medium" || ct.Description != "查网" || string(ct.Params) != `{"type":"object"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("rdm.trace = %+v", ct)
+	}
+	if ct := byID["rdm.baseline"]; ct.Risk != "low" || ct.Description != "基线视图" {
+		t.Fatalf("rdm.baseline = %+v（risk 缺省 low、description 缺省 title）", ct)
+	}
+	if _, ok := byID["rdm.hidden"]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("未声明 exposeAsTool 的命令不得投影")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCommandToolDispatchEnvelope(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newToolBus(t)
+	// 注册一个带处理器的暴露命令，经 Dispatch 分发验证完整回执链路。
+	var spec agentcommand.CommandSpec
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`{"id":"rdm.echo","title":"回声","exposeAsTool":{"risk":"low"}}`), &spec); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := b.RegisterPluginCommand(spec, func(ctx context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		return map[string]any{"echo": req.Params["v"], "actor": req.Actor, "entrance": req.Entrance}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp := b.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "rdm.echo", Params: map[string]any{"v": 1},
+		Entrance: "agent", Actor: "bob", Owner: "bob", ConversationID: "cnv-1"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt = %+v (%s)", resp.Receipt, resp.Receipt.Reason)
+	}
+	m, _ := resp.Payload.(map[string]any)
+	if m["entrance"] != "agent" || m["actor"] != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("payload = %+v（Entrance=agent 原样入审计）", m)
+	}
+}
+
+type nopAudit struct{}
+
+func (nopAudit) AppendAudit(owner string, env agentcommand.AuditEnvelope) error { return nil }
+
+// U3：owner 级注入闸——gate 拒绝的命令不投影（禁用即不注入能力）；fail-closed
+// （owner 为空且 gate 判否时不投影）。
+func TestCommandToolsForGate(t *testing.T) {
+	bus := New(nil, nil, func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() })
+	if err := bus.RegisterPluginCommands([]json.RawMessage{
+		[]byte(`{"id":"generative-ui.present","title":"生成页面","description":"d","paramsSchema":{"type":"object"},"exposeAsTool":{"risk":"low"}}`),
+		[]byte(`{"id":"other.echo","title":"回声","description":"e","paramsSchema":{"type":"object"},"exposeAsTool":{"risk":"low"}}`),
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bus.SetToolGate(func(owner, id string) bool {
+		return !strings.HasPrefix(id, "generative-ui.")
+	})
+	on := bus.CommandToolsFor("alice")
+	for _, ct := range on {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(ct.ID, "generative-ui.") {
+			t.Fatalf("gated command leaked for enabled owner: %+v", ct)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(on) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected only other.echo, got %+v", on)
+	}
+	if n := len(bus.CommandToolsFor("")); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("empty owner must be fail-closed on gated commands, got %d", n)
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/intents.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// Package cmdbuf 意图路由（G2-2：Intent 声明面与自然语言入口）。
+// 插件经 extension.Registry.AddIntent 声明「短语 → 命令」映射；宿主把声明汇入
+// 本表。匹配口径：文本归一（去空白/小写）后做包含匹配，最长短语优先——
+// 无模型参与的确定性第一档；路由终点仍是命令总线（同审计信封与 HITL 收口）。
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+// Intent 一条意图声明：短语命中后分发到 CommandID（参数模板随声明携带）。
+type Intent struct {
+	ID          string         `json:"id"`               // 形如 <domain>.<intent>（如 rdm.write-proposal）
+	Phrases     []string       `json:"phrases"`          // 触发短语（归一后包含匹配）
+	Command     string         `json:"command"`          // 目标命令 id（须已注册）
+	Params      map[string]any `json:"params,omitempty"` // 参数模板（可被调用方覆盖）
+	Description string         `json:"description,omitempty"`
+	Plugin      string         `json:"plugin"` // 声明方（审计归因）
+}
+
+// IntentStore 意图声明表（进程内；插件注册期写入，运行期只读）。
+type IntentStore struct {
+	mu      sync.RWMutex
+	byID    map[string]Intent
+	phrases []string // 归一短语（排序后长词优先匹配）
+}
+
+// NewIntentStore 建表。
+func NewIntentStore() *IntentStore {
+	return &IntentStore{byID: map[string]Intent{}}
+}
+
+// normalize 意图匹配归一：小写、压缩空白。
+func normalize(s string) string {
+	return strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(s)), " ")
+}
+
+// Declare 登记意图（同 id 覆盖；短语与命令必填——fail-closed）。
+func (s *IntentStore) Declare(in Intent) error {
+	if in.ID == "" || in.Command == "" || len(in.Phrases) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("cmdbus: intent %q 声明不完整（id/phrases/command 必填）", in.ID)
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.byID[in.ID] = in
+	s.rebuild()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *IntentStore) rebuild() {
+	s.phrases = s.phrases[:0]
+	for _, in := range s.byID {
+		for _, p := range in.Phrases {
+			s.phrases = append(s.phrases, normalize(p))
+		}
+	}
+	// 长短语优先：更具体的意图先命中。
+	sort.Slice(s.phrases, func(i, j int) bool { return len(s.phrases[i]) > len(s.phrases[j]) })
+}
+
+// Match 自然语言匹配：返回命中的意图（ok=false＝未命中）。
+func (s *IntentStore) Match(text string) (Intent, bool) {
+	n := normalize(text)
+	if n == "" {
+		return Intent{}, false
+	}
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	for _, ph := range s.phrases {
+		if ph != "" && strings.Contains(n, ph) {
+			for _, in := range s.byID {
+				for _, p := range in.Phrases {
+					if normalize(p) == ph {
+						return in, true
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return Intent{}, false
+}
+
+// List 全部意图声明（清单面）。
+func (s *IntentStore) List() []Intent {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	out := make([]Intent, 0, len(s.byID))
+	for _, in := range s.byID {
+		out = append(out, in)
+	}
+	sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].ID < out[j].ID })
+	return out
+}

internal/cmdbus/project_work_command_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestFormalRDMWritesRequireProjectWorkDecision(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, id := range []string{"rdm.reqs.add", "rdm.docs.instantiate", "rdm.docs.delivery.approve", "rdm.doc.snapshot", "rdm.conflicts.resolve", "rdm.review.doc.approve", "rdm.structure.propose", "rdm.trace.confirm"} {
+		if !RequiresProjectWorkDecision(id) {
+			t.Errorf("formal write %s bypassed project source preflight", id)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{"rdm.inspect.tree", "rdm.reqs.list", "rdm.structure.proposals", "rdm.structure.issue", "rdm.structure.decide"} {
+		if RequiresProjectWorkDecision(id) {
+			t.Errorf("read or separately proven command %s was misclassified", id)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/cmdbus/slash_intent_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package cmdbus
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	agentcommand "agent-command"
+)
+
+// EXT-10② 红测：插件命令规格自带 slash 别名 → 四入口同源（slash 命中同一命令
+// id，经总线分发同审计信封）。
+func TestPluginSlashAliasBindsAndDispatches(t *testing.T) {
+	bus := New(nopAudit{}, nil, nil)
+	called := ""
+	if err := bus.RegisterPluginCommand(spec(t, `{
+		"id": "rdm.ping", "title": "自检", "slash": "/rdm.ping"
+	}`), func(ctx context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		called = req.ID + "|" + req.Entrance
+		return map[string]any{"ok": true}, nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	id, ok := bus.ResolveSlash("/rdm.ping")
+	if !ok || id != "rdm.ping" {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveSlash = %q ok=%v（插件别名未绑定）", id, ok)
+	}
+	// 大小写与首尾空白归一。
+	if id, ok := bus.ResolveSlash(" /RDM.PING "); !ok || id != "rdm.ping" {
+		t.Fatalf("归一解析失败: %q %v", id, ok)
+	}
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: id, Entrance: "slash", Owner: "alice"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("slash 分发 = %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	}
+	if called != "rdm.ping|slash" {
+		t.Fatalf("处理器见到 %q（须同命令 id）", called)
+	}
+	// 同一命令按钮入口分发——同源同信封。
+	if resp2 := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: "rdm.ping", Entrance: "button", Owner: "alice"}); resp2.Receipt.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("button 分发 = %+v", resp2.Receipt)
+	}
+}
+
+// G2-2 红测：意图声明→归一包含匹配（最长短语优先）→路由到命令（chat 入口）。
+func TestIntentDeclareMatchRoute(t *testing.T) {
+	bus := New(nopAudit{}, nil, nil)
+	_ = bus.RegisterPluginCommand(spec(t, `{
+		"id": "rdm.draft.compose", "title": "起草"
+	}`), func(ctx context.Context, req Request) (any, error) {
+		return map[string]any{"sectionId": req.Params["sectionId"]}, nil
+	})
+	if err := bus.Intents().Declare(Intent{
+		ID: "rdm.write-proposal", Phrases: []string{"帮我写项目建议书", "写项目建议书"},
+		Command: "rdm.draft.compose", Params: map[string]any{"sectionId": "sec-1"},
+		Plugin: "rdm",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// 未命中。
+	if _, ok := bus.Intents().Match("今天天气如何"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("无关文本不得命中")
+	}
+	// 命中（含大小写/空白归一）。
+	in, ok := bus.Intents().Match("请 帮我写项目建议书，尽快")
+	if !ok || in.ID != "rdm.write-proposal" {
+		t.Fatalf("匹配 = %+v ok=%v", in, ok)
+	}
+	// 路由：匹配到的命令经总线 chat 入口分发成功。
+	bus.SetProjectWorkPreflight(func(context.Context, Request) error { return nil })
+	resp := bus.Dispatch(context.Background(), Request{ID: in.Command, Params: in.Params, Entrance: "chat", Owner: "alice"})
+	if resp.Receipt.State != "committed" {
+		t.Fatalf("路由分发 = %+v", resp.Receipt)
+	}
+	// 声明校验：缺短语拒绝。
+	if err := bus.Intents().Declare(Intent{ID: "x", Command: "y"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("不完整声明须拒绝")
+	}
+	// 最长短语优先：更具体的意图先命中。
+	if err := bus.Intents().Declare(Intent{
+		ID: "rdm.write-competitive", Phrases: []string{"写竞品分析"},
+		Command: "rdm.draft.compose", Plugin: "rdm",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if in, _ := bus.Intents().Match("帮我写项目建议书"); in.ID != "rdm.write-proposal" {
+		t.Fatalf("长短语意图应先命中: %+v", in)
+	}
+}
+
+func spec(t *testing.T, raw string) agentcommand.CommandSpec {
+	t.Helper()
+	var s agentcommand.CommandSpec
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &s); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return s
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net"
 	"os"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -26,6 +27,28 @@ type Config struct {
 	Instance        string `json:"instance"`
 	InsecureListen  bool   `json:"insecureListen"`
 	AllowedHostsRaw string `json:"allowedHosts"`
+	// DisableExecTools 启动级硬关闭执行原语（用户设置 runtime.exec 无法覆盖）。
+	DisableExecTools bool `json:"disableExecTools"`
+	// ExecBackend 执行后端（EXT-16）：direct（空 = 现状直启）| sandbox（bwrap
+	// 隔离档）。DisableExecTools 优先级高于后端选择。
+	ExecBackend string `json:"execBackend"`
+	// ExecDepsDir sandbox 档只读依赖层目录（空 = 不挂载）。
+	ExecDepsDir string `json:"execDepsDir"`
+	// ExecWorkspace sandbox 档工作区模式：空=直写；overlay=冻结基底+upper。
+	ExecWorkspace string `json:"execWorkspace"`
+	// ExecEnvRoot 分层 Python 环境根。空 = 不启用申请代理。
+	ExecEnvRoot string `json:"execEnvRoot"`
+	// Tier 部署档（协作存储方案 KTD1）：空=auto（DSN→PG，否则 SQLite）；
+	// local=强制 SQLite（不允许 DSN）；team=强制 PG（缺 DSN/未开认证拒绝启动，
+	// PG 故障拒绝就绪，绝不回落 SQLite）。
+	Tier string `json:"tier"`
+	// PG 连接预算（KTD12）：零值走默认（16/8/300s/不限/不限）；负值非法。
+	// PGQueryTimeoutSec>0 时以 statement_timeout 附着到 PG DSN。
+	PGMaxOpen            int `json:"pgMaxOpen"`
+	PGMaxIdle            int `json:"pgMaxIdle"`
+	PGConnMaxIdleSec     int `json:"pgConnMaxIdleSec"`
+	PGConnMaxLifetimeSec int `json:"pgConnMaxLifetimeSec"`
+	PGQueryTimeoutSec    int `json:"pgQueryTimeoutSec"`
 }
 
 var defaults = Config{
@@ -37,16 +60,27 @@ var defaults = Config{
 
 // envKey 字段 → 环境变量名（AGENT_SYSTEM_ 前缀）。
 var envKey = map[string]string{
-	"addr":           "AGENT_SYSTEM_ADDR",
-	"data":           "AGENT_SYSTEM_DATA",
-	"plugins":        "AGENT_SYSTEM_PLUGINS",
-	"dsn":            "AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN",
-	"artifacts":      "AGENT_SYSTEM_ARTIFACTS",
-	"auth":           "AGENT_SYSTEM_AUTH",
-	"mock":           "AGENT_SYSTEM_MOCK",
-	"instance":       "AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE",
-	"insecureListen": "AGENT_SYSTEM_INSECURE_LISTEN",
-	"allowedHosts":   "AGENT_SYSTEM_ALLOWED_HOSTS",
+	"addr":                 "AGENT_SYSTEM_ADDR",
+	"data":                 "AGENT_SYSTEM_DATA",
+	"plugins":              "AGENT_SYSTEM_PLUGINS",
+	"dsn":                  "AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN",
+	"artifacts":            "AGENT_SYSTEM_ARTIFACTS",
+	"auth":                 "AGENT_SYSTEM_AUTH",
+	"mock":                 "AGENT_SYSTEM_MOCK",
+	"instance":             "AGENT_SYSTEM_INSTANCE",
+	"execBackend":          "AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_BACKEND",
+	"execDepsDir":          "AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_DEPS_DIR",
+	"execWorkspace":        "AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_WORKSPACE",
+	"execEnvRoot":          "AGENT_SYSTEM_EXEC_ENV_ROOT",
+	"insecureListen":       "AGENT_SYSTEM_INSECURE_LISTEN",
+	"allowedHosts":         "AGENT_SYSTEM_ALLOWED_HOSTS",
+	"disableExecTools":     "AGENT_SYSTEM_DISABLE_EXEC_TOOLS",
+	"tier":                 "AGENT_SYSTEM_TIER",
+	"pgMaxOpen":            "AGENT_SYSTEM_PG_MAX_OPEN",
+	"pgMaxIdle":            "AGENT_SYSTEM_PG_MAX_IDLE",
+	"pgConnMaxIdleSec":     "AGENT_SYSTEM_PG_CONN_MAX_IDLE_SEC",
+	"pgConnMaxLifetimeSec": "AGENT_SYSTEM_PG_CONN_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC",
+	"pgQueryTimeoutSec":    "AGENT_SYSTEM_PG_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SEC",
 }
 
 // Source 配置来源层级（数值越大优先级越高）。
@@ -96,11 +130,7 @@ func Load(file string, envLookup func(string) (string, bool), cli Config, cliSet
 		}
 		// 文件层按"键存在"覆盖（区分未出现与显式 false/空串；空值有效性由字段语义判定）。
 		for f := range present {
-			if isBoolField(f) {
-				setBool(&cfg, f, boolField(fc, f))
-			} else {
-				setString(&cfg, f, stringField(fc, f))
-			}
+			setField(&cfg, f, fc)
 			src[f] = SrcFile
 		}
 	}
@@ -113,6 +143,12 @@ func Load(file string, envLookup func(string) (string, bool), cli Config, cliSet
 					return Resolved{}, err
 				}
 				setBool(&cfg, f, b)
+			} else if isIntField(f) {
+				n, err := parseInt(key, v)
+				if err != nil {
+					return Resolved{}, err
+				}
+				setInt(&cfg, f, n)
 			} else {
 				setString(&cfg, f, v)
 			}
@@ -122,15 +158,22 @@ func Load(file string, envLookup func(string) (string, bool), cli Config, cliSet
 	// CLI 层：仅显式传入。
 	for f := range cliSet {
 		src[f] = SrcCLI
-		if isBoolField(f) {
-			setBool(&cfg, f, boolField(cli, f))
-		} else {
-			setString(&cfg, f, stringField(cli, f))
-		}
+		setField(&cfg, f, cli)
 	}
 	return Resolved{Config: cfg, sources: src}, nil
 }
 
+// setField 从同类型快照覆盖单个字段（文件/CLI 层复用；字段类型由字段名决定）。
+func setField(dst *Config, f string, src Config) {
+	if isBoolField(f) {
+		setBool(dst, f, boolField(src, f))
+	} else if isIntField(f) {
+		setInt(dst, f, intField(src, f))
+	} else {
+		setString(dst, f, stringField(src, f))
+	}
+}
+
 func loadFile(path string) (Config, map[string]bool, error) {
 	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -165,6 +208,28 @@ func loadFile(path string) (Config, map[string]bool, error) {
 			dst = &c.InsecureListen
 		case "allowedHosts":
 			dst = &c.AllowedHostsRaw
+		case "disableExecTools":
+			dst = &c.DisableExecTools
+		case "execBackend":
+			dst = &c.ExecBackend
+		case "execDepsDir":
+			dst = &c.ExecDepsDir
+		case "execWorkspace":
+			dst = &c.ExecWorkspace
+		case "execEnvRoot":
+			dst = &c.ExecEnvRoot
+		case "tier":
+			dst = &c.Tier
+		case "pgMaxOpen":
+			dst = &c.PGMaxOpen
+		case "pgMaxIdle":
+			dst = &c.PGMaxIdle
+		case "pgConnMaxIdleSec":
+			dst = &c.PGConnMaxIdleSec
+		case "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec":
+			dst = &c.PGConnMaxLifetimeSec
+		case "pgQueryTimeoutSec":
+			dst = &c.PGQueryTimeoutSec
 		default:
 			return Config{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("config file %s: unknown key %q", path, k)
 		}
@@ -194,18 +259,69 @@ func stringField(c Config, f string) string {
 		return c.Instance
 	case "allowedHosts":
 		return c.AllowedHostsRaw
+	case "execBackend":
+		return c.ExecBackend
+	case "execDepsDir":
+		return c.ExecDepsDir
+	case "execWorkspace":
+		return c.ExecWorkspace
+	case "execEnvRoot":
+		return c.ExecEnvRoot
+	case "tier":
+		return c.Tier
 	}
 	return ""
 }
 
 func isBoolField(f string) bool {
-	return f == "mock" || f == "insecureListen"
+	return f == "mock" || f == "insecureListen" || f == "disableExecTools"
+}
+
+func isIntField(f string) bool {
+	switch f {
+	case "pgMaxOpen", "pgMaxIdle", "pgConnMaxIdleSec", "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec", "pgQueryTimeoutSec":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func intField(c Config, f string) int {
+	switch f {
+	case "pgMaxOpen":
+		return c.PGMaxOpen
+	case "pgMaxIdle":
+		return c.PGMaxIdle
+	case "pgConnMaxIdleSec":
+		return c.PGConnMaxIdleSec
+	case "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec":
+		return c.PGConnMaxLifetimeSec
+	case "pgQueryTimeoutSec":
+		return c.PGQueryTimeoutSec
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func setInt(c *Config, f string, v int) {
+	switch f {
+	case "pgMaxOpen":
+		c.PGMaxOpen = v
+	case "pgMaxIdle":
+		c.PGMaxIdle = v
+	case "pgConnMaxIdleSec":
+		c.PGConnMaxIdleSec = v
+	case "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec":
+		c.PGConnMaxLifetimeSec = v
+	case "pgQueryTimeoutSec":
+		c.PGQueryTimeoutSec = v
+	}
 }
 
 func boolField(c Config, f string) bool {
 	switch f {
 	case "insecureListen":
 		return c.InsecureListen
+	case "disableExecTools":
+		return c.DisableExecTools
 	default:
 		return c.Mock
 	}
@@ -215,6 +331,8 @@ func setBool(c *Config, f string, v bool) {
 	switch f {
 	case "insecureListen":
 		c.InsecureListen = v
+	case "disableExecTools":
+		c.DisableExecTools = v
 	default:
 		c.Mock = v
 	}
@@ -238,6 +356,16 @@ func setString(c *Config, f, v string) {
 		c.Instance = v
 	case "allowedHosts":
 		c.AllowedHostsRaw = v
+	case "execBackend":
+		c.ExecBackend = v
+	case "execDepsDir":
+		c.ExecDepsDir = v
+	case "execWorkspace":
+		c.ExecWorkspace = v
+	case "execEnvRoot":
+		c.ExecEnvRoot = v
+	case "tier":
+		c.Tier = v
 	}
 }
 
@@ -251,6 +379,14 @@ func parseBool(name, v string) (bool, error) {
 	return false, fmt.Errorf("env %s: invalid bool %q", name, v)
 }
 
+func parseInt(name, v string) (int, error) {
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(v))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("env %s: invalid int %q", name, v)
+	}
+	return n, nil
+}
+
 // Explain 只读诊断：逐字段打印解析值与来源层级，DSN 脱敏。
 func (r Resolved) Explain(w io.Writer, file string) {
 	if file != "" {
@@ -259,16 +395,32 @@ func (r Resolved) Explain(w io.Writer, file string) {
 		fmt.Fprintln(w, "config file: (none)")
 	}
 	fmt.Fprintln(w, "field            value                                                    source")
-	for _, f := range []string{"addr", "data", "plugins", "dsn", "artifacts", "auth", "mock", "instance", "insecureListen", "allowedHosts"} {
-		v := stringField(r.Config, f)
+	for _, f := range []string{"addr", "data", "plugins", "dsn", "artifacts", "auth", "mock", "instance", "insecureListen", "allowedHosts", "disableExecTools", "execBackend", "execDepsDir", "execWorkspace", "execEnvRoot", "tier", "pgMaxOpen", "pgMaxIdle", "pgConnMaxIdleSec", "pgConnMaxLifetimeSec", "pgQueryTimeoutSec"} {
+		var v string
 		if isBoolField(f) {
 			v = fmt.Sprintf("%t", boolField(r.Config, f))
+		} else if isIntField(f) {
+			n := intField(r.Config, f)
+			if d := intDefault(f); n == 0 && d != 0 {
+				v = fmt.Sprintf("%d (默认)", d)
+			} else {
+				v = fmt.Sprintf("%d", n)
+			}
+		} else {
+			v = stringField(r.Config, f)
 		}
 		if f == "dsn" {
 			v = redact(v)
 		}
 		fmt.Fprintf(w, "%-16s %-56s %s\n", f, v, r.sources[f])
 	}
+	if msgs := r.TierProblems(); len(msgs) > 0 {
+		for _, msg := range msgs {
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, "tier guard: 拒绝启动（%s）\n", msg)
+		}
+	} else {
+		fmt.Fprintln(w, "tier guard: 放行")
+	}
 	if msg := r.ListenRefusal(); msg != "" {
 		fmt.Fprintf(w, "listen guard: 拒绝启动（%s）\n", msg)
 	} else if r.InsecureListen && !IsLoopbackListen(r.Addr) && !r.AuthEnabled() {
@@ -283,6 +435,90 @@ func (r Resolved) AuthEnabled() bool {
 	return r.AuthMode == "on" || (r.AuthMode != "off" && r.StorageDSN != "")
 }
 
+// intDefault 返回 int 字段的默认值（0 表示零值合法、无默认替换）。
+func intDefault(f string) int {
+	switch f {
+	case "pgMaxOpen":
+		return DefaultPGMaxOpen
+	case "pgMaxIdle":
+		return DefaultPGMaxIdle
+	case "pgConnMaxIdleSec":
+		return DefaultPGConnMaxIdleSec
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// 连接预算默认值（KTD12；与 store 层默认保持一致，两处同时修改时以测试对齐）。
+const (
+	DefaultPGMaxOpen        = 16
+	DefaultPGMaxIdle        = 8
+	DefaultPGConnMaxIdleSec = 300
+)
+
+// TierProblems 部署档语义校验：返回阻止启动的问题列表（空 = 放行）。
+// team 档 fail-closed：缺 DSN、未开认证直接拒绝；local 档不允许 DSN（KTD1）。
+// 执行隔离在 team 档是启动警告而非拒绝（本增量先可见、U3/U5 再硬化）。
+func (r Resolved) TierProblems() []string {
+	var msgs []string
+	switch r.Tier {
+	case "", "local", "team":
+	default:
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("未知部署档 %q（local | team）", r.Tier))
+	}
+	if r.Tier == "team" {
+		if r.StorageDSN == "" {
+			msgs = append(msgs, "team 档需要 PostgreSQL DSN（dsn / AGENT_SYSTEM_DSN）；不会回落 SQLite")
+		}
+		if !r.AuthEnabled() {
+			msgs = append(msgs, "team 档必须开启认证（auth=on）")
+		}
+	}
+	if r.Tier == "local" && r.StorageDSN != "" {
+		msgs = append(msgs, "local 档不使用 PostgreSQL DSN（改用 team 档，或去掉 dsn）")
+	}
+	if v := r.PGMaxOpen; v < 0 {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgMaxOpen 不能为负（当前 %d）", v))
+	}
+	if v := r.PGMaxIdle; v < 0 {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgMaxIdle 不能为负（当前 %d）", v))
+	}
+	if v := r.PGConnMaxIdleSec; v < 0 {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgConnMaxIdleSec 不能为负（当前 %d）", v))
+	}
+	if v := r.PGConnMaxLifetimeSec; v < 0 {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgConnMaxLifetimeSec 不能为负（当前 %d）", v))
+	}
+	if v := r.PGQueryTimeoutSec; v < 0 {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgQueryTimeoutSec 不能为负（当前 %d）", v))
+	}
+	if idle, open := r.EffectivePGMaxIdle(), r.EffectivePGMaxOpen(); idle > open {
+		msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("pgMaxIdle(%d) 大于 pgMaxOpen(%d)", idle, open))
+	}
+	return msgs
+}
+
+// EffectivePGMaxOpen/Idle/ConnMaxIdleSec 返回连接预算有效值（零值落默认，KTD12）。
+func (r Resolved) EffectivePGMaxOpen() int {
+	if r.PGMaxOpen > 0 {
+		return r.PGMaxOpen
+	}
+	return DefaultPGMaxOpen
+}
+
+func (r Resolved) EffectivePGMaxIdle() int {
+	if r.PGMaxIdle > 0 {
+		return r.PGMaxIdle
+	}
+	return DefaultPGMaxIdle
+}
+
+func (r Resolved) EffectivePGConnMaxIdleSec() int {
+	if r.PGConnMaxIdleSec > 0 {
+		return r.PGConnMaxIdleSec
+	}
+	return DefaultPGConnMaxIdleSec
+}
+
 // AllowedHosts 把逗号分隔的主机名拆开，忽略空段。
 func (r Resolved) AllowedHosts() []string {
 	var out []string