Merge pull request 'Correct the v0.4.0 tag targets to current main heads' (#528) from feature/rdm-increment-settings-duties into main

Why: Backend #195 and Frontend #82 (parallel task feature/project-member-access)
merged after the original targets (Backend 15566f9 / Frontend c294835), and Dev
main 20e086e pins exactly those new heads (5d5fc989/eb2d6d32). Tagging the stale
SHAs would make RDM pins->v0.4.0 a downgrade versus Dev main, so the release must
land on current main HEADs; the checkout origin/main command already does this.

Evidence: SELF rows on the card - four-repo ls-remote (main HEADs recorded, all
v0.4.0 tag refs empty), git ls-tree origin/main pins, and 15566f9../42cda9c0..
commit ranges showing the parallel merges.

Impact: Dev task card release-plan section only; no code or pins change.

Refs: task feature/rdm-increment-settings-duties; related Backend #195,
Frontend #82, Dev #527.

.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -174,3 +174,506 @@ jobs:
         run: make test
       - name: Build the single binary
         run: make build
+
+  # 协作存储方案 U2：真实 PostgreSQL + pgvector + Redis 门禁。
+  # 缺服务时失败而非跳过（make test-backend-pg 硬校验环境变量）；
+  # 组件版本随 job 输出固定，供验收记录对齐（方案 KTD12/U2）。
+  test-pg:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    env:
+      GOPROXY: https://goproxy.cn,direct
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # Credential handling stays inline: no file from the candidate is executed.
+          # Workflow provenance and runner isolation still require platform controls.
+          python3 - <<'PY_CHECKOUT'
+          import os
+          from pathlib import Path
+          import re
+          import subprocess
+          import sys
+          from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+          # 服务端基址取运行器注入的 GITHUB_SERVER_URL（平台控制、候选 PR 不可影响）。
+          # 2026-10-05 修复（run 948/949 实测）：注入值为内网直连形态
+          # 'http://172.17.0.1:3000'（docker 网关 → 宿主 Gitea），与公网拼写不同且为
+          # http——此前硬编码常量严格比对会拒绝合法检出。校验收宽为「http(s) + 非空
+          # netloc」；凭据仍只附着于「该基址 + 下方仓库白名单」构造的 URL。
+          SERVER = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", "").rstrip("/")
+          parsed_server = urlsplit(SERVER)
+          if parsed_server.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed_server.netloc:
+              sys.exit("Checkout server must be the platform-injected http(s) URL")
+          SSH = "ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          # Reviewed allowlist, independent of candidate .gitmodules. Add repositories
+          # here only with an explicit review of the checkout credential's scope.
+          REPOSITORIES = {
+              "modules/core": "Agent-System-Core",
+              "modules/backend": "Agent-System-Backend",
+              "modules/frontend": "Agent-System-Frontend",
+              "modules/ui": "Agent-System-UI",
+              "modules/documents": "Agent-System-Documents",
+              "deps/agent-system-core": "Agent-System-Core",
+              "deps/development-guidelines": "Development-Guidelines",
+              "deps/agent-native": "Agent-Native",
+              "deps/agent-squad": "Agent-Squad",
+              "deps/agent-intent": "Agent-Intent",
+              "deps/agent-command": "Agent-Command",
+              "deps/error-code-system": "Error-Code-System",
+              "deps/logging-system": "Logging-System",
+          }
+          root_token = os.environ.pop("TOKEN", "")
+          component_token = os.environ.pop("SUBMODULE_TOKEN", "")
+          if not root_token or not component_token:
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires TOKEN and SUBMODULE_TOKEN")
+          if os.environ.get("GITHUB_REPOSITORY") != "weichen/Agent-System-Dev":
+              sys.exit("Checkout repository is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+          sha = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SHA", "")
+          if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", sha):
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires a fixed commit SHA")
+
+          # Discard inherited Git tracing/config/SSH hooks. Auth lives only in one
+          # Git process tree, in an exact URL-scoped header, never in a URL or file.
+          clean_env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if not k.startswith("GIT_")}
+          clean_env.update(GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM="1", GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM="/dev/null",
+                           GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL="/dev/null", GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT="0")
+          config = {
+              "core.hooksPath": "/dev/null", "core.fsmonitor": "false",
+              "init.templateDir": "", "credential.helper": "",
+              "fetch.recurseSubmodules": "false", "submodule.recurse": "false",
+              "http.followRedirects": "false", "protocol.allow": "never",
+              "protocol." + urlsplit(SERVER).scheme + ".allow": "always",
+          }
+
+
+          def git(repo, *args, extra=None):
+              values = config | (extra or {})
+              env = clean_env | {"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": str(len(values))}
+              for index, (key, value) in enumerate(values.items()):
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_{index}"] = key
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_{index}"] = value
+              return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], env=env,
+                                    check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout
+
+
+          def materialize(repo, depth=0):
+              if depth > 16:
+                  raise ValueError("Submodule depth exceeds the reviewed checkout limit")
+              links = {}
+              for entry in git(repo, "ls-tree", "-rz", "HEAD").split(b"\0"):
+                  if not entry:
+                      continue
+                  metadata, path = entry.split(b"\t", 1)
+                  mode, kind, commit = metadata.decode().split()
+                  if mode == "160000":
+                      links[path.decode()] = commit
+              if not links:
+                  return
+              raw = git(repo, "config", "--no-includes", "--blob", "HEAD:.gitmodules", "--null", "--list")
+              entries = {}
+              for item in raw.split(b"\0"):
+                  if not item:
+                      continue
+                  key, value = item.decode().split("\n", 1)
+                  match = re.fullmatch(r"submodule\.(.+)\.(path|url)", key)
+                  if not match:
+                      raise ValueError("Unsupported candidate .gitmodules setting")
+                  name, field = match.groups()
+                  if field in entries.setdefault(name, {}):
+                      raise ValueError("Duplicate candidate .gitmodules setting")
+                  entries[name][field] = value
+              if set(entries) != set(links):
+                  raise ValueError("Submodule names must match the fixed gitlink paths")
+              # Validate the entire level before any authenticated component fetch.
+              for name, fields in entries.items():
+                  repository = REPOSITORIES.get(name)
+                  if not repository or fields.get("path") != name:
+                      raise ValueError("Submodule path is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+                  trusted_url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{repository}.git"
+                  if fields.get("url") not in {SSH + repository + ".git", trusted_url}:
+                      raise ValueError("Submodule URL is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+              for name in entries:
+                  url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{REPOSITORIES[name]}.git"
+                  # Persist only the reviewed public URL so Git recognizes the
+                  # initialized submodule after process-scoped config is gone.
+                  git(repo, "config", f"submodule.{name}.url", url)
+                  git(repo, "submodule", "update", "--init", "--checkout", "--", name,
+                      extra={f"submodule.{name}.url": url,
+                             f"submodule.{name}.update": "checkout",
+                             f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + component_token})
+                  child = repo / name
+                  if git(child, "rev-parse", "HEAD").decode().strip() != links[name]:
+                      raise ValueError("Materialized submodule does not match the fixed SHA")
+                  materialize(child, depth + 1)
+
+
+          try:
+              root = Path.cwd()
+              # An ephemeral clean checkout is required; do not reuse prior Git state.
+              if (root / ".git").exists():
+                  raise ValueError("Checkout requires a fresh workspace")
+              git(root, "init", "-q")
+              url = SERVER + "/weichen/Agent-System-Dev.git"
+              git(root, "remote", "add", "origin", url)
+              git(root, "fetch", "--depth=1", "origin", sha,
+                  extra={f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + root_token})
+              git(root, "checkout", "-q", "--detach", "FETCH_HEAD")
+              materialize(root)
+          except (ValueError, OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+              sys.exit(f"Checkout refused: {error}")
+          print("Checkout complete; credentials were not persisted in Git configuration")
+          PY_CHECKOUT
+          unset TOKEN SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+      - name: Install Go 1.27.1
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          curl -fsSL -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz" https://mirrors.aliyun.com/golang/go1.27.1.linux-amd64.tar.gz
+          tar -C /usr/local -xzf "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz"
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
+      - name: Install house-style Python packages
+        run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple python-docx python-pptx openpyxl
+      - name: Install PostgreSQL, pgvector and Redis
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          SUDO=""
+          if command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then SUDO=sudo; fi
+          $SUDO apt-get update -y
+          $SUDO apt-get install -y postgresql postgresql-contrib postgresql-16-pgvector redis-server
+          # 固定组件/扩展版本输出（随日志归档，作为验收对齐依据）。
+          psql --version
+          redis-server --version
+      - name: Start PostgreSQL and Redis
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          SUDO=""
+          if command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then SUDO=sudo; fi
+          # 运行器容器以 root 运行且无 sudo：以 postgres 身份执行用 runuser/su
+          # （实测 $SUDO -u 在 root 容器展开成裸 "-u" → exit 127）。
+          pg_as_postgres() {
+            if command -v runuser >/dev/null 2>&1; then runuser -u postgres -- "$@";
+            else su postgres -s /bin/bash -c "$*"; fi
+          }
+          $SUDO service postgresql start || $SUDO pg_ctlcluster 16 main start
+          # 预装 pg_trgm 到 public：与测试辅助的幂等预装一致，锁定的组件契约；
+          # pgvector 版本一并输出（随日志归档，作为验收对齐依据）。
+          pg_as_postgres psql -tAc "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector"
+          pg_as_postgres psql -tAc "SELECT extname || '=' || extversion FROM pg_extension WHERE extname IN ('vector','pg_trgm')"
+          pg_as_postgres psql -c "CREATE USER ci_agent PASSWORD 'ci_job_local_only' CREATEDB"
+          pg_as_postgres psql -c "CREATE DATABASE agent_test OWNER ci_agent"
+          pg_as_postgres psql -d agent_test -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm"
+          redis-server --daemonize yes --port 6399 --save '' --appendonly no
+          redis-cli -p 6399 ping
+      - name: Backend tests against real PostgreSQL and Redis (required, no silent skip)
+        env:
+          AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN: postgres://ci_agent:ci_job_local_only@127.0.0.1:5432/agent_test?sslmode=disable
+          AGENT_REDIS_TEST_ADDR: 127.0.0.1:6399
+        run: make test-backend-pg
+      - name: Two-process HTTP acceptance over shared PostgreSQL (U7, required)
+        env:
+          AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN: postgres://ci_agent:ci_job_local_only@127.0.0.1:5432/agent_test?sslmode=disable
+        run: make test-multi-instance
+      - name: RDM lifecycle pin is three fixed SHAs
+        run: python3 -m unittest tests.test_lifecycle_pin -q && bash scripts/fetch-rdm-pin.sh tests/integration/lifecycle/rdm.pin >/dev/null
+      - name: Clone Agent-System-RDM with nested pins (reviewed allowlist addition)
+        env:
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # 凭据纪律与 Checkout 块同源：经 GIT_CONFIG_* 环境注入 URL 级 token 头，
+          # 不落文件/命令行；allowlist 扩项 = Agent-System-RDM 及其 pins（同一
+          # 组件集合），由本 PR 评审背书。SSH pins URL 以 insteadOf 改写到受信
+          # https 基址后再取。只追加 pin 的三个 40 位 hex，不 source pin 文件。
+          SERVER="$(printf '%s' "$GITHUB_SERVER_URL" | sed 's:/*$::')"
+          scheme="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL%%://*}"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=4
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0="protocol.$scheme.allow"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="always"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1="http.$SERVER/.extraheader"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1="AUTHORIZATION: token $SUBMODULE_TOKEN"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_2="url.$SERVER/weichen/.insteadOf"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_2="ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_3="core.hooksPath"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_3="/dev/null"
+          git clone --depth=1 "$SERVER/weichen/Agent-System-RDM.git" rdm
+          mapfile -t pins < <(python3 - <<'PY'
+          import pathlib
+          got = {}
+          for line in pathlib.Path("tests/integration/lifecycle/rdm.pin").read_text().splitlines():
+              line = line.strip()
+              if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+                  continue
+              key, value = line.split("=", 1)
+              if key not in ("sha", "prev_sha", "legacy_sha") or len(value) != 40:
+                  raise SystemExit("rdm.pin rejected")
+              if any(c not in "0123456789abcdef" for c in value):
+                  raise SystemExit("rdm.pin rejected")
+              got[key] = value
+          if set(got) != {"sha", "prev_sha", "legacy_sha"}:
+              raise SystemExit("rdm.pin rejected")
+          print(got["prev_sha"])
+          print(got["legacy_sha"])
+          print(got["sha"])
+          PY
+          )
+          [ "${#pins[@]}" -eq 3 ]
+          # depth=1 会把三个 pin 变成互不相关的浅根，update 会把 prev→sha 误判成分叉。
+          # 当前 first-parent 距离是 39，200 留余量，仍不拉全史。
+          git -C rdm fetch --depth=200 origin "${pins[@]}"
+          for rev in "${pins[@]}"; do
+            git -C rdm checkout --detach "$rev"
+            git -C rdm submodule update --init --recursive
+          done
+          echo "RDM commit: $(git -C rdm rev-parse HEAD)"
+          unset GIT_CONFIG_COUNT GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0 \
+                GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_2 \
+                GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_2 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_3 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_3
+          unset SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+          : > rdm/pin-build-digests.txt
+          for rev in "${pins[@]}"; do
+            git -C rdm checkout --detach "$rev"
+            make -C rdm build
+            sha256sum rdm/bin/agent-system-rdm | awk -v rev="$rev" '{print rev, $1}' >> rdm/pin-build-digests.txt
+          done
+      - name: Install Node 22
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          curl -fsSL -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/node.tar.xz" https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/node/v22.23.3/node-v22.23.3-linux-x64.tar.xz
+          tar -C /usr/local --strip-components=1 -xJf "$RUNNER_TEMP/node.tar.xz"
+      - name: Build the real agent-system binary
+        run: make build
+      - name: Real-combination lifecycle gate (make test-lifecycle, required)
+        env:
+          AGENT_PG_TEST_DSN: postgres://ci_agent:ci_job_local_only@127.0.0.1:5432/agent_test?sslmode=disable
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # 路径变量在脚本内解析（YAML env: 不做 shell 展开）。
+          # 不设 SVC_RDM_ORIGIN：全轨 git 部署由 svc-realcombo 作业覆盖。
+          # pins 物化没有 SSH known_hosts。token 只经 SVC_CI_GIT_TOKEN 进
+          # ci_git_env 的 URL 级头，不写文件。
+          export SVC_TEST_REAL=1 SVC_TEST_PG=1
+          export SVC_REAL_BIN="$PWD/bin/agent-system"
+          export SVC_REAL_RDM_BIN="$PWD/rdm/bin/agent-system-rdm"
+          export SVC_RDM_SRC_DIR="$PWD/rdm"
+          export SVC_CI_GIT_SERVER="$(printf '%s' "$GITHUB_SERVER_URL" | sed 's:/*$::')"
+          export SVC_CI_GIT_TOKEN="$SUBMODULE_TOKEN"
+          unset SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+          make test-lifecycle
+
+  # U3（统一部署方案）：真实 Dev/RDM 制品的 svc.sh 生命周期门禁——桩套件
+  # （test_svc*.py）只证明脚本逻辑；本作业证明「声明≠能力」的最后一道：真实
+  # identity 领养/verify、release 切换、伴生工作台、RDM 全轨部署。缺件即失败，
+  # 不静默跳过（SVC_TEST_REAL=1 硬开关）。
+  svc-realcombo:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    env:
+      GOPROXY: https://goproxy.cn,direct
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # Credential handling stays inline: no file from the candidate is executed.
+          # Workflow provenance and runner isolation still require platform controls.
+          python3 - <<'PY_CHECKOUT'
+          import os
+          from pathlib import Path
+          import re
+          import subprocess
+          import sys
+          from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+          # 服务端基址取运行器注入的 GITHUB_SERVER_URL（平台控制、候选 PR 不可影响）。
+          # 2026-10-05 修复（run 948/949 实测）：注入值为内网直连形态
+          # 'http://172.17.0.1:3000'（docker 网关 → 宿主 Gitea），与公网拼写不同且为
+          # http——此前硬编码常量严格比对会拒绝合法检出。校验收宽为「http(s) + 非空
+          # netloc」；凭据仍只附着于「该基址 + 下方仓库白名单」构造的 URL。
+          SERVER = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", "").rstrip("/")
+          parsed_server = urlsplit(SERVER)
+          if parsed_server.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed_server.netloc:
+              sys.exit("Checkout server must be the platform-injected http(s) URL")
+          SSH = "ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          # Reviewed allowlist, independent of candidate .gitmodules. Add repositories
+          # here only with an explicit review of the checkout credential's scope.
+          REPOSITORIES = {
+              "modules/core": "Agent-System-Core",
+              "modules/backend": "Agent-System-Backend",
+              "modules/frontend": "Agent-System-Frontend",
+              "modules/ui": "Agent-System-UI",
+              "modules/documents": "Agent-System-Documents",
+              "deps/agent-system-core": "Agent-System-Core",
+              "deps/development-guidelines": "Development-Guidelines",
+              "deps/agent-native": "Agent-Native",
+              "deps/agent-squad": "Agent-Squad",
+              "deps/agent-intent": "Agent-Intent",
+              "deps/agent-command": "Agent-Command",
+              "deps/error-code-system": "Error-Code-System",
+              "deps/logging-system": "Logging-System",
+          }
+          root_token = os.environ.pop("TOKEN", "")
+          component_token = os.environ.pop("SUBMODULE_TOKEN", "")
+          if not root_token or not component_token:
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires TOKEN and SUBMODULE_TOKEN")
+          if os.environ.get("GITHUB_REPOSITORY") != "weichen/Agent-System-Dev":
+              sys.exit("Checkout repository is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+          sha = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SHA", "")
+          if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", sha):
+              sys.exit("Checkout requires a fixed commit SHA")
+
+          # Discard inherited Git tracing/config/SSH hooks. Auth lives only in one
+          # Git process tree, in an exact URL-scoped header, never in a URL or file.
+          clean_env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if not k.startswith("GIT_")}
+          clean_env.update(GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM="1", GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM="/dev/null",
+                           GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL="/dev/null", GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT="0")
+          config = {
+              "core.hooksPath": "/dev/null", "core.fsmonitor": "false",
+              "init.templateDir": "", "credential.helper": "",
+              "fetch.recurseSubmodules": "false", "submodule.recurse": "false",
+              "http.followRedirects": "false", "protocol.allow": "never",
+              "protocol." + urlsplit(SERVER).scheme + ".allow": "always",
+          }
+
+
+          def git(repo, *args, extra=None):
+              values = config | (extra or {})
+              env = clean_env | {"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": str(len(values))}
+              for index, (key, value) in enumerate(values.items()):
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_{index}"] = key
+                  env[f"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_{index}"] = value
+              return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], env=env,
+                                    check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout
+
+
+          def materialize(repo, depth=0):
+              if depth > 16:
+                  raise ValueError("Submodule depth exceeds the reviewed checkout limit")
+              links = {}
+              for entry in git(repo, "ls-tree", "-rz", "HEAD").split(b"\0"):
+                  if not entry:
+                      continue
+                  metadata, path = entry.split(b"\t", 1)
+                  mode, kind, commit = metadata.decode().split()
+                  if mode == "160000":
+                      links[path.decode()] = commit
+              if not links:
+                  return
+              raw = git(repo, "config", "--no-includes", "--blob", "HEAD:.gitmodules", "--null", "--list")
+              entries = {}
+              for item in raw.split(b"\0"):
+                  if not item:
+                      continue
+                  key, value = item.decode().split("\n", 1)
+                  match = re.fullmatch(r"submodule\.(.+)\.(path|url)", key)
+                  if not match:
+                      raise ValueError("Unsupported candidate .gitmodules setting")
+                  name, field = match.groups()
+                  if field in entries.setdefault(name, {}):
+                      raise ValueError("Duplicate candidate .gitmodules setting")
+                  entries[name][field] = value
+              if set(entries) != set(links):
+                  raise ValueError("Submodule names must match the fixed gitlink paths")
+              # Validate the entire level before any authenticated component fetch.
+              for name, fields in entries.items():
+                  repository = REPOSITORIES.get(name)
+                  if not repository or fields.get("path") != name:
+                      raise ValueError("Submodule path is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+                  trusted_url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{repository}.git"
+                  if fields.get("url") not in {SSH + repository + ".git", trusted_url}:
+                      raise ValueError("Submodule URL is outside the reviewed allowlist")
+              for name in entries:
+                  url = f"{SERVER}/weichen/{REPOSITORIES[name]}.git"
+                  # Persist only the reviewed public URL so Git recognizes the
+                  # initialized submodule after process-scoped config is gone.
+                  git(repo, "config", f"submodule.{name}.url", url)
+                  git(repo, "submodule", "update", "--init", "--checkout", "--", name,
+                      extra={f"submodule.{name}.url": url,
+                             f"submodule.{name}.update": "checkout",
+                             f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + component_token})
+                  child = repo / name
+                  if git(child, "rev-parse", "HEAD").decode().strip() != links[name]:
+                      raise ValueError("Materialized submodule does not match the fixed SHA")
+                  materialize(child, depth + 1)
+
+
+          try:
+              root = Path.cwd()
+              # An ephemeral clean checkout is required; do not reuse prior Git state.
+              if (root / ".git").exists():
+                  raise ValueError("Checkout requires a fresh workspace")
+              git(root, "init", "-q")
+              url = SERVER + "/weichen/Agent-System-Dev.git"
+              git(root, "remote", "add", "origin", url)
+              git(root, "fetch", "--depth=1", "origin", sha,
+                  extra={f"http.{url}.extraheader": "AUTHORIZATION: token " + root_token})
+              git(root, "checkout", "-q", "--detach", "FETCH_HEAD")
+              materialize(root)
+          except (ValueError, OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+              sys.exit(f"Checkout refused: {error}")
+          print("Checkout complete; credentials were not persisted in Git configuration")
+          PY_CHECKOUT
+          unset TOKEN SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+      - name: Install Go 1.27.1
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          curl -fsSL -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz" https://mirrors.aliyun.com/golang/go1.27.1.linux-amd64.tar.gz
+          tar -C /usr/local -xzf "$RUNNER_TEMP/go.tgz"
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/go /usr/local/bin/go
+          ln -sfn /usr/local/go/bin/gofmt /usr/local/bin/gofmt
+      - name: Install Node 22
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          curl -fsSL -o "$RUNNER_TEMP/node.tar.xz" https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/node/v22.23.3/node-v22.23.3-linux-x64.tar.xz
+          tar -C /usr/local --strip-components=1 -xJf "$RUNNER_TEMP/node.tar.xz"
+      - name: Build the real agent-system binary
+        run: make build
+      - name: Clone Agent-System-RDM with nested pins (reviewed allowlist addition)
+        env:
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # 凭据纪律与 Checkout 块同源：经 GIT_CONFIG_* 环境注入 URL 级 token 头，
+          # 不落文件/命令行；allowlist 扩项 = Agent-System-RDM 及其 pins（同一
+          # 组件集合），由本 PR 评审背书。SSH pins URL 以 insteadOf 改写到受信
+          # https 基址后再取。
+          SERVER="$(printf '%s' "$GITHUB_SERVER_URL" | sed 's:/*$::')"
+          scheme="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL%%://*}"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=4
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0="protocol.$scheme.allow"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="always"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1="http.$SERVER/.extraheader"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1="AUTHORIZATION: token $SUBMODULE_TOKEN"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_2="url.$SERVER/weichen/.insteadOf"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_2="ssh://git@git-ssh.u1680832.nyat.app:31411/weichen/"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_KEY_3="core.hooksPath"
+          export GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_3="/dev/null"
+          git clone --depth=1 "$SERVER/weichen/Agent-System-RDM.git" rdm
+          # 凭据环境须保持到 pins 子模块取完（insteadOf + token 头覆盖嵌套 SSH URL），
+          # 之后再 unset。
+          git -C rdm submodule update --init --recursive
+          echo "RDM commit: $(git -C rdm rev-parse HEAD)"
+          unset GIT_CONFIG_COUNT GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0 \
+                GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_2 \
+                GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_2 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_3 GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_3
+          unset SUBMODULE_TOKEN
+          make -C rdm build
+      - name: Run real-combination lifecycle gates (SQLite, U3, required)
+        env:
+          SUBMODULE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SUBMODULE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # 路径变量在脚本内解析（YAML env: 不做 shell 展开）。
+          export SVC_TEST_REAL=1
+          export SVC_REAL_BIN="$PWD/bin/agent-system"
+          export SVC_REAL_RDM_BIN="$PWD/rdm/bin/agent-system-rdm"
+          export SVC_RDM_ORIGIN="$PWD/rdm"
+          # CI 无 SSH key：把受信基址与 URL 级 token 头经环境交给套件（仅环境传递）。
+          export SVC_CI_GIT_SERVER="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL%/}"
+          export SVC_CI_GIT_TOKEN="${SUBMODULE_TOKEN}"
+          python3 -m unittest tests.test_svc_realcombo -v

.gitignore

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 /bin/
 node_modules/
 __pycache__/
+.DS_Store
 *.py[cod]
 /data/
 /data-test/
 .zcode/plans/
 runtime/
+runtime-backups/
 .svc.env
 
 # 运行时环境文件（含密钥，不入库；svc-envfile 任务约定）
@@ -16,3 +18,6 @@ runtime/
 
 # Mimosa 安全扫描插件的逐会话状态（hook-status/reports/ledger，机器自动重建）
 .mimosa/
+
+# e2e.sh 运行工件（构建/种子/日志；scripts/e2e.sh 输出）
+.tmp/